The Shift in the American Press Discourse over Iran's Nuclear Deal 2015. Case Study: New York Times and Washington Post 2015-current days

A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Candidacy for a Doctorate en Sciences in English

Submitted by: Djalal Eddine AMRANI   **Supervised by:** Prof. Bakhta ABDELHAY

Board of Examiners

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DEDICATIONS

I dedicate this work to my primary school educator and my guide in life, my Father and my Mother, and also to my dear Wife.

I also dedicate this thesis to my Professor Neddar Belabbes, may Allah mercy him and trespass his misdeeds.

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ABSTRACT

Iran nuclear issue has been one of the most controversial topics in the international political arena since 1979. The anti-colonial and Islamic sentiments have immensely widened the gap between Iran and the west and, thus, fuelled and legitimised the Iranian revolutionary discourses when confronting the west. So this issue has gone under many political irresolution and disputes, and it has brought both Iran and US, in many occasions, to an extremely polarised context in which both sides project and maintain a legitimate position against the other, to the extent they have been on the verge of war recently (especially with the killing of Soleimani in 2019). By considering this very brief background to this issue, and based on Edward Said's notion of orientalism and Hall's mechanisms of the Self/Other representation, this study examines the American press discourse towards Iran in the period stretching between 2015 till 2020.The study tries, on one hand, to see whether the Orient (Iran) has still the same bad image, or it has been altered. On the other hand, the study then examines the discursive strategies used by the American press to legitimize the anti-Iranian actions, policies and discourses, as well as to de-legitimize the Iranian actions and discourses. Second, this research attempts to examine the ideological stance of the American press behind their linguistic forms towards Iran nuclear issue especially since Iran nuclear deal 2015. Third, the study attempts to re-address the issue of the complex mediation between discourse and social structure and find convincing answers to the question of how discourse shapes to influence the socio-political structures. For this aim, I take both New York Times and Washington Post as the source of my data of analysis in the period stretching from 2015 till current. The study focuses on the texts written in the periods after the Iran deal 2015-2016, and the period when Trump came to pull US out of the deal and put more sanctions on Iran again 2017-2020. Thus, 27 articles were selected from both the newspapers'

opinion, editorials and new analysis sections. To achieve the above objectives, I draw on Wodak's (2001) Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), its referential, predicational and argumentative strategies, as well as some other aspects of language such as recontextualisation. The findings of the analysis show that both newspapers, NYT and WP, adopt the Orientalism concepts that help defining the Self against the Other. Iran has been referred as terrorist, autocratic, defiant and liar. In argumentative terms, the topos of threat, history, responsibility and uselessness are used by the newspapers de-legitimized the Iranian actions and discourses as well as Iran nuclear deal. This has given rise to the ideological dichotomy Us vs Them which is spread over the opinion articles of both newspapers. Moreover, out of their liberal views and stereotyping theory, the ideological stance of both newspapers is clear, they both stand against Iran as a regime, and their ideological discourse is firm in terms of distinguishing the good (Self) from the bad (Iran). Therefore, the discursive strategies produced, referential, predicational or argumentative, have influenced to shape the American identity.

Key words: CDA, press discourse, Iran's nuclear deal, media text, Self/Other legitimation, Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), ideology, Orientalism

RÉSUMÉ

Le programme nucléaire iranien est, depuis 1979, l'un des plus controversés sujets sur la scène politique internationale. Les sentiments islamiques et anticoloniaux ont profondément creusé le fossé entre l'Iran et l'Occident ; alimentant ainsi et légitimant les discours révolutionnaires antioccidentaux iraniens. Cette question a donc été au centre de nombreuses irrésolutions et d'événements politiques, mettant l'Iran et les États-Unis, à maintes reprises, dans un contexte extrêmement polarisé, où les deux parties se positionnaient en adversaires, tout en justifiant leur animosité au point d'être, récemment, au bord d'une guerre (notamment avec l'assassinat de Soleimani en 2019). En considérant ce bref historique de cette question et basé sur l'orientalisme de Said et système de représentation de Hall, la présente thèse se propose, en premier, d'examiner les stratégies discursives utilisées par la presse américaine pour légitimer les actions, politiques et discours anti-iraniens, ainsi que pour délégitimer les actions et discours iraniens. Deuxièmement, cette étude tente d'examiner la position idéologique du discours de la presse américaine vis-à-vis de la question nucléaire iranienne, notamment depuis l'accord iranien. Troisièmement, l'étude tente de trouver une réponse convaincante à la question de savoir comment le discours façonne les structures socio-politiques. Dans cette optique, j'ai pris le New York Times, ainsi que le Washington Post comme source de données d'analyse sur la période allant de 2015 à ce jour. L'étude porte sur les écrits parus dans les périodes suivant l'accord iranien en 2015-2016, ainsi que la période où Trump a retiré les États-Unis de l'accord pour imposer davantage de sanctions à l'Iran en 2017-2020. En somme, 27 articles ont été sélectionnés dans les rubriques avis, éditoriaux et nouvelles analyses. Pour atteindre les objectifs énoncés ci-dessus, j'ai adopté l'approche historique du discours (DHA) de Wodak (2001), ses stratégies référentielles, prédicationnelles et argumentatives, en sus de quelques autres dispositifs analytiques, tels

que la recontextualisation. Les résultats de l'analyse montrent que les deux journaux, le New York Times et le Washington Post, adoptent des concepts orientalistes qui aident à définir le Soi contre l'Autre. L'Iran a été qualifié de terroriste, d'autocratique, de rebelle et de menteur. En termes argumentatifs, les thèmes de menace, de responsabilité et d'inutilité utilisés par les journaux ont délégitimisé les actions et les discours iraniens ainsi que l'accord nucléaire iranien. Cela a donné lieu à la dichotomie idéologique Nous contre Eux qui est omniprésente sur les articles d'opinion dans les deux journaux. De plus, à partir de leurs vues libérales, la position idéologique des deux journaux est claire, ils s'opposent tous deux à l'Iran en tant que régime, et leur discours idéologique est tranchant en termes de distinguer le bon (Soi) du mauvais (Iran). Par conséquent, les stratégies discursives produites, référentielles, prédicatives ou argumentatives, ont influencé pour façonner l'identité américaine.

Mots clés : CDA, discours de presse, accord nucléaire iranien, texte médiatique, légitimation Soi/Autre, approche du discours historique, idéologie, orientalisme.

الملخص

كان البرنامج النووي الإيراني من أكثر القضايا إثارة للجدل على الساحة السياسية الدولية منذ عام 1979. وقد أفضت مُناهضة الاستعمار والمشاعر الإسلامية الناقمة عليه إلى تعميق الهُوة بين إيران والغرب،شاحنةً بذلك الخطابات الثورية الإيرانية المُعادية للغرب مع إضفاء الشرعية عليها. وعليه، كانت هذه القضية محور كثير من الأحداث السياسية غير المحسومة، وقد زَجَّت كُلاً من إيران والولايات المتحدة، في مناسبات عدة، في حلبة صراع عنيف وتنافس عدائي، يرى فيه كل طرف أنه على حق، إلى درجة أنهما كانا على شفا حرب في المدة الأخيرة (خاصة مع مقتل سليماني في عام 2019). وبعد نظر وجيز في حيثيات القضية، و اعتمادا على نظرية الاستشراق لإدوارد سعيد و التشكيل لاستوارد هول،حاولنا في هذه الدراسة، بادئ ذي بدء، تحليل الاستراتيجيات الخطابية التي تستخدمها الصحافة الأمريكية لإضفاء الشرعية على الإجراءات والسياسات والخطابات المعادية لإيران، مع نزع الشرعية عن أفعال إيران وخطاباتها. ثانياً، حاولنا في هذه الدراسة تحليل الموقف الأيديولوجي لخطاب الصحافة الأمريكية تجاه الملف النووي الإيراني،خاصة منذ الاتفاق الإيراني. ثالثًا، حاولنا الخروج بإجابة مقنعة للتساؤل حول كيفيةتشكيل الخطاب للبُنى الاجتماعية السياسية. لهذا الغرض، اتخذنا جريدتي "نيويورك تايمز" و"واشنطن بوست" مصدرا لاستقاء البيانات التحليلية للفترة الممتدة من عام 2015 إلى يوما هذا. وتُركز الدراسة على الكتابات الصادرة بعد الصفقة الإيرانية (2016-2015)، والفترة التي سحب فيها "ترامب" الولايات المتحدة من الصفقة مع فرضه، مرة أخرى، مزيدا من العقوبات على إيران (2020-2017). وهكذا، انتقينا 27 مقالاًمُعبِّرا عن رأي الصحف وكذا افتتاحيات وتحاليل جديدة. ولبلوغ الأهداف المذكورة أعلاه، اعتمدنا مقاربة تحليل الخطاب التاريخية "وداك" (2001)، واستراتيجياتها المرجعية والتنبؤية والجدلية وكذلك بالاعتماد على كل من استراتيجية اعادة السياق.

نتائج البحث اظهرت بان كلا الجريدتين "نيويورك تايمز" و"واشنطن بوست" تبنت مفهوم الاستشراق و الدي ساعد في تعريف الذات مقابل الاخر. ايران و صفت ارهابية، استبدادية، متحدية و مراوغة. بالنسبة الى المصطلحات الجدلية، حجة التهديد التاريخ المسؤولية و اللافائدة التي استعملت من طرف الجريدتين، ادت الى نزع الشرعية من ايران و افعالها و كدلك خطاباتها و الاتفاق النووي الإيراني. و بالتالي هدا كله ادى الى بناء ايديولوجية 'نحن' ضد 'هم'،و التي اضفت تقريبا على كل مقالات الجريدتين. زيادة، نظرا لآرائهم الليبيرالية و استعمالهم لنظرية النمطية، الموقف الايديولوجي للجريدتين واضح كلاهما وقفا ضد ايران كنظام، و خطابهما الايديولوجي كان حازما من خلال التفريق بين الايجابية لصالح الذات مقابل السلبية للآخر. و نتيجة لهدا، كان لاستراتيجياتها المرجعية والتنبؤية والجدلية التي وضفت في الجريدتين تأثيرا بالغا في تكوين الشخصية الامريكية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: تحليل الخطاب النقدي (CDA)، خطاب صحفي، الصفقة النووية الإيرانية، مقال إعلامي، إضفاء الشرعية على الذات/الآخر، مقاربة الخطاب التاريخي، أيديولوجية، الاستشراق

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CDS: Critical Discourse Studies

CNN: Cable News Network

D: Democrats

DHA: Discourse Historical Approach

EU: European

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IRGC: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

IRP: Islamic Republic Party

JCPOA: Joint Comprehension Plan of Action

NPR: National Public Radio

NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

NYT: New York Times

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

R: Republicans

SFL: Systemic Functional Linguistics

NBC: National Broadcasting Company

UN: United Nations

US: United States

WP Washington Post

UK: United Kingdom

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General Introduction

Iran nuclear deal has been a topic of debate and numerous critical analyses in media outlets, press, radio, televisions and most recently social media. From the revolutionary period 1979 till current days, different discourses have been emerged as a consequence of the constant change of the Iranian regime and its politics and political relations to the world, especially the west. This change was embodied in the anti-western and Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 after it was secular monarchic and pro-western. The Islamic revolutionary system created a spirit of challenge against the hegemony of the west, and this system was reinforced and legitimized by many favourable facts later.

After 1979, Iran started to boost its political regime and economic infrastructures, and this was due to the influence of society. Thus, many social, economic, political and cultural discourses were introduced and adopted by the establishment of this system. These changes were positive, and they enhanced the fluidity and flexibility of the Islamic Republic. So Iran triggered the alarm of the challenging west (US and European countries) to shift its attention to them (KhosraviNik, 2015).

Iran nuclear program, which was initiated in the mid-1960 under the authoritarian and pro-western regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi with the U.S support, is now a central topic of conflict between Iran and the West and the most debatable and publicized international issue in media. This nuclear program has brought a fierce criticism and a growing enmity to the country. Consequently, and as a reaction to this enmity, Iran continued to fuel its nuclear project by fabricating nuclear heads and weapons of destructions. This resulted in the war between Iran and Iraq, and tension continued to escalate to the extent the West would launch a war against Iran.

When Obama elected as the president of US in 2008, an era of rapprochement had been opened and US extended its hand to Iran if this latter unclenched its fist and suspend its nuclear enrichment. The shift of the American position toward managing relations with Iran

held the promise of a new geostrategic dialogue and brought hope of progress in the nuclear negotiations. Eventually, Iran and US went on a long arduous negotiations, and as consequences, they struck a deal in Vienna 14th July, 2015. This nuclear deal is now considered one of the most important post-Cold War diplomatic accords. It was also considered as a breakthrough to end the dispute between the West and Iran. However, this nuclear accord was opposed by many critics inside Iran and in the United States as well.

