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**FOOTBALL AS A POLITICAL AGENDA: A Study of a
Politically-Manipulated Sport. The case of Algeria-Egypt 2010
World Cup and African Cup Qualification**

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Dedication

I dedicate this research work to

My dearest parents for their love, support and endorsement

*My sisters and brothers for their encouragement in moments of stress and
difficulties*

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Abstract

This work attempts to highlight the influence of political agendas on the discourse of sport that goes around it and the impact of this discourse on the social (re)construction between Algeria and Egypt in 2009. It studies the political manipulation that marked the 2010 World Cup qualification matches. It aims at highlighting the reason behind challenging the peoples' collective identity (the common-sense of belonging to a social group) that was socially-determined and politically-bewildered by the political Special Elite (Noam Chomsky's conceptualization of the powerful leaders). Critical Discourse Analysis is used throughout the whole work in order to provide a critical analysis of events and actions, and establish a linkage between them for the sake of highlighting the concealed political agendas that manipulated the 2010 World Cup Qualification Matches. The theoretical framework studies the arena of football in the Arab World as an arena of political clashing discourse, as well as the conditioning of the atmosphere that pushed the discourse of sporting competition into a salient political discourse, which approached the diplomatic ties between Algeria and Egypt to their end. This study profoundly examines the scope of *Sub-Arabism*, as a new ideological theory, and the political polarization of this ideological apparatus to fulfil dominant political agendas. The practical side investigates the effects of this discourse on the re-framing of a social identity, and highlights the concealed political agendas that manipulated this identity. The study assesses twenty-one newspaper articles, official reports, such as presidential speeches, and four videos. Thus, it examines the nuances that differentiate between the respond to/of individuals with politically-manipulated identities, and that of /to those who truly represent their identities. The political polarization of football as a social institution challenged naturally-existing social identities, leading to the affiliation of Egyptian *Ourness* and Algerian *Otherness* through discourses of magnification and vilification. The latter were produced via the ideology of *Sub-Arabism*, which defines who the *true Arab* is. This ideological propaganda concealed major political interests, main of which was Djamel Mubarak's inheritance of the Egyptian rule, and the political (re-)construction of the Algerian and Egyptian socio-political order.

Keywords: Sport; Political agenda; Critical Discourse Analysis; Algeria; Egypt

General Introduction

Increasingly, sport has become toys in the hands of political actors and economic investors. Its pitch, incidents taking place before and after its matches, and players are professionalised apparatuses to control masses away from their problems, pass agendas of leading, build on nationalism, confront certain policies and repressive regimes, and so forth. Sport as an institution, as others like electoral celebrations and religious manifestations, provides schemes to those who would like to 'hegemonize' people and turn their awareness towards certain intentions. Discourses of entertainment and competition of sport are construed into political ground, fuelled with languages of prestige, nationalism, propaganda or change. That is what was observed during the World Cup football qualification of 2010 between Algeria and Egypt,

Media serve as a venue between political plans and masses. They help political actors to shape contexts through which soccer events have become presidency instruments of propaganda and means of exerting pressures against the 'Other'. The latter is an 'imaginative enemy', created to reorder peoples' preconceptions. George Orwell suggested that authoritarian regimes always rub against an enemy. They create an alternative imaginative enemy to divert the public attention away from interior frustrations, in addition of making their nations mass around their leaders. This is what happened before and after the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches that took place between Algeria and Egypt. Those who boarded the crisis fabricated it to divert the public responsiveness from internal worse problems and the weakness of leadership by exporting them to an external imaginative enemy.

Media coverage of these matches was characterised by such severe congestion and unprecedented speech. The language of this congestion reached to the degree of provoking people to murder and take revenge. The speech was marked by conceptions of war, reflected in media. The level of congestion was not expected to reach to the point of summoning ambassadors, getting people out to the streets to protest and burn flags, promoting the idea of cutting diplomatic ties between the two countries, and neglecting the social and economic interest. All

these pictures caused crisis about football. The qualification matches ‘ended’; the political matches took longer, touching several fields, related to economy, politics, foreign affairs, culture and even religion. Some Arab leaders, such as the Libyan ex-president Colonel Qaddafi, noticed that it was necessary to interfere for reconciliation between the two countries. However, if this initiative succeeded, and politicians and their leaders regained their relations back, who would seek reconciliation between the two peoples whose governments caused wounds that, in turn, affected all the levels?

The researcher was motivated to do this study due to the interest to investigate a number of issues related to politics, discourse, agenda and football. The first notion attaches the extent to which soccer in Algeria and Egypt becomes an institution and sets a context of violence where demarcations are cut clear between the Us as being the true Arab, the poly-civilized (Islamic, Pharaoh and Arabic civilizations) and the hero, and the Other as being the barbarian, the savage, the hooligan and the without-history coward. The second interest is to explore the role of media discourse in constituting pressurized environments between nations that descend from the same origin. The third motive is the extent to which media turn a football match from ‘just’ a match to an epic battle between nations harking to war. Through this parlance, the causes why an entertainment competition of ninety minutes turns into a merely political issue that may shade for ever are likely to be acquainted with.

Several works have studied the ideological representation, that is one of the major concerns of Critical Discourse Analysis, of the Arab and Muslim other, the impact of power and culture discourses in approaching and synthesizing veiled reality through media, and the effect of ideology on culture. One may state Edward Said’s theory of representation and Orientalism; Foucault’s concern for discourses and discursive formations that helped in linking culture to representation and mass media in the age of information spreading; Driss Ridouani’s the Representation of the Arabs in the Western Media (2011); Jack G. Shaheen’s Reel Bad Arabs; R.Khabbani’s imperial Fictions: Europe’s Myths of the Orient (1994); A. Hassan’s Islamic Stereotypes in Western media; etc. However, though the multidimensional from of these studies, no work has taken into consideration, while trying to analyze the reason of any settled clash between two nations, the dimension of two Arab nations of almost the ‘same origin’ having conflicts. The objective of this work is to study the extent to which public relations practice is

able to be changed or influenced by the representation of the Other in the printed media when two peoples of the same Arab origin, sharing the same official language, continent and civilization have quarrel upon the discourse of football; and to determine the underlying themes, and critically analyse further implications of their content.

The peculiar intention of conducting this investigation has boosted my motivation. The power of discourse and language in mediating nations' relationship destiny is seen to have an instant effectiveness. Egyptian public opinion has been shackled. They presented their refusal of other future relations (of any type: business, other sports, cinema and art, diplomacy, so forth) with Algeria. TV channels, forums, newspapers and YouTube have been established as mediated means for news making and a line between the real place and the 'imaginative space'.

In order to study Al-Ahram newspaper representation of the Algerians, the relationship between football and politics in this context and its impact to elucidate new changes when the Egyptian power failed to exercise so on the Egyptians, it is first necessary to put the two football matches of November 2009 for World Cup qualification into a contextual and historical perspective. The Algeria-Egypt crisis began just before the return-football match which took place on November 14th, 2009 – when the bus of the Algerian team was attacked by some Egyptians while transporting them from airport to the hotel, although the word fighting did not actually begin until the second match of November 18th, 2009. The events were watched very closely around the world, and Algeria is no exception because it had a team that was going to regain the Algerian victory and Egypt because it had the last chance to qualify to the 2010 World Cup considering itself the only Arab country that had the right to represent the Arab world in South Africa.

In this context, the chief rational addressed in this work is:

1. How and why were the 2010 World Cup Qualification matches between Algerian and Egypt politically-manipulated to the extent of mostly closing deep ancient diplomatic relations between two nations?

A set of sub-questions is examined:

1. What is the impact of the political investment in football?
2. How essential is it to examine these matches to understand the political agendas and relationships passed through the ruling regime during that period?

3. How are the depicted images that represent difference in popular cultural heritage and religious practices elaborated to locate the Algerians in the realm of Otherness?
4. If Orientalism is the ideology that the West has on the Arabs and Occidentalism is ideology that the East has on the West, how shall such type of ideology where an Arab country sets negative depictions on an another country of the same origin be called?

The above questions are hypothesised:

1. The discourse set by an Arab-Us to refuse an Arab-Other may be entitled Sub-Arabism. This ideology is characterised by its own features.

2. The negative attitudes and representations are formulated due to socio-cultural ideologies made upon the 'Other' via collective thinking. The latter favors comprehending the 'Other', not through approaching reality; but rather perceiving media. These illustrative pictures are elaborated through the sense of Arab Nationalism delivery to put Algeria and the Algerians in the realm of *Otherness*.

3. The power elite wants from, what Chomsky calls, the 'bewildered herd' to preserve their cultural, social, national and spiritual symbols. This status quo serves them as it creates the discourse of refutation because it makes this herd closed from reality. Therefore, the 'Specialised Class' would easily perpetuate control over them. Mediation is 'instrumentalized' to fulfil interests that are concealed within the Algerian and Egyptian political agendas.

First and foremost, the point that must be referred to in order to discuss the reasons of fuelling events is that those incidents showed the failure of Arab leaders to deal with social complications, economic crises, Arab issues and external problems. Though they are great countries, having the privilege of sustainable history, ancient people, rich agricultural lands and precious raw materials, but they still suffer from poverty, corruption, deteriorating health, poor education, economic collapse and social mismanagement. The Egyptian political regime had exported these crises to football stadiums. Instead of leading their masses, they were led behind them. Instead of appearing as great leaders of the Arab nations, they bowed to public pressure and took advantage of public enthusiasm towards football matches. All these exploitation resulted in tensions although there was any trouble between the players of the two teams or

clashes between the fans inside the stadium. The incidents were ‘heard’ to be taking place outside the soccer pitches. Thus, they can be real; as they can be just rumors and lies, promoted by newspapers, television, artists and political leaders. Even if it was true, they could not be with such sharpness as they were covered by media and led-by-interest institutions.

Pro-governmental and private media fuelled those events because there were concealed intentions. There are some channels and sides, be them external or internal, are against the union of Arab states, provoking a class of people against another. This stimulation can appear using ideologies such as “pharaohs”, “foundling people”, etc. These sources establish alliances with regimes and businessmen to fight coalition between Arab nations. In most western countries, altercations take place between games players and fans inside stadiums, but they do not reach to the level of escalating diplomatic ties.

“The dignity of the country” was present as an ideology. The dignity of a country uses sport games where each side take the advantage of learning from the experience of the other. For instance, the president of Turkey went to Armenia to attend a soccer game, and so did the president of Armenia. This attendance was to calm down their peoples and lead them to peace, as well as towards the Kurds. In addition, the Turkish president opened the borders to Syria to pass without visa. This presence had several profits. So, instead to Egypt of meeting Algeria to solve their internal problems, such as unemployment, illegal immigration, problem of housing, poverty and unresolved Arab issues – as the questions of Palestine, Darfur and the Western Sahara – , the Egyptian ex-president’s sons interfered in the sporting events to cut relations. Instead of unifying the Arabs for fighting disasters in Sudan, they blamed the Sudanese government in the failure of protecting the Egyptian fans. It was noticeable that there was a sharp political polarization to pass certain economic and political issues through standing with a team against another. Media created a fictitious image of hatred which led to the creation of hostility between the two countries. Next to the political leaders and media institutions, the situation was characterised by protests and marches, led by Egyptian artists to foment abhorrence. The journalistic battle was managed with such blaze to fight masses behind the notion that this battle was their country’s battle.

The primary aim of this research is to see how media construct events without getting access to the participants they are dealing about. The analysis of media’s role in the commercialization of stormy ideas is based on a corpus of newspaper articles from the Egyptian

Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper. The data collection window represents three periods: the 14th Algeria-Egypt football match (Egypt struggle for being the great); the 18th Algeria-Egypt football match (Algerian revenge); the period after the matches (the aftermath). Al-Ahram English newspaper produces editions each week. The editions from which articles are taken: 22nd-28th October, 2009; 12th-18th November, 2009; 19th-15th November, 2009; 26th-02nd December, 2009; 03rd-09th November, 2009; 10th-16th December, 2009.

To carry out this research, Critical Discourse Analysis is used to provide an interdisciplinary tool of investigation. First of All, in order to provide an analysis on how key disciplines are interrelated in to obtain deep understanding of the politico-materialistic and ideological spinning of those football events, Economic Determinism Theory of Karl Marx is called upon. Secondly, content analysis identifies what the story is about, the events, participants, the asserted claims and justifications. Social representation theory is selected to study the psychosocial phenomena where historical, cultural and social conditions that individuals use to construct communities through their actions are analysed. Then, Niccolo Machiavelli's Law of Reforming Theory, which is postulated in his masterpiece of *The Discourse on Reforming the State of Florence* (1520), is used to provide an argumentation on how policies, such as that of Arab leadership, were undertaken, and what affected their production. Later, Van Dijk's (1998a) approach of ideological criteria is used to define the ideological theory about Otherness that was marked in the politicized discourse of the 2010 World Cup Qualification Matches between Algeria and Egypt. Thus, this approach is used to define the ideological theory of Sub-Arabism. Finally, Fairclough's (1993) approach to Critical Discourse Analysis is used to establish a discourse critique to analyse the causality of the discursive use of polarized discourses in the selected sample, so to be acquainted with the way that was used to 'reproduce' political power and domination as far as football politicization is taken into consideration. Data collection, political speeches and media propaganda will be studied to measure the temperature of political policies, media plans, and analyse the political concealed agendas and the ideological politicization of history, culture and football. Indeed, the symbolic power of the used language propagated for the discursive use of discourse.

Discourse is a peculiar breeding ground that builds a platform for the maintenance of ideologies. In this work, the peculiar emphasis of the study is that it will investigate how the

discourse of ‘entertainment’ and ‘competition’ is changed into a salient ‘political’ discourse, and its impact in setting demarcations between the Egyptian ‘Us’ and the Algerian ‘Other’. Thus,

1. The first chapter deals with the theoretical platform upon which this study is held. Firstly, it studies the polarization of human conditions, such as history and culture, to identify the reason for having conflicts with the Other. Secondly, the Arab political discourse is interlinked with the language of sport to understand the extent to which the Arab sport was influenced. Thirdly, Arab media is studied to understand the impact of its propaganda in the production of representations that are needed to purchase negative attitudes basing on the context of culture differences and conflicts. Fourthly, it studies how the discourse of competition that characterizes football pitch is shifted into a salient political discourse and clashing ideologies.
2. The second chapter re-examines the concept of ideology, but this time the dimension of two Arab-countries’ football and political coincidence are taken into consideration. Then, the political agendas, being responsible for the politicization of the football events between Algeria and Egypt, are highlighted.
3. The third chapter provides a practical framework for the critical analysis of the selected sample.

CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER ONE
FOOTBALL AS AN ARENA OF CLASHING
POLITICAL DISCOURSES

I.1. Introduction

Sport has been one of the prominent social institutions that have influenced the Arab World's political agenda. Political arena and ruling campaigns have played a crucial role in reformulating managerial arrangements of its discourse of entrainment and competition. Thus the leading political theories that are drawn and driven by dominant political agendas founded the substratum upon which political, historical, cultural and social discourses are polarized. This has made of the issue of losing the game of football a dilemma to question the national sovereignty.

Deliberately, a set of questions rises in order to discuss and analyse important political features that challenged to language of sport. What are the characteristics that marked the process of the sporting discourse? Who participated in the political impeachment of this naïf discourse? What were the reasons behind plaguing the diplomatic ties between closed nations? What caused the polarization of the competitive discourse of football?

In this chapter, we will discuss how media representations and political institutions purchase negative attitudes that turn sport stadia, along with their before-and-after events, into battlefields to practice further political ends. Before going into the political polarization of sport discourses, the 'instrumentalization' of human development conditions as clashing discourses is given evidence for the sake of reaching the conclusion that fuelled disagreements do not boast

between day and night. Major conditions of sustainability have great role in setting the metaphor of disagreeing and competing over all domains, be them political, militant, religious, cultural or sporting. Facts show what the symbols of, in this case, *'Egyptianism'*¹ and *'Algerianism'* were, and how these ideologies were instrumentally instilled into people's minds through governing and media institutions. The Egyptian system of governing used sports to build collective identity and hegemonic unity through political discourses, 'emphasising' on 'Their' valued facts consistent with dominant ideology of patriotism, and 'cancelling' the 'Other's' valued truth. Examples of political professionalization of sport will be provided. Then, the fact that most media discourses serve dominant decision-makers rather than serving people's thinking will be shed light on. Finally, we will study the causes that tie the knots established between football language, political intentions, polarisation of national and historic symbols, playing over people's emotions, symbolism, governance and chauvinist self-esteem to make leisured and competitive discourses of sport shift into salient political discourse.

This chapter depends on the socio-political approach in order to highlight the extent to which politics plays over the management of social issues, in this case the political management of soccer pitch.

¹ The researcher conceptualizes Egyptianism and Algerianism as two ideological terms to refer to the political fundamentalist definition of the Egyptian and Algerian social communities

I.2. Approaching Conflicting Social Realities from a Critical Perspective

Human beings, throughout history, have basic needs for sustainable experience with individual and collective identities. Any person obtains his specific identity through his socialization with a set of cultural, religious, linguistic and social traits of his community, as well as his exercise of a range of basic cultural skills that are all specific to his environment. Communication, self-directed acts and achievements are among the other criteria that constitute social structures and practices. In fact, the practicing of social identity requires the multiple use of language within a particular needs-based framework. Effectively, the interdisciplinary methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis is called upon in order to establish a study, focusing on how power is exercised and negotiated by language users. It is concerned with the notion that encoders of meaning within a particular text tend to choose a particular lexical jargon and grammatical constructions that reflect 'Our' ideological stance and limit the receiver's position of understanding this text, i.e. audiences' consciousness is directed towards specific connotations.

The studies of discourse (1980s and 1990s) were concerned with the use of language at the level of structure. The relationship between language form and meaning was seen as having the ability to bound grammatical forms and denotative meaning in order to generate coherent meaningful units. This relates to different types of discourses or genres to communicate meaning. So discourse is to make meaning in different modalities (genres and registers). It is the way we produce and organize meaning in relation to language. The earlier studies deal with how meaning is created on the levels of language forms, text and communication, i.e. functional level.

Later studies of discourse have encompassed different context dimensions to study the relationship between language use and meaning. The definition of discourse has become more than a mere set of communication and meaningful textual units. Discourse acts as a constellation of conditions that provides the user of language with a framework to realize meaning and correct power relationships in a precise direction. This framework consists of cultural, political and social background. Consequently, discourse is not just the way of writing or speaking. It is the strategy of thinking. The way people talk or act may index the way they think, or the way their ideologies are established enacts the way they speak. Body language and voice intonations also decode the way of thinking and acting. It is critically important that we should try to understand not just what the sender is saying, but also what he is not saying. We always have the choice of

what to say, what not to say and how to say it. Our choices categorize subject positions, i.e. the way we position ourselves vis a vis others. Fairclough (2003) says, “Styles are the ‘discoursal’ aspect of ways of being, identities. Who you are is partly a matter of how you speak, how you write, as well as a matter of embodiment” (p. 112).

The symbolic efficacy of discourse depends on the linguistic competence of the person who utters it and the way he addresses it. The use of language depends on the social position of the speaker (to what extent he can get access to the language of particular institutions, that is, to the legitimate speech). And this leads to the extent of accessing legitimate instruments of expressions, i.e. the authority of institution. Here, we can apply the Marxian theory of ‘Social Determinism’. The social role of each member of society determines the way and the right he has to do social practices and communicate. As a result, this practice naturalizes the conflicting use of social realities; either as a tool to back up particular acts, or a method to influence the other.

The analysis of discourse examines the relationship between discourse and social system that provide a framework within which this discourse is coured. Pierre Bourdieu (1991) saw that discourse constitutes symbolic systems and social orders through the symbolic use of language because meaning and language are used by the powerful to deceive and oppress the ‘dominated’. For instance, discourse of war uses language such as victory, defeat, troops and manoeuvre. The meaning delivered through this linguistic selection produces discursive elements, such as ideas of aggression, conflict, winning, etc. Now, consider the following examples which can be mentioned in sport media: “Algeria defeated Egypt”, “the battlefield of Um-Derman stadium”, “this historical victory..”. The production and consumption of conflicting discourses communicate aggression, affecting the broader societal elements other than sporting ones. The discourse of sporting events should be competitive and entertaining. However, the discursive use of this conflicting language naturalizes the making of the sporting arena a battlefield where diplomatic ties and political order are affected. All this situational usage of language articulates ideologies and idealised mythologies.

As far as social realities are taken into consideration, modernity involves all forms of society, be them economic, political, industrial conditions and frameworks, which are embodied in technologies, employment, leadership, development or business. This milieu has led people, along with their culture to participate in a world of competition, divided into the super-powerful

and the common. This competition divides people according to their cultural aspects, political actions and economic activities. Maurice Roche (2000) affirms the naturalization of human classification according to their social belonging:

In the context of these forms (social, economic, religious, political structures, etc.) people generate class related and nation related cultures—either ‘high’ or effectively ‘unpopular’ versions of culture and ‘low’ or ‘popular’ versions—through their activities, both in the public and the private spheres, people’s individual and group identities can thus said to have been significantly formed by adaptations they made to, the uses they made of, these classes of the politico-economic societal environment. (p.219)

Maurice Roche approves the fact that the leaders’ systematization of their political practices and discourses is influenced by their auto-generated interests. This leads to the (re)construction of their society and their people. Critical Discourse Analysis plays a pivotal role in highlighting the important role of the context of one’s living, be it the territory of his community or outside it. Effectively, this context emancipates influences on his identity. His ecosystem is marked by his culture, relations with his environment, religion, social institutions, political arena, and economic corporation. Cultural celebrations, or any other event, create dramatic materializations on attitudes and identities. On the same parlance, Roche (2000: 219) says, “This (event ecology) can be said to have helped to provide personal, interpersonal, and cultural meaning contexts in which personal and group identities could be shaped through special patterns of embodied action, in special times and places” (p. 219).

Those manifestations are particularly true of , for instance, the male national and international soccer rounds where specific behaviour and the sense of ‘Self-ness’ and nationalism are created by the context of this event. Through those occasions, people can perceive and appraise differences from, and their aptitude of coexistence with, the ‘Other’. The capacity and readiness to socialize with others get to the forefront, but only after the participator builds the stones of his ‘self’. That is why the dominants’ propagation of an incident firstly cares about making the spectacle convinced that his reaction and attitude towards this event are flowed from his own natural consciousness. The bedrock upon which this awareness is built is set through the utilization of one’s ecology where he was born and has grown up.

Evidently, before discussing the maturity of ideologies and stereotypes, in addition to the impact of their ‘instrumentalization’ in manufacturing public or individual attitudes, one should first know the forces that light the tendency to wage conflicts. Any society conforms to a particular way in order to define the scope of its development. The geographic locations, as well as the social, economic, religious, political and historical conditions exhibit a framework of differences, diversities and complexities, especially when the latter is encountered with the framework of the ‘Other’. To comprehend the causes of these conflicts, one should understand their origins, or, in other words, postulates from which they emerge. Abedeji (1999) points out:

Understanding the origin of conflicts means, therefore, developing framework for comprehending (a) how the various causes of conflict fit together and interact; (b) which among them are the dominant forces at a particular moment in time; and (c) what policies and strategies should be crafted to address these causes in the short, medium and long term. (as cited in Bujra, 2002)

The inter/outer-societal mechanism involves interacting interrelationships between economic, political, religious and historical processes. These systems form the common purposes and values, upon which society members are oriented towards collective living, and divergent from the other communities. These social mechanisms, being factors condition development, are also the sources that are ‘instrumentalized’ by the ‘superior representer’ to exhibit falsifications and misrepresentations about the ‘alien Other’, and justify dominance over them. This system is not real as it does not draw a factual view of the ‘Other’. Indeed, they are illusionist reviews. The interrelation that is drawn between the ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’ restricts, revises, reinterprets, rebuilds, and restores the world of the ‘other’. Then, if a postmodern study is used to debate a phenomenon like this, the keys that have shaped this event should be analysed. John Harris affirms: “Postmodern thinking highlights the idea that all studies take place within a particular social, historical and cultural framework.” (John Harris 2006).

I.3. The Politicization of the Discourse of Sport

Any era throughout the history of Arab sport generally, and Algeria and Egypt particularly, holds specific social and political characteristics, and contradictions. Soccer was employed as a tool to confront colonialism, an organ to build up Arab and national unity and sovereignty, as well as a charismatic style to improve legitimacy towards leading authority,

region or party. The exhibition of sport clubs and associations reflects the appearance of political streams. Thus, 'hegemonized collective identity' is framed, embracing the same characteristics of which each stream spells. Choosing colours of t-shirts and flags, titles, slogans, etc. during sport manifestations expresses different identical loneliness. The latter makes members of a certain current along with its specific cultural, political and social traits. As a result, dissimilitude, as well as confrontation, appears. Norval (2007) offers an overview on how hegemony is processed:

On the one hand, demands are always specific, even particularistic, in that they arise from the experiences and conditions of particular and limited groups. On the Other hand for those demands to become universalized, to function as a horizon in which more generalized demands may become inscribed, they need to be marked by something transcending their particularity. (p.49)

Political, and diplomatic controversies and partition between Arab countries afforded several convulsions that impinged all the domains, one of which is the internal and external relations. Most of the Arab sporting competitions announced the transfer of political conflicts, such as, struggling over authority, influence, government, etc.; contesting over who leads the Arab world;... etc.) to the scene of sporting community. Wasn't it the Camp David political decision, adopted by the Egyptian ex-president Anwar Sadat with Israel in 1979, that ousted the Egyptian national soccer team out of Arab sport races for some years?

After this agreement, the Arab world went divided into 'Objecting States' and 'Allying States'. The dissection led to diplomatic, social, cultural and political fraught disputes. One of these was the issue of the Arab League. Some Arab countries, such as Algeria, re-questioned the matter of who leads the Arab issues. As a consequence, this political division affected sporting Arab unity in Arab Olympics and international competitions. Although Egypt had had a pivoting role in the establishment of well-sport-managing leaders and associations, and sporting journalism, the Israeli-Egyptian decision against Palestine made some Arabs forget the Egyptian competence and performance in the sporting domain. Thus, sport provided such a great role that was 'instrumentalized' for practicing political activities. Political actors, electoral party leaders and businessmen use sport to booster their political strength and vividness.

Albeit the Palestinian disastrous situation and the loss of their sovereignty and identity, Palestine participated in several Arab sport tournaments, such as the 1953's. This presence bore

political significances through which it aimed to propagate the vitals of ‘Palestinianism’, the legitimacy of its resistance and its belonging to the Arab World. Serge Bainvel (2005) states: “The Palestinian team is playing to promote their fight to have an independent state nearby Israel.” (Bainvel 2005: 49). Moreover, the Palestinian sport kicked efforts to show to the world the Palestinian harsh reality and sufferance. They did not just play; they tried to reflect different agendas of solving social disputes, economic adversity, political and national issues, and Israeli occupation of their land. PFA president Rajoub, an anti-Israeli activist and member of the Central committee of Abbas’s Al Fatah political party, affirms the consolidation of political positions through sports:

We can achieve a lot of our cause through sports. The world is changing and we have to push the legitimacy of our national aspiration through sports. I hope sports will help Israel reach the right conclusion. We are 4.2 million people living under Israeli occupation; I hope that I can convince the Israelis that we should open new page that recognizes the existence of the Palestinian people.” He added: “I don’t wish the suffering of the Palestinian people on anyone, including Israelis. If we are for sport in the world, it has to be fair and just for all. I speak Shimon Peres, and on this we have some common ground. (as cited in Dorsey 2011, November 06)

On the same parlance, James M. Dorsey mentions:

“We want this (plan) to be seen as an integrated part of our national development plan, an indispensable component,” Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad told diplomats, describing sport initiatives as “a hope enterprise.” He said recalling his recent attendance at a soccer match that sport provides “a sense of joy, happiness of the people with just being their”.

(Dorsey 2011, October 29)

For them, numerous sport projects provide them ways that call for social flourish and nation building. Furthermore, its language exposes to the global community that Palestine deserves freedom, development and international confession that its borders are hotlines, encountering it as a nation and a state.

The national and international complexity of it gives football the privilege of amplifying national passions and identities, and developing collective imagination. Sometimes, it is used to promote ideas having no relation to sports, such as spiritual sacrifice, myths, national prestige, dominance, sense of patriotism and chauvinism as well. Governors and political actors spend gadgets on sport manifestations, and control sporting federations, driven by the desire to endorse

the strength of ideological ideals. Intensified by symbolism, national hymns, party songs, flags, colours and ideological slogans brainwash sport fans. As a result, the mass become prouder of their country, regime and/or policy. To the world that a certain government is progressing, success in international competitions is necessary. The Egyptian political leaders, during the 2010 World and African Cup qualification matches, were convinced that, as much as their national team achieve victory in those matches, it would celebrate prestige of Egypt over Africa and the Arab World. Therefore, Mubarak's regime's self-image of gaining more power and superiority would be awarded. Several Arab national teams, during Jamel Abdunasser, Boumedian, Gaddafi, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Sadam Husain, were used as vehicles through which national, Pan-Arabic, chauvinist and patriotic ideologies were transformed to build national prestige, and indoctrinate people with a particular political philosophy (such as Communism and Nasserism). For instance, the 1953 Pan-Arab Games took place in Egypt. People's needs were unified in order for this national, philosophic or ideological hegemony to sustain its power. Laclau emphasises the need to conceal the agenda of imposing particular political policy through hegemony:

Hegemony is an ongoing struggle for unification and generalization. Hegemony includes in its context not just the direct and indirect enforcement of a regime, or the transformation and the manipulation of the people in order for them to accept the regime as the one and only possible functioning system. Hegemony is also characterized by a never-ending effort of various groups to guarantee acceptance and ascendancy of their philosophy, ideology and worldviews. (as cited in Kortzanov, 2012, May, p. 26)

However, the game's power was not always effective because of political rifts and disagreements. The notion that sport cannot live in one melting-pot along with politics goes wrong. Governments, ethnic groups, political parties, businessmen, and so on, often interfere in matters related to sport for political outlets. Nesrouche (July 1, 2014) says:

These [economic and political ambitions] are stakes born around sport in general and football in particular, because it is the most popular and mediated game. Since its adoption by the World's population, football has taken a central place in the social, economic and symbolic spheres. Therefore, it became a beneficial lever for political powers and global capitalism. From the political arena to the football field, conflicting relations between nations have always played prolongations. (...)

Internal political issues are also pretext to employ football appointments and manipulate populations. (para. 02; 04)

During the British and French occupation of the Arab lands, sport provided means to Arab countries in order to call out for their sovereignty, existence and independence. Football was used as a way for resistance against the colonial existence, and proving the legitimacy of their issue in the international arena. Sport proved to build identity awareness of 'Ourselves' as collective identity, and 'Otherselves' identity as an alien collective identity. For instance, the Algerian Political Party FLN (Algerian Liberation Front Party) engaged in sport events, as the Third Arab Sport tournament, taking place in Morocco in 1961, so to internationally defend the Algerian revolution cause. Sport field served the FLN leaders, during and after the Algerian Independence, a tool to control the mass as well. The interest of 'we are the legitimate movement to ask for the liberation of Algeria' was practiced. Thus, the Algerian football played had a major role in the building of the Algerian identity and the spread of the notion of the Algerian Nationalism during the French colonialism. Serge Bainvel (2005) says: "It was not for the first time that, in Algeria, football and politics had been linked together. Before the independence of the state, an FLN team played abroad to send a message of autonomy to the French community" (p. 57). Indeed, similar to the FLN party's role in the Algerian revolution, its sport team played the role of defining the Algerian sovereignty and highlighting the Algerian sufferance.

Since the Ottoman era and occupation of the Arab land, Arabs had tried to identify their independent identity in different ways. After the Ottoman Empire, its heritage was shared by France and Britain. As a result, the Arabs found themselves between the hands of a new colonialism. Then, they fought for their independence. However, full independence was to be successful only through unity and solidarity. Slogans of unifying Syria, parts of the Arabian Peninsula to form the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, etc. were present. Nevertheless, the hole Arab alliance had not been taken into action yet. It was until the foundation of the Arab League to call for the Arab World union. The situation of fulfilling this plan has stayed a dream because of the scarcity of efforts to accomplish it. The first secretary of the Arab League Abdurrahman Azam used to declare his tendency to establish institutions to call for the unification of the Arabs. One of his ideas was the call for founding and participating in sport competition in 1947. However, this went undone because of several reasons. First, Arab countries were still under occupation. Secondly, Palestine was in war. Thirdly, some Arab countries were not convinced of establishing

such plan. Once again, Abdurrahman Azam recalled for his idea after some years in a memorandum declared after the Council of the Arab League:

There is no doubt that sport is one of the highest and best means of linking youth and young women of the Arab nation, (...) It is one of the best means that tighten their social ties and removes differences between them. Thus, young Arabs looked forward to the League of the Arab states and its honorable council to achieve their goals and aspirations because the meeting Arab athletes each year is the best way to recognize each other, love and unite, consistent with the Charter of the Arab League. (as cited in Rabadi 2003, p.124)

Arab countries started to deal with the plan. The League of the Arab States founded institutions and councils, financed several sportive activities and facilities, prepared researches and studies to solve sportive problems and strengthen Arab relations with international bodies. However, have all these efforts been realized? Each Arab country's sporting institutions are characterized by isolated sporting achievements for the reason of fragmented political systems and the transition of political conflicts into sport community. Therefore, successful initiatives in this domain are weak. Sport has several values through which people from different cultures, religions and classes meet in order to attain certain valued ends. It was politics which ruined the human value of sports. Rabadi (2003) says:

If not just sport teams, but even committees of the Arab Olympic sports, were given the chance to participate in one sport team with one trainer under one organization, our young Arab would be actually enabled to access to an excellent sport performance, and that the only direct reason for the absence of an unbroken Arab team, united in all different forms of sports, is a political decision before it is a matter of sport. (p.126)

On the same parlance, Shafi Abulhafid said:

Sport heroes did what ministers could not. Then sport serves politics: it is not politics in the service of sport. On the contrary, politics spoils sport (...) This is the one who spoiled those morals and even sport production because he wants to shine his image only, and looks neither at the results, to the profitability nor to the sport production. (as cited in a television show "The Relation between Politics and Sport". (Juin 16, 2001)

The connection between politics and sports is getting more complex because of regimes' manipulation of sport, the Arab political systems' and dominant classes' validation of regulations and laws to FIFA and other sport associations bodies, as well as the military backing of sport champions. There are plenty of examples providing that several sport players are excluded from pro-government clubs players having expressed political views against government.