The Iranian nuclear deal is now a point of contention. When Trump came to the white house in 2017, he set the Iranian file as priority in his agenda. Trump, while campaigning for president, described the deal as "disastrous", "the worst deal ever negotiated", "terrible", would "lead to nuclear Holocaust", and he said he would turn it around and rip up this contract. Trump's discourse has been tough and unpardonable, and he made it, when he became a president, by announcing that the United States breaks and withdraws away from the deal (knowing that the P5[1] are still compliant with Iran's deal). Indeed, On May 8, 2018, president Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the agreement.

Now, Iran nuclear deal is one of the top interests of the American media and a national security interest of US government. Due to its sensitive problematic and complexity, elites and media have attended to it with different approaches and analysis, between against, with and neutral, and this can be explained by the fact that each side has their way of persuasion and ideology to convince their public. Therefore, many discourses have emerged to explain the reality of the deal in particular, and Iran nuclear issue in general, since 2015. These discourses were constructed to reflect the ideological stance and critics of the American press and elites. Therefore, the problematic of this thesis centers around the mechanisms of constructing discourse to negatively or positively portray the Other and Iran deal in the

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[1] P5 are China, Russia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom

American press. Having a look at some political discourse books, Chilton's 'analysing political discourse (2004) is among them, the construction of such discourse which revolves around racist topics is so sophisticated, and I came across with many theories which could have a role in shaping the discourse towards Iran such as Orientalism. Additionally, since this topic has part in media, I tried to look at media discourse theories. Some of them such as Bakhtin's notions of voicing (1986), Goffman's concept of framing (1981), could help to understand the discourse studied.

Having all this background of the topic of research, what I am interested in is not the deal itself and its political side, but I am interested in how media (the American press) use different strategies, Said's concept of Orientalism and Hall's system of representation are among them, to discursively portray Iran and the deal and its actors in these two periods, after the deal and after Trump's order to pull US out of JCAOP in 2018. In this period after the achievement of the deal, politicians, representatives and elites from both sides (Iran and the US) employed news media as channels for disseminating their own version of reality. The question that is always being asked was whether the Other (Iran) remains the same (as an enemy and defiant to the west) or has the deal changed Iran to good and peaceful nation. So the research also focuses much on the Image and representation of the *Other* in US press. Newspapers' Opinion section is one of the sites that can provide discourse analysts and this research with commentaries, editorials and opinions to answer this question. It is worth mentioning that this kind of section can bestow myriad discourses with different perspectives, and knowing that discourse is the bearer of hidden ideologies and a particular language in use, the research makes 'discourse' a source of study and analysis.

Now, as a PhD student specialized in (critical) discourse analysis and media studies, the reasons behind undertaking this topic are several. First, I was eager to take this case study to broaden my knowledge about the field of (political) discourse analysis and know, particularly,

how media discourse is analysed. Second, this topic has been always given a wide space in the international media by the dint of its delicacy and emerging renewal issues. Much interestingly and this is one of the main focuses of the study, there are still a number of issues in this domain (CDA) which have not been received a thorough analysis and satisfactory explanation such as the mediation between discourse and society, as well as the theory discourse-ideology-legitimacy, and what are the micro-linguistic mechanism that can thoroughly explain these interplays. Therefore, this topic can offer a great deal of explanation in terms of its socio-political data and fresh and renewal themes. Therefore, the main idea of this research bursts out from these conceptual theories which still need relevant conceptual tools and methods to be analysed especially. First, the research focuses on analysing the different discourses, topics and themes that are employed to legitimize the self's actions and de-legitimize the Other's ones, too. Second, in light of the afore-mentioned focus, one would conclude what conceptual and practical tools that can lead to elucidate the mediation between discourse and society (social structure). Ruth Wodak has several times addressed the issue of how we analyse social meaning in context and bridge the gap between form and content. This issue still remains an area of an in-depth research, though some discourse critics, such as van Dijk (cognitive analysis), have tried to come up with approaches that could analyse the social phenomena of meaning by integrating his cognitive theory. Hence, through the current topic, I try to dig deep to look at the effectiveness of the analysis methods which can contribute to explain the interplay between discourse and social structure, ideology and legitimacy. Thus, the research takes the Iran nuclear deal as empirical case study to find out enough answers. Moreover, I become interested in this case study among others because it is a big socio-political topic that can provide suitable data to the study, and its data collected are varied in nature and time. So I based this research on what I have observed about Iran nuclear deal between 2015 till president Trump left the US presidency in 2021. This period of time of

nearly six years has noticed two major decision makings: the first decision was when the two parties, Iran and US with its allies, came on one table to sign a historic nuclear deal on July 14, 2015, which eased sanctions on Iran and reduced its nuclear capacity. The second decision was when Trump ordered to pull US from the commitment of the nuclear deal in 2018 and collapsed all what Obama administration achieved. This unexpected change (shift) in decision from 'yes for the deal' to 'no for this deal' prompted the international press to write more about the history of Iran-US relations and analyse this shift of decision about the accord. Therefore, so much say and critic have been written, and this will be rich support to this thesis in terms of data collection.

I tried to come up with these two stages of conflict between Iran and the west and analyse its discourses. Knowing that very few studies have been done, and almost of them were focusing on the analysis of the political aspects of the issue, so I want to make it a unique study and exclusive that can dig deep in questions about discourse, identity, ideology and legitimacy.

For this purpose, I selected New York Times and Washington Post newspapers (US press) for many reasons. First, the study focuses much on the representation and image of the Other (Iran and the nuclear deal) in the American press. Both newspapers have written much on the topic and, thus, provided different discourses. Second, I chose these newspapers because of their reputation as news leaders and for their remarkable influence in media sphere. Both newspapers have their own discursive strategies in portraying the news and political stance toward Iran nuclear issue in particular. In their context of treating this topic, they both manifested many discourses that go with or oppose or stay neutral towards the deal. This made it difficult to understand and construct the reality of Iran and the deal. As a result, it is imperative to thoroughly examine the newspapers discursive construction of the deal and how they attempted to legitimize the Self's discourses and actions and de-legitimize the Other's

actions and discourses, and this is for the purpose to persuade the American public. Nevertheless, the challenges in this study are posed in the fact that whether the approach applied in the analysis, which is Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), is enough to respond to questions about discourse and social structures, though now many critical discourse analysts call for synergy time. Other than this challenge, there are many elements of context that surround New York Times and Washington Post newspapers which are beyond reach, and this may make the analysis not pretty accurate. It is important to know also that the articles chosen for this study are among hundreds of articles produced and published regarding the topic during the period stretching between 2015 and 2020. They are downloaded from the newspapers' websites despite the fact that there are a lot of articles inaccessible for private reasons.

In order to understand the discourses of American press regarding the nuclear deal between 2015 and 2021, an extensive analysis will be carried out by integrating critical discourse analysis with historical and socio-political considerations as the theoretical framework of this research, and this is to find answers to questions about Self/Other representation, legitimation and identity. CDA has proved its rigor and efficiency in analyzing socio-political issues, the relationship between discourse and society and the ideological stance of media. CDA undertakes interdisciplinary approaches to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Wodak & Meyer, 2009a: 10). So language is a medium of domination and social force (Habermas, 1979).

What makes CDA distinguishing from the other approaches of analysis is that it assumes that language legitimizes inequality and injustice (Titscher et al., 2000), and discourse is not only expressions of social practice, but it carries ideologies (Wodak, 2001). Hence, this

assumption of CDA is so useful to this study because it deals with the ideological dichotomy Us/Them which has been existing in Iran nuclear deal discourse since 2015.

Now, CDA tends to take a growing interest in political issues, and the orientation to this field involves discourses of media, identity, prejudice, gender, racism, anti-Semitism and sexism (Wodak, 2001; Titscher et al., 2000). CDA plays an important role to make the implicit explicit and disclose the embedded ideologies and the silenced voices, thus, it can make people aware of hidden alienating forces (Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 1989). In sum, one of the goals of CDA is to demystify discourses by deciphering ideologies (Wodak, 2001:9).

Among the CDA approaches that proved accurate analysis of political issues are Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach. The discourse historical approach (DHA) is interdisciplinary; it involves various theories, methods, methodology, research practice and practical application which can lead to an adequate understanding and explanation of the research object. It also combines in its analysis historical, socio-political and linguistic perspectives (triangulatory analysis, which can bring comprehensive insights to the research questions). The historical context is taken into account in interpreting texts and discourses (recontextualization and interdiscursivity). The historical orientation permits the reconstruction of how recontextualization functions as an important process linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time (Wodak, 2015).

Wodak with Reisigl have used the discourse historical approach to analyze many political discourses, and their work has been a great contribution to the field of CDA. They consider "discursive strategies" as a means of analysis for the social actors and their actions to argue and achieve their goals at the end. The DHA identifies five discursive strategies, which are said to be realized linguistically in text: nomination (reference), predication, argumentation,

perspectivization (involvement) and intensification (or mitigation) (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 46, 2009: 94).

The discourse historical approach (DHA) is applied in this research to answer the questions regarding the self-representation negative and positive of Iran in the American press (New York Times & Washington Post), and the (De) legitimization of discourse concerning Trump's orders to pull US out from the nuclear deal 2015 and the mediation between discourse and society. I chose the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) of Ruth Wodak (2001) for the analysis for a number of reasons. First, DHA is interdisciplinary approach, and it focuses on political issues more than any other ones. The type of data of the research, which have been thoroughly selected in terms of time-period (2015-2020) and nature (socio-political), are taken from 'Opinion, editorials sections' from each newspaper. Opinions/editorials discourses have a kind of persuasive, argumentative and evaluative character, and DHA is specialized in analyzing this sort of discourse. The data have been gathered from New York Times and Washington Post newspapers. These two genres of papers are internationally well known, widely read and the validity and reliability of their data can yield to good analysis. This topic of my thesis is considered the heart of DHA and its interest. More details on methodology and design of the study are explained in chapter four, section one.

Before setting up the research questions of this research, it is beneficiary to have a look at the previous studies regarding Iran nuclear issue to add more perspectives to this issue. In fact, ample researches and studies have been carried out regarding Iran nuclear issue since the revolution 1979. Critical discourse analysis has been an erect discipline for Iranian academics and critics to attend to a range of studies either in linguistics, media, cultural studies, or social science. Among these studies were analysed diachronically and synchronically such as the reformist discourse of Khatami, the representation of Iran in the Western media after the

revolution period 1979, the issue of Iran nuclear program, and more recently the nuclear deal between Iran and P5+1. To begin with, the reformist discourses during Khatami were the focus of a number of critical studies within the CDA understanding. From a grand political-discourse theoretical approach, Tajik has contributed to the conceptualization of discursive shifts in the contemporary Iranian context by drawing heavily on Foucault, Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe (Tajik, 1998, 2000). Sultani (2008) has studied the discursive features and origins of political power in the Islamic Republic of Iran up to the reformist era of Khatami. The study combines Laclau and Mouffee's discourse theory with micro-analytical methods of CDA to bridge the gap between macro vs micro levels of investigation. Aghagolzadeh (2006) studied the press discourse in Iran about the reformist period, and he concluded the reformist newspapers were guided by a strictly interwoven ideological stance. Also Yarmohammadi and KhosraviNik (2002) criticised the general lack of systemic textual analysis in CDA studies in Iran through a number of case studies.[2]

Second, the representation of Iran in the western media has varied from an issue to another. It is the era after the Islamic Revolution 1979 which attracted the Western media to cover. For example, Roushanzamir (2004) critically analyses the representation of the veil and Iranian woman in US print media, and he asserts that most of the media coverage was most interested the 'hostage-taking crisis' and Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, Richardson (2007) discusses the characteristics of Iran's representation in the Western press through an inherently Orientalist lens, and he argued that the notions 'serious threat', 'danger' are combined to the elements 'Islam', 'weapons' to represent Iran.

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Third issue is the nuclear program which has taken much interest of the international media. Paul Chilton wrote a book about the nuclear debate took place in Britain. The book covers many political and international conflicts; in particular the conflict between the East and the West (Cold War), and the contributors examine the conflicts and their legitimacy linguistically in terms of "words" uttered by the political elites in Britain with the assumption that 'conflict begins in words and the means of destruction can be legitimised by words' (Chilton, 1985; xxiii).

Two papers attended to the representation of Iran's nuclear program in the American press. The first one is for Izadi and Saghaye-Bira (2007). The study focus on Said's binary notions of Orientalism which match the themes discussed in the representation of Iran such as inferiority, untrustworthiness, threat, irrationality, etc. the paper concluded with the assumption that Iran is a threat, untrusty country (Izadi and Saghaye-Bira, 2007: 161-2). The second paper is for Rasti and Sahragard (2012). They set out to illustrate bias in weekly western newspapers by focusing on actor analysis and delegitimising Iran's position. The research argues for disproportionate bias in the actor application and the systemic exclusion of the Iranian public in its elitist use of language towards the legitimisation of more sanction on Iran.

Other critical discourse analysis studies have done to evaluate the Iran-US relation, and legitimise and delegitimise the position of Iran in different British, American and Iranian newspapers. To illustrate some, a study, which was the critical analysis of Iran's Nuclear Power Program, is for Biook Behnam and Robabeh Moshtaghi Zenouz (A Contrastive Critical Analysis of Iranian and British Newspaper Reports on the Iran Nuclear Power Program). This study investigates how the Iranian and British press represent this program to their readers following different socio-political patterns. To undertake the comparison, a corpus consisting of prominent Iran Nuke reports in Iran Daily, Kayhan, The Guardian and The Telegraph

spanning 2004 were analyzed in terms of the transitivity system and interpreted following Fairclough's (1989) framework. The papers tended to depict Iran as the main participant, mostly portrayed as a social deviant in the British papers in which the ideology seemed to include polarization. A new recent study has also made by Majid KhosraviNik, a professor of Media Studies at Newcastle University, is entitled (Macro and micro legitimation in discourse on Iran's nuclear programme: The case of Iranian national newspaper *Kayhan)*. The study attempts to throw light on the nature and quality of discursive strategies used in Iranian discourse on the nuclear programme as represented in an influential Iranian daily, *Kayhan*. Working within the general guidelines of critical discourse analysis, the general orientation of the article is towards explicating how the newspaper texts may come to be perceived within an Iranian socio-political context. The article is part of a larger research project which has looked at the discourses of Iran's nuclear programme as represented in different British and Iranian newspapers, and the ways they may devise micro-linguistic and macro-argumentative strategies to construct and de/legitimise the positions of Self and Other. The focus of this article is on findings on the broad argumentative aspects of one of the influential Iranian dailies which functions as a flagship of what can arguably be called the overarching conservative rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Broad discursive approaches of the newspaper are distinguished in terms of a global, overarching, political macro-legitimatory approach versus a local, restricted micro-legitimatory approach towards identities of Self and Other and the nature of the political conflict over Iran's nuclear programme.

A number of studies have been done and published in the three years period before the deal and others in the three years after the deal. Almost these studies were carried out by Iranian scholars on media discourse and drew on CDS approaches (van Dijk's socio-cognitive model and van Leeuwen's social actor representation). To start with, Kheirabadi and Alavi Moghaddam (2012) examined the representation of Iranians and western actors in news

articles written on the topic of Iran's nuclear programme by *New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Reuters.* Kheirabadi and Alavi Moghaddam adopted van Leeuwen's (2008) socio-semantic network of social actors to study them. They used inclusion/exclusion mechanism to discover which actors were highlighted and which ones were suppressed in the news. Their findings showed that, while Western figures were included in the news with their personal identities as *peace-seekers*, *experts* and *law-makers*, Iranian figures were either excluded or categorised with mass nouns (collectivised) or negative titles (*Islamic regime*, *Shia regime*).

Other similar works were done by Rashidi and Rasti (2012) to see how Iran was portrayed in the Western media (*The Economist*, *The Express*, *The Washington Post* and *The New York).* Using van Leeuwen's (1996) inventory of social actor representation (inclusion/exclusion, activation/passivation, association/dissociation, individualisation/assimilation and personalisation/ impersonalisation), they found that Iran was passivated and its actors involved in the nuclear programme were also portrayed negatively. Also Atai and Mozaheb's (2013) examined five British media (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Independent and BBC) in order to reveal the recurrence themes associated with Iran in its Nuclear Programme. Using a number of linguistic tools like nominalization, lexical choices and passivation, they found the following themes: Iran's programme as *a threat to the world*; Iran as *defiant and boastful*; and Iran's programme having a *rebellious nature*.

There were other studies of discourse that examined the representation of Iran in the Western and Iranian press. Ahmadian and Farahani (2014) studied the representation of Iran in Los Angeles Times and Tehran Times between May and June 2010. Using van Dijk's (2000) Ideological square framework of the discursive strategies (disclaimer, illegality, history as a lesson, hyperbole, vagueness, etc.), they found that lexicalisation (i.e. use of negative/positive terms and labels), repetition, vagueness (i.e. the use of vague expressions

like *very* or *few*), illegality (i.e. attributing illegality to 'Their' actions) and history as a lesson were the most frequently used strategies to realise the two macro-strategies of positive 'Self' and negative 'Other' representation in both papers.

A very interesting critical study was done by KhosraviNik (2014). He examined the discourse of Keyhan, an Iranian conservative newspaper, regarding Iran's nuclear programme. KhosraviNik tried to discover the linguistic and argumentative strategies applied by the newspaper to realise the general macro-strategy of (de)legitimation. The binary concepts Us/Them are the most strategy used by Keyhan to depict the Anti-America and Anti-Imperialism discourse. In the same study, KhosraviNik, at the argumentation stage, examined the use of Topoi in Keyhan to display the Sels/Other notions regarding Iran nuclear programme. He found a list of topoi that *Kayhan* used to recontextualise the issue of the nuclear: the topos of *strength* and *defiance* (we are right because we are strong and we are defying them); the topos of *resistance* (we are right because we are resisting); and the topos of *threat* and *invasion* (we are right because they are threatening).

In a similar study carried out by Hosseinpour and Heidari Tabrizi (2016) to explore the use of Topoi in editorials published by the New York Times between 2010 and 2015. They found out that Topoi of *advantage*, *disadvantage*, *reality*, *history* and *threat* from Reisigl and Wodak' (2001) typology used are means to justify criminal and uncooperative Iran, and the ultimate goal of the newspaper was to prepare the ground to impose sanctions on Iran.

Given all these previous and recent studies on Iran nuclear issue, I would say that my current study is a carry-on research to a big project about Iran nuclear program which started since long, and it specifically covers the period after the nuclear deal. Few studies have been done and they all focused on criticising only the political aspect of the deal. However, my research combines discourse and the socio-political aspects of the issue and the role of the media discourse (press) in shaping the identity of people. All this will bring valuable insights

to the field of discourse analysis. My perspective is to critically analyse the discursive representation and rhetoric used by the American press of Iran nuclear deal and provide an understanding to both discourse-society relationship and discourse-ideology-legitimacy theory, and this will certainly add a marking value to the field of discourse analysis (DA). Moreover, this kind of research which endeavours to analyse media texts by means of critical discourse analysis could be of use and help to students and researchers conducting projects as such this one.   Therefore, in light of the literature review and the goals set forth for this research, the study is based on the following research questions:

The first research question attends to the referential traits and attributions of newspapers articles. It seeks to find out how the Self (US and its allies) and Other (Iran) were discursively constructed in Op-Eds discourse during Obama second term and also in Trump period of presidency. To answer this question, I will examine the discursive strategies employed by the authors of each newspaper in the construction of the Self/Other actors and actions. The goal behind this question is to trace the discursive strategies of the American press and how they implicitly employ Said's notion of Orientalism and Stuart Hall's concept of Representation. Also this question tries to find what biases are presented in the text and what are the implications (stereotyping), and therefore, it tries to answer the question whether the Orient (Iran) is the same before the deal, or the deal has brought a good image to Iran in Media. (How American newspapers discursively construct and (de)legitimate the position of Self and Other, and how similar and different these newspapers in their Self/Other legitimation and identity constructions after the nuclear deal since 2015?)

The second research question aims at examining the arguments behind the reason of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. For this purpose, Wodak's argumentative strategy, which consists of different topos (threat, disadvantage, responsibility, history, etc.), is employed to find out what are the most dominant topos used by the authors to justify and legitimize

Trump's order to pull US out of the deal 2015. The question also seeks to find how discourse is ordered and set up to give legitimacy to order.

The third research question attempts to know the ideological stance of both NYT and WP towards Iran nuclear deal. This can be achieved through tracing the historical claims of the newspapers towards Iran and relate them with their present reports and representations.

The last research question investigates the role of discourse in shaping (American) identity. Ways and strategies used by the American press to shape its discourse are profoundly investigated. This question will broadly investigate the relationship between discourse and society, how both influence each other. The purpose behind this is to find out new concepts and theories that may add clear understanding to the mediation between discourse and society. Additionally, the process of investigation of this question may enable me to come up with a definition to discourse relative to the study (topic and perspectives). This question summarizes all the previous research questions and pulls them to a final conclusion that can be the contribution of this thesis in the domain of discourse analysis.

To hypothesize these research questions, we have to consider the fact that hypotheses are not clear-cut and final answers, but they may carry a probability to the right answers. For the first research question, I hypothesize that both newspapers, NYT and WP, adopt discursive strategies, representational and argumentative, in order to depict the Self with positive qualities and the Other with negative qualities. These discursive strategies also enable them to legitimize the Self-actions and discourses and de-legitimize the Other practices and discourses, and this can have relevance with Said's notion of Orientalism and Hall's system of Representation.

For the second research question, I hypothesize both newspapers employ the topos of threat, history, usefulness and responsibility to analyze the discourse of trump about his

decision to withdraw US out of Iran nuclear deal. The topos aforementioned can legitimize US exit from JCPOA.

For the third research question, I hypothesize that both newspapers show a bias towards nation's (US) security interests. This can be traced through their historical treatment of the topic and the current reports in their articles about Iran nuclear issue. Critical discourse analysis can help to find this bias in language.

For the last research question, I hypothesize that the opinion discourses of both newspapers can influence the readers and make them aware of the national security and US interests. Through *persuasion* and *language choices* and *stereotyping* which are set up by the language of the articles, identity can be constructed.

To fully attend to this study and cover almost its theoretical and practical axes, I set up four chapters, including the general introduction. This latter gives an overview of the topic, its background, and research problem, the purpose of the study, a brief account of the methodology applied and the significance and limitation of the research.

Chapter one accounts for the theoretical account for the study, and it introduces the background knowledge of CDA, its roots, main principles and defining characteristics. More specifically, the chapter dissects CDA's constitutive aspects, i.e. the notion of critique, ideology, the definition of text and discourse and the notion of analysis. Besides, it gives full details on the approach adopted in this research which is Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA), its foundation and tools of analysis.

Chapter two is divided in two parts. The first part briefly sheds light on media texts analysis and political discourse analysis. The second part attends to the socio-political context of the production and interpretation of almost discourses of the post-revolutionary period in Iran. It diachronically analyses the major discourses produced about Iran nuclear issue till current.

Chapter three will be devoted to talk about media and the press, particularly, in both Iran and US, the development of the press in both nation and their relation to the state. Also, the chapter discusses the theory of Self/Other representation which was thoroughly analysed by Edward Said in his book '**Orientalism'** and Stuart Hall in his book '**Representation'**, and the Iranian post-revolutionary period which was described as an anti-colonial and Islamic, and this all was fully analysed in Edward Said's book '**Covering Islam'.** Also, the chapter traces how the international media and media agencies have analysed this shift in the agreement of Iran deal, particularly, how both American and Iranian newspapers have been analysing the change in practice in the period 2015 till 2020. In addition, this chapter goes over on some main stations of Iran and US relation, and a special analysis will be given to the relation of both nations in the period between Obama's presidency and Trump's one. At last, more recent socio-political conflicts between Iran and US are to be discussed and its aftermath and impact on their relation and the future of the nuclear deal such as Trump's order to pull US out of the JCAOP on May 8th, 2018.

The subsequent chapter, four, is served to methodology of the research and the analysis of texts and discourses of New York Times and Washington post. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section gives full explanation of the research methods. It includes a short sketch of the main methods suggested within the Discourse Historical Approach as far as the referential, argumentative and predicational strategies are concerned. Also, more analysis approaches, which are important and useful in the analysis of the Self and Other presentation such as Topoi and recontextualisation, will be explained. Additionally, a short history and background of each newspaper are given, and the type of the data selected is identified.

The second section includes textual analysis of both newspapers. It is about the analysis of their contents using referential, predicational and argumentative strategies, as well as

recontextualisation. The focus of the analysis drops on context of the nuclear deal between 2015 till 2020, and the emerging themes and topics produced by the social actors.

At last, I close the analysis chapter with discussion of the findings. It is about all the results the analysis produced. Then, the general conclusion brings all the analyses together and draws a final conclusion. It tries to position the finding within the wider socio-political and genre-specific contexts attended to in chapters one and three, and finally concludes with the implication of the research.