After the Iraq war with Iran had stopped in 1988, Iraq suffered from big economic and financial problems although it established great success in this war. Kuwait took a decision to foster its oil production. This decision transgressed what came in the OPEC concordat. The expansion of petroleum production was on the wells situated on a region on Iraq-Kuwait border. The dilemma of who was the legitimate owner of this land had caused disputes between the two countries. Thus, Iraq did not welcome this pronouncement since it charged it with great financial loss. The Iraq ex-president Saddam Husain declared a war on Kuwait. Most of the Western and Arab countries did not welcome this occupation. Therefore, bad resolutions were acknowledged on all spheres, one of which was sport. All this led to fission in the Arab sporting union. This served western countries' agendas and those who did not want the Arab land to be unified. Prof. Kamel Rabadi (2003) says:

... where the issue of stepping Iraq out of the Arab and Asian Unions began to be submitted, and the Asian Olympic Council recommended to deport the Iraqi sport teams from the Asian Games. In the Arab sport, some of Arab sport Unions spelled the same recommendation, causing a big gap between them (...) There is no doubt that we are well aware that the Arabs themselves are divided on each domain, even in sports.
(p. 133)

Several efforts started to separate between politics and sport. However, division became a determined fact between those who patronized Iraq in favour of separating politics from sport and unifying the Arab sector, and those who approved the punishment of Iraq for its war on Kuwait. Although Iraq accepted to step out of Kuwait, the blockage over its participation alongside international and Arab sporting competitors was not backed yet. Those, be them Arabs or Westerners, who did not prefer the Arab union had other political ends. For instance, Syria did not accept Iraqi national team players to participate in the Seventh Arab sporting tournament in 1992. Syria was one of those which were against the war. The Syrian ex-president did all his efforts to betray Iraq. The Syrian agenda concealed between its support of the American decision

against Iraq was to extend more voices in the United Nations and the American support. Besides, it suffered from Arab isolation since it was a member neither in the Arab Cooperation Council nor the Gulf Cooperation Council. After its support of the American policy, Syria gained a membership in these councils. Therefore, the Arab unification has stayed a dream that cannot be fulfilled even in the sporting sphere since any Arabic front that would have the ability of depositing the Arab sports from the labyrinth of politics is founded. Many sport events (such as the Seventh Arab sporting tournament of 1992, the Eight Arab sporting tournament in 1997, the Ninth Arab sporting tournament of 1999, etc.) tried to ingather the divided Arab World; but, political intentions contravened these efforts because of political instability. Prof. Kamal J. Rabadi (2003) says:

The disagreements and rivalries between the different parts of the Arab World have created a state of instability, reflected negatively on football in particular and sports in general. A lot of sport issues were got to be dealt with in the courts. We do not deny that there were several disagreements in the past, but not to such extent of sharpness. Unfortunately, we find a sports club closes its doors or a football player thrown in jail for political disagreements. The current diplomatic and political situation of the Arab states from revolutions exacerbated the crisis which, in turn, weighed sporty side and exceeded the exploitation of sport as a tool in politics. (p. 159)

If the political situation of any state suffers troubles, it affects the sport estate. For instance, Iraq and Afghanistan are witnessing civil wars, ethnic hatred and sectarian violence. As a result, sport pitch, administration and players are targeted. Players suffer from kidnapping, are deprived of funds and needs, and are away from homes because of financial neglecting, sectarian turbulence, etc. The administration management is financially and tactically abandoned. James M. Dorsey (2011, November 06) mentions:

The players have problems in their lives; they are not normal footballers," Vieira recalls.(...) "I lost two members of my family. It's difficult when you have no safety. Cars explode all the time. I had to pick up my two guns before going to practice, because I'd been threatened. You can buy guns anywhere in Baghdad. You need them," said Hawar Mulla Mohammad, the team's Kurdish striker, who lost his stepmother four days before the Asian finals.

However, many sport members try to restore what political leaders and policy governors have damaged. Players from different sects play side by side in order to show to people that the sense

of unity can be fulfilled if they destroy the borders instilled in their minds. James M. Dorsey mentions: “None of our politicians could bring us under this flag like our national football team did. I wish that politicians could take a lesson from our team,” Abdul-Hassan said.” (Dorsey 2011, November 06).

Since most of Arab countries espoused “Arab Spring”, the revolutions have declared on them streams of instability and hooliganism. Sport games have been taken as a tool for defeating authoritarian policies, expressing discontent over the social frustration and economic crises, and sweeping out repressive leaders. Revolutionists turned sport clubs and soccer stadia into turmoil fields where they launched their oppositions against subjugation. Besides, soccer fans and players set their antagonism and mobilisation for the verdict of struggling for political freedom, and against repressive police harsh schemes, corruption, anti-democratic establishments, illegality and criminalization. As a case in point, the Egyptian ultras – militant soccer fans – have adopted soccer incidents and pitches as battlefields where they have marched their fight against the police and security banning of their freedom. Dorsey (July/August, 2014) exemplifies the politicisation of sport in Egypt:

In Egypt, the ultras’ various battles for freedom made them political by definition. This included fighting in the stadia and on Tahrir Square, as well as opposition to the military rulers who succeeded Mubarak and the toppled Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi.(p. 97)

They used to promote anti-government slogans and actions, joining revolutionary marches in Tahrir (Liberation) Square and Rabaa (in behalf of Rabaa El-Adaouia) Square, and helping protesters break down barriers of faire to defend themselves against freedom oppressors by convincing them that failure had no opportunity. The Egyptian ultras had also agendas. One of these is to gain the favor of the public opinion since they belong to the Egyptian militant forces (led by El-Tantaoui). The latter went against Mubarak because they did not welcome the plan of his sons’ succession of governing the country. The Egyptian ultras have several groups. Before the 21st January Revolution, each group have distinct beliefs according to the soccer team they belong to. For example, the Black Knights support ‘Al-Ahly’; the ultras Wight Knights assign to the principles of ‘Al-Zamalek’ soccer team. Since the Arab Revolution started to sweep Egypt, all ultras groups took courage to set themselves side by side, confronting the Mubarak’s regime

as one enemy. After ousting Mubarak, the Egyptian militant soccer fans have been increasing hostility with security forces, and becoming more and more politicized. Meanwhile, they are considered as hooligans because they do not promote for the reputation and agendas of those forces. This consideration is propagated in media. Besides, they are put into jail because they are accused of guiding violent clashes and unrest. Dorsey (July/August, 2014) reports:

In May 2014, 12 militant Egyptian soccer fans were sentenced to five years in prison in an expansion of the military-backed regime's crackdown on its Islamist and non-Islamist opponents, which potentially repositioned soccer as a major platform of protest. The fans, members of Ultras Ahlawy, the well-organised and street battle hardened militant support group of Cairo club Al Ahli SC, were sentenced in absentia for organising an illegal gathering and vandalism. (p. 97)

Evidently, the Egyptian 21st January Revolution and its aftermath have made from football a field to spotlight political tensions. The politicization of the Arab sport because of the recent political turmoil is noticed where its impact on football performance is omnipresent in most of the Arab countries. For example, after the 2011 'Arab Spring' upheavals started to wind over Libya, the Colonel Gaddafi's son run the Libyan soccer game to lead it towards his intentions and plans, of which opposition against the political system was prevented to be present in football fields. Barret (January 16, 2012) asserts:

The recent history of football in Libya was not just characterised by poor performances, but by the politicisation of the game principally through Gaddafi's son Saadi, who was Head of the Libyan Football Federation, captain of the national team and had played for both of Libya's dominant clubs Al-Ittihad, who won six consecutive league titles prior to the revolution, and the club he once owned, Al-Ahli (Tripoli). [...] On a national level, while the players were showered with gifts from the regime, the influence of Saadi ensured that as a symbol of the regime, the results of the national team took on a political as well as sporting importance. (para. 10; 14)

According to Barret, the politicization of football was not the politicisation of language within sport arena only. Rather, the heading of leading sport federations and organizations plays a pivotal role in ensuring the full manipulation of football as a social, becoming a political, institution.

I.4. Representations in Media Discourse

Media are exploited and exploiting means of communication and information sharing tools. Arab channels have widely spread because rich governments, business men, and security services finance them. On one hand, those sponsors play a vital role in determining the way through which the reporting of events can be exploited for their own interests so that they lead the Arab issues at all levels. Pertaining to Critical Discourse Analysis, its critical perspective pays attention to the Marxist Theory for that all means of production, main of which media as a social institution, are controlled by the 'Special Elite'. According to Marxism, the 'Bewildered Herd' uses those means under the protocol and for the benefits of the 'Leading Class'. Thus, Media are either private or pro-governmental, as the journalistic activity is monopolized by the political authority. Nawar (December, 2006) offers an overview on the political determinism to which the Arabs are exposed in order to be bewildered by authoritarian regimes straight forward the fulfilment of 'special interests':

The fact that Arab countries are lagging behind in the race for democracy is clearly visible. Rulers of Arab countries, many of them have been in power for decades, are denying their own people any real chance for political choice. In most cases one party or a ruling family is the main feature of political life. Restrictive laws and near absolute power of police forces ensure that there will be no challenge for family or one-party dictatorship. The media is controlled by the state in order to drug public opinion and beat up the drums in support for the corrupt ailing ruling clans. (Nawar 2006)

Political leaders and decision-makers manipulate mediating corporations to bewilder the mass, turning their attentions away from what they are deciding. Government regulates outlets of owning media to ensure that a market of producers and viewers is monopolized. It exercises restrictions on media ownership. Dominant and leading corporations have the tendency of consolidating a podium over where they communicate their plans. This consolidation limits consumers' choice, manipulates news coverage and 'hegomonises' cultures and people thinking. Mediating institutions have an immense power within the mass. They shape how people perceive the world events and what they should consider.

Effectively, politicians and power elite must pay attention to those foundations in order to make them perform critical functions important to their process because media report of events

and news serve as a mediating tool between power foundations, mass herd and field of events, as they determine agendas to be issued and how to keep people processed under political policies. Professor Tariq Ramadan once referred to that if political democracy was analysed without referring to economic autonomies could be geo-strategically treacherous. Taking into account the ‘Arab Revolution’, how come western states would recognize Arab revolts and president’s dictatorship after sustaining it for long periods if their primary interest was not an economic and geostrategic planning. Bad social situations, patriotism, nationalism, etc., are ideologies that are ‘instrumentalised’ by media institutions to incorporate the formal community. Robert G. Girgen, in his work *The Congress and the Media: Forces in the Struggle over Foreign Policy*, says, “policy decisions should be made to take into account, first and foremost, what is true, and for the interests of the country, and not on what is common on a temporary basis in public opinion polls, or what will gain as support with fast attention on a screen TV” (as cited in Simon Serfaty 1995:92). On the same parlance, Chomsky and Herman (1988) mention:

He [political Scientist, Thomas Ferguson] contends that for ordinary voters to influence electoral choices they would have to have “strong channels that directly facilitate mass deliberation and expression.” These would include unions and other intermediate organizations that might, through their collective power, cause the interests of ordinary voters to be given greater weight in the political system. (p. xli)

In reference to Chomsky and Herman, one of the critical perspectives of Critical Discourse Analysis in the study of political discourse scrutinizes the chronology of media propagation of political ideologies and interests. In other words, it highlights the way through which this propagation is framed and put into function is controlled in contribution to concealed ‘special’ agendas. Under the parlance to Van Dijk’s Socio-cognitive Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, we can say that media propaganda functions at challenging the public consent, while changing their cognitive dissonance (such as thinking system, emotions and attitudes), and, thus, their behaviour.

Most Arab papers support official views, higher the position of decision-makers and promote authority policies. However, those who object any established rule are misdoubted as their reputation is blemished in front of the public opinion. We deduce that Arab media and means of communication are characterized by an authoritarian heredity. The journalistic system

was born within authoritarian political system that follows anti-journalistic freedom of speech activities and restrictions. This political environment notices the absence of parties' role-taking alternation over authority as the dominant political parties lack flexibility, ambition for change, revision of their speeches and plans, as well as the ability of analysing the real-estate of their societies. The letter's political practice is characterized by certain modes that know no relation with democratic exercise in behalf of the common concernment. Initially, decision-makers participate in political or social appointments (for example, electoral, religious, cultural issues; sport manifestations...). Nevertheless, their political participation is not effective as it is for the sake of performing certain roles or getting personal interests. For instance, the Egyptian ex-president's son, Alaa Mubarak, had never ever been interested in sports. Once it came to the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches, taking place between Algeria and Egypt, Alaa Mubarak attended the football matches as an 'instrumentalized' field, where pro-governmental television concentrated its camera lenses on him and his son. This was for the purpose of highlighting definite agendas. Chomsky (2012) views the role of media propagation in influencing public awareness:

The major media are large corporations, owned by and interlinked with even larger conglomerates. Like other corporations, they sell a product to a market. The market is advertisers—that is, other businesses. The product is audiences. For the elite media that set the basic agenda to which others adapt, the product is, furthermore, relatively privileged audiences. (p, 68)

Furthermore, the political participation takes the form of mobilizing and packing for the tendency of making the addressed public favour their policies, without having any attention to know what is going-on in the real political and social community. This means that no political development flourishes in a frame-work within which any ruling system should be flexible to social and international changes. Subsequently, no development can be sustained in all the levels of building an Arab nation. Likewise, old senators dominate the ruling class for long terms so to kill the vitality of the political activity because of the absence of educated elite and youth ambition for change and innovation. As a consequence to the Arab unsuccessful political behaviour, media institutions and mass communication are frustrated since politics, media and public all together have a cyclic advantage, as each depends on the accomplishment of the other. Furthermore, the nature of the Algerian and Egyptian political systems have made from media channels for

transferring political authoritarian speeches because of the ruling classes' monopoly of the information sector and the control of news flow. On the same contexture, Doctor Mohamed Djassim Falhi El-Moussaoui, in his article Mass Media and Communication Theories, says:

The crisis of freedom of the media and culture are inseparable from the crisis of democracy where authoritarian regimes that put authorities in the hands of the head of a state (...) In the absence of popular and democratic political organizations, and in the context of the imbalance between the executive, the legislative and the judicial authorities, most Arab newspapers turned into government agencies whose mission is to propagate systems of governance, mobilize the masses and array them in favour of supporting their policies and practices (...) the government dominates the central official newspapers, and practices different forms of regulating and controlling.

On the other hand, mediation means take the advantage of orienting the public opinion towards certain policies put by dominating leaders, ideologies and regimes. This 'Special Elite' have ever supported neither democracy nor freedom of speech. However, media leaders could rather enter every home, concocting streamed and consolidated outlook. Therefore, the public awareness is 'hegemonised'. Sidaoui (July 04, 2009) states:

Arab mass media has always been highly fragmented, the object of competing states in the region attempting to gain hegemonic influence. . To underline the existence of this media Cold War in the Middle East, one can perhaps mention the following anecdote. Yamama, the biggest Saudi advertising company in the Arab region, was recently instructed by the Saudi regime not to cooperate with Al Jazeera, a move that obviously had an impact on the revenues of the channel. This leads us to clarify another structural feature of the Arab media world: they are financially or commercially unsustainable. (...) None of the Arab mass media would survive if they did not benefit from the largesse of rich and powerful sponsors, states or princes. (para. 08)

What makes somebody blind to see reality? Media producers manipulate readers' blindness to search for and see reality. They are not objective as they try to make some idea or plan heard. Now comes the 'bewildered herd's' blindness to seek what is real. They do not look for reality; but, rather, for their interests. This is what limits their future vision. They will not think; they just act. Political and social pressures that this herd faces are manipulated by media institutions to serve the interests of political practitioners through an intensified language. This language fabricates stories that cover the plans of the controlling elites. The dominating associations

control nation capacities, and do not respect different rationalities; in fact, the way they analyse and report events is totally free of credibility, responsibility and neutrality. The piece of news got is not analysed basing on scientific criticism.

Bureaucratic policies indicate to journalists the points of interests on which news events to be reported and which ones endanger certain political, cultural and social systems or policies. This would provide an explanation to how come a piece of news information would cause some parasites though the original discourse of this piece attaches neither of political sensibilities. It is because this piece is revised and re-installed through several levels. For instance, the incidents, which took place between Algeria and Egypt during the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches, were reported after passing through dominating or ruling classes to be reviewed (the proof is that most of the incidents did not blow during or directly after the matches; but, rather, after some days). Those leading structures amplified the events with ideologies, such as patriotism, dignity, nation's symbols (martyrs, flag, pharaoh...), etc., so that their discourse was reshaped. The amplification, made by media to events, shows the politicization (i.e., events being covered according to political interests set by the ruling elite) and polarity (i.e., events being selected rather than others) of communication means, misleading the public thinking. Mai Abdullah, in *The Role of Spatial Media in the Arab Revolution*, mentions:

Iraqi people noticed an absence of the coverage of the Iraq Revolution, and Arab media contribution in reporting sectarian concepts that divide the Iraqi people into sects according to the creed of the ex-American president, George W. Bush, before invasion. They remarked scurrility on their will and role in objecting the colonizer. Many Arab media means deal with the concept of terrorism blindly without sifting and conforming it to reality. They may have noticed that this concept had been used more than hundred times a day in the news, debates and seminars. Consequently, the public opinion is reframed through subjective concepts that are not legally acquainted.

Media and communication means have a pivoting role in the political operation. They are among the available sources through which politicians and opinion-leaders obtain information, test public reactions, on their policies, and receive the steps associated to political decision-making. In addition, policy-makers know that the public depend on these means. The latter build the way the mass think, the tendency they direct to, and the attitude they adopt towards various events, policies and trends. Therefore, political agenda-setters depend on media in order to know

which information to be dealt with, how to draw the public awareness, and how to override their thinking. Lang and Lang observe, “The mass media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images of political figures. They are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, and have feeling about” (as cited in Maxwell et al., 1972, p. 177).

Based on these facts, the official media of Algeria and Egypt took several approaches in their coverage of the football matches and the events that followed them. First, blackout equations were utilized by altering truth. For example, the Egyptian official pro-governmental media defrauded the fact that the Egyptian security failed to do its duty in securing the way of transporting the Algerian team players from the airport to the hotel. This fact was reconfigured, convincing the public that the Algerian football team players had beaten themselves with stones. Different languages were used in order to express this picture ambiguity so that the receiver of the message would have gone blind to believe it. Secondly, the approach of terrorising the public was adopted. As a result, it scared them, making them assume the impression that barbarism and hooliganism characterise the other confronting side. For instance, the Algerian and Egyptian public opinions were convinced that the Egyptians and the Algerians (according to the policy of their regimes), respectively, were responsible for the anarchy. An ‘imaginary enemy’ was created to intimidate the public.

Efficiently, this leads to another equation that is balancing what has been mystified with what is happening. Nonetheless, the policy that reflects their ideological preferences or increases their power is always kept on passing. As a case in point, some members of the Egyptian parliament – members of the Brotherhood Party (El-Ikhwan), say – passed their opinion on what happened between Algeria and Egypt during and after the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches. Their attention towards the issue was reported by media. As a result, their interest in drawing media attention would have increased their visibility in the parliament and generated their power. Correspondingly, this indicates two reciprocal directions. On one hand, political and decision agents display concerns to media coverage. On the other hand, they follow their actions through mediatisation. Peter Van Aelst et al. (2014) mention:

Based on a survey among MPs in five countries, Walgrave and colleagues (2010) show that MPs who tend to take their cues from the

media are also the ones who are the most successful in getting their issues into the media. This suggests that, on the individual level, when the impact in one direction is strong it tends to be strong in the other direction as well. When actors surf on the media waves and react to media coverage they, in turn, get their actions more easily in newspapers and on TV. This finding indicates that there is a feedback loop in which media power and political power reinforce each other. (p.15)

Highlighting Aelst's viewpoint, and according to Critical Discourse Analysis, the political agenda concealed behind the patching is to make the public mind believe that this agenda-setter is the legal claimer and sponsor of certain issues, say Arab and continental leadership.

From this context, one could deduce that media promotion of political agendas depends on the following: subject, spin-object, aim, political actors, public, and media institutions. Primarily, 'subject' means which issue media and decision-makers want their audience to focus on, and opinion they hold. Secondly, what and how media, under the supervision of political actors, frame the subject is the production of spin-object. Thus, this object is a revised material, made up in a noticeable aimed message. Thirdly, the aim is the degree of emphasis and interest that provide details, according to which the subject is framed. Then, political agents are actors who would benefit from this promotion in order to pass on their perspectives and ideologies or get power of domination. Iyengar and Kinder says, "By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news [as well as the other news media] influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged" (as cited in McCombs, January, 2011, p.12).

To exemplify this, in the 2014 presidential elections, many candidates participated in them. One of them was Rashid Negaz who had not had well-known reputation during his first appearance because of several reasons. However, mass media (e.g., Al-Jazeera Channel, the Algerian El-Shorouk Channel) and social networks (e.g., Facebook) emphasized considerable spaces to cover his plans and proposals. As a result, the Algerian public opinion (specially, youth's) was broadened to a certain extent. Afterward, mediatisation provides attributes to get key-sources of these perspectives from political figures and decision-leaders. These clues describe the operation of framing the issue. For that reason, mediation apparatus limits the public reaction and thinking. Finally, the public opinion is the central actor who would provide acceptance or refusal of these agendas. However, their awareness would have been already oriented by wide net of influencing

institutions that indicate our path of thinking, in behalf of the political power. Lippmann (1922) notes that: “the news media are a primary source of those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs, a world that for most citizens is “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind””(p. 29). On the same parlance, Maxwell McCombs (January, 2011) states, “What we know about the world is largely based on what the media decide to tell us. More specifically, the result of this mediated view of the world is that the priorities of the media strongly influence the priorities of the public. Elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent in the public mind” (p, 12).

One of the theories that study the effect of mass media is Agenda-setting –Theory. It emphasizes on that media and communication means have a pivoting role in ordering the issues of priority. One of the best declarations stating the function of agenda-priority ordering is mentioned in Bernard Cohen’s 1963 book, “Press and Foreign Policy”. He refers to the idea that journalism may not be able to say to people of what they think; but, it performs a certain success in saying to its readers of the things they think about (as cited in Abdullah, 2006, p.284). in addition, people learn how to judge the importance of the social and international affairs and which political issues to be discussed, according to the level of emphasis signed by means of communication and press. Mediating institutions that conform to the condition of being the applicators of ideological lines are counted in the pot of ‘Specialized Elite” they attract the public mass towards framed beliefs, distracting their attention from real issues of interest and public affairs (making them loose their attention), or diverging their way of thinking by sponsoring agendas of stories (i.e. displacing true questions to totally peripheral ones). Ideologies, depicting images and stereotyping are apparatuses, hold by these institutions to accomplish their function. These arrangements dole out concealed ends oriented to dominant elites. Chomsky (1989) states:

The major media – particularly, the elite media that set the agenda that others follow – are corporations “selling” privileged audiences to other businesses. It would hardly come as a surprise if the picture of the world they present were to reflect the perspectives and interests of the sellers, the buyers, and the product. Concentration of ownership of the media is high and increasing. Furthermore, those who occupy managerial positions in the media, or gain status within them as commentators, belong to the same privileged elites, and might be expected to share the perceptions, aspirations, and attitudes of their associates reflecting their

own class interests as well. Journalists entering the system are unlikely to make their way unless they conform to these ideological pressures, generally by internalizing the values. (p. 08)

According to Chomsky, public awareness is ‘corporationized’ by the ‘elite’ through media institutionalism. As a case in point, the Egyptian official and pro-governmental media played a central role in politicizing the incidents of the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches. They indirectly documented what the governments had planned. They concentrated their cameras on the president’s sons, so that the public mass would favour another Mubarak succession. They have concealed purposes from their empowerment of citizens and helping governments in their restraining of freedom. They wish to build reputation, get the favour of and shelter from rulers, win economic revenues as well.

Mass communication is considered as one of the means that build human relations. This establishment characterizes the functional role of these means because they are one of the tools, besides political and decision leaders, that sift special issued fields. The files that could serve their interests are ‘instrumentalised’ and set as preferential matters. This is operated through: first, selection; secondly, concentration, i.e. pertaining large spaces, time and efforts to frame them; then drawing public attention so as to be turned into social and political needs; finally, having products, known as the current issues of interest that signify or endanger, according to the ‘bewildered herd’, the common society. For instance, according to the real definition of sport the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches are for entertainment or competition in most. However, these events were politicized for further ends. These events were just a chance, as any other chance (a sporting competition, religious manifestations, ..) which had opened doors to certain attentions. Si Moussa states:

Many studies identify the relationship between the press and public opinion by focusing on the role played by the press, especially in the escalation of certain topics and stirring public interest, until they become considered as social needs, passing through the stage of attracting public attention leading to the level of public debate which is the first stage of the phase of shaping public opinion [Mc Combs Maxwell, Agenda Setting: Readings on Media, Public Opinion and Policy Making, Lawrence Associate, New Jersey 1991, P2]. In this stage, media intensify light on it and highlight it as one of the priorities of public opinion. (Abdullah Si Moussa 2011, December 01)

Therefore, those matches were taken as privileged fields for fulfilling certain profits. Then the two peoples were bewildered behind the ideologies of patriotism, chauvinism, Arabism, the advocator of the Palestinian issue. They drew the public attention towards this subject, which had already been turned into a social need and priority that would save or endanger the social estate.

Finally, the interest for depicting images on the other is replaced in the inclusive reflection on the discussions maintained to debate a country's image, culture, people and history, on which stereotypes and representations are structured by mediating institutions under the consent of political leaders. However, how do these discourses turn discourse of entertainment and competition into a salient political discourse that could endanger diplomatic relations between two further histories?

I.5. Debating the Shift from Discourse of Entertainment and Competition to the Discourse of Politics

Sport has accomplished an extraordinary value, being practiced by popular classes to celebrate different traits of national identity. Football has become a veritable event where any individual can practice his rights and put a definition to his capacities. However, state's spin doctors, businessmen, party leaders and regimes have put back these definitions, and have configured them into new corrections by indirect means, drawing limits. Representations, ideological apparatuses, manipulation of people's emotions, impulsion and passion, and employment of political polarization in discourses of entertainment or competition process great role in itemizing these corrections. They recognized most people's massive hysteria about sports, chiefly football, which in turn has obtained venomous role. Noam Chomsky (2012) offers a clear view about the effect of spectator sports when he points out, "This scenario for interactive technology reflects an understanding of the stupefying effect spectator sports have in making people passive, atomized, obedient nonparticipants–non-questioning, easily controlled and easily disciplined"(p, 169).

Therefore, when setting up a project that studies football event, the researcher had better inform himself/herself of the political context. Which political party is in power? Which group dominates power? What is the economic, political and social situation in the country whose

football event is studied? What is the political and leading reputation of the regime? Who is participating from powerful people elite? For which political reasons (or private purposes) do they impose their will? What are the tools they use for the 'instrumentalization' of football events?

Since sport has proven itself to be socially lasting structure, carrying satisfaction to different classes of societies, world nations mull over it as a devastatingly positive component of society. Sport, despite of its universal leasured and competitive construction, its pitches, performers, sponsors, organizers, mass and state apparatuses should be analysed along with the foundation of any country's political and social order. Sport serves as a tool for wealthy, leading and powerful elites to keep the 'bewildered herd' down. As religion used to be the foundation of happiness and trust for poor people when economic realities and capitalist schemata thwarted them from getting satisfaction, sport has succeeded the position of religion in society. People who suffer from bad social or political conditions find sport ground a relief through which they forget their sufferance. According to L. Althusser, ideological apparatuses, which are considered by the Marxian thinking as an umbrella under which reality of social reports is disguised, also possess a leading façade and certain autonomy in constructing these reports during sport phenomena (as cited in Clément et al.1994, p. 28).

In the arena of sport, the 'state' is a formal organization that has the power to produce and implement rules of who plays, where and how sports are organized and who can sponsor/ be sponsored. Generally, sport possesses good reflection. Government leaders and dominating institutions work to relate their image to people so that they gain public opinion. Besides, businessmen have the interest and power in leading public awareness in whatever interest-serving events since regimes give them this privilege because of their support to their policies. For instance, Egyptian business conglomerates, like Orascom, sided as partners of the National team because they also concealed politico-economic ends. It is institutionalized to direct to youth because of their importance for the operation of 'vibrating' phenomena. Authority institutions run to support sport teams for prestige and power gaining, and draw public attention towards their legitimacy of leading. When plans and change are constructed to be pervasive, sports are supported to draw ties closer and produce 'imagined communities' where new identities are collectively shaped and sense of belonging is promoted.

Sport has famously become an ideological tool that legitimates and defends the interest of the dominant powers. Being ‘professionalized’, its field functions to install new ideas and prejudged values over people’s raw ideas and beliefs new set of values serves the benefit of a group over others. ‘Instrumentalised’ sports conserve the ‘status quo’ of the masses, where agendas, concealed between lines of having the right to perform and possessing the sense to compete, of what to do and how to behave, are indirectly transformed to the masses. As a consequence, they will celebrate and applaud new corrected system of injustice, inequality, prejudice, illegality and unfairness. Brohm (1976) says, “Sport as “an ideological apparatus of state”, as the army or the church, produces ideology intended to perpetuate the power of the dominant class. In this sense, even in socialist countries, it helps to strengthen bourgeoisie ideology of sport, symbolized by the ideal of competition and performance. (as cited in Clément et al.1994, p. 28). Brohm affirms that social ideals that are related to a particular institution, such as honour, dignity and victory, are ‘ideologised’ and manipulated to legalize prominent practices or policies.

Leading institutions have the power to rebuild the social management of individuals through socialisation, and integrate them into unified common party or group. This social integration is easily pertained before, during and after events’ conflicts because they are unified through commonsense. Debates are enriched to have practice over, and coherent personalities are constructed, with the interest of organizing activities that serve the elite’s needs. A linkage is spontaneously determined between the characteristics of sport objects and different social groups who share the same beliefs. Leading institutions and governing apparatuses indirectly and smoothly maintain the notion of socialization, and social and political in order to construct hegemonic power in sport fields. Clément (1994) says:

All work addressing these issues [sociability, expression of identity and socialisation process] is based on the explicit idea or less evident in all common cases that sports have a great power of expression of identity in the broadest sense (...) The Power of “socialisation” and “social integration” attributed to sports, more than any other form of grouping is not unfounded because falling under the common sense. (p. 117)

He adds:

The notion of incorporation, in the centre of the Bourdieu process of sketching a Theory of Practice (1972) and in the practical sense (1980), introduced “body activities” as favoured places for social identity construction of the individuals. The power of expressing sports identity is deeply linked to the socially meaningful embodied properties, often objectified, that do sports of powerful social symbols. (p. 118)

According to Clement, political determinism uses sport as an arena where collective identity is socially re-built in order to re-order the social practices. As a result, sport has become a corporation to address all the public in form of a unified group, instead of being a competitive game related to a particular social entity.

In sport, and especially in soccer games because of its dynamic practice, journalistic discourse use metaphors of war that drives on emotions and passions. Jargons, such as ‘desert soldiers’ field strikers’, ‘pierce the defence’ and ‘a playing side conquered the playing space’, are used to reformulate the sporting events with dramatic framework. Players have nicknames, put by mediating apparatuses, to treat them as competitors. These war expressions prepare players and supporters within decisive competitions. Media polarised discourse use national symbols, like flags, national ideologies, chants, etc. As a result, national identities are constructed, having the sense of fighting. Sport ground becomes battlefield that promotes combative and aggressive attitudes, gaming over the world. States and media manipulate entertaining and competitive incidents through setting violence in order to pacify public opinion and gain growth.

Sports provide an outlet of achieving orientation and the desire for having social unification and corporation. However, the criteria that maintain a society into operation can be turned into an arena of tension, aggression, anxiety and violence. Sport can be constructed as useful tool for adopting authority and source of power. It may originate destabilization of social order and moral distraction. One of these conflicted outlets and ‘politicisation’ of sport dominated sport that took place during Hitler’s domination, where the Nazi racial authority was expressed to be higher and the alien teams were scratched to be the inferior dynasty. Prior to the Egyptian help to the Algerian Revolution and the building of its government after Independence, Egypt had the complex of being its father because most of those aids, in addition to the desire to turn Algeria into a Pan-Arab communist state, were for the agenda of adopting it under its control. However, after several incidents, such as the Egyptian notification of the Camp David Agreement,

Algeria re-questioned the Arab belonging of Egypt and its legitimacy of leading the Arab League, in addition to other problems since Algeria became its rival on several spheres. These incidents were transferred to the sporting scene, where it became a determined fact that whenever the Algerian team meets the Egyptian team, there is a struggle for proving the legitimacy of leading.

Sport scale and victories are qualified by media and dominant institutions along with social and political systems and powers. They are circulated as propaganda to make the mass accept new regime, new order construction, or accession to power. During the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches that took place between Algeria and Egypt, media institutions and dominant classes propagated political and religious discourses. The latter condemned motivation of the two peoples. Both of the sides were responsible providing that they were driven behind the 'instrumentalization' of patriotism, chauvinism, close-minded vision and strong emotions. What matters the establishment of Algerian and Egyptian brotherhood? It should be dignity, mutual respect, and admiration of own culture and the respect of the other's. Unfortunately, these traits were professionalized by political discourse in the arena of football. Thus, to hold critical analysis of a soccer event, all what relates to the history of the relation between the two sides, the social order, the context of the event, and the system of political and mediating institutions should be taken into consideration as all of these reformulate identities and condition behaviours. Roche (2000) affirms the influence of re-order of social practices in challenging the performance of the social identity and, thus, attitude saying:

It is often observed that late modernity's structural tendencies (globalization, mediatisation, informationization, etc.) are capable of having some profound socio-psychological effects, many of which may ultimately be incompatible with the development and maintenance of personal identity and agency to the degree that, as suggested earlier, these are dependent on, among other things, an investment in embodiment in activity and the maintenance of space-time frameworks. These potentially negative effects include the compression and destructuring of people's experience of personal and social space and time, and, of others, and ultimately perhaps of ourselves. (p. 221)

According to Roche, the social structure of a particular society along with its cultural and social traits is redefined. Consequently, this society loses its social, and even geostrategic, role that makes it different and prevalent among other societies, as its identity being no more luring

because of its lost uniqueness. In fact, people of this society are bewildered to perform within a particular frame, losing their freedom and humanism. The latter do not explicitly appear. As far as Critical Discourse Analysis is considered, media propaganda and dominant agendas are dealt with in relation to the axis of change in people's performance. Thus, we can say that sport events are related to all levels that can re-constitute a society and political system. Amara (June, 2014) ensures, "Arab personalities' and companies' buying of European clubs and the rights of advertising on players' shirts has a positive impact in propagating for the Arab countries, in addition to the benefit of connecting the Arab investments internationally" (p. 23).

Phenomena that take place within sport field should also be analysed along with representation. Sport position constitute objects that conceptualize the analysis of what representations deliver as meaning related to certain political plans. These objects allow the classification of sport discourse. The linguistic, cultural, social and geopolitical differences are represented so that these limits become stereotypes in form of barriers and boundaries. We believe that sport political conflict consists of four concepts:

- Field: abstract reality of authentic on-going events rests in this arena.
- Actors: dominant institutions are the performers that report the abstract reality of events that take place in the 'field'. They establish the transformation of the field events, providing the mass with the framework that limits their consciousness (i.e. frame their thinking, avoiding having further unwished interpretations that could endanger their agendas)
- Representations: the transformed reality is turned into naturally perceived reality because the actors have made corrections upon the 'raw reality' through their forces. These forces affect representations.
- Public: the 'bewildered herd' express already-framed opinions. They affirm their existence and express their identity through emotions that turn into 'Savoir Faire'. However, these identities and agencies are not original ones; they are constructed.

Representations permit the 're-problematization' of arguments in a politico-ideological type, where the universality and cultural utility of sport resides in its capacity to make people and their representation confront with each other in a symbolic universal. After Egypt lost the match that took place in Sudan against Algeria, the Egyptian leaders and newspapers depicted the incidents that were between the Algerian and Egyptian fans after the match as important, addressing political appeal. They are considered as that they humiliated the dignity of Egypt. Both of the

countries called off their ambassadors and took several measures. Unrest was ‘instrumentalized’ by both of the regimes and media institutions so to blind their masses off the real economic and social problems.

Dominant elites, say presidency governors and political parties, take the advantage of leading people’s mind in order to exercise power that serves their interests by delivering sense of belonging and unity among their ‘herd’ before, during and after sport incidents. Emotional unity is created during sport incidents, making different members of the society closer. They can meet, exchange feelings and thought about their teams. People ‘seem’ to belong to the same group, sharing emotional unity, during the time of a game. Sport plays a big role in people’s consciousness. Decision-makers and several civil actors are using sport to promote their ideas. Football pitch may turn into an arena used by power-leaders and dictators to pass certain propaganda since it drains and turns people into masses. Those actors charge sport organizations and fans to ensure high performance of the players. This amplification is a tool for publicising certain position. Furthermore, xenophobic ideas are more important. For instance, in the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches, the Algerian and Egyptian pro-governmental and private media dealt with war-like and national expressions, such as ‘national soldiers of Sahara’ and ‘the pharaohs’, to indirectly instil concealed ideas that serve interest of ruling and existence. Competitive sports represent states and nations. When achieving victory, it symbolizes the gaining of prestige. For instance, the Egyptian, as well as the Algerian, winning of the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches had been considered as proving superiority of representing the Arab world in South Africa, which in turn symbolises the legitimacy of leading. Arnaud and Rion (1998) set three major themes that turn the context of sport into a new battlefield:

1. Propaganda: Here, sport victories by a national team contribute to reinforcing the image of a political regime...
2. The freezing or banning of sport competitions between national team from meeting such and such an adversary for strictly political reasons. This would be political use of sport for reprisal purposes...
3. Popular discontent expressed in protest can lead to disorder and event violence either at the sports event itself or in the town/city where it is taking place, or both. Through word or action, it can result

in a sort of nationalism and xenophobia, and the anti-sentiments expresses can be political or sporting. (as cited in Bainvel 2005, p. 26)

Political patriotism in sport identifies Nationalism of a nation through sport, physical and ideological creation of a perceived alien, and strengthening their superpowers by persuading the population of their qualities and adopting their values according to every generation and every circumstance. These processes service of bounding people together against a real or imaginative enemy, to which internal problems are transformed in order to mass people around and guide their consideration away from certain established regime's policies. Dinko Kortzanov writes:

They [Laclau and Mouffe] underline the (sometimes aggressive) antagonism between the established order and the rival regimes, be them forged fantasmatic conceptions or real threats. Or to put other words– in order for a hegemony to sustain intself it needs an external conflict, which to attract (or shall we say distract) the population's attention. It mobilizes the people and channels their resistance against a factor, which is outside their governing political system. (Kortzanov 2012, May: 27)

As an exemplification to Laclau and Mouffe's emphasis on the need of an external enemy to provide national common-sense, soccer in Egypt bounded all the Egyptians, Muslims and Copts – who had not had much in common – , together against the threat of losing the honourable mission of representing the Arab World in South Africa. Participants and observers are ideologically and politically divided into the 'Us' with 'Our' values versus the 'Other', with 'Their' made- non-evident values.

Decision leaders and political actors take from football an arena for polishing their image, passing agendas of leading, taking revenge of those who have not followed their policies or orders, gaining financial or economic profits, etc. Their language screens highly polarised political discourse, passed through biased and chauvinist media. Polarized political discourses use ideologies, national and historic symbols, and deliver fraught pejorative preconceptions that bias, 'hegemonise' and mobilize masses against the 'Other's' history, people and culture. For instance, in the 2010 World Cup qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt, the Egyptian president, his sons, members of parliaments and dominant businessmen professionalized political

discourses, delivering declarations having no relation with Arab brotherhood or diplomatic bonds, creating political crisis and aggravating diplomatic ties between the two peoples.

I.6. Conclusion

The 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches, played between Algeria and Egypt, celebrated a pivoting role at the scenes of both of the countries' regimes. Mubarak and his sons had worked on planning to turn Egypt into a Mubarak-like dynasty. Nonetheless, the Omdurman stadium changed the balance of power in favour of the Algerian victory. As a result, the political agendas that had been set were put into question. This nightmare awakened the Egyptians to think back on their real social and political estate. One of the causes that stepped out Mubarak's system of governing and sparked the wick of the 'Arab Revolution' was the Egyptian awakening after their loss to represent the Arab football in South Africa, when they noticed that their government planned to play on their patriotic and chauvinist emotions to make their consideration off their bad social and political estate. However, if victory was in favour of the Egyptian national team, would the 'Arab Spring' wind over Algeria?

Ideologies are manipulated in form of social idealism to be convenient to people. Thus, public awareness is re-formulated. However, this social re-order harasses the social identity because its people have lost their authentic performance. Consequently, hegemony can be easily pertained in order to fulfil dominant agendas. Here, sport is an important institution to realize the process of the 'political manipulation of society'.

Original Quotations

1. Nouri Nesrouche (July 1st, 2014) ["Football et Politique: Enjeux en Jeu. El-Watan Newspaper. N°7215. (Tuesday, July 1st 2014)] says: " Ce [les ambitions économique et politique] sont des enjeux nés autour du sport en général et du football en particulier étant le jeu le plus populaire et le plus médiatique. Depuis son adoption par la population mondiale, le football a pris une place centrale dans les sphères sociale, économique et symbolique. Il est devenu, par conséquent, un levier rentable pour les pouvoirs politiques et le Capitalisme mondial. De l'arène politique au terrain de foot, les rapports conflictuelles entre nations ont toujours joué les prolongations (...) Les enjeux politiques internes sont aussi prétexte à employer les rendez-vous footballistiques et à manipuler les populations."

These [economic and political ambitions] are stakes born around sport in general and football in particular, because it is the most popular and mediated game. Since its adoption by the World's population, football has taken a central place in the social, economic and symbolic spheres. Therefore, it became a beneficial lever for political powers and global capitalism. From the political arena to the football field, conflicting relations between nations have always played prolongations. (...) Internal political issues are also pretext to employ football appointments and manipulate populations.

2. He said [mentioned in: Prof. Kamal J. Rabadi, (2003: 124), "The Sport in the Labyrinth of Politics," 1st ed., Amman: Dar Wael]:

"لا شك بأن الرياضة تعتبر من أسمى و أفضل الوسائل التي تربط بين شباب و شابات الأمة العربية، و تمكنهم من خلال سواعدهم الفتية، و أجسادهم السليمة، و عقولهم النيرة لبناء مستقبل الأمة العربية. و هي أفضل ما يوثق روابطهم الاجتماعية و يزيل الفوارق بينهم. و لذلك تطلع شباب العرب الى جامعة الدول العربية و مجلسها الكريم لتحقيق أهدافهم و طموحاتهم. لأن لقاء الرياضيين العرب في كل عام، يعتبر خير وسيلة للتعارف و المحبة و الوحدة، بما يتفق مع ميثاق الجامعة العربية. و بناء على ذلك تم إقامة الدورة الرياضية الأولى في مدينة الإسكندرية بمصر عام 1953."

There is no doubt that sport is one of the highest and best means of linking youth and young women of the Arab nation, and enable them through their young sleeves, and their healthy bodies and their enlightened minds to build the future of the Arab nation. It is one the best means that tightens their social ties and removes differences between them. Thus, young Arabs looked forward to the League of the Arab states and its honorable council to achieve their goals and aspirations because the meeting Arab athletes each year is the best way to recognize each other, love and unite, consistent with the Charter of the Arab League. Therefore, the first sport tournament has been established in the city of Alexandria, Egypt, in 1953.

3. Prof. Kamal J. Rabadi (2003: 126) ["The Sport in the Labyrinth of Politics," 1st ed., Amman: Dar Wael] says:

" لو أتيح للفرق الرياضية لا بل اللجان الرياضية الأولمبية العربية المجال للاشتراك جميعها في فريق رياضي واحد و مدرب واحد و تنظيم واحد، لتمكن شبابنا العربي من الوصول الى واقع رياضي ممتاز ، و أن السبب الوحيد والمباشر في عدم وجود فريق عربي موحد في جميع أشكال الرياضات المختلفة هو قرار سياسي قبل أن يكون رياضيا."

If not just sport teams, but even committees of the Arab Olympic sports, were given the chance to participate in one sport team with one trainer under one organization, our young Arab would be actually enabled to access to an excellent sport performance, and that the only direct reason for the absence of an unbroken Arab team, united in all different forms of sports, is a political decision before it is a matter of sport.

4. Shafi Abulhafid said:

"فعل الأبطال ما لم يفعله الوزراء، إذن تكون الرياضة هي في خدمة السياسة ولا السياسة في خدمة الرياضة. بالعكس إن السياسة تفسد الرياضة، ومن هذا المنطلق و في ميداني العملي أرى كل من هب ودب يتحمل مسؤوليته الرياضية دون أن يكون له علم و دراية بالشأن الرياضي. لماذا؟ لأنه رجل سياسي ينتقل من حزب الى فريق، ثم من فريق الى جامعة، و من جامعة الى وزارة. هذا هو الذي أفسد تلك الأخلاق و أفسد حتى المنتج الرياضي، لأن هذا المسؤول يريد أن يلمع صورته فقط، ولا ينظر الى النتائج والى المردودية و الى المنتج الرياضي."

Sport heroes did what ministers could not. Then sport serves politics: it is not politics in the service of sport. On the contrary, politics spoils sport. From this sense and according to my experience in the practical field, I see that all of those who do not consent and do not have knowledge of Sports affairs bear responsibility of sport. Why? Because he is a politician moving from party to a team, from the team to a University, and from the University a ministry. This is the one who spoiled those morals and even sport production because he wants to shine his image only, and looks neither at the results, to the profitability nor to the sport production.

6. Prof. Kamel Rabadi , (2003: 133), "The Sport in the Labyrinth of Politics," 1st ed., Amman: Dar Wael] says:

"في ظل هذه الأجواء المفعمة بالخطورة دخلت القوى الأجنبية و على رأسها أميركا المنطقة، لاسترجاع الكويت، حيث زاد دخولها للمنطقة خطورة انعكست آثارها على الوضع العربي بشكل عام، ومن ضمن الأوضاع الجانب الرياضي حيث بدأ يطرح موضوع إبعاد العراق عن الاتحادات العربية و الآسيوية، و أوصى المجلس الأولمبي الآسيوي عام 1990 بإبعاد الفرق الرياضية العراقية عن الدورات الآسيوية و في الرياضة العربية أوصت بعض الاتحادات نفس التوصية مما أحدث شرخا كبيرا بينها، و أصبح الاتحاد اتحادان كما حصل لاتحاد كرة السلة إحداهما في القاهرة و الآخر في بغداد و كل منهما يتهم الآخر بعدم شرعيته، و قد انطبق ذلك على العديد من الاتحادات الرياضية (...) لا شك أننا ندرك جيدا أن العرب أنفسهم أصبحوا منقسمين على بعضهم حتى في الجانب الرياضي."

In such a precarious climate, the foreign powers, mainly the America, entered the region to restore Kuwait. Its entry to the area increased serious effects reflected on the Arab World's estate in general. One of these arenas was sport, where the issue of stepping Iraq out of the Arab and Asian Unions began to be submitted, and the Asian Olympic Council recommended to deport the Iraqi sport teams from the Asian Games. In the Arab sport, some of Arab sport Unions spelled the same recommendation, causing a big gap between them. As a result, the same union became doubled, as what happened to the Basketball Federation, one in Cairo and the other in Baghdad where each one accused the other of not bearing legitimacy. The same decision was practiced on many other sport Federations (...) There is no doubt that we are well aware that the Arabs themselves are divided on each domain, even in sports.

7. Prof. Kamal J. Rabadi, (2003: 159), "The Sport in the Labyrinth of Politics," 1st ed., Amman: Dar Wael] says:

"إن الخلافات و التناحور بين أجزاء القطر العربي خلق حالة من عدم الاستقرار انعكس سلبا على كرة القدم بصفة خاصة و الرياضة بصفة عامة. وصلت الكثير من الأمور الرياضية الى المحاكم. لا ننكر أنه كان في السابق خلافات لكن ليس بهذه الحدة. فلأسف نجد ناديا رياضيا يغلق أبوابه أو لاعب كرة القدم يزج به في السجن من أجل خلافات سياسية. الوضع السياسي و الدبلوماسي الراهن للدول العربية من ثورات زاد من حدة الأزمات التي أثقلت بدورها الجانب الرياضي و من نسبة استغلال الرياضة كورقة في السياسة."

The disagreements and rivalries between the different parts of the Arab World have created a state of instability, reflected negatively on football in particular and sports in general. A lot of sport issues were got to be dealt with in the courts. We do not deny that were several disagreements in the past, but not to such extent of sharpness. Unfortunately, we find a sports club closes its doors or a football player thrown in jail for political disagreements. The current diplomatic and political situation of the Arab states from revolutions exacerbated the crisis which, in turn, weighed sporty side and exceeded the exploitation of sport as a tool in politics.

8. Doctor Mohamed Djassim Falhi El-Moussaoui, in his article "MASS MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION THEORIES"

"أزمة حرية الاعلام و الثقافة لا تنفصل عن أزمة الديمقراطية حيث تسود الأنظمة السلطوية التي تضع السلطات في يد رئيس دولة سواء كان رئيسا او سلطانا او أميراً، وفي غياب التنظيمات السياسية الشعبية و الديمقراطية و في إطار عدم التوازن بين السلطات التنفيذية و التشريعية و القضائية تحولت معظم الصحف العربية الى أجهزة حكومية مهمتها الدعاية لأنظمة الحكم و تعبئة الجماهير و حشدها لتأييد سياساتها و ممارستها (...). الأنظمة العربية في تلك الدول لم تتحرر حتى الآن من تراث النظرية السلطوية، حيث تهيمن الحكومة على الصحف المركزية الرسمية، و تمارس أشكالاً مختلفة من التنظيم و السيطرة مثل التحكم في تراخيص إصدار الصحف و تعيين رؤساء التحرير و توجيه السياسات التحريرية و التحكم في تدفق المعلومات و الإعلانات"

The crisis of freedom of the media and culture are inseparable from the crisis of democracy where authoritarian regimes that put authorities in the hands of the head of a state, whether president or sultan or prince, prevail. In the absence of popular and democratic political organizations, and in the context of the imbalance between the executive, the legislative and the judicial authorities, most Arab newspapers turned into government agencies whose mission is to propagate systems of governance, mobilize the masses and array them in favour of supporting their policies and practices (...) Arab regimes in those countries so far have not been liberated yet from the heritage of the authoritarian theory, where the government dominates the central official newspapers, and practices different forms of regulating and controlling, such as controlling the licensing of issuing newspapers, appointing editors, directing liberal policies, and controlling the flow of information and advertising .

9. Abdullah Si Moussa, in his article “ The Political Environment and the Political Media in Algeria ” [Algeria: Al Nabaa Informational Network (December 1st, 2011)]][<http://www.annabaa.org/nbanews/2011/12/001.htm>] states:

"قامت عديد الدراسات بتحديد العلاقة بين الصحافة والرأي العام وذلك، بالتركيز على الدور الذي تقوم به الصحافة خاصة في تصعيد موضوعات معينة واثارة الاهتمام العام بها، حتى تصل إلى مصاف الاحتياجات الاجتماعية مروراً بمرحلة جذب الانتباه العام وصولاً إلى مرتبة النقاش العام وهي المرحلة الأولى من مرحلة تشكيل الرأي العام [Mc Combs Maxwell, Agenda Setting Readings on Media: Public Opinion and Policy Making, Lawrence Associate, New Jersey 1991, P2]. حيث تقوم وسائل الاعلام بتكثيف الضوء عليها وابرازها كإحدى أولويات الرأي العام."

Many studies identify the relationship between the press and public opinion by focusing on the role played by the press, especially in the escalation of certain topics and stirring public interest, until they become considered as social needs, passing through the stage of attracting public attention leading to the level of public debate which is the first stage of the phase of shaping public opinion [Mc Combs Maxwell, Agenda Setting: Readings on Media, Public Opinion and Policy Making, Lawrence Associate, New Jersey 1991, P2]. In this stage, media intensify light on it and highlight it as one of the priorities of public opinion.

10. s.J. M. Brohm (1976) [mentioned in: Jean-Paul Clément, Jacques Defrance and Christian Pociello, (1994), “Sport and Powers at 20th Century”, University Presses of Grenoble, p.28] says: « Le sport, en tant « qu’appareil idéologique d’Etat », au même titre que l’arme ou l’église, produit de l’idéologie destinée à pérenniser le pouvoir des classes

dominante en ce sens, même dans les pays socialistes, il participe au renforcement de l'idéologie bourgeoise du sport, symbolisée de la compétition et de la performance. »
Sport as "an ideological apparatus of state", as the army or the church, produces ideology intended to perpetuate the power of the dominant class. In this sense, even in socialist countries, it helps to strengthen bourgeoisie ideology of sport, symbolized by the ideal of competition and performance.

11. Mahfoud Amara, in an interview entitled " Totalitarian Regimes Invest Soccer Politically" broadcasted on Al-Jazeera Channel on 23th June 2014 [available at: <http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/in-depth/2014/6/23/الأنظمة-الاستبدادية-تستثمر-كرة-القدم-سياسيا>] ensures:

"شراء الشخصيات و الشركات العربية أندية أوروبية و حقوق الاعلان على القمصان يؤثر إيجابيا في عمل دعاية للبلدان العربية: إلى جانب فائدة ذلك في ربط الاستثمار العربي بالدولي"

Arab personalities' and companies' buying of European clubs and the rights of advertising on players' shirts has a positive impact in propagating for the Arab countries, in addition to the benefit of connecting the Arab investments internationally.

CHAPTER TWO

CHAPTER TWO

Sub-Arabism as an Ideological Generator of Political Agenda in the Arena of Football in Algeria and Egypt

II.1. Introduction

Once again, football was reassumed by the Arab politics, here Algeria and Egypt, to be course for reaching political power, private interests and legitimacy through the 2010 World Cup Qualification matches, along with their incidents. Several factors pushed the ‘Specialized Elite’, both in Algeria and Egypt, to compete in this arena of sport that was shifted into a system of politics and harassing. Ideology played a pivotal role in the scene of the conflict that was maintained between the two nations. Effectively, the political power occupied the anonymous space of ‘Otherness’ as a way to mould the public consciousness, strengthen the ‘Self’ collective identity, refute the ‘Other’ ‘s identity, celebrate demarcations between two nations of the same Arab and African origin, as well as generate agenda-based ideas and ideals.

On this parlance, a set of questions emerges to find out about the political escalation of the football events between Algeria and Egypt in the wake of the 2010 World Cup qualification matches. How was the escalation of these football events? What were the parties involved? How were they translated and implemented in a form of sensitive issues, which attracted the attention of the political, media and public classes? What was the major factor that caused the intensification as well as the ‘instrumentalization’ of these incidents? What extent did the ideological apparatus effect the moulding of the public attitudes and identity, where the diplomatic ties between the two countries were about to be broken on football conflicts? What are the characteristics of this ideological apparatus? What extent is it different from the previous ideologies like Occidentalism and Orientalism?

This chapter questions the bedrock upon which the argument that part of the Orient itself, here is Egypt, takes part in the process of ‘Othering’ the people from another part of the same Orient that is Algeria has been set. Secondly, it studies the scope and conceptualization of this new ideology, in addition to the criteria that define its framework. This chapter aims at highlighting the major factor that made the arena of football shift from a discourse of sport to a salient political discourse, distorting the Algerian history and origin.

II. 2. Ideology: Symbolic Power vs. Symbolic Violence

Any person calls up meaning and image of an object or a person through the characters s/he attributes according to the way s/he perceives this person. This objectification is the communication that connects two sides. It is a set of products manifested between the 'producer' of concepts and the 'Other, which accommodates ideologies. These definitions negatively or positively pertain in effects and affects. The ecology of man or of a society is arranged under the ecology of each that assures his conscious assimilation or accommodation of knowledge. Karl Marx (as cited in C. Jouster, January 12, 2007) states, "Man's consciousness is determined by his social being" (p. 24).

Thus, ideology helps define the image of the 'representer', i.e. in order for the 'Us' to construct or magnify their identity, they need to arrogate or devalue the identity of the 'Other' so that they appear. Edward Said (1995) says: "the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another different and competing alter ego" (p. 332). It could be observed that the Egyptian 'Specialised Elite' tried to create a pertinent enemy through whom the Egyptian utilitarian policies would be justified and their further ends could be realized. In the name of the Algerian football fans' threat, during the 2010 World Cup Football Matches, Algeria was wholly considered as a totalitarian threat to Egypt and the Arab World. Thus, you could have found President Hosni Mubarak summoning the Egyptian Parliament to call for the duty of protecting Egypt and the Egyptians.

Being a conceptual coherent discourse of values, ideology attaches to on-going situations. It appears as a structure that solves problems of these situations, where selected members are brought together to support it for the benefit of community cohesion. Ideologies are culture-valued apparatus that is introduced in political, economic and social spheres. The exploitations of this apparatus treat the ways of observing and explaining events, and creating corrections. Dijk (June 15, 2004) says:

Ideologies are the axiomatic basis of the social representations of a group and—through specific social attitudes and then through personal mental models— control the individual discourses and other social practices of group members. In this way, they also are the necessary resource of in-group cooperation, coordination and cohesion, as well as for the management of intergroup relations, competition, conflict, or struggle. (p. 3)

Conventionally, many researchers, such as Edward Said (1995), Fairclough (2001), Marx (1970) and Boudon (1991), have attempted to characterize the relationship between peoples, using a binary model of division between the ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’. To dilute the idea of continuous tensions that suggested such an idea (of polarity), it was advocated that the negative feelings towards the ‘Other’ could include cultural mechanism that strengthens the position, epistemology and perspective of the ‘Us’. Now, the legitimacy of possessing power can be perceived as a tool that facilitates the dilution between ideology and politics. The ‘bewildered mass’s’ support of the policies of their rising politicians can be obtained through a religious, sportive, historical or geostrategic apparatus. The latter’s existence convince them that this rising power is the legitimate regime because of their sustainable role. Fairclough (2001) says:

Ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions; and because they as means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the reoccurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences for granted. (p. 2)

Fairclough, in relation to Critical Discourse Analysis, believes that the ideological conceptualization of representations both affects and is affected by differences in the practice of power. Efficiently, ideologies can change the practicality of knowledge about the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, the relation-ship between them as well.

As far as the relation between power and ideology is taken into consideration, Critical Discourse Analysis implements critical perspective on the way politicians make their people ‘unified’ through which the propagation of interests and legitimacy can be, by all means, uncomplicated, straight forwarded and, thus, unconsciously received by the ‘mass’. Effectively, people submit to the rising totalitarian authority. Referring to Gramsci (1971)’s concept of hegemony, authority can integrate the truthiness of its policies without any further complications or oppositions. At this point, all the natural religious, sportive, cultural, social or educational apparatuses are utilized to brainwash their subjects’ mind. Here lies the role of the polarization of religious/ sportive/educational/cultural events, and historical figures and symbols in the arena of politics. Then, ideological citations provide motivation, opportunities and resources to defend and practice power on the ‘collective identity’ of the ruled. They construct meaningful falsifications that are situated in the psyche, dress consciousness, and

destabilize and threaten spiritual elements of life. The Egyptian ruling class, including the Mubaraks and the ruling National Party, could sustain the Mubarak dynasty on the Egyptian kingdom although Egypt was a republican state. Althusser (1970) suggests on ideology and its functional hegemonic policy:

If the ideological state apparatuses ‘function’ massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by which they function is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of ‘the ruling class’. Given the fact that the ‘ruling class’ in principle holds State power (openly or more often by means of alliances between classes or class fractions), and therefore has at its disposal the (Repressive) State Apparatus, we can accept the fact that this same ruling class is active in the Ideological State Apparatuses insofar as it is ultimately the ruling ideology which is realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses, precisely in its contradictions. (Althusser 1970)

As a matter of fact, every ideologically-determined society works to have stability where social and mental solidarity of ideological aspects between the members in one group, and work together to make this community or party solid. This dimension can be “explained in terms of relatively stable, socially shared mental representations of groups.” (Dijk, February 01, 2006, p. 04).

The problem of ideology destruction is abstracted from its connection to the problem of on-going events. The ideological structure refers to the created experience and perspectives of people, places, cultures, societies, etc. In Egypt, during the 2010 World Cup Football Qualification Matches, those perspectives could be obtained to allow people to recognize differences and distances, and ignore the truth as far as the role of Algerian ‘Other’ is concerned. And magnify the valued role of the Egypt to congratulate the Egyptian ‘Self’. The involvement of ideologies and the politicization of ideological apparatuses, such as sport and history, in institutionalized, influential and professionalized events provide opportunities for people to reanimate members in the ‘Selfhood’ world. Besides, they build new sense of effective agency that defends against the ‘perceived’ threats that are omnipresent in the dynamics of already-governed people’s lives. It is to that involvement that ideologies are misused, or rather politicized. In other words, although they can be negative or positive, their application makes it depressing. The producers of phenomena that take place during on-going incidents and the ‘Specialized Elite’ (politicians, regime leaders, etc.) organize experienced processes, which without doubt have a direct impact on the destruction of audiences’

previous agency, for planning and managing the delivery of those events. Van Dijk says that ideology can be “negative or positive, depending on the perspective, values, or group membership of the one who evaluates them” (Dijk, February 01st, 2006, p. 02).

The structure of ideologies is standardized by members of a group who share common beliefs. Nonetheless, those beliefs cannot be totally and usually stable. This is what makes this standardization flexible, without being fixed. In other words, its criteria change according to the principles of the politicization of discourses and practices. The common political, economic, social and cultural ecology assumes the foundation of the system of beliefs. They are made, shared and utilized by members of the common in-group/in-party in form of social, symbolic, cultural and political representations so that ideologies are ‘instrumentalized’. Jurgen Habermas, in his work “Citizenship and National Identity”, says:

Nationalism is a form of collective consciousness which both presupposes a reflective appropriation of cultural traditions that (...) spreads only via channels of modern mass communication (...) (this lends) nationalism the artificial traits of something that is to a certain extent a construct, thus rendering it by definition susceptible to manipulative misuse by political elites. (as cited in Takahashi, 1998, p. 704)

However, where do ideologies derive from? Every individual, social group or party establishes mental interpretation that models the meaning of their discourse. The discourse where all of these interpretations are biased is called context. The latter turns events into categorized communicative events. For instance, political discourse can form ideologies within sport field to tune planned communicative aspects over its events. Therefore, the discursive use of the discourse of this sport event is prejudiced in different intonations. Dijk (2001) says:

Context models are like models of other events, but with specific categories tuned to communicative events, such as the overall social domain (e.g., politics, education), the overall social action being accomplished (e.g., legislation, teaching), setting (time, location), participant roles (communicative, relational or social roles), and cognitions (beliefs, goals, aims, opinions). Their control of discourse operates at all levels: They tell the language users which relevant (interesting, new, etc.) propositions to select in event models, what speech act to realize and what the conditions of the speech act are, what politeness forms to choose, what style characteristics to select, and so on until the very intonation of spoken discourse.(p. 19)

As far as the events that went around the 2010 World Cup Football Qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt are concerned, media was polarized in the building of its discourse for the propagation of political ideals. This propaganda was carefully selective, where every part of its form was moulded and conceptualized according to what suited particular political interests. In order to condition this conceptualization, for instance, media used symbolic figures like historical heritage, intensified language heavily to exhibit spiritual sentiments of the members of the in-group and out-group. The traditions and the cultural as well as historical heritage that Algeria possesses were stroked for the purpose of blowing their values and drawing their intensified emotions. In the Egyptian channels, such as Dream and Masr Elyaoum, presenters of sport programs, say, used special heavy pitch and gestures that denoted angriness, while showing their interest that they cared about the dignity of the Egyptian people, devoting most of the television shows listening to people. Those pro-governmental channels' stereotypes built the status quo of the Egyptian ruling class within the Egyptian picture. As a result, 'hegemonized' people would be indirectly convinced that the Egyptian established regime's priority was Egypt and the Egyptians. In fact, the Egyptian citizenship was politicized and 'instrumentalized' for the purpose of 'hegemonizing' the masses. The picture below (Figure01) is an example of media's careful utilization of verbal and nonverbal communicative tools for the intention of amplifying the propagation of discourse and justifying the position of their viewpoint, using the language of hatred.



Figure 01: An Egyptian Journalist Amr Adib a Talk Show (ALQahira Today) ¹

The following picture (figure02) is another example of the media careful selection of, not just the language and speech parts, but the presentation well-known figures like artists and football players was also part of the instrumentalized model of propagation. Besides, those famous figures choose their language and use cultural and historical symbols in order to illustrate and intensify the conceptualization of their discourse. For instance, after the football qualification match that took place between Algeria and Egypt in the Sudanese Al-Mereikh Stadium on November 18th, 2009, the artist who appears in this picture addressed the Algerian People: “The Algerian People are backward, jerk (...) who should be welcomed with shoes”².

As a matter of fact, this discourse is biased because it, first, deduces the definition of the whole Algerian people from what a small group of fans did at that time. Secondly, the discursive use of history, in order to describe people along with their past, present and the future, was pejorative. Since she was invited by the talk show, especially that she is neither a sport analyser nor news presenter, it can be advocated that she was invited to play the role of a

¹ Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIqXtg3uq28>

² Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWHHBSY0pec>

spokesperson. In other words, her character was politicized as a pseudo-intellectual, whose role was to construct new corrections on definitions (for instance, as induced in the previous example, define who the Algerian people are), turn this definition into a theory (say, the Algerians are always violent, ignored...), and justify this theory into a made-fact. Then, this conceptual construction of meaning leads to the production of a system of beliefs that, in turn, creates sentiments. That system of beliefs can be claimed to be a supposedly background knowledge that gives answers to imaginative questions (for instance, who are the Algerians? Where they came from? What is and how was their history?).



Figure 02: an Egyptian Actress in a Talk Show (ALQahira and the People)³

Van Dijk (1998a) finds a set of characteristics to ideology, being an apparatus that makes a system of beliefs that induces background knowledge, as was marked in the previous example (as cited in Dijk, 2001, p. 15). Most of them will be extended later (the further extension of ideology and Sub-Arabism). He approaches the scope of ideology, saying:

- a. Among many other things, ideologies are systems of beliefs.
- b. These systems of beliefs are shared by members of a social group.
- c. Groups also share other beliefs, such as knowledge and attitudes.

³ Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWHHBSY0pec>

- d. The beliefs shared by a group will be called 'social representations' (SRs).
- e. Ideologies are the organizing, 'basic' beliefs of these SRs.,
- f. Groups not only have their 'own', ideologically based, «knowledge» (often called «beliefs» by other groups), but also share in more general, consensual, culturally shared knowledge, which may be called (cultural) 'common ground'.
- g. This cultural common ground may be seen as the foundation of all cognition, across and between different groups, and thus is also presupposed by different ideologies.
- h. Common ground may be empirically assessed as all beliefs that are presupposed in public discourse. This means that, for a given culture, such common ground is noncontroversial, commonsensical, and hence non-ideological.
- i. Part of the common ground are also the general norms and values shared by the members of a culture.
- j. Groups select some of these cultural values and organize them in their own ideologies, e.g., freedom, equality, justice or objectivity.
- k. Ideologies probably have a canonical structure that facilitates their acquisition, use and change.
- m. Although we don't know yet what this structure might be, it is probably related to the basic social properties of a group, such as the criteria of group membership, activities, aims, norms and values, relations to other groups, and specific group resources (or lack thereof)—or 'capital'.
- n. Ideologies and their structures may also be seen as the cognitive core of the identity of a group and its members, that is, as a social self-schema of a group.
- o. Ideologies and the social representations organized by them control the social practices of actors as group members.

(Dijk, 2001, p. 15)

As far as the case of the 'Egyptianist' ideology that was vivid to describe, define and mark the discourse—that took place during the events of the 2010 Qualification Football Matches as well as the incidents that partook that span of time—is concerned, all the images of this discourse acknowledged most of the characteristics that have been set by Van Dijk to extend the approach of ideology. The second, third and fourth characteristics admit that the 'the Specialised Elite' indirectly require people to support their policies, i.e. they are required to have a collective identity and share the same belief. That is why they care firstly about the 'hegemony' of their subjects.