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Chapter One

The Theoretical Foundations of the Research

Critical discourse analysis and discourse historical approach

1.1. Introduction

This chapter is the theoretical part of the study. It deals with many aspects of language and critical discourse analysis methods. The chapter starts with an exposition to the field of critical linguistics, its emergence, interests and development. Kress and Hodge, Fowler, van Dijk, Fairclough and Wodak are the main linguists who considerably contributed to the foundation and development of the field. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has offered the foundation of this study. It encompasses three essential cornerstones: discourse, ideology and power. All these elements will be given a thorough explanation, as well as some sub-titles like text, context, intertextuality and interdiscursivity are to be explained.

Also one of the main titles of this chapter is interdisciplinarity. I include it in here because it has a direct relevance to the research. All CDA approaches are interdisciplinary, and their focus is not only explaining the linguistic structures, but they attempt to find explanations to the phenomena of the relationship between discourse and society. Now, interdisciplinarity becomes a new perspective in CDS. All this will be given a deep analysis and other sub-titles will be tackled, as well as the stages of the research process in empirical social research.

Since the issue of Iran nuclear deal has received many critics and opposition from different elites in the United States, the framework of analyzing their claims and opinions should be appropriate and fit to examine their various textual aspects. Conducting a comprehensive review of literature, I decided to adopt Wodak's (2001) Discourse Historical Approach. It is suitable for the analysis of the discourse under study (literature on DHA and why do I use it are in this chapter and in Methodology chapter, too).

Finally, the chapter also brings up three important concepts: the Self/Other representation, identity construction in discourse and the function of discursive legitimization and de-legitimization. All these titles are directly related and foundation of the analysis chapter

(four). Media texts are considered sites of this kind of ideological concepts. Therefore, a meticulous explanation should be bestowed to them for the benefit of the research analysis.

1.2. The Foundation of CL/CDA

The emergence of new form of discourse and text analysis started in 1970s. At that time, the linguistic research focused on the formal aspects of language (speaker's grammatical competence) rather than language use (Chomsky, 1957). So the sentence and its components were still regarded as the basic units. The research focused on explaining and describing the language variation and the structure of communicative interaction, but with a very limited attention to social dimension and hierarchy and power (Labov, 1972; Hymes, 1972). However, now the interest in the analysis of text and its production and interpretation with relation to society was raised to revolt against the formal view of language. Hence, the term CL was born to serve this aim and the work of Kress and Hodge (1979), Fowler et al. (1979), van Dijk (1985), Fairclough (1989) and Wodak (ed.) (1989) has exceedingly contributed to serve this purpose.

Fowler, Kress and Hodge (1979) put an effort to develop CL, and their work has been inspired by Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). Halliday considers language as social act, and Fowler et al. (1979, p. 188) supported this view and see that language is an ideologically driven social act since "the relation between form and content is not arbitrary or conventional, but…form signifies content". Furthermore, CL practitioners, Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979), consider that CL emphasises the relation that persists between language and the social factors, and the linguistic structure and the social structure are associated in a pervasive relation.

Kress (1990, p.88) indicates that this term CL is self-consciously adapted. Later on, CL underwent major developments over the years and was referred as a newly-emerged theory called CDA. The recent developments must be acknowledged and they are distinguished

features. The scope of analysis of CL has been extended beyond its inclusion of textual analysis only and proffered to include the intertextual analysis.

Fowler et al. (1979) made a considerable contribution to the foundation of CL. He showed how the Chomskyan grammar and Halliday SFG can be used to uncover linguistic structures of power in texts. Using their critical linguistics, Fowler et al (1979) analysed discourse by applying Halliday's systemic functional linguistics to texts. They argued for the existence of connection between the linguistic structure and the social structure in a way that moved beyond the realm of traditional sociolinguistics, and claimed that 'social groupings and relationships influence the linguistic behaviour of speakers and writers'. In 1990, Fowler attempted to update critical linguistics by analysing the language of newspapers. Critical linguistics, according to Fowler:

> seeks, by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of social and historical situation of the text, to display the consciousness the pattern of belief and value which are encoded in the language- and which are below the threshold of notice of anyone who accepts the discourse as "natural" (p.67)

Fairclough (1989) sets out the social theories underpinning CDA. It was his first work aiming at analysing a variety of textual examples in order to illustrate the field, its aims and methods of analysis. Later Fairclough (1992, 1995) and Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) have made great advances to the field of CDA. They investigated language in relation to power and ideology, and, much interestingly, they showed how CDA is useful in disclosing the discursive nature of much contemporary social and cultural change. They penetrated their work to mass media field, because it is a site of struggle, power and also as a site where language is apparently transparent.

Van Dijk had and still has a remarkable influence and contribution in the development of the linguistic analysis. He showed his interest in text linguistics and discourse analysis (1977,

1981), and considered text and discourse as the basic units of analysis. He developed his cognitive model of discourse to explain the construction of meaning on a societal level. Van Dijk interest in media was his try to bring together the theories and applications of a variety of scholars interested in the production, uses and functions of media discourses (1985). Van Dijk focused on issues of racism and ideology.

By the end of 1980s, CL was able to describe its aims, perspectives, research interest and methods of analysis. All scholars, who were engaged in this process, shared a particular perspective in which the concepts of power, ideology and history figure centrally. Yet, Wodak (1996) has brought a great interest into the historical perspective under her discourse historical approach. In developing CDA, she refers to the reliance on Hallidayan linguistics, Bernsteinian sociolinguistics, Foucault, Habermas, Bakhtin and Voloshinov. She believes that interdisciplinarity is necessarily required when analysing the relationship between language and society.

The work of M.A.K Halliday (1978) and his theory SFG (Systemic Functional Grammar) developed to a greater degree CL. He had stressed the relationship between grammatical system and the social and the personal needs that language is required to serve (Halliday, 1970, p.142). He distinguished three metafunctions of language: the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual one. All are interconnected.

Theo Van Leeuwan (1996) also gave much importance to the contribution of semiotic devices to discourse analysis. Both Kress and van Leeuwan (1996) theory provided a useful framework for considering the communicative potential of visual devices in the media. Van Leeuwan distinguished two kinds of relations between discourses and social practices: discourse itself as social practice, discourse as a form of action, as something people do with each other. Also, there is a discourse in the Foucauldian sense, as a form of knowledge, as a way of representing social practice, as the things people say about the social practice (1993,

p.193). Critical discourse analysis, according to him, should be concerned with both these aspects, with discourse as the instrument of power and control, as well as with discourse as the instrument of social construction of reality (ibid).

The Duisburg School led by Siegfried Jager was concerned by linguistic and iconic characteristics of discourse, focusing on 'collective symbols' (Topoi). Discourse is seen as the flow of text and speech through time (Jager 1993, p.6). Discourses have historical roots and are interwoven.

Advances on CL/CDA did not stop at this level, however, a network of CDS regrouped together in 1990s in a symposium at the University of Amesterdam. It consisted of Tenu van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak. The purpose was to discuss theories and methods of critical discourse analysis, their differences in methodologies in discourse analysis, and sameness in programmatic way were laid out. Overall, the CDS network agreed that CDS approaches are problem oriented and interdisciplinary and eclectic. Moreover, CDS approaches have common interest in deconstructing power and ideologies through the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual).

The Amesterdam meeting was the real start to enhance the CDS approaches, and an opportunity for different scholars to work collaboratively. The outcome was multiple. New journals have been launched (the journal of language and politics; discourse and communication; discourse and society and visual communication), as well as e-journals such as (CADAAD), and books such as (discourse approaches to politics; culture and society). In sum, CDS has become an established discipline, institutionalised across the globe in many departments and curricula.

Thus, the evolution in CL has led the creation of the current theoretical framework CDA. Bell and Garret (1998) perceive that CDA does not include one particular approach, but it

combines approaches from different schools and thoughts. Van Dijk, Ruth Wodak and Norman Fairclough are considered the main and most insightful practitioners in this field. They all considered the concept 'critical' as central in deconstructing ideological discourse.

1.3. The Critique/Critical in CDA

We could trace the roots of the critical linguistics and CDA to the *Frankfurt school*[3]or Jürgen Habermas (Anthonissen 2001; Fay 1987; Thompson 1988). Actually, the "critical theory" of the Frankfurt school is based on the seminal 1937 essay by Max Horkheimer. It is actually based on two principal concepts: first, the critical theory should be directed at the totality of society in its historical specifity. Second, the critical theory should improve the understanding of society by integrating all the major social sciences, including economics, sociology, history, political science, anthropology and psychology.Critical Theory, in the view of the Frankfurt School, entails social theory being oriented towards critiquing society for betterment as a whole, in contrast to traditional theory which orients social theory towards understanding or explaining society (Wodak & Meyer, 2009a: 6).

Krings (1976) made it clear that, nowadays, it is conventionally used in broader sense denoting "the practical linking of social and political engagement with a sociologically informed construction of society" (Krings et al., 1973). So the critical research system is firmly dependent on social constructions. This was emphasized by Pierre Bourdieu that criticism is integrated within social fields.

Much interestingly, the critical theories, thus also CDS, enable human beings to acquire a critical knowledge that can free them from forms of domination, and they also seek to create awareness in agents of their needs and interests. So at this point, it should be pointed that CDS

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[3]According to Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998, p. 2910), the origin of Frankfurt school lies in the 1920s when some Marxists tried to adapt the Marxism theories with the need of that time. They are more distinguished because of their attempt to put every feature of social sciences in the frame of critical theory of society. Most of its innovations are the result of numerous articles that Max Holkhiemer wrote in the 1920s and 30s in criticizing idealist philosophy and contemporary empiricism and establishing a new historical philosophy that can explain the evolution of human reasoning. Analyzing cultural, economical and psychological aspect of the society he tried to analysis that how the rational organization of the society is achieved.

emphasize the need for interdisciplinary work in order to gain proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing social institutions or in exercising power. By interdisciplinary, it means that critical analysts have to integrate the social, economic and political motives in their work. There has been a huge continuity of critical linguistics especially by Fairclough and Wodak (1997); Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000). Primarily, it was developed at the University of East Anglia, with Roger Fowler, Tony Trew and Gunther Kress. Their basic claim was that "discourses are ideological and that there is no arbitrariness of signs" (Kress, 1993). What is more, other roots of CL and CDA came from classical rhetoric, text linguistics, sociolinguistics, applied linguistics, pragmatics, gender issue, issues of racism, media text and identity researches.

One of the many meanings of the word critical, criticism or critique is to make the implicit explicit, in other words, the critical discourse analysts endeavour to make explicit the implicit relationship between discourse, power and ideology. Moreover, it is one of the goals of CDA in research studies and analysis to implicate critique. Kress commented on this and summed up in the following:

> Critical studies of language, Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) have from the beginning had a political project: broadly speaking that of altering inequitable distributions of economic, cultural and political goods in contemporary societies. The intention has been to bring a system of excessive inequalities of power into crisis by uncovering its workings and its effects through the analysis of potent cultural objects – texts – and thereby to help in achieving a more equitable social (Kress 1996: 15)

Second, being critical in CDA means being self-reflective and self-critical. CDA aims to criticize the critical itself, as Habermas hinted to it, and it was made by Wodak (1989) and ten years later by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999). Additionally, critical analysis is a practice

itself that may contribute to the social change. Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p.32–4) distinguished between three critiques, "text-immanent critique", "socio-diagnostic critique", and prospective (retrospective) critique. Text-immanent critique is inherently oriented towards retroductable, careful text analysis. Socio-diagnostic critique is based on integrating the sociopolitical and structural context into the analysis and interpretation of textual meaning. At this level, the aim is to reveal multiple interests and contradictions in the text producers, on the basis of the evidence of the text and its contexts. Prospective critique builds on these two levels in order to identify areas of social concern that can be addressed by direct social engagement in relation to practitioners and wider audiences (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 34).

Also, Andrew Sayer (2009) stated that there are different concepts of critique in social sciences:

> In a simple way, critique could merely indicate a critical attitude to other, earlier, approaches to the study of society. Hence all social science should be critical. If it goes further, critique shows that some of the concepts that are influential in explaining social phenomena are false or ignore something significant. In this sense, critical research is oriented towards the reduction of illusion in society itself. It supports 'subjugated knowledge' against 'dominant knowledge'. This kind of critique implies a minimalist normative standpoint. The idea of explanatory critique goes another step further as it explains why specific false beliefs and concepts are held.

Sayer (2006) acknowledged the importance and role of critical analysis in society:

> CDA might be said to be critical in a number of ways. At a minimum it produces analyses of discourse which differ from, and hence are critical of, lay understanding of discourse. One respect in which it might do this is by showing the influence of discourse in structuring practices and influencing or shaping subjects rather than in

merely externally representing them … CDA demonstrates this point in highlighting

the constructed and contingent nature of discourses.   (ibid.: 467)

Fairclough understanding of Critique targets injustices caused by the late capitalist societies. Fairclough (2009, p. 163) provides a broader framework of critique in which he flags social 'wrongs' – injustice, inequality, lack of freedom etc. – as the target of critical social research.