Purposefully, the first characteristic was needed to set the equation of difference between the Egyptian 'Self' and the Algerian 'Other'. Indeed, people were required to adopt supposed beliefs in order to frame 'Otherness'. Although what (usually not an apparatus) conceptualizes an ideology exists before being 'instrumentalized' in form of ideology, it is

functioned in form of an apparatus because of newly-set contexts and further political interests. Ideology is a set of ideas and shared beliefs that it is “not emotional” (Dijk, 2006, p. 04). However, their usage is situated in emotional context since they “are socially shared... by individual group members in concrete situations (that) may of course trigger and be expressed as emotions.” (Dijk, 2006, p. 04). In other words, new changes on the context of a willingly-intensified incident make this apparatus pejoratively utilized. For instance, the Egyptian Civilization is a primordial historical heritage, being a non-apparatus fact. Conversely, this fact was utilized by the Egyptian ideologues (such as media) for the sake of giving the opportunity to polarize those football events so that the Egyptian ruling regime would have the opportunity to convince its people of its legitimacy other than other interests. As a result, the Egyptian ancient foreign roles as well as the Egyptian ancient Civilization of the Pharaoh were turned into ideological apparatuses, instrumentalizing Arabism and Egyptianism in pejorative contexts. In addition, people should be convinced that those were not ideologies, but canonical heritage that defined their belonging to Egypt (that is claimed by the eighth characteristic (h)). Geertz (1973) defines ideology:

Ideology tends to be simple and clear-cut, even where its simplicity and clarity do less than justice to the subject under discussion. The ideological picture uses sharp lines and contrasting blacks and whites. The ideologist exaggerates and caricatures in the fashion of the cartoonist. In contrast, a scientific description of social phenomena is likely to be fuzzy and indistinct. (p. 209)

The seventh and twelfth characters (g and m) are acquainted with the idea that ideology is a weapon that can be used to firstly define ‘Otherness’ and secondly confront this ‘Other’. This is what marked the case of the politicization of the 2010 football events, where several ideologies were needed; that of Egyptianism, Arabism and Sub-Arabism. Each one of these ideologies had its role. The first one was to define the Egyptian ‘Us’. The second was to define the true Arab, magnify the role of the Egypt in the Arab World and Algeria (for instance, Egypt is ‘Um Eddounya’ (Mother of all nations)). The third was to devaluate the value of the Algerian ‘Other’ in the Arab World and Egypt, and excommunicate the ‘Other’ from the Arab World (or at least shrink the image of the Algerian role in the Arab World in order to get rid of it from the competition of being the godfather of the Arab World).

The adoptive role of ideological discourses develops its aim from the priority it gives to the exercise of beliefs and dramatic features of domination through ‘power and hegemony’. The thirteenth and fourteenth criteria of Van Dijk’s schema to define the conceptualization of

ideology (characteristics n and o) admit that ideologues structure the framework of ideologies, taking into consideration their cognitive affect that they should have on the public collective consciousness. For instance, during football matches and the incidents that go around them, the dominant institution, such as politicians and media, provides a report of abstract events, i.e. the transmission of real events. Nonetheless, this institution establishes this provision via a framework that limits the mass's consciousness. Consequently, limiting their thinking makes the dominant elite to avoid any further public intentions that would affect that succession of the dominant interests. In other words, the abstract and naïf reality of those football events would be instrumentalized, becoming dominated already-framed opinions that dominate and harasses the real reality. It has been sited:

When one ideology, or world view, dominates, it suppresses or stamps out, often cruelly, any other ways of explaining reality. Actually, hegemony can contain a variety of ideologies. Some are artificial -- theoretical explanations created by academics or political activists or philosophers. Other ideologies are "organic," which means they come from the common people's lived experience. These consist of a culture's way of seeing and believing, and the institutions that uphold these beliefs, like religion, education, family, and the media. Through these beliefs and institutions, society endorses the ethical beliefs and manners which "the powers that be" agree are true, or right, or logical, or moral. The institutions and beliefs that the dominant culture support are so powerful, and get hold of people when they are so young, that alternative ways of envisioning reality are very hard to imagine. ("Antonio Gramsci and the Idea of "Hegemony"', n.d.)⁴

Dimensionally, the social organization of ideology can change as a function of social groups reversely changing their social tactics in response to short-term changes of the environment. Any social group modifies their interactions with other groups and organizes social systems, basing on a single strategy that sets it different from others. Social organizations are mostly ideology-specific. The flexible, dynamic, changing, contextualized and subjective aspects of the ideological apparatus are "accounted for by ideologically based, specific, subjective mental models of group members that control discourse and other social practices in each situation." (Dijk, 2006, p. 04). Indeed, according to Van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analyst pays attention to the framing of discourse that is affected by the cognitive and social aspect of its later effect that a politician, or any other ideologist, should take into consideration while coding the message of his discourse.

⁴ Retrieved from <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~hfox/gramsci.html>

On the same parlance, the Marxist theory uses the notion of ideology to describe the process through which the dominant ideas within a given society reflect the interests of a ruling class. Under the light of this Marxist thinking, Critical Discourse Analysis studies ideology as an apparatus that has established a challenging notion, as many of its elements have treated it as relatively stable body of knowledge that the leading class transmits wholesale to its subordinate classes. Karl Marx's Theory of Social Determinism considers society as being divided into two classes: the Dominant who controls all means of production, and the Bewildered who is determined to work in, or deal with, these means for the sake of serving or supporting the Dominant. Thus, the ideological system is a tool that a state uses to hold the circumstances and relations of production being 're-produced and 're-maintained' in a social community by institutions like media, government, educational system, religion, cultural events or sport, among others. The Marxist Theory uses the notion of ideology to describe the process through which the dominant ideas, within a society, reflect the interests of a ruling class.

Efficiently, ideological apparatuses are linked to common-sense leadership in order to set domination unrelenting through beliefs as falsified facts. Common-sense ecology consists of making a set of processes, such as cultural traits, spiritual development, learning systems, historical records, civilizing missions and specific political manifestations every individual has the right to possess, committed to a social group or party. According to Norman Fairclough (1998), ideological common-sense is considered as

common sense in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power. This is a matter of degree. In some cases the relationship to symmetrical power relations may be a direct one, like the commonsensical assumption (...) that everybody has 'freedom of speech', which disguises and helps to maintain the actuality of barriers to speech of various sorts for most people. In other cases, the relationship may be rather indirect (...) And rather than assuming a classification of common sense into 'ideological' or 'non-ideological', it will be more helpful to say that common-sense assumptions may in varying degrees contribute to sustaining unequal power relations.(p. 84)

This vision puts members of a common community in a framework where they understand the world. It does not instil leadership only; rather, it is the leadership itself, basing group/ party influence. It processes specific-community assumptions underlying the consciousness of authority followers through hegemony and discourses of coherence. Common-sense

ideologies establish and consolidate relations among members of a particular social grouping (Fairclough, 1998, p. 84).

II. 3. Sub-Arabism

II.3.1. Sub-Arabism: Conceptualization, Scope and Actualization

The propagandist guerrilla that mounted the atmosphere of the 2010 World Cup qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt transformed the discourse of competition and sporting into a salient political discourse. The latter blazed the diplomatic ties between the two countries. The discursive use of this discourse required the dominant institutions to conceptualize an ideology, through which they would approach concealed dominant interests and theories. In Egypt, the ideology of the Egyptian superiority succeeded in becoming a national culture, as well as a system of strong beliefs, sentiments, apparently-already fixed traditional practices of being the leader of the Arab World. Effectively, throughout the politicization of those football events, the exclusive appropriation of the Egyptian historical achievements that they made to their nation and the Arab-Islamic World, as well as the Egyptian civilization, secured and justified this ideology. On the one hand, this ideology, that can be called ‘Sub-Arabism’, was for the reason of summoning the value of their past and recent geostrategic role. On the other hand, in addition to being a *de facto* action to prove the magnification of their valuable position, the Algerian role was ideologically devalued and hidden.

Efficiently, the public adherence to and consumption of this ideology were not simply or superstitiously apparent as just simple beliefs or symbols. Rather, they were rationally produced and consumed as practices, as well as answers to the needs of the politicians and the mass people. Politician’s needs were the struggle to control their subjects, fulfil their desire to establish the kingdom of Mubaraks so that the Egyptian throne would be succeeded by President Mubarak’s son. They tried to fulfil this through, what Gramsci (1971) calls, ‘civil society’ that rules through consent not force. Gramsci believes that civil society is seen as the public sphere where trade unions and political parties gained concessions from bourgeois state, and the sphere in which ideas and beliefs were shaped, where bourgeois ‘hegemony’ was reproduced in cultural life through the media, universities, and religious institutions to ‘manufacture’ the public consent and legitimacy (as cited in Heywood, 1994, p. 100-101).

Apparently, President Mubarak and his son Djamel were convinced that Egypt was witnessing reluctant development. As a result, they were convinced that using force to inherit Mubaraks' dynasty in ruling the country would draw the public against them. Accordingly, those matches' atmosphere was relevant and suitable to be an ideological field through which public consent would be manufactured. Madjdi (2012) says:

The aim of a parliament was to be measured according to the measurements of Mubarak and his son. It had one goal only that was embracing the birth of a new Mubarak regime. And if Mubarak thought of dying in his office and standing for another term, this would be good. And if he passed his presidency to Gamal Mubarak, that would be "okay"; that means that the Candidates, according to the most qualified scenario to be won are President Mubarak and his son Gamal Mubarak. (p. 250)

The importance of this policy was also needed to make the Egyptians forget their real tough times, economic problems, social delinquency, unemployment, deteriorated health, etc. consequently, Djamel Mubarak would enter the political field step by step through actions that he was purposely doing in order to come close to the people. On March 28, 2009, Gamal Mubarak said: "We have come to help and serve people only—and we do not have any other aims." (as cited in Madjdi, 2012, p. 254). This language seems naïf and simple. However, it shows that he was emphasizing the delivery of the first part of his saying, "We have come to help and serve people only". In fact, the word "only" can be considered as the first sign that a specific interest is concealed between the words. The negation, in "do not have any other aims", that he did not have any other intention justifies what is contrary to his spoken language "to help and serve people". That seems to help and serve his interests, especially that a space seemed to be left bare after saying "to help and serve people". We may ask ourselves: why didn't he complete his words? He may say: "we have come only to help and serve needy people".

As far as the public needs are taken into consideration, the ideologues, through this ideology, planned that people would feel and express that there was just one source that could guarantee and fulfil their needs. That was the Mubarak regime and the ruling National Democratic Party. Although those needs were planned and backed by politicians and pro-governmental media, they were made in such a way to make people feel and express that their feelings were real and natural sentiments, rather than faked. The importance of this ideology as well as the wavering sentiments of the Egyptian patriotism define 'Selfness' and 'Otherness', and the relation the Egyptians should have with the 'Other', especially that this

Other' was portrayed as being a source of threat to true Arabism. As the Egyptian conception and theories about Algeria and the Algerians were thoroughly determined, Sub-Arabism defines the framework whose borders could classify who would be inside the group of Arabic fundamentalism and who would be outside, as well as the nature of the mere faithfulness to the 'Our-group' or 'Other group'.

Subsequently, Sub-Arabism could be the antonym of the in-group. Thus, this ideology determines the representation of who was out of the group of true Arabism. Effectively, language, here Arabic as a sociolinguistic tool, is prominently used in order to define appropriate characteristics of inter-groups relations, attitudes, nationality (as far as Algeria is a nation that was considered as out-group), social and cultural behaviours, and religion. Algeria was considered as a cross-cultural encounter. In fact, it was seen as a foreign country that should belong to France. For instance, the Egyptian media and artists said that it was Egypt that taught Arabic language and civilization, basing their arguments on the real Algerian historical events that took place during the French occupation of Algeria.

In the same way, Arabism was a conception of 'pure Arab' that was biased as an ideology, basing their portrayal on Arabic ethnocentrism and the categorisation of in-group Arabs and out-group Arabs. The instrumentalization of Arabism claimed the moral superiority of who would pure Arab over who would be 'sub-Arab'. As a matter of fact, Egypt was not considered to be pure Arab country only. It was also considered to be the leader of the Arab World. In fact, Sub-Arabism was not instrumentalized just to separate categories that are established on the basis of who was the full Arab and who was not an Arab. Indeed, full-Arabist ethnocentrism was used to decree the universality of Egypt to be the leader of the Arab World because the superiority of its values induced the universality of its role in the Arab World. That was prominent when making Egypt the land on which most of Arab national buildings, such as the Arab International Federation of Football and the Arab League, are located. Abdellah-Pretceille (2004a) defines the universality of ethnocentrism as "the more negative that is politically interpreted by expansionism (...) the attribution of values and hierarchical systematization of cultures that confesses an ideological character or authorises the ideological manipulations" (p. 120).

The universality of ethnocentrism, which induced the ideology of Sub-Arabism, claimed Egypt to hold the basis of the superior ruler of the Arab World. This induced the framing of boundaries, constructing identities of the in-group and out-group members, defining the distinction between the characteristics of the 'Us' from that of the 'Other'. As a result, the conception of this new identity develops new attitudes, positive towards the in-group member

and negative towards the out-group member. Even the 'Other' can be caused to form their specific negative attitudes towards the in-group. That means it makes the 'Other' recognize their under-valued value and their distinction from the in-group. Edward Said (1995) says: "The construction of identity (...) involves establishing opposites and 'Others' whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from 'Us'" (p. 332).

As a result, the construction of identity contributes to the construction of awareness, making each member who has interests or is attached to particular recognition affirm, or rather *convince*, his awareness and confession that the superior ruler is the one who adheres to the universality of pure-Arab ethnocentrism. As a case in point, the Egyptians believed that the process of defining the Arabic identity and superiority in the Arab World was Egypt. It seemed that even some foreign countries, which had interests in the Middle East, were convinced of this role. That was apparent in an American magazine, called Newsweek. A copy of its front page is below. The article is entitled: "The future is Egypt... forget Iraq... The key in the Middle-East is the change in Egypt"



Figure 03: President Mubarak’s Son Djamel Mubarak on a Front Page of the Newsweek Magazine (Mentioned in Madjdi 2012: 263)

Eventually, cultural specific aspects, such as religious practices and traditions, provide common-sense processes with visions of interpreting things and ways of building collective experiences that all help in the creation of power acting. This charges the ‘bewildered herd’ with shared-activities and knowledge. As far as the Egyptian-Algerian case is concerned, the

ideological discourse of chauvinism and nationalism was existent, with a constellation of images, judgements and false assumptions in form of a subjective scholarship approach used by the Egyptian dominant institutions that situate between the 'Us' and the 'Other'. Those institutions used a set of speech genres and imaginatively-discursive discourses to render the 'Other' through a system of unauthentic depictions. Otherness is seen through institutions that make illusory connecting lines between a nation and another. They are not seen as members of a common community; they are seen as individuals. As an example, Algeria was a subject that was racing Egypt on the honour of being the symbol of the Arab-World. Evidently, in the Egyptian media, the Algerian people were the prime focus of the public concern. To substantiate this, the Algerians were collectively associated with bad behaviours, such as violence.

Ultimately, as might be expected, the Algerian 'Other' was not allowed to witness any possibility of development. Besides, the nation of the 'Other' could have never been seen as transforming and dynamic entity. Accordingly, change was seen by the Egyptians as coming from outside as a force to the extent that it could not be managed or contained. The 'Us' imagine that they should colonize the Other's mind to provide flourishing conditions. The Egyptian role, according to the Egyptian institution, was the saviour of the Algerians by infecting them with the Egyptian spirit and guiding them to the true 'Arabhood'. The Egyptian state practiced attitudes and misrepresentations to function to the 'Other' as "underground self", demarcating the Arab World; thus, giving strength and identity to Egyptian Pharaoh-related identity. New established ideas have a long tradition including certain customs of thinking, imagining and vocabulary to give these ideas grounded reality.

In due course, ideology can be considered as "a macro-nationalism or projection of micro-nationalism onto the larger geographical area, based on consumer interests (religion, culture and race) as the bases of aspiration for political entity" (Tibi, 1981, p. 44). Historically, historians and social scientists agree that the first example of modern Arab state emerged in Egypt. Among the first Arab nationalist at that time was El-Tahtaoui. He introduced the Egyptian Nationalism, called 'El-Watan'. Thus, the Egyptian patriotism is an ideology drawn to justify that the Algerians threaten the Egyptian national identity, 'El-Watania', which preaches anti-individualism and anti-secularism. What mostly matters in the case of Sub-Arabism and the Egyptian discourse on Algeria was 'El-Watania's' anti-individualism and all the aspects that define an Arab country like the language, cultural heritage and history. This common-sense exhibited 'Sub-Arabism' as a mediated and popular discourse. The Orient has been significant to Europe because European states have had their

rich and old colonies in the territory. In contrast, the Sub-Arab was significant to Egypt because it had rich business companies in the Algerian territory. Thus, Sub-Arabism is a 'corporate institution' for dealing with the Sub-Arab by devaluating its value and concealing its role. It represents the Algerian culturally and ideologically as a mode of discourse through institutions (like soccer and media), imaginative geographies, and politicized doctrines (Arab Political Nationalism).

Ideological norms are discourses that help in the comprehension of the mechanism of power and power relations between the worlds of the 'representer' and the 'represented'. The latter is characterized as being conflicts-based experience as an 'eternal order'. They provide a fixed and regular distinction between them. 'Us' ("we the Egyptians") was used, in the case of Algeria-Egypt conflicts, to refer to the pure-Arab, and bravely and heroically revolutionary. The Algerian 'Other' was not only defined as the opposite of the Egyptian, but also as he was the learning follower of the Egyptian all-knower. The Egyptian depicting discourse lumped Algeria different cultures in terms of social structures and values, in this manner fashioning imaginative Sub-Arab geography. The identity of the Algerian people was seen as being difficult to be recognized, and feared to be controlled due to their brutality and savageness. In fact, all those images were deduced and generated by the Egyptian media propaganda on the all the Algerians. Egyptian channels and players biased the real incidents of the match that took place in Sudan. They declared that they were beaten by the Algerian fans who, unlike the Egyptian fans who consisted of media figures and artists, were prisoners and gangs. All those conceptual categories called for the analysis of the difference that raised 'Otherness' that would lead to elimination.

Throughout history, some figurative boundaries have been very powerful in maintaining separation of difference between nations. Some leading organizations developed a set of stereotypes depicting the 'Other' as violent, half-civilized (in the case of Algeria as half-Arab) and violent, and devaluated, establishing incidents that would fuel diplomatic crisis and political mobilizations. Media corporations take an active role in questioning cultural, social and political agendas. In the case of Algeria and Egypt football incidents of 2009, media corporations and football set a system of classification that can be elaborated to sustain oppositional relations between the perceived 'civilized' and the perceived 'uncivilized', the perceived hooligan and the perceived 'hero'. They also create an atmosphere of fear and discomfort to enhance ideologies of difference for the purpose of controlling/ devaluating the 'Other', maintaining dominance on their country's herd to practice further ends. At this stage, misrepresentations become effective vehicle for advancing political agendas.

As a matter of fact, representations are essential in the drawing the public awareness in order to absorb the ideological ideas and political ideals. The relationship between knowledge and power, according to Foucault, is fundamental in the process of cultural representation and the creation of ideologies. Power operates within institutional apparatuses, such as media, religious institutions, sport field and political regimes. Each of these foundations develop strategies for demarcating difference-based relations between the ‘ourselves’ and ‘other-selves’, and articulating them within a space of cultural, political and diplomatic aggression. Discourses are systems of thought.

According to Foucault, discourse forms ideology. It is important in the understanding of ideologies as they relate to power and knowledge. The Egyptian political power and the Egyptian interpretation of the Algerian history, culture and identity all set the discourse of deteriorating the Algerians. The discourse of the political elite, of newspapers, on-line forums, of television showed is discursively creative. One of the aspects of Orientalism, which have been defined by Edward Said (1995), can be highlighted to define one of the characteristics of Sub-Arabism. The ideologies that were produced and utilized by the Egyptian political and mediating institutions propagated the discourses of ‘Algerianophobia’. In other words, those institutions established a relation between the urgency to have the power for ‘hegemonizing’⁵ their subjects and the production of beliefs to be utilized as a source of knowledge to produce new definitions of the ‘Other’. Thus, language is used as a symbolic power to narrow the public thinking so that they would have the ability to convince them of legitimacy of the ‘dominant’ regime. Besides, the function of this language transmitted via discourse builds imaginative geographies of the ‘Other’ land, along with its newly-defined political, cultural, historical, social (the field of sport can be considered as an example because its discourse of entertainment can be shifted into a socio-political institution; another example can be the sociological identification of state like aggressiveness and backwardness) and linguistic aspects. Said (1995) states⁶:

Without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively (...) so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could

⁵ I have used this word as a reference to the action-verb that can denote Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’.

⁶ Here Orientalism is taken to define ideology generally, not specifically to the Orient, as containing some of the aspects that can be shared between Orientalism and Sub-Arabism as conceptions

do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. (p. 03)

II.3.2. Criteria for the definition of Sub-Arabism

Sub-Arabism is an ideology that was used by the ‘Egyptianists’ to define the Algerian ‘Other’. This would maintain ‘Egyptianist’ Arabism as a struggle against this Otherness in form of cultural, sociolinguistic, political and historical framework. The ideological designation of this conceptualization bears some criteria that allow the ideology of Sub-Arabism to be an extensive approach that was used by the Egyptian dominant propagation to define the Algerian Otherness. These are some:

- ❖ First criterion: the Egyptian ideologues used ‘Sub-Arabism’ as a mediator between the Egyptian ‘We’ and the Algerian ‘Other’. Thus, this Otherness could not be naturally viewed without the ‘We’ pseudo-intellectuals’ explanation of the codes that inform about Algeria. Just like the Orient in the eyes of the West and the Occident in the eyes of the Orient (Said, 1995, p. 67), the ‘Algerian’ was depicted by the ‘Egyptianists’ with their body of biased knowledge. The latter was made by the Dominant Institution in order to make the ‘bewildered herd’ ignorant about whom the ‘Other’ truly is. In other words, to know about the ‘Sub-Arabist’, the Egyptians needed to consult the ‘Egyptianist Specialized Elite’ like the pro-governmental media and artists, and the dominant regime whose role was to guide them in their cultural, political and social aspects of the ‘Us’ life. For instance, the Egyptian journalist Kamel Aneur, who was the guest of ‘Erriyada Elyoum’ (Sport Today) talk-show on Dream channel, admits, “We are the ones who speak and we are the ones who say about Egypt, the people of Egypt and the sovereignty of Egypt. If anyone wants to talk about Egypt, he has to pay the price and take responsibility. No harm and we will not remain silent and every one remains in place.”⁷

As a result, the Dominants’ imperative, in their ‘instrumentalization’ of the Algerian Otherness, was for the sake of protecting the political, social and economic status quo of Egypt. This was for the reason that, at that time, the Egyptians were experiencing economic and social hardship. The Egyptian

⁷ Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIqXtg3uq28>

political institutions, such as the National Party that was managed by Djamel Mubarak, was ruling over most of the Egyptian institutions as those of health and tourism. The same hardship, which was the result of corruption, would lead to the ‘Arab Spring’. Gelvin (2012) says:

In both Tunisia and Egypt, privatization of government owned assets fed the corruption; those who had connections with, for example the ruling party, or more important the president’s family, were most successful in acquiring public enterprises, usually at bargain- basement rates (...) (the story) of privatization in Egypt revolves around Djamel Mubarak, Hosni Mubarak’s son (...) there was, however, more to corruption than that bred by privatization, and there was a reason one of the most popular chants among protesters (...) more serious than presidential theft (i.e. the Mubarak’s accumulation of \$ 2-3 billion dollars) was the nexus of the National Democratic Party leadership, cabinet or parliamentary membership, and economic opportunity. (p. 40-41)

Focusing the Egyptians’ attention on the influence of the French colonization on Algeria, for instance, the Egyptian government covered its subjects for the sake of turning their awareness away from a far important debate over the real Egyptian social status quo. Calling over the collective identity of people functioned as an instrument of symbolic power and domination. In George Orwell’s novel, 1984, the role of government’s revision of historical events for brainwashing minds is emphasized. Effectively, as far as Otherness is taken into consideration, the establishment of a relationship between politics and history, religion, culture, or any other social institution played an important role in the maintenance of the Egyptian political status quo. The political ‘revisionism’ of the Algerian history, in addition to its use as an instrument both to highlight the positive value of the Egyptian dominant policies (nationally and geo-strategically), and attenuate the Algerian ones (nationally and geo-strategically).

- ❖ Second criterion: Sub-Arabism’s ambivalent treatment of the Algerian Otherness required forged images and misrepresentations of the ‘Algerian’, instead of deliberate naïf and natural portrayal of reality. This stigmatising depiction induces a mythical scholarship of actualities rather than an objective analogy. The ideological stereotypes answered the question of whom Algerians are and what Algeria is, through substantial political scope that Algeria and Algerians were ‘represented’ rather than being presented. Besides, this subjective analogical study of the ‘Algerianism’, along with organizing structure of Algerian past and current facts, was encountered with subjective

mythical study of 'Egyptianism', along with organizing structure of Egyptian past and current aspects.

In a way or in another, this indicates that the emotions and trusteeship the Egyptians had in their history and civilization— that, according to them, marked the symbolic construction of their identity—were instrumentalized for the purpose of masking reality, gaining their public political conscience, making people perceive reality, as well as driving their consciousness away from their social contradictions. Capdevila (2004) says, "The invisibility of ideology signifies that the identification of individuals with their society is total" (p. 164). Consequently, that 'instrumentalization' of history shifts the spiritual aspect of accounting history to be a materialistic and utilitarian approach. Thus, the figurative boundaries, caused by representations— in case of Egypt-Algeria relations during the 2010 World Cup Qualification Matches, there were misrepresentations, maintaining separation of differences between the two nations.

The 'Egyptianist' media developed a set of stereotypes, depicting the Algerians as uncivilized, barbaric, people with a lost identity and violent. One of the most prominent texts that capture this encounter was media that dealt with the incidents of the 2010 World Cup Qualification football incidents to fuel diplomatic crisis and feed political mobilization, ranking the Algerian society on the scale of under-valuable role of its policies and barbarism. Media corporations took an active role in questioning the Algerian cultural and political agendas. Media and football as institutions set a system of classification that could be elaborated to sustain oppositional relations between the ancient civilized versus the uncivilized, the real-Arab versus the Sub-Arab, the hero versus the hooligan, in addition to other supplemented examples. Moreover, it created an amplified atmosphere of fear, suspicion through pejorative polarization of symbolic facts like history and language.

- ❖ Third criterion: the ideological and imaginative approach of Sub-Arabism admits that the conflicts and prerequisites between Algeria and Egypt that were produced before, during and after the qualification matches of 2010 could be only settled through the 'Us' total destruction of or domination over the 'Other'. This was significantly confirmed by media. Before the qualification match of November 18th, 2009, a journalist, named Amro Adib, in a talk show "Cairo Today"⁸says:

⁸ Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIqXtg3uq28>

I hope the Algerians will be sad tomorrow. Their arrogance, humiliation, provocation and confiscation of their force bother me a lot. As much as I am an Egyptian and I want Egypt to win, I hope the Algerians lose. Why do Algerians hate Egypt? Did they forget that we won the World Cup through them before this? God willing, may Allah break the Algerians, and the sons of the Pharaohs win through the Algerian team.

The principle of adopting this conflicting sentiments towards the Algerian ‘Other’ was basic to the succession of the whole ideology along with its affects, such as the building of public collective hegemony of the ‘Us’, bargaining the legitimacy of the dominant elite, and propagating for the established policies and interests. First of all, in the previous saying, Amro Adib acts as pseudo-intellectual who fights for the sake of his country’s glory. His chauvinist sentiments towards his country in the context of a football match, through which the final decision over who would exceed to the World Cup of 2010 was highly competitive, were manipulated as an agenda. The latter could be the political race to gain their legitimacy through their appearance as the right carer about the Egyptian social problems and the domestic needs of all people; approval of the Egyptian supremacy over the Algerian ‘Other’. More intensively, he wishes not only that the Algerian football team to be defeated in the coming match. Those sentiments also wish the whole country to be frustrated. In other words, for the sake and urgency to define the Egyptian sovereignty, the state of mind of the ‘Self’ needed an enemy whose imaginative geography was drawn through the discursive activation of the Egyptian patriotism and chauvinism, by saying **“as much as I am an Egyptian... I wish the Algerians lose”**. Taking into consideration the national and international role of a country participating in a World Cup, and having either Algeria or Egypt as the only representatives of the Arab World in front of the international football magnified the need to defeat the Other. The decisive defeat of the ‘Other’ postulates the ‘Us’ overwhelming of power.

Secondly, the question “Why do the Algerians hate Egypt” induces exaggerating depiction that defines ‘all’ the Algerians without having any closer experience with them. Then, it draws geographic spaces of both Algeria and Egypt, amplifying the natural distinction and differences between the two peoples strengthened the context of hatred.

- ❖ Fourth criterion: As already dealt with in the previous criterion, natural differences that logically exist between nations are the bedrock upon which the ideologues utilize them to emphasise ontological borders between the peoples. This state of mind indicates that the two peoples can, by no means, meet. Accordingly, being civilized is the matter of having an ancient civilization, and the fact of having a dominant role in the micro-level (inside the country: in this case Egypt) and the macro-level (outside: in this case the Arab World). Therefore, this ideology leads to the adoption of specific evaluations and judgements on whom the Arab and the Sub-Arab are. Although this position is not real, but it is rationalized. It is the job of the ideologue of this position to naturalize and backup the idea that of the Egyptian Self's supremacy over the 'Other'. As a result, new identities are built and transformed into new social habits that would feed political attitudes. Then, the transformation of produced positions towards the Self and the Other into reasoned positions recognizes ideological opinions as merely legitimate realities and, thus, becomes accurate identities. Pierre Bourdieu (1991) says:

Distinction does not necessarily imply (...) a quest for distinction. All assumptions and, more generally, all practice in conspicuous, visible, whether or not it was performed in order to be seen (...) Hence, every practice is bound to function as distinctive sign and, when the difference is recognized, legitimate and approved, as a sign of distinction (...) produces separations which are meant to be perceived legitimate difference. (p. 237-238)

Efficiently, in addition to the specific utilization of particular linguistic jargon, the polarization of these differences gives the dominant elite the tool to practise their power, through which they pursue their interests, display their practical competence and approve their policies.

The confrontation between Algeria and Egypt, due to inconvenience about the 2010 World Cup qualification matches, rose a context where the 'Us' was a reference of the pure, most civilized, and bravely and heroically revolutionary Arab on the one hand. On the other hand, the Algerian 'Other', who was not only defined as opposite to the Egyptians, was the learning follower of Egyptian all-knower. The discourse of that confrontation lumped Algeria into one large semi-Arab hegemonic entity, closing eyes in the Algerian different values in terms of social and cultural structures, fashioning imaginative massive sub-Arab nation. Besides, the stereotypes of this discourse dealt with the Algerian people as being unable to identify their identity and feared to be controlled to their brutality and savageness. All these conceptual

categories called for the analysis of the differences that processed Otherness, leading out elimination.

Eventually, the discourse of those processed differences put all the Algerian 'Other' in one floating word. Gramsci's concept of hegemony seemed playing a game over the two peoples' ties. Hegemony is a state that policy makers and politicians should pertain in order to build the collective identity of their people so that their consent would be easily manipulated. Indeed, their awareness is limited within a particular frame. As a result, their awareness makes limited definitions of the 'Other' without having a deep investigation on each persons of this 'Other'⁹. Thus, subjective judgements on a small group of gangs or some ignorant persons are a source of reference to the all people. In other words, they take the criterion of a small entity from the whole 'Other' and make generalizations on who is every 'Other' citizen. The cognitive aspect, which the representation of the 'Other' had on the public cognitive awareness, affected the social attitude of the 'Us' towards the 'Other'. Effectively, the behaviour of a small entity was naturalized as the criterion of the whole people. Regarding the case of Algeria and Egypt, the curse and violence had been exercised on people who did not belong to the supreme values and characteristic-based world. Hegemonic power worked to persuade individuals to undertake the path to the social values and norms of a manipulative system. The production of knowledge about the Algerians had an important feature in the construction of reel images and judgements on them. Said (1995) says, " In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over others; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as hegemony, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life" (p. 07).

Edward Said offers a clear view on the power of hegemonizing the public awareness and consent. Thus, the drawing of a pejorative and subjective 'imaginative geography' is needed and instrumentalized by the 'Special Elite' in order prove their socio-political policy.

⁹ Here, I use the word 'Other' in order to refer to all the people of the other country being confronted by the country of the 'Us'

II.3.3. Sub-Arabism as a Tool to Approach Otherness

The conception of Sub-Arabism can be observed to be an approach through which people were controlled as their attention was drawn. This hegemony required the Egyptian Specialised Elite create an imaginative geography of 'Algerianism' in the minds of the Egyptian people as a tool to have their support of the established political power, and the public conviction of the legitimacy of the Mubaraks' rule. Thus, this ideology was meant to realize the agenda of turning the Republic of Egypt into a kingdom. Madjdi (2012) illustrates:

A diplomatic cable from the United States revealed that leaders of the ruling Egyptian National Democratic Party (NDP) were upset on the heroic image of Alaa Mubarak after Algeria's World Cup qualification match. The US Embassy in Cairo indicated in a document, which was released in November, 2009, that the National Party decided to launch a wide propagation campaign to bring the image of Gamal Mubarak back to the forefront. (p. 259)

This research refers to this ideology as Sub-Arabism, i.e. 'Egyptianist' conceptualization of representative theories about the Algerians in the discourse that was used during the Qualification matches of 2010¹⁰. This concept induces the ideological apparatus that was as an approach by the Egyptian political propagandist that had no scientific validity. In other words, it was faked. Then, it was made real. As Edward Said applied the criteria of Orientalism to consider the Western depiction of the Arabs and the Muslims, the researcher embraces the criteria of Sub-Arabism to denote the Egyptian politicians' and media guerrillas' depiction of Algeria and the Algerians the period that took place before, during and after the 2010 World Cup Football Qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt in Algeria, Egypt and the Sudden.

Although Orientalism was used as a term to refer the Western distorted and biased view of the Orient, and Occidentalism was used as a term to refer to the Oriental biased view of the west, neither terms, or any other concept, has been coined to a distorted and biased view that might be framed by members of the same origin, such as that of the Egyptians and the Algerians. In fact, Sub-Arabism is used by the researcher as a term to refer the Egyptian biased view of the Algerians and their country before, during and after the incident of the

¹⁰ Firstly, I use the term of *Egyptianist* instead of Egyptian to highlight the Egyptian political biased view that was meant by the Egyptian politicians and pro-governmental media as an approach to refer to Algeria and the Algerians the lenses of a polarized football incidents and the politicization of historical events. Secondly, I advocate the proclamation of the term of Sub-Arabism as being coined and used by myself.

2010 World Cup football qualification matches. In fact, the ideology that is represented by this term is not an approach that was used to depict the Algerians and shrink their value only; rather, it was also used by the Egyptian dominant institution and the Egyptians—after being convinced of its subscribed rationality, to spiritually restore the warmth of the Pharaoh community. For instance, the discursive use of some historical symbols, such as "الفراعة" (the Pharaoh) as a reference to the Egyptian football national team, was an approach to regain the Egyptian in-group community. Besides, it can be considered as a tool to consolidate solidarity among the Egyptians.

Furthermore, the researcher can extend this concept to include all the negative reactions to the Algerian culture, basing their arguments on some behaviour that some Algerian fans practiced against the Egyptian fans, according to the Egyptian media. Sub-Arabism was definitely devoted to the cause of propagating the discourse of hatred and the rejection of the Algerian Otherness, as well as their confirmation of their Egyptian 'Self'.

At this stage, the propagation of this ideology must have needed the spokesperson as its pseudo-intellectual. It means that it needed to adopt an intellectual to advocate its truthfulness, whereas the real definition of an intellectual is the one who bases his arguments on the scientific validity of facts. Intellectuals believe "**never in solidarity before criticism**" (Said, as cited in Ghosh, 2009, p. 157). Nonetheless, the production of ideologies that is based on biased depictions cannot rely on intellectuals. Thus, an established political, cultural or religious discourse selects its spokesperson to be its pseudo-intellectual. The discursive use of the political, social and religious discourse, during the events of the qualification matches of 2010, utilized national figures from the arena of sport, such as "الفراعة" (the Pharaoh) as a reference to the Egyptian football team, "الخنزير" (El-Khodre) as a reference to the Algerian national football team. Another example is that, in the football match that took place in Um-Darman (Sudden) on the 14th of November, 2009, the Egyptian president Mubarak Hosni selected the Egyptian fans to be from intellectuals, media figures and artists. Conventionally, this denotes that this was not really the selection of the Egyptian football fans. In fact, it was the selection of the spokespersons that would be the pseudo-intellectuals of the Egyptian dominant agenda. Thus, the national symbolism was the figure that tried to embrace the symbolic figurehead of the ideology of Sub-Arabism.

Paradoxically, although Algeria and Egypt have different aspects that draw their specific geostrategic, social, sub-cultural and political borders, they still do share some

aspects that engage them into the Arab World, such as language and religion, in addition to other historical features like their revolutions and struggles for independence. Thus, one can deduce that the mainstream cultures, which have brought them to be melted in the pot of Arabism, are just one part the whole Arab cultural reservoir. The political and corporate interests and theories spoil the natural relation between people. Thus the interests-based ideological discourse of the Egyptian politicians and media effected the usual formation of Egyptian social, linguistic, historical and cultural representations of Algeria and the Algerians, according to the context of sport, context of politics in which both of the countries were expecting sooner presidential elections, and the social context that was noticing social problems, unemployment, illegal immigration and deteriorating health. Nait Brahim (2005-2006) says:

Members of the same culture tend to have different views of the same things. This difference is due to the fact that, beside the cultural referents, they do have other referents that vary according to an individual's context of life, studies, work and reaction. Among these referents ideology holds an important place. (p. 99)

II.4. Football as a Politically-Manipulated Agenda in Algeria and Egypt

II.4.1. Football as a Socio-Political Contract in Algeria

During the 2010 World Cup qualification matches, the political system invaded and played an active driver of events in sport. Soccer was exploited by the political 'Specialized Elite' as the arena of socio-political competition instead of a sporting one. The political official, in turn, looked for what would silence the citizen to keep up with his problems and demands from jobs, housing, raising salaries and everything related to the conditions of a decent living. The political dominant institution was looking for a solution to deter the inconvenience of the citizen to the administration. World Cup qualification matches were an area to mobilize the entire community towards football. They did not want them to be aware of their obligations and problems. The 2010 matches coincided with waves of anger in many areas of the country during 2009 and 2010, which were improving and providing the necessities of living.

Effectively, those sport matches were exploited by politicians to absorb the negative reality, albeit temporary until they search for other methods to play the role that was played by sport in addressing the public social sufferance. We saw a series of economic and social crises such as suicides, child abduction, illegal immigration, in addition to other social conditions the citizens used to live. At this point, football was used as a method to obscure the anger of the people until they find ways to make the citizens forget their problems. Political decision-makers knew all the certainty that football was an important thing to the young Algerian, through which he tries to forget his struggles, and claim his rights and duties outstanding in the disabled projects. May be basing on football would delight the people. Besides, enabling the national team to appear in a good image could enhance the geostrategic image of the country, locally and in the Arab World. In a press interview with the Algerian newspaper Al-Khabar (جريدة الخبر), Major General Khalid Nizar, on the occasion of the publication of his book "On the Egyptian Front," admitted:

The President of the Republic must take advantage of the Algerian victory on Egypt, to improve his relationship with the Algerian youth, reduce unemployment and freedom, and open up a wider area of freedom of expression. I think the president's chances have risen to 40 percent because he was behind the victory of the national team, by sending 13,000 supporters to Sudan. However, he must attach this policy to another to restore the image of the Algerian society.

(as cited in Al Khabar, January 25, 2010)

Any decision, issued at that time to defend the dignity of the country through sports events, was for the purpose of giving great attention to football. The latter was treated as a medium that could make the people unify into one body to forget their suffering, and give the governing institution stability. The status of the football events, taking place during the 2010 World Cup qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt, proved the extent to which people were connected to football, which is one of the current issues. Indeed, it is the case of all poor societies looking for things that fill the vacuum inside their lives. Thus, sport is one of the requirements for people living amid a huge number of problems, including poverty and unemployment. The only recipient of the victories are those who will have a large share of the harvest, from financial rewards, leadership positions, obtaining legitimacy of government like media, as well as other interests. This is the opportunity to pump up their assets and gain other privileges. The citizen can see them at those appointments only, showing their patriotism associated with their concealed interests. Whereas, the hope of a simple citizen is merely an observer of what is happening and a listener to what is promoted.

On the same parlance, Karl Marx (1989), in his theory of Economic Determinism, admits that society is divided into two groups: the ‘super-powerful’, who controls means of production, and the ‘proletariat’, who works in these means in order to produce power for the ‘super-powerful’. This theory can be simultaneously applicable in the field of politics since the ideological consciousness is the factor that determines hierarchies, duties and rights. Thus, according to Noam Chomsky, in his masterpiece “Lectures on Government and Binding” (1981), the ‘specialized elite’, who is the ‘super-powerful, utilizes ideologies in order to make the ‘bewildered herd’, who is the ‘proletariat’, in order to fulfil dominant interests. In other words, the mass are socially, politically, culturally and economically determined to produce privileges in order to satisfy the will of the dominant institutions like policy makers, private guerrilla and decision determiners. Karl Marx (1859) says, “The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness” (as cited in Feuer, 1959, p. 43-44). Marx admits that social re-order makes people lose their neutral experience of society. Thus, their awareness, identity and agency are challenged by the dominants’ correction of social roles.

At first glance, it appeared to be a football, but in reality it showed the conflict in society, with the phenomenon of corruption being solved by some gangs responsible for running the affairs of citizens. One can hardly see them until they notify an event, or rather an "occasion". They go out to the society and communicate with the citizen, showing their patriotic spirit. Since the occasion is the prominent leader of the situation, the decision-makers were found talking to him to give the picture that they were the sons of Algeria. They wanted an empty space of problems and demands. It looked like a campaign to support the national team. The public opinion was dominated through the means of media under the principle of citizenship, dignity of the country, and the preservation of its sanctities and symbols such as the Martyrs. Those football incidents formed the public anger without problems, although the social problems were created by governments because of their policies and decisions. Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli's Law of Reforming Theory, which is postulated in his masterpiece "The Discourse of Reforming the State of Florence" (1520), says that the creation of policies and the issuance of decisions are determined and affected by the concealed theories of the dominant institutions. The football events of 2009 were 'instrumentalized' by the political class, such as the political parties. The political manipulation of those incidents were affected to shift from a salient sporting discourse to a politically-amplified one. The political discursive use of symbols was an ideological vehicle of obscured concern. The First Secretary of the Socialist Forces Front Karim Tabou congratulated the national team on their qualification to the 2010 World Cup, saying:

The national team has achieved what governments have been unable to do for decades, creating national cohesion and a new national spirit that can be invested in more than one level. For the first time since 1962, the Algerians agree, despite of their different orientations and regions, on one government (...) a government led by Rabah Saadane.
(as cited in El-Khabar on November 20, 2002)

The following pictures (figures 04 and 05) show the hegemonic power of ideologically-based dominant policies and reforms, and their effects on the public awareness, identity and personal decision-making.



Figure 04: A Caricature (El-Khabar Newspaper, October 19, 2009)




Figure 05: A Caricature (El-Khabar Newspaper, November 16, 2009)

II.4.2. Egyptian Political Agendas

II.4.2.1. Football as an Instrument to Approach the Inheritance of Governance

It was not a surprise for the Egyptian political ground that every year had brought changes and challenges over the course and the discourse of political reforming approaches to pass on the project of changing the Egyptian type of governance to be hereditary ruled. What may have been surprising, during the Egyptian political course to politicize the football incidents of 2010 World Cup qualification matches, was the size and the way of bewildering and mobilizing the public crowd towards the interest of this shift in the type of governance, as well as the manner of gaining more loyalty and credibility from people through an institution like football. President Mubarak's regime was an old political system, through which he was sticking to the clings of all power forms, by amending the constitution, abolishing judicial

supervision and preventing civil society organizations from oppositions against the established policies. This system condemned the hope of the Egyptians to have a peaceful society, and notice an exchange of leadership. Eldjoudjari (2012) says:

The Mubarak regime (...) was seeking to engage citizens in sub-issues so that they do not care or focus on the core issues, the most important of which is the continuation and tyranny of the regime (...) and it has taken over most of the leadership centres (...) There is no one president Hosni Mubarak seizing the throne, but there is Hosni Mubarak in every ministry and each legislative institution until we are trapped by personalities that have not changed for decades.(p. 98-99)

The ruling regime of Mubarak and his ruling Party did not have any relationship with his people. Egypt noticed deteriorating social status quo. Nonetheless, when the opportunity came, the Egyptian ruling class rushed to exploit it in order to make the citizens forget about their real problems, create new social and political status quo and convince them that they were caring about the public affairs. Furthermore, they wanted to get rid of all of their political opponents like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasserites. Wikileaks realised a US Embassy Cable for a President Mubarak's visit to the United States, saying:

Egypt continues to be a major regional economic, political, and cultural power. However, economic problems have frustrated many Egyptians (...) Mubarak himself refuses to discuss economic assistance to Egypt, but other interlocutors may raise it (...) There were bread riots in 2008 for the first time since 1977. Political reforms have stalled and the GOE has resorted to heavy-handed tactics against individuals and groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, whose influence continues to grow. (as cited in The Guardian, Decemeber 09, 2010)

President Hosni Mubarak and his sons, Alaa and Gamal, intensified their presence on television stations and newspapers during the sports crisis, especially the Om-Durman (Sudden) crisis between Algeria and Egypt, which ended with the victory of the Algerian team over the Egyptian team and the qualification for the 2010 World Cup. There were clashes between the supporters of the two teams as Alaa Mubarak came out with statements in which he criticized the Algerian people and described them as a "mercenary group" whose interest was not the result, but the attack on the Egyptian supporters. Thanks to the pro-governmental media that mastered the propagation of those incidents, this statement was widely accepted by the Egyptian public.

The Chauvinist media, indeed, used fabricated facts against Algeria, its revolution and its people. Both Alaa Mubarak and Gamal Mubarak were a direct cause of the political crisis that polarized sports events through non-Arab statements, condemning the Algerian people, until the relations between the two countries were almost to be broken down. President Mubarak's sons were busy collecting money, and enjoying football events. They were leading mass demonstrations during these events. However, they did not think to sympathize with the people in their social problems, and did not support them in their social crises. The only thing was their endeavour to seek what enables them to raise money and pass their political projects. They conducted offices that had strong authority in shaping government policies, such as Gamal Mubarak's heading of the National Democratic Party. Eldjourjari (2011) mentions:

The director of Mubarak's office saw that the deposed president used to become very annoyed if reports acknowledged that the people were moaning under the pressure of the economic problems. It was not a sense of sympathy for the masses. Rather, he considered such reports as a source of nuisance and anger. (p. 216)

According to Eldjourjari, instead of dealing with social problems as part of his duties to be fixed, President Mubarak considered them a source of threat to his 'dominant agenda'.

In order to improve their image more effectively, he had to eliminate any opposing voice or opponent to his rule. He was 'instrumentalizing' every tool through which he could sustain his governance, and dedicated each effort to pass on an agenda through which he would turn Egypt into a Mubaraks' kingdom. Jerom Kajan, an American psychologist, said:

Egypt is committing a national suicide, as President Mubarak enters to his fourth term as a dictatorial ruler, and he seems determined to re-run for the presidential elections in September 2009, or to pass the power to his son Gamal. He is practicing harsh repression against internal opposition through the emergency law. (as cited in Eldjoudjari, 2011, p. 192-193)

According to Kajan, the psychology of fear was maintained by the Egyptian regime as a tool of hegemony for the sake of pertaining authoritative policies and polishing its image in front the 'bewildered herd'. Thus, any opposing voice was smashed before being convenient to the public awareness.

The Egyptian regime took advantage of the sporting events, making an imaginary struggle with Algeria after investing in football. Its goal was to prepare Mubarak's son for government, as Algeria was considered as the one that would suitably serve it, and make the Egyptian people assembled around his cause and stand by the president. As a result, President

Mubarak would get what he planned for. It seemed that the conflicts that rose between Algeria and Egypt were not the sole instrument to fulfil the project of inheritance of the rule. Indeed, this planning goes back to the period when Egypt had been organizing the African Finals to take place in late 2009.

In fact, the ramification of conflicting events over the football matches was a conspiracy. This project plunged the two peoples into a major conflict, creating an ideological apparatus par excellence. The peoples were the vulnerable target whose diplomatic relations were tended to be corrosive. That was the point, making the peoples hate and fear each other. The crisis was transformed due to political reasons, causing popular mobilization and activism; but this time was for making people, instead of acting against the government's policies that was causing deteriorating social and political societies, act in self-destructive directions and forget about their real issues. It was taking the form of unfocused anger attacks on one another. The political arena of those football events made it to pass a political project that was waiting for the right time to go without hesitation, after letting the public consciousness believe that democracy was functioning and that the regime was caring about what was hurting the nation. For instance, President Mubarak took the advantage of this opportunity, and delivered a speech on the parliament to counter-attack the illusionary Algerian harassment. On November 21, 2009, President Hosni Mubarak delivered a speech in front of the Egyptian Parliament, after the football match between Algeria and Egypt in Omdarman, Sudan, supporting the Egyptian team and condemning the Algerian actions. An important thing might be the president's selection of the parliament to address his speech to people. First of all, parliament should symbolise the public voice. That is why the president utilized the parliament, which symbolizes the people's voice, in order to improve his image in front of the representatives of people. Secondly, the parliament is a source of power. For the same reason, the president challenged the usual function of the parliament in order to champion the power of ruling the country, and the people, too. In fact, in contrary to the usual public power of the parliament, he indirectly propagated the ruling community of the Mubaraks' Dynasty. The following picture illustrates the parliament where he addressed the discourses of hegemony, fear, and, above all, the legitimacy of rule, instead of addressing his plans to solve the economic problems and deteriorating social status.



Figure 06: A Screenshot of the Egyptian Parliament and President Mubarak on November 21, 2009¹¹

Efficiently, the Egyptian dominant institution chose the football events, and sacrificed the Egyptian relation with Algeria for the benefit of its system that was seeking to inherit the Egyptian rule. Neither the relations between the countries nor the historical aspect matter. What mattered was their political endeavour, making the football matches with Algeria their precious opportunity. It was for the interest of the ruling power that the diaspora and expatriate were polarized to run out their project with satisfaction. Algeria was chosen as a source to ignite strife between the two peoples, especially that, as some sources mention (like Adel Eldjoujari 2011), there was a deal in 2009 where he wanted to mediate between Algeria and the American Lockheed Martin Company. The deal would make Alaa Mubarak receive rewards, estimated as more than \$ 100 million. Nonetheless, the Algerian authorities rejected the offer of President Mubarak's son. Adel Eldjoudjari (2012) says:

¹¹ Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42aWoinu1sw>

After the fall of the rule of Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, during the investigations with Habib al-Adli, the Minister of Interior Affairs in the regime of the deposed president, it was revealed that a room called "Chamber of Hell" was specialized in the manufacturing of crises. Some say that the crisis between Egypt and Algeria was contagious, especially that the FIFA had settled the matter for Algeria's interest. (p. 211)

According to Eldjoudjari, it seems that the psychology of fear¹² was not established on the Egyptian people only. The Algerian 'Other' was also a victim to this psychology because Algeria did not accept to help in the proliferation of the Egyptian agenda of 'special interest'. Consequently, hostility over business was polarized in politics and transformed into a reason to justify the policy of cutting ties with Algeria.

The Egyptian leading politicians created uninformed subjects who made irrational choices of what had been indirectly dictated by the dominant elite like politicians, dominant corporations and media. As a result, those uninformed subjects would turn into uninformed supporters of the dominant interests that was, for instance, to get rid of the public roar about their problems, or uninformed electorates of the Mubarak's 'Specialized elite'. The political speeches and discussion of policy issues utilized the notions of their care about their people, democracy, the national dignity, and the national development. However, this was just an illusion that was used as a strategy to veil their real mask. In other words, what the political leaders and their backers wanted, through the politicization of the 2009 football events with Algeria, was to make the public sharply disconnected from what they really did and what they failed to do.

Moreover, the three World Cup qualification football matches between Algeria and Egypt were not the sole sporting arena that was manipulated. In fact, the Egyptian political polarization of sport to be manipulated for the sake of fulfilling the project of inheritance went further before the matches between Algeria and Egypt, i.e. it goes back to the Egyptian competition to host the Finals of the African Nations of 2009 and the preparation to participate in the World Cup of 2010. The *Magazine of Egypt*, in its issue Number 35 of Spring, 2004, mentions, in a big title "A golden Opportunity to Enjoy Egypt, the Rich History and the Flourishing Present", the international great satisfaction of the Egyptian Facilities, and magnifies the special potentiality of President Mubarak. This does not promote a good image of President Mubarak; it also propagates the issue of this competition publically to convince

¹² The psychology of fear is the consequence of the mistrust in the emotional relationship with the Other. this relationship is defined by ideologies.

people to support the Egyptian project of hosting the football events. On the same magazine, it is mentioned:

The Egyptian file (to host the 2010 World Cup) is considered the only file among the competing countries, which receives great support from the political leadership because Egypt is the only country represented by a delegation at the highest political level (...) who represented Egypt in this event and presented the Egyptian file was Dr Fat'hi (...) The priority of the evaluation committee is to register the popular will to host the World Cup. He stressed the Egyptians' love for the world's first popular game. (The Magazine of Egypt, Issue 35. Spring, 2004, p. 17; 19)

On the parlance of this discourse, Dr Fat'hi, who presented the Egyptian file to participate in the competition to host the World Cup, was the same Dr Fat'hi Sourour who would, later, win the 2011 elections as the president of the Egyptian Council by 505 votes out of 506 candidates (Eldjourjari 2011: 97).

The following picture (figure07) illustrates the Egyptian politicization of the football arena.



Figure 07: President Mubarak with FIFA's President Joseph Blatter

(The Magazine of Egypt, Issue 35. Spring, 2004: 17)

II.4.2.2. Creed of Leadership in the Arab World

Egypt has always seen itself as the most prominent Arab nation that has a crucial role in the Arab World. As far as the question of the Egyptian politico-geostrategic role is taken into consideration, there must be two angles to view it. On the one hand, Egypt has viewed that it is the suitable one to lead the Arab World in order to deal with its issues, basing their argument on its deep history of ancient civilization and its geostrategic location. On the other hand, some other Arab countries, such as Algeria and Syria, have also had their own view, especially that this role has been questioned since the Egyptian normalization of its relations with Israel at the Camp David Peace Treaty in 1978.

Evidently, since the Egyptian ex-president Djamal Abdel Nacer's Pan-Arabism, the Egyptian political regimes have always advocated their sustainable role in processing peace in the Arab and African regions. One of them was President Hosni Mubarak who used to announce the Egyptian viewpoint on the relative factors that could bring about just and comprehensive peace, not only in the Middle East, but also in the regions that noticed conflicts. He used to consider that Arab circle stood on the head of the Egyptian exterior political movement that could consolidate the Arab Economic and political issues. That statement was proved through the 'instrumentalization' of Egypt's natural resources, such as water and geographic location. One of those assumptions was evident during the Algerian Dark Decade, saying, "Egypt, in accordance with its Arab and national policy, has strongly opposed acts committed by terrorists in Algeria and hopes that its savage acts will end definitively" (Egyptian State Service, 1999, p. 48-49). The polarisation of historical events was prominent. It was used as a tool to justify their policy of keeping Algeria away from leading the Arab World.

In fact, the Egyptian embracement of this task reflected the creed of the Egyptian regime to lead the Arab World according to its philosophy. Besides, this proclamation, which is its geopolitical role, also concealed other agendas, not only that of leadership; rather, it was also to fulfil the American-Egyptian mutual interests in the region. In addition to that, President Hosni Mubarak used to receive privileges and rewards due to his participation in the American War on Iraq in 2003 and even after the American presence in Iraq, by providing information about the Iraqi militant activities, especially that America had got fears from Iran. Another example was his convenience with Israel that is exemplified in the opening of the Suez channel to let the Americo-Israeli fleet pass. Wikileaks leaked cables on the American-Egyptian efforts to consolidate their closer political and military relationship with the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Wikileaks released a cable on President Mubarak's visit to the United States in May, 2009, President Obama's visit to Cairo in June, 2009, and their meetings, mentioning:

The Egyptians want the visit to demonstrate that Egypt remains America's 'indispensable Arab ally', and that bilateral tensions have abated. President Mubarak is the proud leader of a proud nation ... (...) He responds well to respect for Egypt and for his position (...) maintained peace with Israel, weather two wars in Iraq and post-2003 regional instability, intermittent economic downturns, and a manageable but chronic internal terrorist threat. (as cited in Luke Harding, January 28,2011)

President Mubarak's external policy cared about consolidating his relations with the United States of America. In fact, this consolidation had mutual interests. Firstly, the United States of America had an economic interest in the Middle East. Thus, allying with Egypt would serve it more. Secondly, as far as the United States has a considerable power in the World, it serves the Egyptian regime to accelerate the Egyptian position in the Arab World. To highlight more, the discursive use and order of "**the proud leader of a proud nation**" propagates the agenda of justify the legitimacy and appropriation of Egypt to lead the Arab World by Mubarak. Chomsky and Barsamian (2007) say, "In fact, if you look at the leading recipients of U.S. aid, most of it military aid, two countries are in a separate category: Egypt and Israel (...) Aid to Egypt is basically aid to Israel, to encourage Egypt to sort of play long" (p. 165). They, advocates the American-Egyptian role in sustaining the American policies in the region, especially its efforts in maintaining help to Israel.

Effectively, the issue of the Egyptian creed to lead the Arab World concealed agendas by itself. Nonetheless, what might one ask is: what is the relation between what had been just said with Algeria first and the 2010 World Cup qualification football secondly?

In fact, the leadership creed, Algeria and football were considered as bedrock upon which those agendas were construed. As we referred before, the Egyptian overriding political elite had business that was based on that creed. Accordingly, this endeavour to rule was a policy, which Niccolo Machiavelli (1520) dealt with as the *Law of Reform*, showing that any proclaimed policy or law is for the purpose of domination and corporate business. What always feared President Mubarak was the Palestinian leading party Hamas since it is the most prominent party that fights for the Palestinian sovereignty against Israel. Consequently, anybody that supported this party was considered as an enemy. In other words, even the agenda of the Egyptian profoundly ancient history was 'instrumentalised' to bewilder the Egyptian people towards President Mubarak's interest of his aid to Israel and America. Wikileaks released a cable, stating:

Mubarak has been effective as an intermediary during various phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict (...) Mubarak's team has made it clear they will not cede the 'Palestinian file' to another Arab state. In general, the Egyptian-Israeli strategic relationship is on solid ground, as they face a shared threat from Hamas. (as cited in the Guardian, December 09, 2010, para. 13)

For Mubarak, he should fight tooth and nail to head the Arab issues. Thus, they had already propagated for this, saying "**they will not cede the 'Palestinian file' to another Arab state**".

The discursive use of ‘will not cede...’ would permit no opportunity for another Arab country to manage the Arab World.

Effectively, as the Algerians have always supported the Palestinians, this exposes Algeria in a candidature pool against the Egyptian regime. Hamas was the enemy of Egypt. Then, it was either Algeria or Egypt to be the only re-presenter of the Arab and the African Worlds in the 2010 World Cup, in other words the Cup was the symbol of the African and Arab leadership. As a result, Algeria was eventually the source that would jeopardize the Egyptian creed, which was, in turn, polarized for the purpose of conserving the interests of the Egyptian president and dominant politicians, received from America and Israel. Saad Bu Aqba, to the Algerian daily Al-Fadjr, says:

The deterioration in the Algerian-Egyptian relations (...) started when Egypt gave itself the right to take the decision to join the war against Iraq in the name of the Arab League (...) the Egyptian humiliation of Algeria continued when President Hosni Mubarak confers with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, then asks the Arabs via the Arab League to ratify the decisions taken. As a result of these unilateral decisions, there were problems before convening the first and the second Arab summits in Tunisia, Algeria and Doha. (as cited in Algeria Complains. Al-Ahram Weekly Online November 29- December 02, 2009, paras. 02; 04)

In addition, the support of the Palestinian issue meant to the Egyptian dominant policy the support to Hamas, as that the support of Hamas was the backing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, this movement meant as the source of threat to the ruling system of President Mubarak since it was considered as the strongest Egyptian movement. President Hosni Mubarak used to order counterfeiting in the Elections, one of the coming presidential Elections of 2010. Adel El-Djourdjari cites:

The Mubarak regime is the one that fed that sedition because it allowed the spread of such ideas. And it was looking for citizens to be occupied by sub-issues so as not to care or focus on the core issues, the most important of which is the continuation and tyranny of the regime (...) He forged the elections and overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood, opposition parties and forces. (p. 96-97)

This postulates that the heredity of the Egyptian rule meant also the fulfilment of the Mubarak’s management of the Arab World.

Now, what could the 2010 world Cup football have meant to the Egyptian regime? The 2010 World cup symbolized leadership in the Arab World, and even Africa. Egyptian

leading politicians were rushing towards the possibility of hosting the 2010 World Cup and African Cup since 2004. It was also a tool through which the Egyptians were ‘hegemonized’, bewildered and convinced of the coming decision to host the Football cups. In his letter to the International Federation of Football (FIFA) and its executive committee, President Mubarak says that:

As Africa was chosen to organize the FIFA World Cup in 2010, Egypt decided to compete in the competition with ambition and confidence supported by the will of nearly 70 million Egyptians who are fond of the game, and all elements of the government. Based on the strong belief that football can play a role in integration, development and peace among peoples (...) It also reflects our strong will, our full readiness and our ability to organize the event. (as cited in the Magazine of Egypt 2004, Spring, p. 17)

On the parlance of his discourse, President Mubarak tries to justify his policy of hosting the World Cup although Egypt was noticing deterioration in social and economic sectors. The polarization of football in his politics was prevailing through the order of his language, when he talks about the Egyptians’ satisfaction of the regime, by saying **“and all elements of the government”**, directly after talking about football, by saying **“fond of the game”**. Thus, the order of discourse may have played a pivotal role in influencing the public awareness.

The Egyptian dominant elite propagated for the legitimate right to host the 2010 World Cup in Egypt. The Egyptian history, the Egyptian deep Civilizations, and all the elements that were provided by this historical heritage were also utilized as a tool to approach the concealed agenda of leadership. The architecture of the stadiums showed Egyptian designs in form of historical symbols, such as the Pharaoh touch. Besides, even political facts about the Egyptian role in the region were ‘instrumentalized. Only the historical, political, cultural and sporting role of Egypt in its preparation to host the football cups was magnified, but the other Arab and African countries’ role was not. The Magazine of Egypt reports:

The 28th International Conference on Sport Medicine in the capital of Oman (...) has highlighted Egypt's right to organize the 2010 FIFA World Cup being the leading country in terms of football, civilization and politics (...) the existence of Egypt, which is the country of civilizations, at the forefront of competitors (...) The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman supported the Egyptian file, stressing Egypt's leading role at the Arab level (...) Egypt's that is great by its history and position, as one of the largest Arab countries, is the right to organize the 2010 World Cup. (as cited in Magazine of Egypt 2004, Spring, p. 20)

The Magazine of Egypt is an example of other media institutions that are manipulated by the Egyptian dominant regime to propagate its policies. It indirectly uses the hosting of World Cup as a ceremony to indirectly magnify the Egyptian role not only in the domain of sport, but also in all issues, by saying **“being the leading country in football, civilization and politics”**. In addition, the approaching of social realities, such as that of civilization and historical records, was stressed to be polarized to prove any upcoming conflict.

Evidently, the football of 2010 World Cup was exploited, whose arenas as well as the management of those arenas were the floor for announcing and propagating the ‘Egyptianist’ concealed agenda of leading the Arab World. People were ‘hegemonized through the ideological apparatus of the Egyptian civilization, patriotism, language like the Egyptian dialect, etc. They were convinced that Egypt would be the leader. It was mentioned in the Magazine of Egypt, “With all these strong points, Egypt presented its profile to the whole world with its full conviction that it deserves the honour of hosting the World Cup (...) the unification of peoples is our goal and the slogan of our campaign. Egypt is the appropriate place to achieve these goals” (as cited in Magazine of Egypt 2004, Spring, p. 20).

In this speech, not only the historical and cultural symbols are manipulated; rather, the linguistic conceptualization of the dominant interest was very selective. **“Egypt”** was referred to instead of a specific football organizing institution in order to build one collective identity, which, in turn, would easily and without any unwanted public reaction facilitate the conviction and bewildering of the public mass towards the dominant purpose. Besides, that policy was made beneficial, where its role to unify all peoples was specified to their decisions, through **“to unify all the peoples is our goal and the slogan of our campaign”**.

II. Conclusion

The football of the 2010 World Cup qualification matches fulfilled, to a certain extent, the establishment of an arena that had been dreamt of by the political 'Specialized Elite'. As far as the context of those matches is taken into consideration, both of the countries noticed public mobilization due to the social problems and economic hardship, such as unemployment, rising costs of living, social delinquency, kidnapping of children and illegal immigration. Besides, the Egyptian regime was preparing for the presidential elections of 2011. Thus, the dominant political institution was trying to enhance its image in front their people vis a vis those problems.

As a matter of fact, in addition to its politicization, football was institutionalized. The political incentives' mission was to make it a sort of a political system to realize dominant political interests, as well as an ideological apparatus to turn it into a battlefield of clashing emotions. In other words, the 2010 World Cup qualification football was a clash course through which the 'Specialized Elite' could dominate the masses' consciousness and bewilder them towards their ends. Deductively, the ideological misrepresentations of the 'Other' entail that the mass communication did not call people to have their own opinion; rather, they were bewildered towards politically-settled ideological opinions. Indeed, the fact of magnifying the Egyptian 'Self' at the expense of devaluing the Algerian 'Other' advocates that the public collective identity was structured and possessed without any apparent rational freedom of social practices.

The Egyptian political manipulation of the football incidents expressed the Egyptian ruling class's will to orientate its public attitudes towards concealing well-defined agendas through a special ideological approach, called Sub-Arabism, whose criteria are different from that of Orientalism and Occidentalism in the sense that it deals with the 'Us' and the 'Other' that are from almost the same origin due to their dominant linguistic, cultural and religious features unlike Orientalism and Occidentalism that address totally different 'Us' and 'Other'. That ideological stance drew the tendency of considering that 'Egyptianism' would be under threat when in contact with 'Algerianism', especially that 'Egyptianism' had a deeply ancient sense of Arabism. Nonetheless, 'Algerianism' was created as an imaginative enemy, with its country as an imaginative geography. All this resulted in the announcement of cutting all types of the bilateral relations, which was illustrated in form of calling back the Egyptian ambassador and destructing the Algerian embassy.

Moreover, Arabism was dealt with as a prototypical criterion to distinguish 'Egyptianism' from the Sub-Arabist 'Algerianism'. In fact, the discursive use of this ideology was in itself a politically-oriented ideology for the purpose of exercising the Egyptian creed of leadership in the whole Arab World. The latter was illustrated in form of the previous Egyptian participation in the competition to host the World Cup. Once again, the Egyptian belief of its instant right to lead the Arab World was also another discourse to realize the profits that the ruling class get from this prominent geostrategic role in the Arab World and, particularly, the Middle East.

Original Quotations:

1- *A diplomatic cable from the United States revealed that leaders of the ruling Egyptian National Democratic Party (NDP) were upset on the heroic image of Alaa Mubarak after Algeria's World Cup qualification match. The US Embassy in Cairo indicated in a document, which was released in November, 2009, that the National Party decided to launch a wide propagation campaign to bring the image of Gamal Mubarak back to the forefront*

(Kamel Madgdi 2012:259)

"كشفت برقية دبلوماسية امريكية عن مصر، أن قيادات في الحزب الحاكم (الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي) انزعجت من الصورة البطولية التي ظهر بها علاء مبارك بعد مباراة الجزائر في تصفيات كأس العالم الاخيرة و اشارت السفارة الامريكية بالقاهرة في الوثيقة التي تعود الى نوفمبر 2009، الى أن الحزب الوطني قرر شن حملة دعائية واسعة لإعادة صورة جمال مبارك مجددا الى الواجهة بقوة"

(كامل مجدي 2012: 259)

2- *We are the ones who speak and we are the ones who say about Egypt, the people of Egypt and the sovereignty of Egypt. If anyone wants to talk about Egypt, he has to pay the price and take responsibility. No harm and we will not remain silent and every one remains in place.*

(Kamal Ameer 2009)

" نحن من يتكلم و نحن من يقول عن مصر و شعب مصر و سيادة مصر. إذا كان من يريد أن يتكلم في حق مصر عليه أن يدفع الثمن و يتحمل المسؤولية. لا مساس و نحن لن نسكت و كل واحد يبقى في مكانه."