Van Dijk explained that the term critical would not mean negative or exceptionally serious social or political experiences or events to be investigated, so any social phenomena lends itself to critical investigation, to be challenged and not taken for granted:

Contrary to popular belief and unfortunate claims of many papers submitted to discourse journals, CDA is not a method of critical discourse analysis. This may sound paradoxical, but I am afraid it isn't. Think about it. Indeed, what would be the systematic, explicit, detailed, replicable procedure for doing 'critical' analysis? There is no such method. Being critical, first of all, is a state of mind, an attitude, a way of dissenting, and many more things, but not an explicit method for the description of the structures or strategies of text and talk. So, in that sense, people who want to practice CDA may be supposed to do so from a perspective of opposition, for instance against power abuse through discourse. (…). Methodologically, CDA is as diverse as DA in general, or indeed other directions in linguistics, psychology or the social sciences. Thus, CDA studies may do so in terms of grammatically (phonological, morphological, syntactic), semantic, pragmatic, interactional rhetorical, stylistic, narrative or genre analyses, among others, on the one hand, and through experiments, ethnography, interviewing, life stories, focus groups, participant observation, and so on, on the other hand. A good method is a method that is able to give a satisfactory (reliable, relevant, etc.) answer to the questions of a research project. It depends on one's aims, expertise, time and goals, and the kind of data that can or must be

generated-that is, on the context of a research project. (…). So, there is not 'a' or 'one' method of CDA, but many. Hence, I recommend to use the term Critical Discourse Studies for the theories, methods, analyses, application and other practices of critical discourse analysts, and to forget about the confusing term 'CDA'. So, please no more 'I am going to apply CDA' because it does not make sense. Do critical discourse analysis by formulating critical goals, and then explain by what specific explicit methods you want to realize it.   (Van Dijk 2013)

For any analysis of a social problem, critique should be there, from the identification of the social phenomena and data selection to methodology and textual analysis. Criticality helps unpack the ideological underpinnings of discourse and reveal structures of power (Fairclough 1985, p. 739). Wodak argues that "critical is to be understood as having distance to the data, embedding data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, and focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research"

Criticality is central to CDA. It helps to explain why, and with what consequences the producer of a text make such a specific linguistic choices (or avoid doing so). In doing so, CDA attempts to account for the mediation between language and society by drawing on socio-cognitive insights, macro-sociological structure or socio-historical notions. As Wodak and Meyer maintain, 'CDA is therefore not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se, but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach' (2009a, p. 2).

The most distinguishing feature of CDS is its primary goal to uncover ideologies that serve discrimination and unequal power in society. This attitude described by van Dijk (1986) in the following:

Beyond description or superficial application, critical science in each domain asks further questions, such as those of responsibility, interests, and ideology. Instead of

focusing on purely academic or theoretical problems, it starts from prevailing social problems, and thereby chooses the perspective of those who suffer most, and critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible, and those who have the means and the opportunity to solve such problems. (p. 4)

Discourse and social structures should be combined, and this is the role of CDA practitioners by their 'critique' to fill this gap.

1.4. The success of Critical discourse analysis

Much of the success of critical discourse analysis can be traced to the works of Norman Fairclough, Tenu van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. Fairclough, in his 1992 book, outlined the critical approaches to critical analysis. They include *critical linguistics* of Fowler et al. (1979), and Althusserian approaches to the study of ideology. Fairclough also used other new terms like *critical language awareness* (CLA), and *critical language studies* (CLS). Fairclough (1995) published his book Critical Discourse Analysis. The book bore the subtitle *The critical study of language*. The use of the definite article in the subtitle was emblematic: it was as if the multiplicity of 'critical approaches', which were outlined in Fairclough (1992a), had coalesced into a uniformity which could be identified as the critical study.

To evaluate or to see to which extent is critical discourse analysis successful in the academic context, two basic concerns that are posed by critical discourse analysis. First, as Fairclough stressed, a new type of discourse has emerged due to the process of marketization, which characterized our society nowadays, and therefore, this has deeply influenced the university contexts, as Chouliaraki and Fairclough write, 'universities these days are under increasing pressure to operate as a market that is shaped by its service relation to other markets' (1999, p. 8). In this regard, Fairclough has noted the need for critical discourse analysts to be critical of the marketing discourse that is produced by the institutions in which they operate.

This leads to a second concern: the need to be reflexively self-critical. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough note "CDA, like other critical social sciences… needs to be reflexive and self-critical about its own institutional position and all that goes with it" (ibid., p. 9). This involves critically examining its discourse. As Gunther Kress wrote, 'all signs are…equally subject to critical reading' for 'no sign is innocent' (1993, p. 174). Therefore the signs of CDA itself must be subjected to critique, and this includes the very symbol 'CDA'. In particular, one might ask whether the general processes of marketization are reflected in Critical Discourse Analysis' own passage from being a 'critical approach' to the capitalized entity of 'CDA'.

1.5. What is Critical Discourse Analysis?

Before we go over the definition and some essential principles of CDA, we have to state and make it clear that CDA is not a homogeneous theory with a set of clear and defined tools of analysis; but it is rather a set of different and methodological theoretical approaches (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). The term 'critical' does not mean distinguishing the bad from the good or detecting the negative sides of society. Critical is distinguishing complexity and self-reflection while doing research and focusing on relevant social problems. We shall return to the notion Critical in CDA with a thorough explanation.

Critical discourse analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. Its current focus on language and discourse was initiated with the "critical linguistics" that emerged (mostly in the UK and Australia) at the end of 1970s (Fowler et al. 1979; see also Mey 1985). CDA may be seen as a reaction against the dominant formal (often "asocial" or "uncritical") paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s. Fairclough defines it as:

> relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to

investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. (1993, p. 135)

CDA is not a school[4] or a specialization, but rather, it aims at providing modes or perspectives to theorize, analyze and apply throughout diverse areas such as pragmatics, media analysis, conversation analysis, rhetoric, stylistics, sociolinguistics and narrative analysis. It is not a theory or method that can simply be applied to social problem, but it can be combined with other subdisciplines and approaches in the humanities and the social sciences.

CDA stands opposite those who abuse text and talk in order to establish, confirm or legitimate their abuse of power. 'CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use' (or in discourse) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009; Wodak and Meyer, 2009a: 10)

CDA does not only consider discourse as a container of ideologies, but discourse is an action in itself, which contributes to or constitutes ideologies, and, therefore, discourse reproduces, recreates and reshapes ideologies. However, to disclose hidden ideologies remains largely unchallenged work. CDA focuses more on this type of ideologies. Van Dijk emphasizes the socio-cognitive aspect of ideology and defines it as the *world views* that constitute *social cognition*, while Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach maintains that ideology is 'one-sided perspective or world view composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluations, and which shared by members of specific social group' (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, p. 88). Fairclough considers ideologies as 'representation of aspects of the world which contributes to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation'.

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[4]There is some literature about whether CDA is a school or not. See Weiss and Wodak (2003), Billig (2003) and Billig (2008), as well as the reactions to it in the Journal of *Discourse and Society*.

One of the areas of research that CDA focuses on is the dialectic relationship between discourse and society. This leads us to talk about the concept of 'contextualization'. This latter is the link that a CDA study makes between language and society in order to 'gain a proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing social institutions or in exercising power' (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 7). Contextualization in one sense is to accentuate the role of 'historicity' in the process of production and interpretation of discourse and 'explicitly includes social-psychological, political and ideological components and thereby postulates an interdisciplinary procedure' (Meyer, 2001, p. 15).

Critical research on discourse needs to satisfy a number of requirements in order to effectively realize its aims:

- It focuses primarily on *social problems* and political issues.

- Empirically adequate critical analysis of social problems is usually *multidisciplinary.*

- Rather than merely *describe* discourse structures, it tries to *explain* them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure.

- More specifically, CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of *power* and *dominance* in society.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p. 271–80) summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems

2. Power relations are discursive

3. Discourse constitutes society and culture

4. Discourse does ideological work

5. Discourse is historical

6. The link between text and society is mediated

7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory

8. Discourse is a form of social action.

Critical discourse analysis has to do much with social research, and it endeavors to seek out the origins of social problem and finding ways to analyze them productively. This is roughly the main concern of most those working in the field. Moreover, since CDA is a rapidly developing field, new objectives may well arise and be added. Mariel Bloor and Thomas Bloor (2013, p.12) proposed the following objectives of CDA:

- To analyze discourse practices that reflect or construct social problems;

- To investigate how ideologies can become frozen in language and find ways to break the ice;

- To increase awareness of how to apply these objectives to specific cases of injustice, prejudice, and misuse of power.

As far as this study is concerned, the critical discourse analysts study both written and spoken language, including media discourse (Fairclough 1995a) to reveal hidden ideological assumptions and related discursive sources as well as formations of power, dominance, inequality and bias, and how these sources are initiated, maintained, reproduced and transformed within specific social, economic, political and historical contexts (van Dijk 1998). CDA has been supported and enriched by various disciplinary fields, such as discourse pragmatics, narratology, speech act theory, and more recently, genre theory. All this, as McGregor (2003) notes, CDA "tries to illuminate ways in which the dominant forces in a society construct versions of reality that favor their interests" and to unmask such practices "to support the victims of such oppression and encourage them to resist and transform their lives". This is because language and discourse can be used by the power-holders in society, particularly the state and/or those who control the mass media, to make unequal power relations and representations of social groups appear to be "common sense", "normal", and "natural" when in fact there is inherent prejudice, injustice and social inequity. Using

"legitimate language", purveyors of social power or those seeking it are able to mislead us so that our concerns about persistent, larger systemic issues of class, gender, age, religion and culture seem petty or non-existent. Thus, CDA provides a framework to deconstruct their discourse and demystify their words, as it were, so that we avoid being "misled and duped into embracing the dominant worldview (ideology) at our expense and their gain" (McGregor 2003).

1.5.1. Its roots and dimensions

The manifold roots of critical discourse studies lie in rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, cognitive science, literary studies and sociolinguistics, as well as in applied linguistics and pragmatics (Wodak and Meyer 2015, p.2). Tenu van Dijk (2008) provided an overview of the field and identified that all these different branches dealt with discourse in the mid-1960s and early 1970s, and they have seven dimensions in common:

- An interest in the properties of '*naturally occurring' language use* by real language users (instead of a study of abstract language systems and invented examples).

- A focus on *larger units than isolated words and sentences*, and hence, new basic units of analysis: texts, discourses, conversations, speech acts, or communicative events.

- The extension of linguistics *beyond sentence grammar* towards a study of action and interaction.

- The extension to *non-verbal (semiotic, multimodal, visual) aspects* of interaction and communication: gestures, images, film, the internet and multimedia.

- A focus on dynamic (socio)-cognitive or interactional moves and strategies.

- The study of the functions of (social, cultural, situative and cognitive) *context of language use*.

- Analysis of vast number of *phenomena of text grammar and language use*: coherence, anaphora, topics, macrostructures, speech acts, interactions, turn-taking, signs,

politeness, argumentation, rhetoric, mental models and many other aspects of text and discourse.

Also, the notions of power, ideology, hierarchy and gender, static sociological variables were dealt with in the interpretation and explanation of text. Then, gender issues, issues of racism, media discourses or dimensions of identity became prominent[5].

CDA continued to develop and take the social dimension, and this is due to its strong link to the Critical Linguistics of the University of East Anglia in 1970s and 1980s, with Roger Fowler, Tony Trew and Gunther Kress. They based their work on Michael Halliday's (1978) theorization of Systemic Functional Linguistics. So CL and CDA shared the same perspectives on doing linguistics, semiotics and discourse analysis (van Dijk 1993, p. 131). The term 'critical' (or critique) is central and shared between CL and CDA. It could be traced to the influence of the Frankfurt School or Jürgen Habermas.

1.6. The cornerstones of CDA: discourse, power, ideology

1.6.1. Discourse

I will not go deep and in much details of the term discourse, but I will try to come up with different definitions of discourse by some theorists. The term discourse has become a common currency in a variety of disciplines: sociology, critical theory, linguistics, philosophy and so on. Throughout history, it has been given different definitions and significations, and its development has been chequered. To start with, let us see this definition of discourse on Collins concise English dictionary (1988):

> **discourse**1. verbal communication; talk, conversation; 2. A formal treatment of a subject in speech or writing; 3.a unit of text used by linguists for the analysis of linguistic phenomena that range over more than one sentence; 4.**to discourse**: the

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[5]See Wodak et al., 1999; Blommaert and Verschueren, 199; Martin-Rojo and van Dijk, 1997; Pedro 1977; Martin-Rojo and Whittaker, 1998; many editorials in *discourse and society* over the years, specifically the debate between Emanuel Schegloff and Michael Billig in issues 2-4, 1999/ 2-4, 2000)

ability to reason (*archaic*); 5. **to discourse on/upon**: to speak or write about formally; 6. to hold a discussion; 7. to give forth

discourse: 1. a conversation, especially of a formal nature; formal and orderly expression of ideas in speech or writing; also such expression in the form of a sermon, treatise, etc.; a piece or unit of connected speech or writing (*Middle English:discours, from Latin: act of running about).*

<div align="right">(Longman Dictionary of the English Language, 1984)</div>

These are almost the core meaning of discourse; it has to do with conversation in general. However, when it comes to deal with context in which discourse occurs, discourse may well vary in definition. For instance, discourse of advertising is almost different of discourse of racism and religion (Mills 2004, p.9).

Within the mainstream of linguistics, the term discourse had shifted from the meaning language is a system, and the sentence is an example of usage, to a concern with language in use (Brown and Yule 1983). For others, discourse was considered as an extended piece of text, which has some form of internal organization, coherence and cohesion (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Carter and Simpson 1989).

Yet, even within a particular discipline, there is a great deal of fluidity in the range of reference of the term discourse, for example, David Crystal tried to contrast the term 'use' with 'text':

Discourse analysis focuses on the structure of naturally occurring spoken language, as found in such discourses as conversations, interviews, commentaries, and speeches. Text analysis focusses on the structure of written language, as found in such texts as essays, notices, road signs, and chapters. But this distinction is not clear-cut, and there have been many other uses of these labels. In particular, discourse and text can be used in a much broader sense to include *all* language units with a definable communicative

function, whether spoken or written. Some scholars talk about spoken or written discourse; others about spoken or written text.

(Crystal 1987, p. 116; emphasis in original)

Hawthorn (1992) also tried to pin down the meaning of discourse by contrasting discourse and text, he said:

Michael Stubbs (1983) treats text and discourse as more or less synonymous, but notes that in other usages a text may be written, while a discourse is spoken, a text may be non-interactive whereas a discourse is interactive . . . a text may be short or long whereas a discourse implies a certain length, and a text must be possessed of surface cohesion whereas a discourse must be possessed of a deeper coherence. Finally, Stubbs notes that other theorists distinguish between abstract theoretical construct and pragmatic realization, although, confusingly, such theorists are not agreed upon which of these is represented by the term *text*.

(Hawthorn, 1992, p. 189; emphasis in original)

Roger Fowler (1979) contrasted discourse with ideology, he states:

Discourse is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience ideology in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded.

(cited in Hawthorn, 1992, p. 48)

These are some straightforward working definitions of discourse. However, as discourse has a complex history and it is used in different range of ways by different theorists, it cannot be pinned down to one definition. Michel Foucault comments on this:

Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word discourse, I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.

It is believed that defining discourse is a much complex process, this due to the fact that every theorist has his own view and when using these aforementioned definitions, they do not specify which of them they are using. Furthermore, context plays a major role in defining discourse too. I shall refer to the term context with clear details in order to know more about the relation between these two key terms in the field of CDA. Critical discourse studies see discourse as 'social practice' (Fairclough and Wodak 1997), and the 'context of language use' to be crucial:

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people. (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258)

All texts we find everywhere either notices, labels, instructions or guidelines serve different purposes, and they are meant to be acted upon and to get things done. These texts whether simple or complex, or they extend beyond the sentence, are uses of language which is produced to fulfil social purposes; we can refer to these complex communicative purposes as discourse. Widdowson (2007) clearly explains this in:

> People produce texts to get a message across, to express ideas and beliefs, to explain something, to get other people to do certain things or to think in a certain way, and so on. We can refer to these complex communicative purposes as the discourse that underlies the text and motivates its production in the first place (p.6).

Reisigl (2004) lists more than twenty definitions of discourse used by Michel Foucault in his famous lecture in the *College de France* on 'orders of discourse'. Foucault (1984) explains the nature and the contexts of discursive events:

> I make the assumption that the production discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and canalized in every society- and that this is done by way of certain procedures whose task it is to subdue the powers and dangers of discourse, to evade its heavy and threatening materiality.
>
> (Foucault, 1984, p.10-11)

For Foucault, discourse is not an object, but it is a set of relationships existing between discursive events. However, and in contrast with Foucault's abstract notion of discourse, Austin's speech acts theory (1960) considers discourse as 'linguistic action', be it written, visual, oral communication, verbal or non-verbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social rules, norms and conventions.

Discourse is not only a verbal communication, but it can be any semiotics and communication, for example, images, gestures, facial expressions, written texts,

conversational interactions (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 98). Van Dijk (2009, p. 67) summarizes all dimensions of the term discourse in the following:

> Discourse is at the same time a linguistic (verbal, grammatical) object (meaning sequences of words or sentences), an action (such as an assertion or a threat), a form of social interaction (like a conversation), a social practice (such as a lecture), a mental representation (a meaning, a mental model, an opinion, knowledge), an interactional or communicative event or activity (like parliamentary debates), a cultural product (like a telenovela) or even an economic commodity that is being sold and bought (like a novel).

Blommaert describes discourse as any meaningful symbolic behaviour and considers it as 'language in action' (2005, p. 2). Wodak characterizes discourse as a linguistic action which can be realized by any semiotic forms, e.g. 'written, visual or oral communication, verbal or nonverbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social rule, norms and conventions' (2008, p. 5).

Wodak and Meyer tried to dust off obscurity and confusion about discourse and argued that the implicit and explicit meanings are associated with the term discourse (2008, p. 1). They assert that discourse now means:

> anything from a historical moment, a *lieu de mémoire,* a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic related conversations, to language per se … thus stretching the meaning of *discourse* from a genre to a register or style, from a building to a political programme.(2009b, p. 2–3)

Wodak and Meyer (2009a: 17) distinguished between discourse and text, and they argue that discourse 'implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures whereas text is specific and unique realization of discourse', and 'text does not stand itself to mean only in

connection with knowledge of the world and of the text' (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008, p. 6-8).

From all these definitions of discourse, one has to conclude that the identification of discourse depends on the concept and perspective of the researcher as Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 89) acknowledge this in:

> The question of delimiting the borders of a 'discourse' and of differentiating it from other 'discourses' is intricate: The boundaries of a 'discourse', such as the one on global warming or climate change are partly fluid. As analytical construct, a 'discourse' always depends on the discourse analyst's perspective. As object of investigation, a discourse is not a closed unit, but a dynamic semiotic entity that is open to reinterpretation and continuation.

Thus, one of the objectives of this research is to come up with a definition to discourse, and this can be realized by looking at the context of the study, its data and objectives.

1.6.1.1. Discourse as a social practice

It is hardly believed that discourse is language in use. People use language to communicate a particular message and perform an action. All this has to be done within society. Hence, when we use the term discourse, we are proposing that language use is a social practice rather than an individual activity. This has the implication that discourse is a mode of action, people use it to interact between them, and it is a mode of representation too. Also, it implies that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse (social practice) and social structure. For Foucault (1972, p. 49) it is *discourse* that shapes the social world. In his view, discourses form the objects of which they speak, or constitute these objects, and it is through discourses and the "regimes of truth" they create that the social production of meaning takes place and power relations are preserved. Thus, for him:

> Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980, p. 131)

The latter is both a condition and an effect of the former. So discourse is shaped by social structure, by class at a societal level, by systems of classification, and by various norms and conventions of both discursive and non-discursive nature. This is on one hand; on the other hand, discourse is constitutive. It represents and signifies the world, and also it constructs the world in meaning. Fairclough (1992, p. 64) describes discourse as "a practice of not just representing, but signifying, constituting and constructing the world in meaning". Van Dijk (1997, p. 8) regards discourse as a form of action, i.e. an intentional, controlled, purposeful human activity. There are three essential aspects of this construction. First, discourse helps construct the relationship between people. Second, discourse contributes to the construction of system of knowledge and belief. And third, discourse contributes to the construction of 'social identities' and 'subject positions' for social 'subjects' and types of 'self'.

Social practice has various orientations, economic, ideological, political and cultural. Discourse is inherent or implicated in all of these. For example, discourse is a political practice, that is, it establishes, sustains and changes power relations and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups). It is, therefore, a site of power struggle.

I shall refer to discourse, text and context again when defining the DHA and some of its principles in this chapter, and I explain them specifically from the angle of DHA.

1.6.1.2. Discursive practice

Discursive practice involves three processes: text production, distribution and consumption. The nature of these processes varies according to the type of discourse and its social actors. For example, texts produced by journalists and reporters on newspapers are not the same texts produced by teachers in the classroom.

Texts are also consumed differently in different social contexts. This is due, first, to the sort of interpretive work which is applied to them (close scrutiny, semi-focused attention in the course of doing others things), and, second, to the modes of interpretations available. Consumption like production may be individual or collective. There are different kinds of consumption of texts, some texts are recorded, transcribed, preserved, re-read such as official interviews, great poems. Some texts are transformed into other texts like political speeches, and others texts are thrown away or unrecorded such as casual conversations.

Texts distributions vary between simple and complex. Casual conversation which have immediate context of situation in which it occurs has a simple distribution. However, texts produced by political leaders, or negotiations over international affairs are distributed across different institutional domains, interpreted and transformed according to their pattern of consumption.

1.6.2. Ideology

I try under this title to provide a multidisciplinary introduction to the notion ideology, and particularly talk about how ideologies are expresses, construed or legitimated by discourse. Ideology could be found in social sciences, politics, mass media and so forth. Many definitions have been given to it, but it still remains vague notion and a contested word in social sciences. Ideologies have something to do with ideas, whether political, social or religious shared by groups or movement. Communism, socialism, liberalism, feminism, sexism are all examples of this. In psychology ideology is a belief or thought, and it is defined as '*ideologies are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its members*'.

For Marxism, ideologies are described as 'false consciousness' or 'misguided beliefs' used by the ruling class to conceal the real socioeconomic conditions of the workers. This negative concept was used as an opposition to true knowledge, especially in politics, and therefore, it presupposes the following polarization between Us and Them: '*We have true knowledge, They have ideologies*'. Also, the Marxists define ideology as "production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness" (Marx and Engels 1970) within class struggle and domination. Therefore, ideology functions as to *legitimize the hegemonic order*.

'*Ideology is the basis for social practices*', for instance, racist ideologies produce discrimination, pacifist ideologies may be used to protest against nuclear weapons, and ecological ideologies will guide actions against pollution. So these actions of conflict, struggle and protest are social practices. However, though ideologies and social practices are closely related, they are two different notions, and ideologies cannot be reduced to 'ideological practices'.

Van Dijk (1993) sees ideology as "the worldviews that constitute social cognition: schematically organised complexes of representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social world, e.g. the schema…whites have about blacks" (van Dijk 1993, p.258)

Fairclough went with the Marxist view of ideologies as constructions of practices from particular perspectives:

> Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts… is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique … (Fairclough 2003, p.218)

Hall (1996) sees ideology as:

> …the mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works. (Hall 1996, p. 26)

Yet, the core definition of ideology as a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values has remained the same in political science over time. The connotations associated with this concept have undergone many transformations, and ideology was confronted with bad connotations, especially in the era of new capitalism. Clearly it is not easy to capture ideology as a belief system and simultaneously to free the concept from negative connotations (Knight 2006, p.625).

There have been multiple of CDA analyses of ideology and its manifestations and discursive representations across various contexts. For example, Fairclough scrutinized the functioning of ideologies in everyday life and in institutional contexts, including political discourse, the media and organisations (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 1992, 2000, 2003). Ruth Wodak, within Discourse Historical Approach, has analysed discursive manifestations of anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, as well as political ideologies within the European parliamentary discourse (Krzyzanowski and Wodak 2008; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2009). Nevertheless, ideology and discourse are interrelated, and every discourse carries ideological implications. There should be a process of analysing discourse ideologically, and this is important to know and deconstruct the implicit meaning of what people say.

1.6.2.1. Ideological analysis of (socio-political) discourse

Ideological analysis of discourse is widely spread especially in social sciences. It implies that the speaker's or writer's ideology should be made uncovered or explicit by deep reading, understanding or systematic analysis. The ideological analysis of discourse is mostly

interested in the interaction between discourse and ideology and the way around, in other words, it focuses on how discourse influences ideology and how ideology influences text and talk.

It should be emphasized that ideological analysis of discourse should be seen as one specific type of socio-political analysis of discourse. This type stresses on making relation between structures of discourse with structures of society. Social properties and relations like class, ethnicity and gender are systematically associated with the structural unite, levels, or strategies of talk and text embedded in their social, political and cultural context. Language users are supposed to speak, write and understand language from a specific social position, and ideological analysis examines what ideologies are typically associated with that position. For example, in order to defend or legitimate that position, ideological discourse may serve to sustain and challenge social positions.