(كمال عامر)

3- *The invisibility of ideology signifies the identification of individuals with their society is total.*

(Capdevila 2004: 164)

L'invisibilité de l'idéologie signifie que l'identification des individus à leur société est totale.

(Capdevila 2004 : 164)

4- *I hope the Algerians will be sad tomorrow. Their arrogance, humiliation, provocation and confiscation of their force bother me a lot. As much as I am an Egyptian and I want Egypt to win, I hope the Algerians lose. Why do Algerians hate Egypt? Did they forget that we won the World Cup through them before this? God willing, may Allah break the Algerians, and the sons of the Pharaohs win through the Algerian team.*

(Amro Adib. Cairo Today)

قال عمرو أديب: " نفسي بكرى الجزائريين يتأكدوا. إذا هذا الغرور و الزلف الجزائري و الاستفزاز و المباهاة بالقوة مضايقتني جدا. يعني قد ما انا مصري و نفسي مصر تكسب، نفسي أن الجزائريين يخسروا. هو الجزائريين يكرهوا المصريين ليه؟ هما نسوا أننا كسبنا كاس العالم من خلالهم قبل كدا؟ ان شاء الله الجزائريين يكسروا، و أولاد الفراعنة ينتصروا من خلال المنتخب الجزائري"

(القاهرة اليوم)

5- *The aim of a parliament was to be measured according to the measurements of Mubarak and his son. It had one goal only that was embracing the birth of a new Mubarak regime. And if Mubarak thought of dying in his office and standing for another term, this would be good. And if he passed his presidency to Gamal Mubarak, that would be "okay"; that means that the Candidates, according to the most qualified scenario to be won are President Mubarak and his son Gamal Mubarak*

(Madjdi 2012:250)

"كان الهدف من برلمان تفصيل على مقاس مبارك و ابنه له هدف واحد فقط هو احتضان مولود نظام مبارك جديد، و لو فكر مبارك في الموت في منصبه و الترشح لفترة اخرى فخيرا، و لو مرر رئاسته لجمال مبارك "اوكيه" بمعنى أن المرشحين حسب السيناريو الأكثر تأهيلا للفوز فيها هما: الرئيس مبارك و ابنه جمال مبارك"

(مجدي كامل 2012: 250)

6- *the more negative that is politically interpreted by expansionism (...) the attribution of values and hierarchical systematization of cultures, that confesses an ideological character or authorises the ideological manipulations.*

(Abdellah-Pretceille 2004a: 120)

plus négative qu'elle se traduit politiquement par l'expansionnisme (...) l'attribution de valeurs et d'une hiérarchisation ou, tout au moins, autorise les manipulations idéologiques.

(Abdellah-Pretceille 2004a: 120)

07- *The President of the Republic must take advantage of the Algerian victory on Egypt, to improve his relationship with the Algerian youth, reduce unemployment and freedom, and open up a wider area of freedom of expression. I think the president's chances have risen to 40 percent because he was behind the victory of the national team, by sending 13,000 supporters to Sudan. However, he must attach this policy to another to restore the image of the Algerian society.*

(Major General Nizar, Al Khabar, January 25, 2010)

"إنه على رئيس الجمهورية استغلال مكاسب الإنتصار الرياضي على مصر، لتحسين علاقته بالشباب الجزائري و ذلك بتقليص نسب البطالة و الحراقة و فتح مجال أوسع لحرية التعبير. أعتقد أن حضور الرئيس ارتفعت الى 40 بالمائة لأنه كان وراء انتصار الفريق الوطني، و ارسال 13 الف مناصر الى السودان. لكنه عليه أن يرفق هذه السياسة بأخرى، قد تعيد للمجتمع الجزائري صورته."

(اللواء نزار، جريدة الخبر 25 جانفي

(2010)

08- The First Secretary of the Socialist Forces Front Karim Tabou said:

The national team has achieved what governments have been unable to do for decades, creating national cohesion and a new national spirit that can be invested in more than one level. For the first time since 1962, the Algerians agree, despite of their different orientations and regions, on the government (...) a government led by Rabah Saadane.

(Quoted in El-Khabar on November 20, 2002)

قال الأمين الأول لجبهة القوى الاشتراكية كريم طابو على تاهل الفريق الوطني لمونديال 2010: "الفريق الوطني حقق ما عجزت عنه الحكومات منذ عقود، و خلق تماسكا وطنيا و روحا وطنية جديدة يمكن استثمارها على أكثر من مستوى، و للمرة الاولى منذ عام 1962 يتفق الجزائريين على اختلاف توجهاتهم و مناطقهم على الحكومة (...) حكومة يقودها رباح سعدان".

(مقتبس من جريدة الخبر 20 نوفمبر 2002)

09- *The Mubarak regime (...) was seeking to engage citizens in sub-issues so that they do not to care or focus on the core issues, the most important of which is the continuation and tyranny of the regime (...) and it has taken over most of the leadership centers (...) There is no one president Hosni Mubarak seizing the throne, but there is Hosni Mubarak in every ministry and each legislative institution until we are trapped by personalities that have not change for decades.*

(Eldjoudjari 2011: 98-99)

"إن نظام مبارك (...) كان يبحث عن اشغال المواطنين بقضايا فرعية حتى لا يهتم أو يركز في القضايا الجوهرية و أهمها استمرار و استبداد نظام الحكم (...) كما أنه استولى على معظم المراكز القيادية (...) فليس هناك رئيس واحد حسني مبارك يتمسك بكرسي العرش بل هناك حسني مبارك في كل وزارة و مؤسسة تشريعية حتى صرنا محاصرين بشخصيات لم تتغير منذ عقود"

(عادل الجوجري 2011: 98-99)

10- *Egypt is committing a national suicide, as President Mubarak enters his fourth term as a dictatorial ruler, and he seems determined to re-run for the presidential elections in September 2009, or to pass the power to his son Gamal. He is practicing harsh repression against internal opposition through the emergency law.*

(Quoted in Eldjoudjari 2011: 192-193)

"إن مصر ترتكب انتحار وطني، حيث يدخل الرئيس مبارك في عقده الرابع بالسلطة كحاكم ديكتاتوري، و يبدو مصمما على إعادة ترشيح نفسه للانتخابات الرئاسية في سبتمبر 2009، أو التمير السلطة لابنه جمال. فهو يمارس عملية قمع قاسية ضد المعارضة الداخلية من خلال قانون الطوارئ."

(عادل الجوجري 2011: 192-193)

11- *After the fall of the rule of Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, during the investigations with Habib al-Adli, the Minister of Interior Affaires in the regime of the deposed president, it was revealed that a room called "Chamber of Hell" was specialized in the manufacturing of crises. Some say that the crisis between Egypt and Algeria was contagious, especially that the FIFA had settled the matter for Algeria's interests.*

(Eldjoujari 2011: 211)

"بعد سقوط حكم محمد حسني مبارك، و اثناء التحقيقات مع حبيب العادلي وزير الداخلية في نظام الرئيس المخلوع، تم الكشف عن غرفة تسمى " غرفة جهنم" و هي المتخصصة بصنع الازمات. لذلك ارجع البعض ان تكون الازمة بين مصر و الجزائر مفتعلة خاصة ان الفيفا حسم الامر لمصالح الجزائر.

(الجوري 2011: 211)

12- *The director of Mubarak's office saw that the deposed president used to become very annoyed if reports acknowledged that the people were moaning under the pressure of the economic problems. It was not a sense of sympathy for the masses. Rather, he considered such reports as a source of nuisance and anger.*

(Eldourjari 2011: 216)

"و قد شهد مدير مكتب مبارك بأن الرئيس المخلوع كان يتضايق جدا إذا ذكرت التقارير التي تعرض عليه ان الشعب يئن تحت وطأة المشكلات الاقتصادية ليس من منطق التعاطف مع الجماهير بل كان يعتبر مثل هذه التقارير مصدر عكنة و غضب"

(الجوري 2011: 216)

13- *The Egyptian file (to host the 2010 World Cup) is considered the only file among the competing countries, which receives great support from the political leadership because Egypt is the only country represented by a delegation at the highest political level. The priority of the evaluation committee is to register the popular will to host the World Cup. He stressed the Egyptians' love for the world's first popular game.*

(The Magazine of Egypt, Issue 35. Spring, 2004: 17; 19)

"يعتبر الملف المصري (لاستضافة مونديال ٢٠١٠) الملف الوحيد بين الدول المنافسة الذي يلقى مساندة كبيرة من القيادة السياسية لان مصر هي الدولة الوحيدة التي مثلها وفد على اعلى مستوى سياسي (...). كان يمثل مصر في هذا الحدث و في تقديم الملف الدكتور فتحي (...). من اولويات مهام لجنة التقييم هو تسجيل الإرادة الشعبية لاستضافة المونديال.. و شدد على حب المصريين للعبة الشعبية الاولى في العالم."

(مجلة مصر، العدد 35، ربيع 2004: 17; 19)

15- *Egypt, in accordance with its Arab and national policy, has strongly opposed acts committed by terrorists in Algeria and hopes that its savage acts will end definitively.*

(Egyptian State Service 1999: 48-49)

L'Égypte – conformément à sa politique Arabe et nationale – s'est fermement opposée aux actes commis par des terroristes en Algérie et souhaite que ses actes sauvages prennent fin définitivement.

(Egyptian State Service 1999: 48-49)

16- *The Mubarak regime is the one that fed that sedition because it allowed the spread of such ideas. And it was looking for citizens to be occupied by sub-issues so as not to care or focus on the core issues, the most important of which is the continuation and tyranny of the regime (...) He forged the elections and overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood, opposition parties and forces.*

(Quoted in Adel El-Djordjari 2011: 96-97)

"إن نظام مبارك هو الذي غذى تلك الفتنة لأنه سمح بانتشار مثل تلك الأفكار و كان يبحث عن إشغال المواطنين بقضايا فرعية حتى لا يهتم او يركز في القضايا الجوهرية و أهمها استمرار و استبدال نظام الحكم (...) زور الانتخابات و أطاح بالإخوان المسلمين و أحزاب و قوى المعارضة."

(الجورجري 96:2011-97)

17- *As Africa was chosen to organize the FIFA World Cup in 2010, Egypt decided to compete in the competition with ambition and confidence supported by the will of nearly 70 million Egyptians who are fond of the game, and all elements of the government. Based on the strong belief that football can play a role in integration, development and peace among peoples (...) It also reflects our strong will, our full readiness and our ability to organize the event.*

(Mentioned in the Magazine of Egypt 2004, Spring: 17)

"و حيث أن افريقيا تم اختيارها لتنظيم كأس العالم لكرة القدم في عام 2010، فإن مصر قررت ان تخوض معترك التافس بطموح و ثقة مدعومة بإرادة ما يقرب من 70 مليون مصري مولعون باللعبة و مدعومة بكل أركان الحكومة (...) و العرض المصري مبني على أساس الايمان القوي بأن كرة القدم يمكنها أن تلعب دورا في التكامل و التنمية و السلام بين الشعوب (...) كما انه يعكس ارادتنا القوية و استعدادنا الكامل و قدرتنا على أن ننظم الحدث."

(خطاب مبارك للجنة الفيفا، مقتبس في مجلة مصر، العدد 35، ربيع 2004 : 17)

18- The 28th International Conference on Sport Medicine in the capital of Oman (...) has highlighted Egypt's right to organize the 2010 FIFA World Cup being the leading country in terms of football, civilization and politics (...) the existence of Egypt, which is the country of civilizations, at the forefront of competitors (...) The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman supported the Egyptian file, stressing Egypt's leading role at the Arab level (...) Egypt's that is great by its history and position, as one of the largest Arab countries, is the right to organize the 2010 World Cup.

(Quoted in Magazine of Egypt 2004, Spring: 20)

"شهد المؤتمر الدولي الثامن و العشرون للطب الرياضي في عاصمة سلطنة عمان (...) على أحقية مصر في تنظيم كأس العالم لكرة القدم 2010 بصفتها الدولة الرائدة كرويا و حضاريا و سياسيا (...) وجود مصر بلد

الحضارات على صدارة المنافسين (...). أعلن وزير خارجية سلطنة عمان تأييده للملف المصري مؤكدا دور مصر الريادي على المستوى العربي (...). إن مصر الشقيقة الكبرى بتاريخها و مكانتها كواحدة من أكبر الدول العربية هي الاحق بتنظيم مونديال 2010."

(مقتبس في مصر، العدد 35، ربيع 2004 :

(20

19- With all these strong points, Egypt presented its profile to the whole world with its full conviction that it deserves the honour of hosting the World Cup (...) The unification of peoples is our goal and the slogan of our campaign. Egypt is the appropriate place to achieve these goals.

(Quoted in Magazine of Egypt 2004, Spring: 20)

"بكل هذه النقاط القوية قدمت مصر بالتفصيل ملفها للعالم كله مع اقتناعها الكامل باستحقاقها نيل شرف استضافة كأس العالم (...). ان توحيد الشعوب هو هدفنا و شعار حملتنا، و مصر هي المكان الملائم لتحقيق هذه الأهداف."

(مقتبس في مصر، العدد 35، ربيع 2004 : 20)

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER THREE

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE MEDIA SEMIOTIC SYSTEMATIZATION OF IDENTITIES: AL-AHRAM WEEKLY AS A CASE IN POINT

III.1. Introduction

Social issues have long been the point of “specialized elite’s” and media’s concern. Any dominant institution identifies ideological apparatuses through a directed use of linguistic and para-linguistic systems as language of usage in order to carry on new orders, agendas and interests. Social issues are prejudiced as their arrangements through specific dimensions. How can Critical Discourse Analysis study these discourses? How are these discourses transformed to influence masses’ awareness and change their opinion? Is collective identity naturally-born characters and attitudes? Why and how are some events measured as social issues?

This chapter centres on analyser’s ability to go beyond the descriptive methods of analysis, where focus is put on describing and detailing linguistic features, to a more critical approach to discourse analysis. It is an attempt to address the issue of how discourse and textual analysers are able to decode, understand, comprehend, explain, and critically evaluate dominant values uttered via symbolic use of language and practice of power.

Main research question:

- How is CDA approach implemented in the analysis of discourse and textual analysis to identify the markers of collective identity build-up and the plans of concealed political agendas?

III.2. Semiotic Systems as Referential Strategies

Political, social and cultural experience applies symbolic effectiveness on the use of language. Forming and reading messages do not rely on denoting the function of a sign. As signs communicate fact, they, along with social and political practises, can be functioned into a new significant system to perform certain social, cultural or political role. Thus, this effectiveness makes realities and behaviours to be mythically coded rather than naturally given. Showing a citizen, on a photograph in a pro-governmental newspaper during incidents taking place after a football match, handing the flag of his country, say Egypt, and kissing it holds different significations. On one hand, it seems a natural icon (a person giving respect to and saluting his country).

On the other hand, this picture signifies greater connotations. In turn, it ‘produces’ a basis for a social and political message, ignore not the environmental context of this photograph content. First, the meaning that Egypt is a great Arab country, having a pivoting role in setting and solving middle-East issues, and being the door to Africa. Secondly, it sets that all her citizens, without any ethnic or religious discrimination is commoditised; faithfully serve under its patriotism. In addition to that, sport incidents served this activity a space to set a certain status, which is approved through media coverage. Stead (2008) wonders, “Does the media presentation of sport mirror reality or is it a representation and construction reflecting the media’s objectives and the influences and practices of the professionals working in it?” (as cited in Burton, 2010, p. 270).

Media and political institutions professionalise sport and sport figures. It has become a source for sponsoring mythic meanings. In for this ‘instrumentalization’ to be approved, the produced views are confirmed through a set of mythic representations, circulated between texts and audiences. Therefore, audiences’ way of reading and analysing is framed. Graeme Burton (2010) says, “In any case, sport is more than just a social activity or a cultural practice. It has been colonized by the media. Its meaning is defined through metaphor and discourse (the use of language), through symbols (its stars, for example)” (p. 270). According to Burton, politics, media and sport has become tools for nurturing mythical meanings, which have a significant role in shaping audiences’ identity. This signification invokes ‘other’ concepts (produced, rather than real). The language used to promote this signification invests sport incidents and sporting celebrities and symbols as contextual issues to prove and justify particular ideas. For instance, Egyptian media, during the 2010 World Cup qualification matches that took place between Algeria and Egypt, drew the awareness of their audiences

towards the idea that winning the qualification to the 2010 World Cup competition should have been an Egyptian fate since Egypt was the exclusive country in the Arab nation that had a starring economic, political and strategic role in the region. Media texts included a certain type of language, “Egypt is the Mother of Nation” [Misr Umm El-dounia], “ we belong to the Pharaoh civilization, the long-lasting civilization”. Besides, discourses of magnification and deny were mentioned.

All types of Egyptian media magnified Egypt’s importance during the Algerian War of Independence, where they mentioned that Egypt had a great role in helping the Algerians to sack out the French colony, and learn the Arabic language. However, they repudiated the Algerian role in the Egyptian Wars against Israel, and their role to develop its economy and fight poverty, amongst other values. Bignell (2002)says:

Myth makes particular social meanings acceptable as the common-sense truth about the world. The function of the criticism and analysis of myth must then to remove the impression of naturalness by showing how the myth is constructed, and showing that it promotes one way of thinking while seeking to eliminate all the alternative ways of thinking. (p. 23)

People, along with activities and practises, and events, along with their incidents and aftermaths, provide to media subjects to be dealt with in form of ‘news’. The latter is not a set of facts only; it is also a set of ‘produced’ signs representing these facts. Once one refers to representation, he should take into account the coding established over these signs that is produced into ‘other’ concepts. Thus, as we referred before, social and cultural practises use codes in order to shape the meaning of these stories. These codes have social or cultural dimensions that use a certain way of dealing with signs recognised by a particular social group. Each of these dimensions, signs and stories, along with their produced connotations, play a vital role in fostering meanings. Mythic meanings, deriving from codes which are borrowed from social and cultural life or used in a reporting medium, are not shaped through the commoditization established over signs to produce new signs only. They are also produced through the selection of particular events as well as the discard of others. Jonathon Bignell (2002) says:

So clearly, news is not a fixed category which arises naturally. News is neither found nor gathered, as if it were already there. It is the product of professional ways of thinking, writing, and composing which are all codes of behaviour learned by news workers. These general points about what news is and how it is produced need to be substantiated by a closer

examination of what can become news, and the codes which structure news discourse. Then we can see how these structures of news encoded the meanings of news in some news stories, and consider how the readers of newspapers might make sense of the news. There are an infinite number of possible facts about the world which could be reported, but news discourse reports only a selection of facts. What is reported is the selection of facts assumed to be significant. (p. 83)

Representations of the world, be them through modification of signs or selection of events to be reported, ideologically produce the discourse of news stories because they are not salient reality. They are produced reality, mediated by the signs, codes, ideologies and myths. The discourse of news stories does not list facts about an event, but they report it. News stories report events, taking into consideration certain criteria that value a piece of news from another. These criteria are a form of priorities and assumptions, shared by news professionals, and cultural and political institutions. The board of news professionals and social institutions determine which news story is given a chief significance and which is given less importance. For instance, due to the importance of highlighting the events that took place before, during and after the 2010 World Cup qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt in order to pass on particular agendas, these sporting incidents were reported on the front page of newspapers instead of being reported on the sport section of these newspapers. The classification of news items according to their perceived significance makes the commentator to have an insight into the ideological apparatuses of media and society. News professionals, first, ideologically form common-sense notions through which reality is perceived. Then this dominant notion is reflected as worthy-valued. Galtung and Ruge delineated the main criteria that set the rhythm for encoding news. Here is the outline:

1- Frequency: short-duration events (like a conference on ozone depletion in the atmosphere) are close to the daily frequency of newspaper publication and are likely to be reported than long processes (like the progressive depletion itself).

2- Threshold: the volume of an event (like a multi-car pile-up) or degree of increased intensity (like an escalation of deaths from AIDS) must be high to be reported.

3- Unambiguity: the event must be clearly interpretable by news codes (like the Queen suddenly goes into hospital – a ‘royal codes story’), even if its meaning is itself ambiguous (no-one knows with her).

4- Meaningfulness: to the assumed reader (an event occurring in or close to close to Britain news, or which is relevant to current preoccupations in the British news).

- 5- Consonance: the expectedness of an event (like more soccer violence at an international match), or assumed reader demand for news about it (like a royal marriage).
- 6- Unexpectedness: the surprising unpredictability of an event (the Foreign Secretary suddenly resigns, for instance), or the scarcity of such events (major floods in London).
- 7- Continuity: the persistence in the news of a story deemed newsworthy in the past (like the persistence of stories about the royal family).
- 8- Composition: a full newspaper will exclude other stories due to lack of space, whereas an empty newspaper will pull in stories to fill it.
- 9- Reference to elite nations: news relating to nations of world importance (like the President of the United States, the Queen, Michael Jackson, etc.).
- 10- Reference to persons: the simplification of processes by reference to a person who is used as a sign of something abstract (Miners' leader Arthur Scargill, for instance, appeared in the 1980s as a sign of the negative value of union militancy).
- 11- Reference to something negative: disasters are more newsworthy than successes, for instance. (cited in Bignell, 2002, p. 84)

Representation, meanings, discourses and discursive practices are all included in texts to make sense of particular valued notions. A text is any verbally or non-verbally- framed thing with which people who would like to construct meanings about themselves, their beliefs, their assumptions and their society, and about all those of others, can engage along with audiences or receivers of their messages. Texts cannot be accomplished without a set of production 'conditions'. Readers, audiences, analysts or commentators of a particular text cannot read what is concealed between the lines of this text without calling over previous knowledge. Where does this knowledge come from? Reader consciously or unconsciously takes into consideration an account of knowledge – that may be related to historical backgrounds; other texts read from the same medium where the text at hand is included – in order to build a conceptual sense of its message.

There is another type of contexts where texts are conditioned. A movie on, say, the Algerian War of Independence watched in YouTube will not be the same as it is watched on television during a national memorial day. This environmental context makes the reader establish different ways to make sense of the same content. Incidents taking place before during and after the text also postulates different ways of producing, receiving and reading meanings. For

instance, to the Egyptians, the expression ‘Algerian people’ may have been read as “those people who suffered from French brutalism and colonialism” during the Algerian War of Independence; perhaps it was read as “ Our brothers” during the Suez Canal Crises and the Egyptian War against Israel; after the Egyptian assignment of the ‘Camp David Treaty’, maybe it was read as “the people, whom we taught civilization, turned over us; during the Egyptian Revolution against their ex-president Hosni Mubarak and the incidents that followed, it may well be read as “people whose historical experience can teach political and social strategies”. Thus, the social context infects what and how it is intended to be coined and understood.

Then, dominant institutions, political and economic superpowers and news journalists also play a vital role in effecting how audiences comprehend text messages. They set dominant values; inform texts about how to conceal agendas, and how to make audiences receive ideas preferred by the dominant elite.

The content released through reported texts is attached to and allowed by the discourses of the ‘dominant elite’ members. These discourses use a language that depends on discursive codes and ideological conventions. Ideology is a set of assumptions invoked by social group, people or things. Nevertheless, it needs to be concrete, reflexive and recognised as well. Representations pave the way through which the ideological ideas are given a substance to be common sense. Ideological thoughts are represented reality, i.e. these ideas used to real but their use is contextualised and intended. For instance patriotic identity is authentic because any member of a group should care about, respect and kit services to the group he belongs to. However, the ‘dominant elite, or ‘the Bourgeoisie’ Barthes (1973) (as cited in Bignell, 2002, p. 24) terms, invest this notion to ‘hegemonize’ audiences around their assertions, policies, interests and theories. Patriotism has no more become a duty; but rather an ideological concept that informs this duty how to work in the context that serves particular ends. Ferguson (1998) says:

Ideological analysis is (...) about recognizing the semiotic and discursive contradictions and tensions within a representation..... at the core of these contradictions and tensions is the potential to challenge particular power relations and concepts of identity. (as cited in Burton, 2010, p. 23)

Another way to reinforce ideological ideas is through repeating representations, and making them appear natural to be unchallengeable (naturalised and idealised).

Therefore, stories should be analysed from several perspectives. The context of the text has to be given importance, because the context of, say, the medium through which this text is channelled transmits particular connotations specific to its quality, genre or reputation for instance. Reader's enjoy to certain newspaper reinforces its identity. The content of a story anchor different meanings providing that the text of this story may include verbal and non-verbal signs. A photograph in a newspaper infects the meaning delivered through the linguistic signs of the text where this photograph is included. In return, the meaning concealed between these linguistic signs also attaches particular implications to this photograph, loading it with cultural, moral, social senses. How a reported story has been chosen and altered should be taken into consideration. Objects that have particular cultural or social connotations has to be given link to the story. The reader of the message delivered by a story has to give importance to other stories or texts talking about the same story. Background of the sender and the context of universal struggle for advantage and power should be known.

III.3. Methodology:

III.3.1. Media Propaganda and Political Discourse

Media are exploited and exploiting means of communication and information sharing tools. Arab channels have widely spread because rich governments, business men, and security services finance them. On one hand, those sponsors play a vital role in determining the way through which the reporting of events can be exploited for their own interests so that they lead the Arab issues at all levels. Most of these channels are private or pro-governmental where the political authority monopolizes the journalistic activity.

Political leaders and decision-makers manipulate mediating corporations to bewilder the mass, blinding them and turning their eyes away from what they are deciding. Government regulates outlets of owning media to ensure that a market of producers and viewers is monopolized. It exercises restrictions on media ownership. Dominant and leading corporations have the tendency of consolidating a podium over where they communicate their plans. This consolidation limits consumers' choice, manipulates news coverage and 'hegemonizes' cultures and people thinking. Mediating institutions have an immense power within the mass.

They shape how people perceive the world events and what they should consider over. Politicians and power elite must pay attention to those foundations in order to make them perform critical functions important to their process because media report of events and news serve as a mediating tool between power foundations, mass herd and field of events, as they determine agendas to be issued and how to keep people processed under political policies. Political democracy could be geo-strategically treacherous without being endured economic autonomies. Taking into account the ‘Arab Revolution’, how come some western states would recognize Arab revolts and presidents’ dictatorship after sustaining it for long periods if their primary interest was not, and is not, economic and geostrategic. Bad social situations, patriotism, nationalism, etc., are ideologies that are ‘instrumentalised’ by media institutions to incorporate the formal community. Chomsky and Herman (2002) mention:

He [political Scientist, Thomas Ferguson] contends that for ordinary voters to influence electoral choices they would have to have “strong channels that directly facilitate mass deliberation and expression.” These would include unions and other intermediate organizations that might, through their collective power, cause the interests of ordinary voters to be given greater weight in the political system. (p. xli)

Effectively, the ideological discourse of chauvinism and nationalism can be existent, with a constellation of images, judgements and false assumptions in form of a subjective scholarship approach. The latter is used by political dominant institutions that situate between the ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’.

Most Arab papers support official views, higher the position of decision-makers and promote authority policies. However, those who object any established rule are misdoubted as their reputation is blemished in front of the public opinion. We deduce that Arab media and means of communication are characterized by an authoritarian heredity. The journalistic system was born within authoritarian political system that follows anti-journalistic freedom of speech, activities and restrictions. This political environment notices the absence of parties’ role-taking alternation over authority as the dominant political parties lack flexibility, ambition for change, revision of their speeches and plans, as well as the ability of analysing the real-estate of their societies. The later political practice is characterized by certain modes that know no relation with democratic exercise in behalf of the common concernment. Initially, decision-makers participate in political or social appointments (for example, electoral, religious, cultural issues; sport manifestations...). Nevertheless, their political participation is not effective as it is for the sake of performing certain roles or getting personal

interests. These discourses are for the purpose of highlighting definite agendas. Noam Chomsky (2012) says:

The major media are large corporations, owned by and interlinked with even larger conglomerates. Like other corporations, they sell a product to a market. The market is advertisers – that is, other businesses. The product is audiences. For the elite media that set the basic agenda to which others adapt, the product is, furthermore, relatively privileged audiences. (p. 68)

Furthermore, the political participation takes the form of mobilizing and packing for the tendency of making the addressed public favour their policies, without having any attention to know what is going-on in the real political and social community. This means that no political development flourishes in a framework within which any ruling system should be flexible to social and international changes. Subsequently, no development can be sustained in all the levels of building an Arab nation. Likewise, old senators pre-dominate the ruling class for long terms so to kill the vitality of the political activity because of the absence of educated elite and youth ambition for change and innovation. As a consequence to the Arab unsuccessful political behaviour, media institutions and mass communication are frustrated since politics, media and public all together have a cyclic advantage, depending on the accomplishment of the other. Furthermore, the nature of the Egyptian political systems has made from media channels for transferring political authoritarian speeches because of the ruling classes' monopoly of the information sector and the control of news flow. On the same parlance, Doctor Mohamed Djassim Falhi El-Moussaoui, in his article "MASS MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION THEORIES", says:

The crisis of freedom of the media and culture are inseparable from the crisis of democracy where authoritarian regimes that put authorities in the hands of the head of a state, whether president or sultan or prince, prevail. In the absence of popular and democratic political organizations, and in the context of the imbalance between the executive, the legislative and the judicial authorities, most Arab newspapers turned into government agencies whose mission is to propagate systems of governance, mobilize the masses and array them in favour of supporting their policies and practices.

On the other hand, mediation means take the advantage of orienting the public opinion towards certain policies put by dominating leaders, ideologies and regimes. This 'Special Elite' have ever supported neither democracy nor freedom of speech. However,

media leaders could rather enter every home, concocting streamed and consolidated outlook. Therefore, the public awareness is ‘hegemonized’. Riadh Sidaoui (July, 04th, 2009), “THE INNER WEAKNESS OF ARAB MEDIA”, states:

Arab mass media has always been highly fragmented, the object of competing states in the region attempting to gain hegemonic influence. . To underline the existence of this media Cold War in the Middle East, one can perhaps mention the following anecdote. Yamama, the biggest Saudi advertising company in the Arab region, was recently instructed by the Saudi regime not to cooperate with Al Jazeera, a move that obviously had an impact on the revenues of the channel. (...) None of the Arab mass media would survive if they did not benefit from the largesse of rich and powerful sponsors, states or princes. (para. 08)

What makes somebody blind to see reality? Media producers manipulate readers’ blindness to search for and see reality. They are not objective as they try to make some idea or plan heard. Now comes the ‘bewildered herd’s’ blindness to seek what is real. They do not look for reality; but, rather, for their interests. This is what limits their future vision. They will not think; they just act. Political and social pressures that this herd faces are manipulated by media institutions to serve the interests of political practitioners through an intensified language. This language fabricates stories that cover the plans of the controlling elites. The dominating associations control nation capacities, and do not respect different rationalities. In fact, the way they analyse and report events is totally free of credibility, responsibility and neutrality. The piece of news got is not analysed basing on scientific criticism.

Bureaucratic policies indicate to journalists the points of interests on which news events to be reported and which ones endanger certain political, cultural and social systems or policies. This would provide an explanation to how come a piece of news information would cause some parasites though the original discourse of this piece attaches neither of political sensibilities. It is because this piece is revised and re-installed through several levels. For instance, the incidents, which took place between Algeria and Egypt during the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches, were reported after passing through dominating or ruling classes to be reviewed (the proof is that most of the incidents did not blow during or directly after the matches; but, rather, after some days). Those leading structures amplified the events with ideologies, such as patriotism, dignity, nation’s symbols (martyrs, flag, pharaoh,...), etc., so that their discourse was reshaped. The amplification, made by media to events, shows the politicization (i.e., events being covered according to political interests set

by the ruling elite) and polarity (i.e., events being selected rather than others) of communication means, misleading the public thinking.

Media and communication means have a pivoting role in the political operation. They are among the available sources through which politicians and opinion-leaders obtain information, test public reactions, on their policies, and receive the steps associated to political decision-making. In addition, policy-makers know that the public depend on these means. The latter build the way the mass think, the tendency they direct to, and the attitude they adopt towards various events, policies and trends. Therefore, political agenda-setters depend on media in order to know which information to be dealt with, how to draw the public awareness, and how to override their thinking. Lang and Lang observe, “The mass media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images of political figures. They are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, have feeling about” (as cited in McCombs.Vol. 36, No.02).

Based on these facts, the official media of Algeria and Egypt took several approaches in their coverage to the football matches and the events that followed them. First, blackout equations were utilized by altering truth. For example, the Egyptian official pro-governmental media defrauded the fact that the Egyptian security failed to do its duty in securing the way of transporting the Algerian team players from the airport to the hotel. This fact was reconfigured, convincing the public that the Algerian football team players had beaten themselves with stones. Different languages were used in order to express this picture ambiguity so that the receiver of the message would have gone blind to believe it. Secondly, the approach of terrorising the public was adopted. As a result, it scared them, making them assume the impression that barbarism and hooliganism characterise the other confronting side. For instance, the Algerian and Egyptian public opinions were convinced that the Egyptians and the Algerians (according to the policy of their regimes), respectively, were responsible for the anarchy. An ‘imaginary enemy’ was created to intimidate the public.

This leads to another equation that is balancing what has been mystified with what is happening. Nonetheless, the policy that reflects their ideological preferences or increases their power is always kept on passing. As a case in point, some members of the Egyptian parliament – members of the Brotherhood Party (El-Ikhwan), say – passed their opinion on what happened between Algeria and Egypt during and after the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches. Their attention towards the issue was reported by media. As a result, their interest in drawing media attention would have increased their visibility in the

parliament and generated their power. Correspondingly, this indicates two reciprocal directions. On one hand, political and decision agents display concerns to media coverage. On the other hand, they follow their actions through mediatisation. Aelst et al (Mediatisation and the Media's Political Agenda-Setting Influence) mention:

Based on a survey among MPs in five countries, Walgrave and colleagues (2010) show that MPs who tend to take their cues from the media are also the ones who are the most successful in getting their issues into the media. This suggests that, on the individual level, when the impact in one direction is strong it tends to be strong in the other direction as well. When actors surf on the media waves and react to media coverage they, in turn, get their actions more easily in newspapers and on TV. This finding indicates that there is a feedback loop in which media power and political power reinforce each other. (n.d., p.15)

The political agenda concealed behind the patching is to make the public mind believe that this agenda-setter is the legal claimer and sponsor of certain issues, say Arab and continental leadership.

From this context, one could deduce that media promotion of political agendas depends on the following: subject, spin-object, aim, political actors, public, media institutions. Primarily, 'subject' means which issue media and decision-makers want their audience to focus on, and opinion they hold. Secondly, what and how media, under the supervision of political actors, frame the subject is the production of spin-object. Thus, this object is a revised material, made up in a noticeable aimed message. Thirdly, the aim is the degree of emphasis and interest that provide details, according to which the subject is framed. Then, political agents are actors who would benefit from this promotion in order to pass on their perspectives and ideologies or get power of domination. Iyengar and Kinder, in his piece of work "News That Matters", says, "By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news [as well as the other news media] influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged"(as cited in McCombs, 2003, p.12). Media's "informantism" pays attention to the selection and order of news. For instance, in the 2014 presidential elections, many candidates participated in them. One of them was Rashid Negaz who had not had well-known reputation during his first appearance because of several reasons. However, mass media (e.g., Al-Jazeera Channel, the Algerian El-Shorouk Channel) and social networks (e.g., Facebook) emphasized considerable spaces to cover his plans and proposals. As a result, the Algerian public opinion (specially, youth's) was broadened to a certain extent. Afterward, mediatisation provides attributes to get

key-sources of these perspectives from political figures and decision-leaders. These clues describe the operation of framing the issue. For that reason, mediation apparatus limits the public reaction and thinking. Finally, the public opinion is the central actor who would provide acceptance or refusal of these agendas. McCombs (2003) says:

What we know about the world is largely based on what the media decide to tell us. More specifically, the result of this mediated view of the world is that the priorities of the media strongly influence the priorities of the public. Elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent in the public mind. (p. 02)

According to McCombs, public awareness is oriented by a wide net of influencing institutions that indicate their path of thinking, in behalf of the dominant power.

One of the theories that study the effect of mass media is Agenda-setting Theory. It emphasizes on that media and communication means have a pivoting role in ordering the issues of priority. One of the best declarations stating the function of agenda-priority ordering is mentioned in Bernard Cohen's 1963 book, "Press and Foreign Policy". He refers to the idea that journalism may not be able to say to people of what they think; but, it performs a certain success in saying to its readers of the things they think about" (as cited in Mai Abdullah, 2006, p. 284). In addition, people learn how to judge the importance of the social and international affairs and which political issues to be discussed, according to the level of emphasis signed by means of communication and press. Mediating institutions that conform to the condition of being the applicators of ideological lines are counted in the pot of "Specialized Elite" they attract the public mass towards framed beliefs, distracting their attention from real issues of interest and public affairs (making them loose their attention), or diverging their way of thinking by sponsoring agendas of stories (i.e. displacing true questions to totally peripheral ones). Ideologies, depicting images and stereotyping are apparatuses, hold by these institutions to accomplish their function. These arrangements dole out concealed ends oriented to dominant elites. Chomsky (1989) offers a clear view on media manufacturing of the public consent as he points out:

The major media (...) are corporations "selling" privileged audiences to other businesses (...) those who occupy managerial positions in the media, or gain status within them as commentators, belong to the same privileged elites, and might be expected to share the perceptions, aspirations, and attitudes of their associates reflecting their own class interests as well. Journalists entering the system are unlikely to make

their way unless they conform to these ideological pressures, generally by internalizing the values; it is not easy to say one thing and believe another, and those who fail to conform will tend to be weeded out by familiar mechanisms. (Noam Chomsky 1989:)

According to Chomsky, journalism has been institutionalised. It manipulates ‘informationalism’ for the sake of manufacturing subjects to support dominant powers. In other words, people are seen as ‘voices’ not as human being. As a case in point, the Egyptian official and pro-governmental media played a central role in politicizing the incidents of the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches. They indirectly documented what the governments planned. They concentrated their cameras on the president’s sons, so that the public mass would favour another Mubarak succession. They have concealed purposes from their empowerment of citizens and helping governments in their restraining of freedom. They wish to build reputation, get the favour of and shelter from rulers, win economic revenues as well.

Mass communication is considered as one of the means that build human relations. This establishment characterizes the functional role of these means because they are one of the tools, besides political and decision leaders, that sift special issued fields. The files that could serve their interests are ‘instrumentalised’ and set as preferential matters. This is operated through: first, selection; secondly, concentration, i.e. pertaining large spaces, time and efforts to frame them; then drawing public attention so as to be turned into social and political needs; finally, having products, known as the current issues of interest that signify or endanger (according to the ‘bewildered herd’) the common society. For instance, according to the real definition of sport the 2010 World and African Cups qualification matches are for entertainment or competition in most. However, these events were politicized for further ends. These events were just a chance, as any other chance (a sporting competition, religious manifestations...) which had opened doors to certain attentions. Si Moussa (December 1, 2011), in his article “The Political Environment and the Political Media in Algeria” states:

Many studies identify the relationship between the press and public opinion by focusing on the role played by the press, especially in the escalation of certain topics and stirring public interest, until they become considered as social needs, passing through the stage of attracting public attention leading to the level of public debate which is the first stage of the phase of shaping public opinion. In this stage, media intensify light on it and highlight it as one of the priorities of public opinion.

Therefore, those matches were taken as privileged fields for fulfilling certain profits. Then the two peoples were bewildered behind the ideologies of patriotism, chauvinism, Arabism, the

proclaimer of the Palestinian issue. They drew the public attention towards this subject, which had already been turned into a social need and priority that would save or endanger the social estate.

Finally, the interest for depicting images on the other is replaced in the inclusive reflection on the discussions maintained to debate a country's image, culture, people and history, on which stereotypes and representations are structured by mediating institutions under the consent of political leaders.

III.3.2. The Impact of the Political and Competitive Discourses on Masses' Identity

Identity is a psychological and cultural apparatus that highlights the position of "self-ness" and "otherness". This position can be political, religious, social and/or cultural. Identity is a measure that is used in order to establish borders between the social relations of particular individuals or collective groups sharing the same criteria, and that of the other individuals or collective groups sharing the same criteria. In fact, still this notion of sameness that leads to "self-ness" is formed, or rather manipulated through 'common sense' conditions so that instilled consistently and continually over 'certain period of time'. Therefore, identity is not natural; but, rather naturalized. Hence, its social construction may track on identity corrections or transformations, confirmed and 'hegemonized' (Gramsche's iconic expression that refers to the manipulated and polarized process of harmony, spread among people of a certain nation) through several levels. The latter are related to particular ends, interests, dominant theories of agendas.

In order to construct a collective identity of particular individuals, the latter should be attached to a fixed framework. This outline encompasses common social, psychological, anthropological, geographical, political, historical, philosophical, linguistic and economic traits shared by members of an entity. Therefore, those members proclaim common sensations, experiences and identity practices corresponding to narratives of a particular destiny, such as historical events, geographical landscapes, fundamental myths and traditions. This framework is called 'nation'. How can we define a nation once it is asked "what is an American/African/ or Egyptian"? An aloof answer might be "a person who was born in America/ Africa/ Egypt, respectively. However, why a White American is called "an American", while a Black American is called "Afro-American"? ; Why is a white American

not called “European American”/ “Italian American, etc., reflecting on that the entire Americans’ ancestors did not share the same origin? Why had Muslim Egyptians used to confront each other – reflecting on that they share the same origin or belong to the same well-known civilization (of the Pharaoh), while they united under the same creed during the conflicts that took place between Algeria and Egypt over the 2010 World Cup Qualification matches or during their demand to the Mubarak regime to vanish?

Hence, nation and national identity are ‘imaginative’ complex mental ideas that encompass collective unity. The latter is produced and ‘made’ equal in order to convince members of the same nation to share an emotional feeling of it. That is to say, sense of belonging to a nation ‘instrumentalized’ (an iconic expression formed by the researcher of this paper to refer to the politicisation and use of objects as instruments) to place distinctions between “our-ness” and “other ness”, and push masses into allies or enemies, dominants and inferiors. Therefore, these discourses, practiced within a political, economic, religious, geostrategic contextual events, baize nationalism. Thus, the latter is redefined to mean an ideology, drawing out “imaginative geography” (an iconic expression coined by Edward Said in order to refer to a manipulated representative idealised mental entity, not existing in reality; but made real) to each naturalized community. Evidently, the latter is disseminated into the virtue of reality once it is produced, transmitted and launched through discourses concealed behind the use of language. The symbolic construction of national identity in contextualized backgrounds and eventual manifestations leads to the symbolic construction and use of differences/uniqueness. The Egyptian media, during the 2010 World Cup Qualification Matches, chose same historical facts and “instrumentalized” them in their propaganda in order to symbolically produce, transform and dismantle a specific form of the Egyptian national identity.

The discursive use of a particular linguistic and semiotic system reproduced and reflected social and international relations and practices. Their mediated and political discourses were polarized through the narration, manipulation and interpretation of national, historical, civilization-related and religious symbols in order to shape new events. They referred back to Pharaoh Civilization as one of the superior identity celebrated by the Egyptian dynasty. It was considered as the sole civilization, revealed to be unique and specific to the Egyptians. Then, ancient religious rituals and events, which took place in Egypt and mentioned in the Holy Quran (intertextuality), were also re-displayed in contribution to the cultivation of the value of Egypt as a ‘Land’. It was selected by Devine to embrace holy events. The location of most important institutions (such as, the Arab League and the African

Federation of Footcall (CAF)) in Egypt, as well as the geostrategic presence of Egypt in the centre of the Middle East and North Africa being the gate that links between Asia and Africa, were also “instrumentalized” and politicized to conceal particular agendas. This way of persuading self-assertion and recognition corrected, produced and transformed a new social identity. The latter resembled the creed for leading the Arab World, wrapped in the proclamation of having the right to be qualified to sign up in international football competitions. These competitions were seen as an emblem that represents having international relations and participating in World affairs.

Purposely, images, stories, events, symbols, ambitions and emotions are discursively used within religious, political, cultural, sporting, scientific, social, educating events by dominant elites, media institutions, parliament deputies and clergy figures to rebuild hegemonic identity. This paves the ways for them to embrace legitimacy, pass on policies, gain or regain public reputation and loyalty, justify actions as well. For instance, an American newspaper article, entitled “The Rising Crime Blamed on Youth Violence, Gangs”. The writer has used simple language to attract the reader’s attention and direct his/her consciousness towards particular message. Right starting from the first word “rising”, audience’s awareness is mounted. It conveys that the social instability is ameliorating, i.e. a new social order is going to take place. “Crime” is used rather than other simple words, such as robbery or gun-holding, etc., in order to intensify the situation and make the reader feel that endangered social security is getting worse. “Blamed” is an action that emphasizes on special group and limits the members of this group to be guilty. The noun “youth” instils the perception that the spread of violence and crime is not government responsibility, i.e. the state is getting its policies off this responsibility. Youth-hood is stereotyped to be the sole source of threat to national stability. “Gang” is used to refer to that there are organized criminal groups who pose violent offences. This discourse may also address minority cultures and traditions, and minority or non-preferable groups (such as Blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims), especially when the study that is indulged and mentioned in the course content of the article text distinguishes between cities and suburban regions. Such discourses influence readers’ consciousness and form new corrections on collective identities to provide them with particular stand towards social instability and social order.

Effectively, the selection of a range of linguistic apparatus frames symbolic semiotic system that addresses particular audiences and carries specific ends. This may be source of awareness for parents who would like to enrol their children in public schools; immigrants who would like to live in America; political regimes and parliament members who would like

to gain legitimacy or pass on new agendas; political candidates who are participating in elections; mediated institutions that would like to gain pro-governmental relations and public reputation; Human Rights members; security institutions; international citizens,...etc.

The encoder of text message veils ideological dimensions throughout the selection of significant verbal, non-verbal and graphic symbols. These choices represent preferable semiotic systems and naturalize particular social, cultural and political arrangements that are completely subject to particular ends. These ends are conditioned to be legitimate, possible, relational and indoctrinated.

Special religious, social, sporting and cultural events' arenas are institutions that help media propagate pre-planned impulses to get people involved in communicative actions. Still, language plays significant impacts on the identity of the audiences since their acts, emotions and response are channelled to build up collective harmony. Mediated language uses strategies to represent actions, actors and events. For instance, word modifiers are used in order to define or ignore the value of social actors. Statistics, previous events, dates censuses are used in order to justify viewpoints as well as provide credibility of news. Naming of places, institutions or individuals is taken into consideration to argue the status of attributions being positive or negative. Representations show the encoder's position in magnifying or devaluating certain actions, events, actors, regions, etc., and highlight his/her relationship with them. During the 2010 World Cup Qualification matches that took place between Algeria and Egypt, for example, linguistic apparatus was employed to construct 'in-groups' and 'out-groups'. The use of denotative words, such as 'we', 'our nation' and 'pharaohs', were used to personify abstract definitions of what a nation is, where we belong. They also personify ideological dimensions of uniqueness, differences and distinctions. The simultaneous use of 'we' or 'they' and 'our' and 'their' implements social, political, cultural, economic and historical definitions of collective communities of 'self-ness', bearing a similitude to Egyptian 'same-hood', and that of 'otherness', resembling Algerian 'other-hood'. Therefore, 'we', as a pronoun, bring members of the same seen in-group, and break their bond with members of the different seen out-group. Later, this would have corrected the relationship between the Egyptians and Algerians. In turn, this affected the political and diplomatic ties between the two peoples.

National football teams are vividly manipulated as representatives of a whole nation. This stereotype changes the definition of what a nation is. It is used to refer to a geographical entity that counters specific cultural, linguistic, political and social heritage. After

participating in major football competitions, the nation has become an entity that is defined by sporting competitive capabilities that trace its boundaries. “Our team” is used not to refer to the participants of an event; but, rather to a whole nation. For instance, “the Pharaohs” (الفراعنة /faraji:na/) is named after the Egyptian national team to represent a whole nation of civilization, who had a pivoting role in the history of other countries. So, this term has turned from being a civilization with all cultural and social contributions to being an entity with sporting capacities.

The Egyptian unenthusiastic adaptation of democracy as well as the tensioned impact of the opinion of the ‘dominant elite and leading superpowers’ on the ‘bewildered herd’s’ (an iconic expression coined by Noam Chomsky to refer to down-to-earth public masses) consciousness are mirrored through the reluctant function of the ‘authoritarian elite’ and their way to respond to the tensions and challengers that face Egypt. The socio-political knowledge and emotions of the masses as well as their positions towards the socio-political orders are prejudiced by the reactions of the political leaders and intellectual elite. The multiplicity of political parties –whether organized or non-organized, overriding or not, pro-governmental or oppositional to the established regime – and opinion leaders along with the diversity of ideological viewpoints towards the Egyptian internal and foreign affairs are polarized. Sometimes, a party seeks advantage from another party’s distrust and tension. All this leads to uncompromising opinions that, in turn, affect and manipulate the public tensions, sensations and attitudes. Therefore, masses are ‘hegemonized’ into one collective identity. In fact, the latter is, in indeed, polarized. Masses compassion is driven in favour of particular dominant policies, doctrines, interest-based theories, political or social orders, or positions towards internal and external challenges via symbolic use of verbal and non-verbal signs.

Finally, masses’ identity is not a neutral fact. It is an ideal common-sense that is created, transformed and justified. Linguistic, graphic and meta-linguistic signs construct new symbolic power practice through discourse and discursive systems. Critical Discourse Analysis is considered as methodology, used to be able to decode, understand, comprehend, explain and critically evaluate dominant and biased values uttered by language users. Further objectives of its use include an effective issue that is contributed on the user’s learning and analysing process so that his interpretation will not be naive.

III.4. The Institutional Situation of Al-Ahram:

Al-Ahram, founded in 1875 by two Lebanese brothers, Beshara Takla and Saleem Takla, is the most circulating newspaper in Egypt and the Arab World. It has three different versions: the Arabic (Al-Ahram), the French (Al-Ahram Hebdo), and the English (Al-Ahram Weekly). The Egyptian government owns control on the paper as it appoints its editors. It is understood to be loyal to the state, i.e. pro-governmental. Al-Ahram Weekly was established in 1991.

As far as the corpus is considered, although they are news related to sport, most of the articles were on the front page. Thus, the order of articles by itself shows the politicization of 'informationalism'. Most of the articles are selected from weekly issues extending throughout November and December, 1973, 1974, 1975. This period was very crucial when the tensions were noticing huge intensification. Throughout the analogy of analysis, I have used Critical Discourse Analysis, switching from an approach to another, mainly Corpus-Linguistic, Dialectal Relational (especially Marx's perspective) and Sociocognitive (Dijk's model) Approaches. In fact, I have tried to read the linguistic formulation of the used language, the selection of words, etc.; whereas, another time I try to see the impact of this on another thing, be it the discourse and policy of the addresser, or the awareness and attitude of the receiver. In other words, I need to focus on both the practice of discourse and the impact of this practice. These articles are used to support the previous theoretical conclusion that were reached for the sake of highlighting the reason lied behind the politicization of 2010 World Cup and African Cup qualifications, in addition to the agendas concealed by the political discourse of this sport.

III.5. Analysis of the Selected Sample

As we have tackled in the previous chapters, the politicization of the 2010 World Cup Qualification matches held several themes that can be related to the political polarization of sport. First and beforehand, the eye of analysis should take into consideration the extent to which human realities, as a source of intertextuality, can be a tool to condition the intensification of conflicting events, the re-order of societies, and the re-construction of collective identities. If one looks at the relationship between power and representation, and how the 'representer' gets access to the 'represented', who is considered as unable to represent himself, this 'representer' should turn to be the authority that has several roles. Making sense of the history of the person is termed through the interpretations that the 'representer' makes of the 'Other'. The constructive act of history is the only possible knowledge about human society. It does not deny that there are facts. The Egyptian political

apparatus assumed an amount of historical data on Algeria, Egypt and between Algeria and Egypt, to be occasionally used as an object of interpreting the Algerian identity, as well as a way to justify their stereotypes. The latter uses a specific language to ‘translate’ historical events. Said (1981) says:

All knowledge that is about human society, and not about the natural world, is historical knowledge, and therefore rests upon judgement and interpretation (...) facts get their importance from what is made of them in interpretation (...) For interpretations depend very much on who the interpreter is, who he/she is addressing, what his/her purpose is in the interpreting, at what historical moment the interpretation takes place (...) they always occur in a situation whose bearing on the interpretation is affiliative. (p. 154-155)

Evidently, the instrumentalization of historical acknowledgement aids in the re-construction of social awareness; but, at this level, it is for a specifically already-framed way of thinking. The French occupation of Algeria was a nostalgia, manipulated by the Egyptian ‘Specialized Elite’, and thus, by some Egyptian people, to make stereotypes on the Algerians. Consequently, the Egyptian Collective identity’s awareness was reframed to adopt those ideas as a reality. In comment on a YouTube video, entitled ‘See the Extent to which Egyptians hate the Algerians’ (January 04, 2011), an Egyptian commentator (Tarek Aymen) says: “Oh, the grand sons of France. Have you forgotten how the French soldiers had raped you, paralyzed your dignity, drank your blood and cut off your heads for 135 years ... until the Egyptian army came to get you rid of all those pains... you must be faithful to Egypt for ever for we saved you from the dirtiest nightmare in your life...” (May 09, 2011). In the parlance of this comment, the interpretative ideological apparatus of those stereotypes that were taken from facts, worked to justify their viewpoint on and acts towards all the Algerians. Firstly, the discursive use of ‘**You**’ and ‘**We**’ exemplifies the willing of the ‘representer’ to draw a historical and social boarder between Algeria and Egypt. Secondly, ‘...**the Egyptian army came...**’ is a language that is used to intensify their esteem of ‘Ourness’ and ‘Otherness, by drawing an imaginative geographic line between Algeria and Egypt. Thirdly, this separation between the Algerian history and the Egyptian history led to the affiliation of who is Egyptian and who is Algerian.

History is an important factor. Its interpretation has a major role in setting representations, and comprehending those representations that are used in conflicts and wage tensions. Karl Marx, in his book *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, says that: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (as cited in “The Represented and the Representatives”, November 18, 2010). In the same previous comment, Tarek

Aymen's saying "...we saved you from the dirtiest nightmare in your life...", the Egyptian must have played the role of the master who brought humanity of the Algerian who were considered primitive and weak. Subsequently, referring to the Algeria-Egypt issue of 2009, the historical chronicles should be studied as being facts that were used by Egyptians to determine images that led to serious tensions. Algeria, being part of North Africa, was considered as a transit region for people moving from or toward Europe. Thus, its people were influenced by the passing people. The influence of those people formed the identity of the natives. The introduction of the Islam and Arabization, the dominance of the Ottoman Empire and the French conquest all had profound impact on the Algerian practices, religious values, social resonance and political power. The Algerians were interpreted as people without fixed identity. The long term of the French dominance was seen as being the force that reshaped the Algerian identity and language. They were not understood, they were interpreted as being part of France. Besides, Algeria was considered as the main cause that led the British and the French invade the Suez in 1956. In other words, the Egyptians saw that this aggression was issued on Egypt because they were having a crucial role in the Algerian struggle for independence; so it was punished.

Another human condition reality must be taken into account whilst the analysis of the football tensions of 2009. In studying human development in cross societies and the borders that are set between nations, the analysis of the cultural traits should be taken into consideration. Culture is an important and pivotal dimension of civilization. The cultural aspects pave the way for understanding, interpreting and forming judgements of the world. Thus, culture provides a certain way of thinking through which realities are understood in form of 'ought-to-be products', rather than 'raw-material'. Thus, representations of the 'Other' are drawn through cultural lenses. Said (1995) states:

The problem is not to that conversion take place. It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist that assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving the other not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be. (p. 67)

In fact culture and language are one of the conditions that build a nation's past and present. Both them were 'instrumentalized' by the political and intensified discourse during and after the qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt. During the last qualification match between Algeria and Egypt in Oum Darman, Sudan, culture was used by the Egyptian elite as a measure to celebrate the Egyptian 'Ourness'. On the one hand, they declared and were magnified that most of the Egyptian fans that are sent by the Egyptian President were from

the Educated Class, main of whom were artists and singers. On the other hand, they vilified all the Algerians as bloodshed hooligans via a small image that was drawn on the Algerian supporters. Language was also a tool through which the Algerian identity was redefined. In a comment on a YouTube video, entitled Resume of the matches between Algeria and Egypt- Sport commentator Hafidh Daradji (December 18, 2009), a commentator, nicknamed The Egyptian, says: “Do you see us speaking Hebrew like you speaking French?... We Egyptians are Arabs...”. Another collective judgement was made on the whole of the Algerians. The discourse of comparison between ‘**us speaking**’ versus ‘**you speaking**’ is meant to celebrate the highness of the Egyptian ‘Selfness’ in contrast to the weakness of Algerian ‘Otherness’, especially that this magnification of the Egyptian identity is considered as the true Arab. In addition, this discourse considers Algeria and Algerians as French, and thus, do not belong to the Arab World. In other words, language was also used to draw the imaginative geography of Algeria.

Evidently, Cultural differences legitimize the issue of comparison between cultures and corrections of social structures. This classifies people, classes, religions and histories in hierarchy, resulting in the formation of the discourse of objectifying the significance of the ‘Us’ and the devaluing the ‘Other’. As a result, ideologies are constructed to approach and legitimize practices. This expounds the clash between peoples of different civilizations. Huntington (1993) notes:

The great divisions among the human kind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the powerful actors on world affairs but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle line of the future. (p. 22)

On the same parlance of this saying, drawing on the importance of culture as the most important factor of fuelling relationship disagreement, scholars, like Geertz (1973), consider culture analysis as a source of meaning to interpret the world. Therefore, analysing the constitutive performance of media in, for instance, mediating sport requires a cultural lens. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (2006) say, “Studying the sport spectacle in its form as a media event is also to engage in a form of cultural history and the analysis of the persisting influence and power of ideas, as well as the performing sporting body, has been put” (p. 04). For instance, the media and political propaganda of the Egyptian file to host the 2010 World Cup utilized the Pharaoh Civilization that draws a fine defining image specific to

Egypt. Even the architecture of the football stadiums and infrastructure depended on the Pharaoh architecture.

In addition to the cultural perspectives and political schemas, religion is also an important factor to be analysed for reading events. To study the establishment of conflicts inside relations between, one must ask whether religion is a factor in setting quarrels. The role of religion has turned out to be contentious since its utility was ‘instrumentalized’. Indeed, unlike Huntington’s saying that Islam has “**bloody borders**”, it is the polarization of religion that has bloody borders, which is anticipated by the influence of ‘dominant interests’. The religious factor is so interactive in setting disputations among two nations. Through the different religious beliefs, even if inside the same religion, are used to prove superiority of an identity over the other. Samuel Huntington (1993) states that, “Tribalism and religion played and still play (...) a significant and determining role in the social, economic, cultural and political developments of the Arab societies and political systems” (p. 276).

Effectively, any belief encompasses certain principles that differ from another so that those principles are utilized for particular ends. These principles practice legitimacy to a belief. A state may comprise more than one religion, each trying to rally around the state leadership and promote religious cohesion. Nonetheless, this rally is ‘politicized’ to set conflicts and used to diverge people from their real status quo. For instance, Egypt used to face religious conflicts between the Muslims and the Copts. However, during the intensified conflict between Algeria and Egypt, all of them unified to question the religious identity of the Algerians. Thus, the interest-based utilization of religious beliefs is influential in shaping views about social and political issues.

Pertaining to the major theme that is attached to the ideological politicization of the 2010 World Cup Qualification football, as discussed in the second chapter, the Egyptian political creed to inherit the rule of Egypt was appealing in the political discourse of the Egyptian politicians and media. For instance, Al-Ahram and El-Mehwar channels played a pivotal role in propagating ‘dominant political plans’ during and following the qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt in 2009. On November 21, 2009, channelled on Al-Ahram Channel, President Hosni Mubarak addresses the Egyptian Parliament, after the football match between Algeria and Egypt in Om-Darman, Sudden:

We establish our foreign relations on the basis of mutual respect, and common interests. And we play an active role because of our Arab, African, Mediterranean and international actions. We put our foreign policies in the service of the Egyptian development, interior issues and our communities around the world. Taking care of our citizens abroad

is the responsibility of the state. We take care of their rights, and do not accept harming them, harassing them or insulting their dignity. I say, with clear words, that the dignity of the Egyptians is the dignity of Egypt, and that Egypt does not tolerate those who offend the dignity of its people. (President Mubarak's Speech on November 21, 2009)¹

He loaded particular linguistic jargon to mobilize and draw, not the public awareness only, but also that of the political 'Specialized Elite'. On one hand, the discursive use of this discourse functions strong words, such as **"the dignity of Egypt"**, **"the responsibility of the state"** and **"their rights"**. He may have liked to convince the public mass that the affordability of the Egyptian dominant policies was related to the question of Nationalism and the Egyptian sovereignty. Here, the Egyptian people are addressed as Egyptian 'citizens', not just as subjects, as if those football incidents played a crucial role in determining the enemies of Egypt and serving the Egyptian sense of belonging. On the other hand, the language of this speech, through **"our citizens"** and **"We take care"**, may have a symbolic power that is utilized as a source for proving legitimacy of his regime. He addresses every individual's freedom, right, dignity and liberty, even those of the Egyptian citizens abroad. The protection of the Egyptian dignity is adjusted as a duty, by saying **"the responsibility of the state"**, rather than a common job, of the ruler. Nonetheless, this discourse conceals the agenda of the president's struggle for power and dominance through hegemony of the population, especially when he addresses even the citizens who were abroad, around common-sense, through **"the dignity of the citizens is the dignity of Egypt"** for instance, aim. However, all this required the creation of an imaginative enemy, whose borders are defined by discourses of fear, violence and backwardness, through his saying **"harming...harassing...and insulting..."**. To a certain extent, the President Mubarak's speech had an impact on the Egyptian public awareness. In fact, it activated their commonsense of national belonging and patriotism. An Egyptian YouTuber, known as Kareem Reda, commented on President Mubarak's speech of November 29, 2009, saying: **"How come a mother accepts a citizen to be insulted, and beaten in his country"**². The YouTuber Kareem Reda has shown his national and patriotic sympathy with Egypt, considering his country as a mother who holds responsibility of and cares about her child. The Egyptian rhetoric struggle against Algeria, during the football events of 2009, illustrates polarization and coalition between the Egyptian dominant elite and the Egyptian people.

¹ Televised on Alharam Channel. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42aWoinu1sw>

² Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42aWoinu1sw>

Evidently, a sports opposition was responsible for policy issues that touched the diplomatic and economic relations between Algeria and Egypt. The play summits were held in tremendous pressure, especially that of November 18, 2009, in Sudden. That pressure was not during the period of the matches only; rather, the pressure's effects would extend further for more than a year. The last two matches, played in Cairo and Om-Darman, were spoiled by unpleasant incidents that had left dozens injured and caused a political crisis between the two governments. The transformation of those football events from sporting discourse to a political one had begun few weeks before the second match that took place at Cairo stadium on November 14th, 2009. In fact, the Egyptian politicization of the 2010 World Cup began years before, when Egypt was rallying to host the 2010 World Cup. On the electronic sport-page of Al Ahram, Egypt was considered:

Among the competing countries, the Egyptian file is considered as the only one that receives great support from the political leadership because Egypt is the only country represented by the delegation of the highest political level, along with the testimony of the presidents and members of the International Federation of Football who represented Egypt in this event and in the presentation of the file Doctor Fathi Sorour... (The Egyptian Delegation has exposed the 2010 World Cup and is well-received by the FIFA. October 1st, 2003)

Significantly, especially at this point, the article implicitly indicates that the politicization of the 2010 World Cup goes years far back. The polarization of the 2010 World Cup within the political arena in Egypt would have been deepened by the Egyptian leading Elite since the ceremony of hosting the competition in 2003. Thus, the politicization of the World Cup was being built as a platform to fulfil the agenda of sustainable leadership that would be headed by the Mubarak pro-government. Through **“the only country represented by the delegation of the highest political level”**, the politicization of sport might have been the result of the policies of ‘the Specialized Elite’ whose end was to gain the legitimacy of sustainable leadership. For that, Doctor Fathi Sorour, who was the leader of the Egyptian Parliament from 1990 to 2011, and was nominated by President Mubarak to head the Egyptian Delegation of the Egyptian hosting file of the 2010 World Cup to the FIFA, had the agenda of holding on his leadership of the Egyptian Parliament. The parliamentary elections of 2010 proved this agenda, where the elections noticed a fraud. Doctor Fathi Sorour gained 505 out of 506 voices (Eldjoudjari, 2011, p. 97).

As far as the impact of the political re-construction of the social order is taken into consideration, one must refer to the effects of this impact on the collective identity, and, thus, the behaviour of the ‘bewildered herd’. The Egyptian response towards the events can be

explained through a set of principles sectioned by political officials and superpowers as a way of distracting people from their miserable conditions of poverty, inflation, unemployment, and authoritarian law that had ruled them for over than thirty years . It played a role of the regime's exercise of power on them. That was the period of elections, when the president family, in a way or in another, wanted to establish a royal dominancy. It used media and soccer to uphold prejudice and propaganda for their ends. The Egyptian political 'instrumentalization' of the 2010 World Cup qualification matches between Algeria and Egypt produced an ideological apparatus, loaded with concealed 'Special Ends'. This apparatus was approached in order to question the identity of the Other, where both of the 'Other' and 'Us' share the most dominant features that characterize their affiliation to the Arab World. Those dominant features and symbols – which are the dominant language that is Arabic, and the dominant religion that is Islam, in addition to some historical aspects of the countries' struggle for independence and Pan-Arabism that they share altogether, infrastructure, etc.–were used as an eye-witness for conviction so that the public awareness mobilize for and not against its ruling class.

Effectively, the intensification of facts on the attacks that were directed to the Algerian fans in Cairo at the end of the game of November 14th, 2009, activated a wave of violence that had referred largely to the local office of Orascom Telecom in Algeria. The feeling of insecurity had led many Egyptian workers to quit Algeria. The Algerian, as a revenge on the attacks on the bus of the Algerian national team in Egypt, attacked the bus of Egyptian supporters on November 18th, 2009, in Khartoum after summing up the match, bleared a wave of more amplified chauvinism against the Algerians. Besides the media propaganda, riots were led in front of the Algerian Embassy in Egypt. After merely passing commentary on the conflicts between supporters of the teams online, the media of both of the countries committed themselves to engage a meaningless war of words without mercy. The determined words of patriotic enlistment around a football team by several Egyptian media carelessly passed a patronizing and chauvinistic mockery, targeting Algeria, its people, culture and its history. The following picture shows the Egyptian mobilization against the Algeria. It is loaded with semiotic connotations. Showing flags refers to nationalism that had mobilized the public sense of chauvinism and patriotism. However, the real effects of the wavering flags may have been the intention of making, what Antonio Gramsci called, 'public hegemony'. In fact, the newspaper's mentioning of such picture on its article may have had further ends. In other words, it was made on the purpose of drawing the public awareness and shaking their sentiments. For instance, showing rioters making a hand-gesture that refers to 'peace'

connotes that they seek life without problems. However, this should be well-known in wars, not in sport incidents because it should have been just a game to be played, not wars to be waged. Thus, one more time, this may have implied that the Egyptians should be convinced that Egypt was confronting a real enemy.



Figure 08: Egyptians Boycotting in Front of the Algerian Embassy³

Consequently, the burning glow was a soccer match. The reality is inspirational. As Al-Ahram newspaper is a pro-government institution, it mobilized a particular form of concealed tribalism among the Egyptians by fixing and exaggerating a very genuine set of accusations over the way Egyptians were being treated abroad (in Algeria and Sudan). For instance, it wanted to justify that the Algerian attacks against the Egyptian targets in Algeria and Egyptian intellectuals in Sudan were real, with government involvement. Algeria was willing to jeopardise its relations, firing bombardment on its Arab neighbours. Thuggery was produced by pro-government media and well-known personalities over illusionary falsified images to strike fear into the public hearts and minds. El-Nahhas (November 26- December 02, 2009) reports:

On the way to Khartoum airport Egyptian fans, including members of the NDP, artists, intellectuals and performers, say they were surprised

³ Retrieved from: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archive/2009/974/eg11.htm>

to encounter truckloads of Algerians carrying knives and machetes and threatening to kill Egyptians. Buses transporting Egyptians were smashed and a number of injuries was reported. Appearing on TV after his return, popular Egyptian singer Mohammed Fouad, who attended the Khartoum match, called the violence "a bloodbath".
(para. 02)

Mona El-Nahas has used an intensified language. In fact, it is not a language only. However, it is a rhyme, loaded with the discourse of hooliganism (**..truckloads of Algerians..**), crime (**.. knives and machetes..**) and intimidation (**.. kill the Egyptians.., smashed...injuries...**). The discursive use of this discourse was to shake the Egyptians' consciousness to realize the danger that might have been exposed by the Algerians in whole. The author justified her standpoint by a 'Special Elite' eyewitness who was considered as one of the Egyptian 'Educated class'. This misrepresentation was made to describe all the Algerians as violent who like bloodshed, justifying, through (**bloodbath...**) the instrumentalization of the historic fact of the Algerian Dark Decade.