Yet, what we need now is a theoretical interface where the social and discursive can meet and be explicitly related to each other. One of the interfaces is 'Situation' or situated social interaction. It depends on one's perspectives or sociological theory (Collins, 1981; Fins, 1991). Situations would represent the unique combination of social members, categories, relations, processes or forces.

Van Dijk added another interface which would relate society with discourse. It is the socio-cognitive interface. He argued that notions of 'actor' and 'action' have an important cognitive dimension. Knowledge, plans, intentions and goals of the actions are all produced from the mind. The same is true for interaction and the adaptation of actions to the social context; they need the mental representation of the actor. Moreover, the structures, meanings, planning and understanding of discourse and interaction need to be formulated in terms of a cognitive account of the mind, involving specific and shared knowledge and other social beliefs (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983).

1.6.3. Power and discourse

Power is one of the most central concepts in the social sciences, and there is almost no social theory that does not contain, suggest or imply a specific notion of power (Wodak and Meyer 2015, p.9). Max Weber (1980) defines power as a chance that an individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own will even against the resistance of others (Weber 1980, p.28). Michel Foucault here combines the notions of power and domination, and he focuses on the structural dimension. He further stated that domination is not only the overt pressure that one person exercises over others. Manifold forms of domination might be exercised within society simultaneously, by various actors and without subjects being aware of this (Foucault 1975).

Power and domination could be conveyed by discourse they are embedded in. Thus, discourses play an important role as discursive formations in conveying and implementing power and domination in society (Hall 1992). Bourdieu (1982, 1991) could find the interplay of language-power. According to him, all social fields are structured by relations of power and domination (Bourdieu 1977, 1980). Social fields are dynamic systems, characterized by struggles among actors within this field over the distribution of resources.

Within CDS, power is usually perceived in the Foucauldian sense, and discourse is considered as a manifestation of social struggles. The interdependence between social power and language is an ongoing and persistent topic in CDS (Fairclough 1991; Wodak 1989). This leads to talk about discursive differences shown in texts. They are governed by differences in power that is in part encoded in and determined by discourse and genre. Therefore text are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance (Wodak 2019, p.12).

Texts are often sites of social struggle, and power could be expressed by means of linguistic forms through various expressions and manipulations of power. Power is

discursively realized not only by grammatical forms, but also by a person's control of the social occasion, by means of the **genre** of a text, or by the regulation of **access** to specific public spheres.

To sum up, the interplay and interdependence between language (discourse) and power could be stated in a number of ways:

- Language indexes and expresses power

- Language is involved where there is connection over and a challenge to power.

- Power does not necessarily derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and long term.

- Language provides a finely articulated vehicle for the expression of differences in power in hierarchical social structures.

In this context, it should be noted that the role of power in news discourse is worth mentioning. The French sociologist Bourdieu (1990) clarified that a proper understanding of the relationship between power, dominance and hegemony and discourse does not solely depend on textual materials; but it requires investigating the institutional context in which it is produced.

> It follows that any analysis of ideologies in the narrow sense of 'legitimizing discourses' which fails to include an analysis of the corresponding institutional mechanisms is liable to be no more than a contribution to the efficacy of those ideologies (Bourdieu 1990, p. 133).

This means that CDA should add the empirical evidence which goes beyond the textual materials if they want to make their researches valid and reliable. Therefore, they have to look at how media organizations make such social assumptions and discursive practices and what prompt them to make specific textual choices.

All in all, we can consider what Hebermass (1967) defined CDA and work with it for this research:

> Thus, CDS could be defined as fundamentally interested in analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse). Most critical discourse analysts would thus endorse Habermas' claim that 'language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations are not articulated, language is also ideological' (Habermas1967, p. 259).

The central and core idea of this research is based on CDA as an interdisciplinary approach, it contains approaches and methods of analysis, and it does not stop or adopt just one technique. Much explanation will be stated in the following subtitle, interdisciplinarity as a new perspective in CDS.

1.7. Interdisciplinarity as a new perspective in CDS

Interdisciplinarity is a catch word of academic discourse. It has been used with specialisation interchangeably by researcher to produce new knowledge (Weingart 2000, p.30). Yet, the question is what does it mean to CDA? How can it be put into practice? What are the preconditions?

In 1990, since the inception of CDA, this latter waved the flag of interdisciplinarity. This is due to the question above (Wodak, 1996; Chouliariki and Fairclough, 1999). Briefly saying, some remarks should be pointed out as why interdisciplinarity be put into practice. From a conference held at Cambridge in 2000 titled 'interdisciplinarity and the organization of knowledge in Europe', the debate was between multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity in

the cognition science (Yvonne Rogers, Mike Scaife and Antonio Rizzo). The science sociologist Helga Nowotny briefly outlined the concepts of interdisciplinarity:

-Pluri(multi-) disciplinarity shows in the fact that the manifold disciplines remain independent. No changes are brought about in the existing structures of disciplines and theories. This form of academic cooperation consists in treating a subject from differing disciplinary perspectives.

-Interdisciplinarity may be recognized in the explicit formulation of a standardized transdisciplinary terminology. This form of cooperation is used to treat different subjects within a framework of an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary design.

-Transdisciplinarity manifests itself when research across the disciplinary landscape is based on a common axiomatic theory and the interpenetration of disciplinary research methods. Cooperation leads to a bundling or clustering of problem-solving approaches rooted in different disciplines and drawing on a pool of theories. (Nowotny, 1997, p. 188ff.)

Much interestingly, all authors of this conference (Axeli Knapp, Hilge Landweer, Roger and Ellen Hollingsworth, Peter Weingart and Nico Stehr) agreed on one respect: the difference between multi (trans) disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity is that interdisciplinarity research ideally integrates theoretical approaches and thereby creates new holistic approaches; while multidisciplinarity does not modify the approaches of individual academic branches and applies them separately.

Actually, interdisciplinarity is considered a core tenet of critical discourse studies. It is a group of approaches to analyse texts in their social context, and therefore, it trespass the rigid and staid disciplinary boundaries of linguistics and other disciplines. Interdisciplinarity has dealt with complex social problems such as racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination

and social domination. This concept has been examined and reaffirmed by many critical discourse scholars, and Weiss and Wodak are among.

One has to know that CDA has its roots in two theories, critical-dialectical theory and phenomenological-hermeneutic theory. Actually, this claim remains relative, because there is not still a common and uniform theory that determines CDA; in fact, there are many approaches. Michael Meyer came to the conclusion that 'there is no guiding theoretical viewpoint that is used consistently within CDA, nor do the CDA protagonists proceed consistently from the area of theory to the field of discourse and then back to theory' (2001, p. 18; see also Wodak and Ludwig, 1999, p. 11).

CDA can bring different theories and conceptual tools to its analysis of discourse. Michael Meyer pointed out to this fact and stated that not only epistemological theories but also general social theories, middle-range theories, microsociological theories, sociopsychological theories, discourse theories and linguistic theories can be found in CDA. So this theoretical framework seems eclectic and unsystematic, and it is, yet, considered a positive phenomenon and strength to CDA. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 16ff.) described this as follows:

> We see CDA as bringing a variety of theories into dialogue, especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other, so that its theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories, though what it itself theorizes in particular is the mediation between the social and the linguistic – the 'order of discourse', the social structuring of semiotic hybridity (interdiscursivity). The theoretical constructions of discourse which CDA tries to operationalize can come from various disciplines, and the concept of 'operationalization' entails working in a transdisciplinary way where the logic of one discipline (for example, sociology) can be 'put to work' in the development of another (for example, linguistics).

From this statement, we infer that there is a direct connection between theory and interdisciplinarity. What arouses difficulties in the operationalization in the research process is the complex mediation between theory and discourse, and this is referred to by Chouliaraki and Fairclough in the above quotation. This, in fact, is relevant for the theory formation process in CDA. This interrelation between discourse and society cannot be analyzed adequately unless linguistic and sociological approaches are combined. So far, there is no theoretical model developed capable of bridging this gap and reconciling the linguistic approaches with the sociological ones.

However, one can speak of a very possible theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools developed in different theoretical schools. Tools of this kind are, For instance, Foucault's discursive formations, Bourdieu's habitus, or register and code as defined by Halliday and Bernstein (Lemke, 1995, p. 19ff.). So in this sense, we rather depend on conceptual tools than a grand theory, and the question that we come up with and address as researcher is not, 'Do we need a grand theory?', but rather, 'What conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problem and for this and that context?' this implies that CDA is eclectic and diverse in choosing tools of analysis, it depends on the data selected and the research context. Eclecticism is actually a common analytical feature of most applied CDA studies.

Much interestingly, there is a general belief among CDA practitioners that the sociological, cultural and historical characteristics of society do explain a great deal about the mediation between discourse and society.

1.7.1. Interdisciplinarity at different stages of the research process

The connection between theory and discourse can be described in **Figure.1** below. It is Wodak and Meyer's well known diagram that shows the research nature and process of CDA. To explain in detail and as a first step, CDA is strongly based in theory. Here theories are many and varied, and they range from microsociological perspective (Ron Scollon) to theories

on society and power in Michel Foucault's tradition (Siegfried Jager, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak), theories of social cognition (Tenu van Dijk) and grammar, as well as individual concepts that are borrowed from larger theoretical traditions.

A second step relates to the problem of operationalizing theoretical concepts. The primary issue here is how the various methods of CDA are able to translate its theoretical claims into instruments and methods of analysis. Here we talk about the mediation between the grand theories as applied to society and concrete instances of social interaction (text and discourse).

As a final step, the interpretation, including the scope and specific focus of what is interpreted, will also be strongly influenced by disciplinary traditions. For instance, ethnographic approaches allow rich description of discursive practices within specific contexts without necessarily generalizing to other contexts, while corpus analysis will allow inferences to be drawn about potentially huge volumes of texts, but perhaps for a more limited range of discursive features.

Thus, CDA imply a circular and recursive-abductive relationship between theory and discourse as shown in **Figure.1**

Figure.1: Empirical research as a circular process

Figure.2 illustrates the typical stages of the research process in empirical social research. We set first the research objectives. Then we pay much importance and respect to the units of analysis, because they are the ground to a valid interpretations and explanations. Operationalization is crucial for not only the validity of results, but also for the auditability and the justification of CDS research (Wodak and Meyer 2015, p.16). Units of analysis are (e.g. ingroup/outgroup differentiation, discrimination, social status of speaker), units of inquiry are (e.g. group meeting, interviews, newspapers), and variables are (e.g. indicators of ingroup/outgroup differentiation, indicators of discrimination, educational status of speakers/writers), and methods of inquiry are (content analysis, rhetorical analysis, surveys, etc.).

Figure.2: The research process (adapted from Titscher, Meyer and Mayrhofer 2008:308)

1.8. Analysis of meanings in society (language in use)

CDA is actually interested in analyzing the linguistic structure of language as well as social meanings (language in use). In doing this, CDA maintains that three analytical separable elements of the process of meaning –making should be taken into account: the processes of

text production, the processes of text reception and the processes of text interpretation (Fairclough, 2003: 10). **Figure.3** shows this:

Figure.3: Faircloughs-3-dimensional-model-Discourse-as-text-interaction-and context

Context is crucial in meaning-making. We speak language in myriad contexts, and to infer the meaning, language must be contextualized. CDA emphasizes on context in interpretation and analysis of texts taking into account the production, distribution and reception processes. Van Dijk maintains that discourse, cognition and society is an interactive **triangle** that CDA is concerned with. **Figure.4** shows the connection between the three elements:

Figure.4: Interrelationship between discourse, cognition and society

Blommaert (2005) criticized CDA for 'its lack of accounting for history' and argues that a critique of the systemic features of contemporary societies cannot be achieved by adopting a solely synchronic approach. However, the discourse historical approach, in particular, explicitly refers to this indispensable context, and it calls for the combination of both the synchronic and diachronic dynamics of discourses in critical discourse analysis.