Like most post-colonial countries, Egypt is a nationalistic state. It noticed poor education levels, low standards of living and the expected sense of disenfranchisement that was arising from the oppression of the government system. Such patriotic commitment ensured the spirit of tribalism and the legitimacy of being the true Arab, not belonging to Africa boiled below the surface. The Egyptian history is known as having ethnic tensions inside its territory, chiefly between the Muslims and the Copts. The major criteria of tribalism were that it was provoked by external actions. It involved an image of the 'Self' that is inherently based on some conceptions of the 'Other'. In fact, the dignity and ego of the Egyptians were assaulted to a far greater extent by the Egyptian 'Specialized Elite'. It is known and evident that Mubarak thugs had beaten and killed more Egyptians than any hooligans (a term expressed in the newspaper addressing the Algerian football fans). However, the Algerian attack on the Egyptians was seen as an off-the-point threat that deserved extreme response and further geo-political measures. El-Nahas (November 26-December 02, 2009) states that:

The independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Yom launched a public campaign under the banner "Egypt's dignity" and called for a mock trial of all Algerian officials involved in the bloody events of 18 November to be staged. The list included the names of the Algerian

Minister of Youth and Sports Al-Hashemi Gayyar, the Algerian ambassador to Cairo, the head of the Algerian Football Association and the editors of four Algerian newspapers. The Bar Association Chairman Hamdi Khalifa expressed willingness to host the trial at the syndicate. (para. 15)

As far as Al-Ahram newspaper is considered as a pro-governmental company, it is a guerrilla tool to cover the eyes over the Egyptian corruptive political system through an external enemy. Algeria was a suitable enemy. Especially, the Egyptian political system was threatened to collapse, and that its decision-making led to social problems and poverty. For instance, the Egyptian file to host the 2010 World cup was unsuccessful because neither the infrastructure nor the Egyptian treasury was sufficient to engage into such program, which was ordered by President Mubarak. Thus, rather than juggling the real personas, they considered that “ **Egypt’s dignity**” was menaced by the Algerian violent actions.

The Egyptian intellectual elites (actors, singers, TV presenters) , on their own right, also used the paper to take the chance of jumping on a popular wagon. They delighted spaces with accounts with their near-death experiences while attending the matches. The following picture (figure 09) illustrates some of the Egyptian artists proving their ‘Egyptianism’ through their standing in front of images of the Pyramid that symbolizes the ancient deep history of the Pharaoh Civilization, condemning the Algerian, according to them, violence, acting as pseudo-intellectuals of real patriotism through their handling of the Egyptian flag as a symbol of nationalism as well.



A host of film stars and public figures including, notably, actor Omar Sharif, held a brief vigil at the Sound and Light Theatre on the Pyramids plateau on Tuesday to mark their protest of Algerian aggression against Egyptian football supporters in Sudan last week. Denouncing chauvinism and terror, they called for forgiveness and putting the emotional energy resulting from the event to positive use

Figure 09: Some Egyptian Famous Figures⁴

After experiencing successful chance in the African Cup championships of the 2006 and 2008, the loss left the Egyptian nation wounded. Their depression had made them putting blames on the Algerians. Egyptian parliamentary members and actors attempted to hurl blames on the ‘Other’ by foaming anger and hatred toward Algeria over assumed attacks on Egyptian fans. This is what the government wanted. Fear and anger were intentionally whipped over soccer matches. Media helped them through headlines such as “**Algerian Terrorism**”, “**Business Affected Too**”, “**Algeria Boycott**”, “**Injured Dignity**”. The result was a fixation when football and crude nationalism that has been rarely seen before in the country. The language of the headlines was very selective as social realities were manipulative. In “**Algerian Terrorism**”, the Algerian sad experience during the Algerian Dark Decade was used to polarize the discourse of football in order to prove their argument that the Algerians are aggressive and they have bloody behaviour.

⁴ Retrieved from http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archive/2009/974/_fr1.htm

The Mubarak and ruling party took the opportunity to enrage a segment of society that had long been excluded from any political or social advancement. Gamal Essam El-Din (November 26- December 02, 2009) mentions:

MPs from the ruling National Democratic party (NDP) this week expressed outrage at what they termed the criminal acts of Algerian fans following the Egypt-Algeria play-Off matches in the 2010 World Cup qualifications held in Khartoum on the 18 November, with many demanding diplomatic relations with Algeria be served. (para. 01)

The incidents that resulted from those matches were politicised, intensified and 'instrumentalised' to secure popular support to the regime and the ruling group as representing the '*true will*' of the people. Furthermore, the circumference of the conflict that took place during the matches was meant to be widened to intensified larger arenas, such as that of political and social attitudes. As previously mentioned in the second chapter, the National Democratic Party was always the manager of Egypt because it was led by the ruling class, main of whom was Djamal Mubarak. In other words, the writer of this article tries to prove his discourse and convince the reader through his mentioning of one of the influential ruling figures. Moreover, he uses more intensified language to draw the public awareness towards the hooliganism of the Algerian behaviour. For instance, he defines the acts of the Algerian fans as "**criminal**".

The false sense of nationalism, which was created in the wake of the defeat in the 18th November match, launched a wave of angry supporters, lamenting their national team's failure to secure a place in South African. It was about football then. But when media spread that Egyptians had been attacked by the Algerians, all hell broke. Noam Chomsky (1988) advocates the role of the mass media in moulding the public consent and crowding them around particular theories. El-Bey (November 26 –December 2, 2009) states:

What made the question more pressing is that the Algerian behaviour after the match was blessed by the Algerian officials and some Arab states. This we are not dealing with individual cases of hatred. However, in our search for an answer, we should refrain from using rhetorical phrases like 'historic relations' and 'fraternal ties between the two states'. These were suitable during the 1950s and 1960s. But now we need long and firm stand with ourselves and others before the chain of hatred shackles us without knowing the reasons for such hatred. (para. 08)

Though it should have been just a game of ninety minutes, it seemed issuing deterioration awakening contention that might sooner have led to war. The paper had the role of making the people 'aware'. They mobilised Egyptians' emotions in order to draw their attentions towards

the '*conceptually-imaginative enemy*', and discard them away from any irresponsibility of the officials. This hegemonic action build new 'collective identity'. "Alaa Mubarak went so far as to ask: "What are you still doing in Egypt? We don't want you in our country."'" (Shaden Shehab, November 26 – December 2, 2009, para. 06). The mobilization of events was 'instrumentalized' to hide the unanticipated defeat of the Egyptian national football team in the play-off. Consequently, people's angriness was cooled and directed towards the 'imaginative enemy' instead of being directed to the political officials so to prevent any unsuspected turmoil against the government, or rather blame the Egyptian ruling class's policies that neglected the economic, domestic and social problems.

This struggle remained at the basis of words, or rather in form of a cold war. However, these words, which seemed valueless, affected the relationship between the two nations, summoning narcissism, chauvinism and football hysteria with unjustified patriotism. It moulded the ties that had been between the two nations. The football context served an Afro-Arab country (Egypt) a context of 'coup d'état' on another Afro-Arab country (Algeria). "Sport has always mended what politics spoils. But in the case of Algeria and Egypt, it spoiled what politics did" (Al-Zayabi, Al-Hayat Newspaper: as cited in "Bottom Lines", 26 November-2 December, 2009, para 06). Nonetheless, the discursive use of this patriotic discourse was utilized through the ideology of 'Sub-Arabism' for the sake of questioning the Algerian Arab identity and belonging, where the whole of Algeria and Algerians were considered as a source of threat, not just to Egypt, but to the whole Arab World. El-Nahhas (November 26- December 02, 2009) reports, "University professors have decided to boycott all forms of scientific cooperation with Algerian research centres and universities. Hussein Eweida, chairman of Al-Azhar University Teaching Staff Club, insists "what happened has uncovered latent Algerian hostility towards Egyptians and Arabs" (para. 14).

As riots were waged, the Egyptian leadership patrons were most likely sitting in their chairs smiling, knowing that for now the Algerian puzzle would occupy the Egyptian people, taking their minds away from the real issues and creating weeks of diplomatic tensions with Algeria. Gamal Essam El-Din (November 26- December 2, 2009) mentions, " "though our government", Bakir continued, "was well aware of these aggressive Algerian intentions beforehand, it did nothing and left Egyptian citizens who went to Sudan to support their team a prey to Algerian criminals"".

Instead of blaming the officials of having intensifying the events for their own interests, all blame had fallen on the Algerians. Small responsibility was fallen on the Egyptian officials. It

was that they did not provide protection. Then, in turn, he proved this irresponsibility by saying that the officials did not have any suspicion about the Algeria attack on the Egyptians. Another conceptual sign can be connoted. It is that he proves the assertions made on the Algerians that they attacked the Egyptian fans knives, heavy wooden sticks and daggers. The Egyptian media stereotyped the Algerians as aggressive and violent. Abu Ghazal (November 26- December 2, 2009) writes:

Such people (Egyptian elite who went to Um-Derman) don't know how to deal with dangerous supporters like the Algerian, Idriss (an Egyptian fan) said, adding that their attacks on the Egyptian fans were mostly done for show anyway. All they did was throwing stones at the Egyptian buses, raise weapons, hurting some fans with the result that people who had never been to football matches before were scared and screamed out of fear. (para. 06)

The Algerians were portrayed as being savage people. They cannot be controlled, as their behaviour is not polite. Abu Ghazal (November 26- December 2, 2009) adds, "Idriss added that when the Algerian insulted Egypt and the Egyptian in the stadium, they had wanted to respond. However, when they did so, the other fans told them "shsh, that's impolite, don't say that""

The irresponsibility of some Algerian supporters was taken as a dimension to portray all the Algerians as criminals. Besides, the Algerian identity was questioned. As an aspect of social realities, history was polarized to amplify conflict and devalue the 'Other's' identity and national symbols. Shehab (November 26- December 2, 2009) mentions:

He (Alaa Mubarak) downplayed any aspects of Arab nationalism being involved in the conflict, saying "until they are able to speak Arabic we cannot call them Arabs" and also criticised suggestions that there are Algerians who love Egypt. "Where are they?" he asked. "We can't hear their voices." (para, 07)

Here, as a political figure, Alaa Mubarak manipulates the national common-sense as an ideological apparatus rather than a rational belief. Through this ideology, he would have like to practice power, guide the public evaluation of who an Algeria is according to his conception. As a result, he may have liked to draw the Egyptians to obtain a particular action towards the Algerians.

Nietzsche's concept of Superiority of Race can be applied in this case. The Egyptians saw the only Arab nation that should have represented the Arab patriotism and fought for the

honour and ego of Arabism was Egypt. They have not expected the loss. They saw that they had a great image all over the world that they could not have distorted. “Now everybody is saying that the Algerian beat the Egyptians in Sudan,” lamented Idriss”(Abu Ghazala November 26- December 2, 2009, para. 07). Shehab (November 26- December 2, 2009) notes: “ If our role is to be above such things because we are the mother of nations[Um-Eldonia], then we no longer need such role” (para. 13). Abu Ghazala’s discourse conceals, in the same article , that it had been a fate picture that the Algerians are known as being violent all over history. He (November 26- December 02, 2009) states, “The officials should have known from the beginning that was one of the most important matches in the history of Egyptian football (...) We knew that the Algerians wanted to attack us there. It was obvious from their actions in Cairo” (para. 11).

Egypt, which had qualified only twice for World Cup competitions (in 1934 and 1990), wanted to overcome its curse of the Pharaohs and reflect its unrivalled record in Africa on the world stage. And with that was widely seen as its best team ever, the country should have qualified without trouble. AbdelGhani (November 19-25) reports, “The Algerian defeat of the Egyptian players was seen as that the Algerians were not qualified. Algerians succeeded with hard efforts. The Algerians played to their strength to get the result they badly craved” (para. 13). Saving the image of the country, the loss was later changed into another discourse. The Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, did special reception, which was considered as a deed that no other predecessor had done before. This, of the course, was done to serve other than other ends by gaining people.

The behaviour of the Algerians was considered as violent as it caused damages. However, the piece of deception made on the Egyptians behaviour, such as the burning of the Algerian Embassy in Cairo and the attack on the Algerian team bus, which was carrying the Algerian team from the airport to the hotel, was considered as being fabricated and not real. Morsy (November 26- December 02, 2009) reports:

He [Hassan Sakr, head of the National Sports Council] said: “The report to FIFA will include Algerian attacks on Egyptian spectators before, during and after the game.” It will also make reference to the stoning incident of the bus carrying Algerian players in Cairo shortly before the 14 November game played in Egypt, which supposedly injured three Algerian players but which Sakr describe as a story fabricated by the Algerians. (para. 09)

The Algerian attacks were proved sure; the Egyptian attack was questioned (supposedly, fabricated). Mazhar (November 19-25, 2009) declares: “A reported stone-throwing on a bus taking the Algerian players...remains a mystery” (para. 06). Mazhar questions event of the Algerian bus attack. Here, perhaps Mazhar indirectly devalues the Algerian identity. However, she did not question the story that the Egyptian fans had been attacked by the Algerian fans in Sudan. This is another image that shows the discourse of magnifying the ‘Self’ through the devaluation of the ‘Other’s’ role.

The president family seemed rallying to gain public stand. It participated in the role of defending the ego and dignity of the Land of the Pharaohs. Mubarak’s sons went to Sudan to appear to the public and gain their mood. They showed enthusiasm towards Egypt and the Egyptians, insisting on their caring about Egypt. The presidency family had a major role in lighting fires against the Algerians. Alaa Mubarak said, “I am not qualified to assume any political titles, neither do I want to” (para. 05). Abel-Ghani (November 19-25, 2009) adds, “President’s sons Gamal and Alaa were among those presents in the stands to cheer for the pharaohs” (para. 09). Through the contradiction between his words and acts, Alaa Mubarak may have seemed that he had the intention for blinding the people to see reality, and drawing them to support their policies, especially that the tensions were taking place during the preparation of the electoral operations.

The Algerian media are depicted as being the only responsible follower for the denouncement of conflicts, threatening the Egyptians. The Algerian media were seen as the only responsible for the creation of problems. Said (December 3-9, 2009) adds, “The situation began to spin out of control as an angry mobs backed by the sensationalist Algerian media took the helm and propelled the football match frenzy to the level of national Crisis” (para. 10). The conspiracy had, first, been planned by the Algerian political groups and media presenters, Emadeddin Adib says, “The anti-Egyptian attacks that first began to appear in the Algerian media several month ago.” (as cited in Shaden Shehab 2009, November 26 – December 02, para. 09).

The presidency family was the first one who propagated the tensions, depicting the Algerian heritage and questioning the Algerian Arab identity. Alaa Mubarak, said, “Until they are able to speak Arabic we cannot call them Arabs.” (as cited in Shaden Shehab, November 26 – December 02, 2009). He also questioned the relationship between Algeria and Egypt, referring to that Algeria just proclaimed that it had good relationship, and that it cared about Egypt and the Egyptians. He said, to Al-Ahram Weekly): “Where are they? . . . We cannot

hear their voices” (Shaden Shaden Shehab 2009, November 26 - December02). Algeria was seen as the country that jeopardized the Egyptian nation, being urged to take serious considerations on it. Otherwise, the citizenship of the Egyptians would lose respect.

Chauvinism seems expressed clearly through the Newspaper to stress out the . The Algerians are expressed as being the only responsible monitor of the drastic crisis, injuring the Egyptian dignity and keeling the ego of honour. **“Al-Osbou wrote, the crack, the shock, squandering Egyptian dignity in Sudan.”** (No More Brotherly Rhetoric. Issue No. 974). President Mubarak aids, "Egypt will never tolerate assaults on the dignity of its people," he said, "for the dignity of our people is the dignity of Egypt" (Shehab, November 26- December 02, 2009, para. 02). Political figures, as the President, show highly intensified politicization of sport conflicts. He manipulated the Egyptian dignity as an ideological social symbol to galvanize the agency and attitude of its subjects. This is explicitly exemplified through the ideological celebration of the Egyptian dignity that stimulates the agency of chauvinism and patriotism. Intertextuality of the political and media discourses played a vital role in justifying each other's opinion and reinforcing the bewildering the masses.

In addition, this image also exemplifies the role of representation in defining the role of the ‘Self’ and that of the ‘Other’. Two types of representation appear here; the first is that of magnifying the role of Egypt, whereas the second is that of denying the value of Algeria. If we follow the propagation of the attacks committed by the two sides as being true, we can question why these two discourses consider the attacks on the Egyptian fans as a source of humiliating the Egyptian dignity while concealing the attacks on the Algerian team, as if the Algerians do not have dignity. In some newspapers, the group of the Egyptian players is expressed as being ‘a nation team’, referring to the nationality and team-work senses among their players; whereas, the group of the Algerian players is referred to as *‘the Algerian players’*. They saw that the Algerian team members play individually without efforts and their play is characterized as being violent. Though the Egyptians lost the visa to South Africa, the Egyptian ego saw that it would have been of honourable task to thank the Egyptian national team. “. . . the failure to thank the national team for its efforts . . . aggressive performance of the Algerian players . . . attack on the Egyptian fans by some fanatic Algerian supporters.” (El-Bey November 26 - December02, 2009). The Algerian supporters neither have identity, nor are from superior elite.

The Egyptian authority politicised their people's interest in SOCCER drama to distract them from the actual political and social issues. It seemed that the real winners of that soccer

champion over the Egyptian power elite as the qualifiers were not the Algerian team, but rather the Egyptian power elite as the qualifiers of the Cairo. The president Hosni Mubarak, for instance, had paid himself much attention to appear as the only person to care about the Egyptian football. Ahmed Morsy's (26 November- 02 December, 2009) article includes a picture where Mubarak is shown having a meeting with the Egyptian team after being defeated in the last qualification soccer match. Parliament members and Islamist parties appeared to the population in the newspaper, showing off their care about the Muslim unity. Gamal Essam El-Din says

MPs from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) this week expressed outrage at what they termed the criminal acts of Algerian football fans Muslim Brotherhood and oppositional MPs responded by expression their own outrage condemnation but asking for restraint." Israelis and Zionists would be happy to see when two Arab and Muslim nations sever relations and boycott one another." Warned one. (para. 02)

The tribune of the paper serves propaganda of events. It played a significant turn-taking in fuelling media war believed because the mass people watch with 'bewilderment'. Media helped the 'Specialist elite' blithering around mega interests. Media have turned entertainment and competitive discourses based on sport into political discourses. Football pitch obtained a battlefield image of society as clash of interests camouflaged as clash of principles.

As much as the friendship and brotherhood had been strong between the Egyptians and the Algerians, a football game almost destroyed the historical relations between them. What might be controversial here was that many parties, such as media, talked about the existence of what is known as a plot. The latter was considered to be planned by Israel to ignite the flames of agitation between the two nations, and as a strategy to direct the world's attention towards what was happening between the two peoples. Thus, they would have the opportunity to continue their monopolization of Palestine. The Egyptian media played a big role in putting pressure on the masses, considering it a declared war that should be won, while the Algerian media was silent, with the exception of some newspapers and press headlines that penetrated itself in the midst of a fierce conflict with its Egyptian counterpart. The Egyptian discourse of propagation employed it to break the Algerian will and devaluate their value. Insulation and curse were employed to distort the history and the martyrs of Algeria,

calling the Algerian people as the barbarians, who had no history, no identity and no value. The Egyptian citizens were also mobilized, ensuring their right to win and qualify. The political rhetoric was present that Israel, once again, tried to use for the sake of distracting the Arabs and making them a game in their hands. The subject of the following picture (figure 10) illustrates the idea of the conspiracy that was provoked to distract the Arab World, causing a state of anxiety and tension. The media intervened to ease the crisis, and included Israel as an active player in the conflict. The reality has shown that a slight plot can shake the Arab relations. This can be ensured, especially after that a football match, which is just a game played by the spirit of sport, shackled deep relations between two Arab countries and introduced them into a cycle of sharp and nasty clash.



"A second game between brothers, like the previous one... and I can guarantee you we can occupy the entire Arab world."

Figure 10: An Israeli and an American Discussing a Plot against the Arabs

III.7. Conclusion:

Critical discourse analysis of the selected sample showed a prominent relationship between the media's selective use of language, the Egyptian Dominant Elites' symbolic practice of power and the emergence of new social orders between the Egyptian 'Self' and the Algerian 'Other'. Discursive use of the political discourse in football arena institutionalised football as a special occasion, and played a pivoting role in creating and naturalizing 'hegemonized' identities. The propagation of violence, conflicts, threat, in addition to other issues, framed the ideological dimensions of Sub-Arabism to naturalize the dominant policies, and legitimize the agendas. They were used as social arrangements through the use of special language as a tool for practicing symbolic power.

The social context within and between Algeria and Egypt was systematized as a block of 'knowledge' to set and endorse conflicts as a right. Indeed, those conflicts were considered as a tool to manifest the 'Us' identity and defend the borders of this identity. Moreover, the 'Other' identity was devalued. The 2010 World Cup qualification football between Algeria and Egypt was an arena in which the 'Self' was celebrated. In fact, the politicization of the historical, cultural and religious, and the polarization of football were meant by the politicians to (re-)construct the socio-political order and the public awareness.

Original Quotations

1. Among the competing countries, the Egyptian file is considered as the only one that receives great support from the political leadership because Egypt is the only country represented by the delegation of the highest political level, along with the testimony of the presidents and members of the International Federation of Football who represented Egypt in this event and in the presentation of the file Doctor Fathi Sourour.

(The Egyptian Delegation has exposed the 2010 World Cup and is well-received by the FIFA. October 1st, 2003)

"الملف المصري يعتبر الملف الوحيد بين الدول المنافسة الذي يلقي مساندة كبيرة من القيادة السياسية لان مصر هي الدولة الوحيدة التي يمثلها وفد اعلى مستوى سياسي بين الدول المنافسة و بشهادة رؤساء و أعضاء الاتحاد الدولي لكرة القدم حيث كان يمثل مصر في هذا الحدث و في تقديم الملف الدكتور فتحي سرور" (وفد مصر يعرض ملف مونديال 2010 و يلقي استقبالا طيبا من أعضاء الفيفا. 01 أكتوبر 2003)

2. We establish our foreign relations on the basis of mutual respect, and common interests. And we play an active role because of our Arab, African, Mediterranean and international actions. We put our foreign policies in the service of the Egyptian development, interior issues and our communities around the world. Taking care of our citizens abroad is the responsibility of the state. We take care of their rights, and do not accept harming them, harassing them or insulting their dignity. I say, with clear words, that the dignity of the Egyptians is the dignity of Egypt, and that Egypt does not tolerate those who offend the dignity of its people.

(President Mubarak's Speech on November 21, 2009)

"اننا نقيم علاقاتنا الخارجية على اساس الاحترام المتبادل و المصالح المشتركة و نمارس دورا فاعلا بدواعي تحركنا العربي و الافريقي و المتوسطي و الدولي. نضع سياساتنا الخارجية في خدمة قضايا التنمية و الداخل المصري و جالياتنا على اتساع العالم. ان رعاية مواطنينا بالخارج مسؤولية الدولة. نرعى حقوقهم، و لا نقبل المساس بهم، التطاول عليهم او امتهان كرامتهم. و اقول بكلمات واضحة ان كرامة المصريين من كرامة مصر، و مصر لا تنتهون مع من يسيء لكرامة ابنائها."

(خطاب الرئيس حسني مبارك عقب المباراة التي جمعت بين المنتخبين

الوطنيين الجزائري و المصري يوم 21 نوفمبر 2009)

3. How come a mother accepts a citizen to be insulted, and beaten in his country

(the YouTuber Kameel Reda on President Mubarak's Speech of November 21, 2009)

"لا تقبل أم يهان المواطن أراى وهو بيتهان في بلده"

General Conclusion

Cerebrally, Algeria and Egypt have different civilizations as a social reality that makes them differ, as they share another type of civilization as another social reality, i.e. the Islamic civilization that bound them together. What one considered when looking forward understanding the conflicts that had arisen between nations that share at least the most dominant aspects, such as Islam, Arabic language and continent, became crucial issue to be investigated after the memorial events of 2009. The expression “desert foxes” and “the pharaohs” were two ideological names used to represent the Algerians and the Egyptians, respectively. This naming was emphasised by each of the two nations to say to the other “I have a civilization that is different from and more elegant than yours”. This patriotism progressed due to the clash inside the political dominant minds, which was transformed to the public mind.

Egypt has long and undeniable memorable experience collectively with the Algerian people. This dates back more or less to the age of the Islamic conquests and the building of the Arabic and Islamic world. The relationship was intensified since both of the nations’ war of independence. The Egyptians supported the Algerian revolution. And when Egypt needed tanks in the 1973 War of the Suez crisis, the first to support them were the Algerians. They had great relationship typed by economic, political, cultural and social give-and-take standpoints. However, because of the political spinning of the 2010 World Cup football, those relationships were turned into inconsistent relations.

The Egyptian media presenters questioned the hatred that was delivered through the attitudes of the Algerians towards the Egyptian people generally and their ‘Elites’ particularly. The sense of ‘We’ was present in the Egyptian press as Egypt as a nation, culture and civilization, drawing the demarcations of the Algerian *Otherness*. The press called the Algerian to remember the role of the Egyptian authorities in the Algerian war of Independence. They considered that Egypt had had a pivoting role in the building of the Algerian Arabic identity after the independence, magnifying the Egyptian role only. To intensify hatred, they propagated that most of the Algerian population was of Tamazight origin. Upon this consideration, the Foucault’s concept “the Civilized Mission” was used as a colonial discourse, this time, to justify not a western dominance, but rather an Arab

supremacy on another Arab nation. They also felt that France had no more been a threat to the Algerian unity as the Egyptian regime had.

The verbal escalation and play with the feeling of the listeners/readers by Egyptian media presenters/writers were incredibly effective in spreading intolerance towards all the Algerians. Deformation of history and the use of it for warlike and malicious purposes honoured the media apostles and government leaders to build their reputation on the ashes of the fires they had lit. Media hooliganism falsified history, transformed hearsays into absolute reality, created hatred that went beyond the soccer as football match and continued beyond sporting events. While supporters had breezed equipments, it was the media which broke the spirit of those supporters. The process of 'Self' justification was also flashed by the Algerian media and people. Algerians were exchanging chatted talk about the Egyptian Pharaonic civilization, misdoubting the origin their Islamic identity. They laid blame on them as being the conspirator of the Palestinian issue.

The Egyptian newspapers (both Arabic and Anglophone) were sites of expressing mockery and insults on the Algerian heritage, language, history and knowledge. Most of the coverage suggested that Algerians were terrorists (referring them to the Dark Decade), barbarians, and hooligans as neither having history nor belonging to the Arab World. They were considered as made Arabs. Algeria was depicted as the country of a million pair of shoes (referring to the martyrs). The reason they looked for in all sorts of media was to answer their question: "why do Algerians hate us?" The Egyptians transmitted insults on the Algerians touching their history, culture, knowledge and behaviour. They were portrayed as hooligans, people without identity nor history, francophone people, savage people holding knives, criminals, and armed gangs. Prejudice and propaganda upheld by media makers to jeopardize strong relations were used by the Egyptian Royal family to serve other ends (that period was the period of elections).

Effectively, public attitudes were approached through the polarization of Sub-Arabism. This ideological apparatus was used as a lens to understand and deal with the Algerian 'Other' within an imaginative geography, which was drawn in the minds of the 'Us', rather than consulting the natural reality. Mass communication used media, official speeches, and talk shows with artists and football figures as the exclusive source of knowledge, by which falsified reality were elaborated. Thus, they were the *pseudo-intellectual*. The latter created a new status quo to, firstly, close the eyes of the public mass to perceive the real status quo that was characterized by social problems, domestic dissatisfaction, deteriorating health

and education, etc. Secondly, legitimizing the Egyptian political policies and turning Egypt into a kingdom of the Mubaraks' dynasty was a very prominent agenda that was to be served throughout the football arena of the 2010 World and African Cups. Thirdly, these cups were also the tool to prove the Egyptian leadership of the Arab World, which was, in its turn, a tool to gain corporate interests from American on the supporting of the Israel. Finally, the concluding point of this stream is to reach the idea that the 2010 World and African Cups were manipulated by the 'Political Specialized Elite' via the ideological apparatus of Sub-Arabism' along with its discourses of magnifying the 'Us' and vilifying the 'Other' to fulfil a set of dominant interests, and prove the dominant political theory of superiority and legitimate symbolic power.

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الملخص

يحاول هذا العمل استكشاف تأثير الأجندات السياسية على خطاب الرياضة الذي يدور حولها و من خلالها، وكذلك تأثير هذا الخطاب على النظام الاجتماعي داخل الجزائر وبين مصر في عام 2009. يدرس التلاعب السياسي الذي شهدته مباريات تصفيات كأس العالم 2010. الغرض منه هو تسليط الضوء على السبب وراء تحدي الهوية الجماعية للشعوب التي كانت مصممة اجتماعيا ومحفوظة سياسيا "بالنخبة السياسية الخاصة". تم استخدام تحليل الخطاب النقدي من أجل تقديم تحليل نقدي وإقامة صلة بين لأحداث والإجراءات من أجل تسليط الضوء على الأجندات السياسية المخفية التي تلاعبت بمباريات التأهل لكأس العالم 2010. تقيم الدراسة مجموعة من المقالات الصحفية والتقارير الرسمية، مثل الخطابات الرئاسية. يدرس الإطار النظري ساحة كرة القدم في العالم العربي كحلبة للخطاب السياسي المتضارب و تكييف الأجواء التي حولت خطاب المناقشة الرياضية إلى خطاب سياسي بارز، كادت تدلي بالعلاقات الدبلوماسية بين الجزائر ومصر إلى نهايتها. تدرس هذه الدراسة بشكل عميق نطاق "شبه العروبة" -Sub-Arabism- كنظرية إيديولوجية جديدة، والاستقطاب السياسي لهذا الجهاز الأيديولوجي لتحقيق أجندات سياسية مهيمنة. يقوم الجانب العملي بالتحقيق في تأثير هذا الخطاب على إعادة صياغة الهوية الاجتماعية، كما يسلط الضوء على الأجندات السياسية الخفية التي تلاعبت بهذه الهوية. وبالتالي، فإنه يفحص الفروق الدقيقة التي تفرق بين الاستجابة للأفراد ذوي الهويات السياسية، وبين أولئك الذين يمثلون هويتهم بالفعل. كان الاستقطاب السياسي لكرة القدم كمؤسسة اجتماعية يتحدى الهويات الاجتماعية القائمة طبيعياً، مما أدى إلى انتماء الذات Ourness المصرية و الذات الغيرية الجزائرية من خلال خطابات التكبير والتشهير. تم إنتاج هذا الأخير من خلال إيديولوجية "شبه العروبة" -Sub-Arabism- ، التي شكلت كمقياس من أجل تحديد من هو العربي الحقيقي. لقد أخفت هذه الدعاية الإيديولوجية المصالح السياسية الرئيسية ، التي كان أساسها ميراث جمال مبارك للحكم المصري، والبناء السياسي (إعادة) النظام الاجتماعي السياسي الجزائري والمصري.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الرياضة، الأجندة السياسية، التحليل النقدي للخطاب، الجزائر، مصر

Résumé

Cet ouvrage tente d'explorer l'influence des agendas politiques sur le discours du sport qui l'entoure, ainsi que l'impact de ce discours sur le (ré) ordre social en et entre l'Algérie et l'Egypte en 2009. Il étudie la manipulation politique qui a marqué les matches de qualification pour la Coupe du monde 2010. Son objectif est de mettre en lumière les raisons qui ont amené à remettre en question l'identité collective des peuples, socialement déterminée et politiquement déconcertée par « l'élite politique spéciale ». L'Analyse Critique du Discours a été utilisée tout au long du travail afin de fournir une analyse critique des événements et des actions, et d'établir un lien entre les deux afin de mettre en évidence les agendas politiques dissimulés qui ont manipulé les matches de qualification pour la Coupe du

monde 2010. L'étude évalue une série d'articles des journaux et de rapports officiels, tels que des discours présidentiels. Le cadre théorique étudie l'arène du football dans le Monde Arabe en tant qu'arène de discours politiques conflictuels, ainsi que le conditionnement de l'atmosphère qui a poussé le discours de la compétition sportive être un discours politique marquant, qui a rapproché les relations diplomatiques entre l'Algérie et l'Égypte à leur fin. Cette étude étudie en profondeur la portée du Sous-Arabisme, en tant que une nouvelle théorie idéologique, et la polarisation politique de cette appareil idéologique pour réaliser les objectifs politiques dominants. La partie pratique étudie les effets de ce discours sur la recomposition d'une identité sociale, et met en évidence les agendas politiques dissimulés qui ont manipulé cette identité. Ainsi, il examine les nuances qui différencient la réponse à / des individus avec des identités manipulées politiquement, et celle de / à ceux qui représentent vraiment leurs identités. La polarisation politique du football en tant qu'institution sociale a remis en question les identités sociales existant naturellement, conduisant à l'affiliation de le 'Soi' Egyptien et de 'l'Autre' algérien à travers des discours de grossissement et de diffamation. Ces derniers ont été produits selon l'idéologie du Sous-Arabisme, qui définit qui est le véritable Arabe. Cette propagande idéologique dissimulait d'importants intérêts politiques, dont le principal était l'héritage Egyptien de Djamel Moubarak et la (re) construction politique de l'ordre sociopolitique Algérien et Egyptien.

Mots clés : Sport ; Agenda Politique ; Analyse de Discours Critique ; Algerie ; Egypt

Appendices