Chilton (2004) emphasized that meaning is inexplicit and it does not reside in words. Yet, meaning is constructed by human minds triggered by social context or language in use. Van Dijk (2003) considers knowledge as an element, among others like ideologies and attitudes, which comprises 'social cognition', and discourse comprehension and production require the use and activation of this socially and culturally shared knowledge,

> Discourses are in many respects icebergs in which only the most relevant information is actually expressed as meaning. Thus, language users need social and cultural knowledge in order to establish local coherence, to derive global topics, to know what parts of sentences or propositions are asserted and which ones are presupposed, and so on. They need knowledge about specific events in order to monitor what they already

know about the event, what is new information, what is foreground and background, and in general they need knowledge in order to establish whether a discourse is meaningful.   (ibid., p. 92)

Van Dijk (2003) asserts that CDA takes not only time/place and the situational framework as elements of context; they rather add "knowledge of the participant" as part of the context (van Dijk, 2003: 94). Moreover, Wodak (2008, p. 13) considers three levels of contexts that CDA study can take into account when examining the structure of a piece of research:

- The immediate language or internal co-text;

- The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourse

- The extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific context of situation (middle-range theories)

- The broader socio-political contexts, to which the discursive practices are embedded in and related (macro-theories)

The issue of linking discourse to society and verse versa is still unsolved, though many critics and sociolinguists have tried to come up with many approaches and techniques to analyse this interrelationship. However, they agree to a large extent that this mediation cannot be analysed adequately unless linguistic and sociological approaches are combined. For example, Basin Bernstein and William Labov, two important founder of sociolinguistics, proposed different innovative approaches summarized as 'deficit' and 'difference' theories. Honestly speaking, what makes this linking difficult is the fact each scope (linguistics, sociology and cognition) has its own definition and concept to a particular term. For instance, The term 'institution' is likewise used with completely different meanings in discourse-analytical concepts and sociological theories (linguists often making no difference between 'institution' and

'organization', whereas the latter define institutions as abstract set of rules in a social domain, organization as the concrete material environment; see Giddens, 2000).

To bridge this gap between discourse and society and mediate them, there is no such uniform theoretical foundation so far. Nevertheless, one can speak of a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools developed in different theoretical schools. The aim behind this is to relate question of theory to the specific problems to be investigated. Therefore, this research incorporates and depends on many conceptual tools such as Edward Said's theory of Orientalism, Stuart Hall's system of representation as well as Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach.

1.9. The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)

In this part I shall explain some salient terms, such as discourse, text, genre, recontextualization, intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Then I proceed to display some analytical tools and the general principles of DHA. Before that, I shall go briefly on the notions of critique, ideology and power again, and show how they are conceptualized in the discourse historical approach. These concepts are constitutive of every approach in CDS/CDA.

1.9.1. Critique

At the beginning in this chapter, the meaning of critique was explained and mostly referred either to the Frankfurt school, or to the Marxist theory. However, the term critique could mean as getting closer to the data, embedding the data in a social context, clarifying the positioning of the discourse participants, and engaging in a continuous self-reflection while undertaking research (Wodak 2015, p.24).

Foucault (1990) clearly refers critique to the examination, assessment and evaluation of a person, objects and so forth, and to the quest for truth, enlightenment and emancipation:

Critique refers to the examination, assessment and evaluation, from a normative perspective, of person, objects, social institution and so forth. Critique can relate to a quest for truth, to specific values and ethics, o appropriate text exegesis, to self-reflection, to enlightenment and emancipation, to specific aspects of social change, to ecological protection and to aesthetic orientation. Following Kant, 'critique' also refers to a propaedeutic ('preliminary') investigation into the conditions and possibilities of knowledge. The term acquired political prominence during the French Revolution and with the emergence of Marxism. Ever since, social critique has assessed the political and social status quo from the point of view of an ideal standard or alternative, in order to diagnose shortcomings and contradictions. At this point, critique can merge with resistance; here, we are also reminded of Foucault's conception of critique as 'the art of not being governed in this specific way and at this specific price' (Foucault 1990, p. 12).

The DHA adheres to the socio-philosophical orientation of Critical Theory. As such, it follows a concept of social critique that integrates three related aspects:

1. '*Text* or *discourse immanent critique*' aims to discover inconsistencies, (self)-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in text-internal or discourse-internal structures.

2. '*socio-diagnostic critique*' is concerned with uncovering the-particularly latent-persuasive or manipulative character of discursive practices. Here, we rely on our contextual knowledge and draw on social theories and other theoretical models from various disciplines to interpret discursive events.

3. Future-related *prospective critique* seeks to improve communication (e.g. by elaborating guidelines against sexist language use or by reducing 'language barriers' in hospitals, schools and so forth) (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p. 34).

1.9.2. Ideology

Wodak and Meyer (2015) see ideologies as worldview and system of beliefs, convictions and values shared by members of a specific social group:

> Ideology, in the DHA's view, is seen as a perspective (often one-sided), i.e. a worldview and system composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, values and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group. Fully developed ideologies (often labelled 'grand narratives'), such as communism, socialism, conservatism or liberalism, include three interrelated imaginaries: (1) a representational model of what a society looks like, i.e. a model of the status quo (e.g. a communist model of a capitalist exploitative society); (2) a visionary model of what a society should look like in the future (e.g. a communist model of a classless society); (3) a programmatic model of how the envisioned society could be achieved 'on the path' from the present to the future (e.g. communist model of a proletarian revolution). Ideologies serve as important means of creating shared social identities and of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse, e.g. by establishing hegemonic identity narratives or by controlling the access to specific discourses or public spheres ('gate keeping'). In addition, ideologies also function as a means of transforming power relations.

1.9.3. Power

For the DHA, language is not powerful on its own. It is a means to gain and maintain power via the use that powerful people make use of it, and an expression of power relation:

> Power relates to an asymmetric relationship among social actors who have different social positions or who belong to different social groups. Following Weber (1980), 'power' can be defined as the possibility of enforcing one's own will within a social relationship against the will or interests of others. Furthermore, power can be described in terms of social relations and their attributes, i.e. of 'ties of mutual

dependence between parties' (Emerson 1962: 32), and in terms of power network, i.e. of 'two or more power-dependence relations' (Emerson 1962, p. 32). Fundamental ways in which power is implemented are 'actional power' (physical force and violence), the control of people through threats or promises, the attachment to authority (the exertion of authority and submission to authority) and technical control through objects, e.g. means of production, means of transportation, weapons and so on (Popitz 1992).

Now let us turn to discourse again and define it from the angle of DHA. Before that, I should signal that the term discourse is still open to many definitions and reinterpretations; it depends on the analyst's perspectives. Some refer it even to the smallest sign, gesture, behaviour that every person can make (crying, a wink, a gaze are all signs).

1.9.4. Discourse in DHA

The discourse historical approach perceives both written and spoken language as a form of social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). A discourse is a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective (Fairclough, 1995, p.14). There is interrelated relation between the fields of action (including situations, institutional frames and social structures) and discursive practices or event. These fields of action shape and affect discourses on one hand, and on the other hand, discourses influence both non-discursive and discursive social and political processes and actions. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) put it clear in the following citation:

> That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned; it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. As discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power.

Discursive practices may have major ideological effects; that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between, for instance, social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people (Fairclough and Wodak 1997).

Girnth (1996) understood discourse as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as 'texts', that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres. A good example of this is the macro-topic, which is a salient definition of discourse. From this macro-topic we can derive or create sub-topics, and intertextuality and interdiscursivity allow for new fields of action. Discourses are not a closed unit or system at all, but they are open and hybrid. So, 'discourse' is considered to be:

- A cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;

- Socially constituted and socially constitutive;

- Related to a macro-topic; (Wodak and Meyer 2015, p.27)

1.9.5. Text

Text is a product of discourse. It refers to concrete oral utterances or written documents (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Reisigl and Wodak 2009). It can be defined as an actual use of language, and we identify a text as a piece of language as soon as we recognize that it has been produced for communicative purpose (Widdowson 1997). Text can be simple and short and straightforward, such as labels, instructions, notice, and it can extend beyond the sentence, a great many of them do, such as travel guides, information leaflets, newspaper articles, interviews, speeches, reports, poems, and so on. All these texts are meant to serve a range of different social purposes.

People produce texts to express ideas, to transmit messages, to get other people to do something, to explain something, and so on. This process of communication is called discourse, this latter underlies the text and motivates its production. So the text is the product of a whole complex process (discourse). Wodak and Meyer (2015) made this distinction between discourse and text in the following:

> We distinguish between 'discourse' and 'text': texts are parts of discourses. They make speech acts durable over time and thus bridge two dilated speech situations, i.e. the situation of speech production and the situation of speech reception. In other words, texts- be they visualized, written or oral-objectify linguistic actions (Ehlich 1983). Texts can be assigned to genres. A 'genre' can be characterized as a socially conventionalized type and pattern of communication that fulfils a specific social purpose in a specific social context. In addition, a genre can be seen as a mental scheme that refers to specific procedural knowledge about a specific text function and the processes of text production, distribution and reception (Wodak and Meyer 2015, p.27).

Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) proposed that if text is a meaningful speech event, it meets seven standards of textuality: *cohesion* (the ways the words are connected in sequence), *coherence* (the outcome of cognitive relations, such as mutual knowledge between the participants in the discourse), *acceptability* (the form of the text in term of appropriateness to the cultural setting and the in which it is received by those taking part), *intentionality* (the text producers' discourse purpose, goals or plan), *informativity* (how far the degree of information transmitted is more or less suitable for the receivers in the circumstances), *situationality* or relevance (the factors which make a text relevant to the situation in which it occurs) and *intertextuality* (the way in which a text relies on previous texts for its form and references and the way in which it may incorporate other texts).

1.9.6. Genre

Genre is the term used for a specific product of a social practice. It is a form of discourse, culturally recognized, which, more or less, obeys socially agreed structures. This term is known in literary and film studies, and it has been later borrowed by discourse analysts. Examples of this are novels, poems, university lectures, biology lab reports, letters, theatre reviews. Another kind of genre is the one used for social events such as committee meeting. This kind has a special linguistic and discoursal patterns, thus, 'genre' can overlap with the term social practice. Another also kind of genre is associated with the institutions within which they evolved. For example, lectures, seminars, study days, textbooks, notes, essays and examination papers are all associated with educational institutions (Bloor T and Bloor, M 2013, p.8). Swales (1990) described genre as socially recognized, recurrent, culturally defined speech event. Genres have their own formal characteristics which can be identified, described, and taught.

Fairclough (1995) defined genre as the conventionalized, more or less schematically fixed use of language associated with a particular activity, as 'socially ratified [Ruth Wodak: that is socially accepted] way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity (Fairclough 1995, p.14).

Following Gunter Kress (1985), in Functional systemic linguistics, most situation are conventional and rule-governed, this results in the production of texts that have to be regarded as 'generic':

> The social occasions of which texts are a part have a fundamentally important effect on texts […] The situations are always conventional […] They range from entirely formulaic and ritualized occasions, such as royal weddings, sporting encounters, committee meetings, to family rituals such as breakfasts or barbecues or fights over

who is to do the dishes. Other, probably fewer occasions are less ritualized, less formulaic; casual conversations may be an example (Kress, 1985, p.19).

The kind of genre associated with this study is newspapers press; they have special and kind of language which is different from other genres. Newspapers are connected with social and political activities, and their language interpretation needs more than linguistic analysis.

1.9.7. Frame

Frame is something cognitive that runs in our minds, it functions to link separate entities together in our mind. Lakoff (2004) defines frames as 'mental structures that shape the way we see the world' and that are triggered by words. They are part of the unconscious mind and operate automatically to make sense of the world. For example, if we take the word *cricket*, it is linked with the following words like *cricket pitch*, *cricket ball*, *cricket bat*, and so on. Anyone who is familiar with the game has a concept (frame) of how they are related. Any account of the game will use the word pitch, ball, and bat. So the word cricket is a cognitive model and it is a specific culture in this way.

Framing is important in CDA, because the way we view the world carries cultural messages, and since frames, like values, vary from culture to culture, they affect the way we view authority, social groups and identity.

1.9.8. Fields of action

Wodak (2011) defines field of action as a segment of social *reality*, a field that constitutes the *frame* of a 'discourse'. Different fields of action lead to have different functions of discursive practices. For example, in the political arena, we could find eight or more different political field of actions that have different functions of discursive practices as shown in **figure.5** down. All discourses are related to each other, and they overlap with other discourses, and they are socio-functionally linked with each other. So **figure.5** represents the relationship

between fields of actions, genres and discourse topics with the examples of the fields of politics.

Fields of action					Field of control
Law making political procedure	Formation of public opinion and self-presentation	Party-internal development of an infromed opinion	Political advertising, marketing and propaganda	Political executive and administration	Political executive and administration
Genres					
- laws - bills - amendments - speeches and contributions of MPs - regulations - recommenda-tions - prescriptions - guidelines - etc.	- press releases - press conferences - interviews - talk shows - lectures and contributions to conferences - articles, books - commemora-tive speeches - inaugural speeches - etc.	- party programmes declarations statements and speeches of principle - speeches on party conventions - etc.	- election programmes - slogans, speeches in election campaigns - announcements - posters - election brochure - direct mailings - fliers, etc.	- decisions (approval/ rejection) - inaugural speeches - coalition papers, speeches of ministers/heads - governmental answers to p.q.	- declarations of opposition parties - parliamentary questions - speeches of MPs - petitions for a referendum - press releases of the opposition parties

Discourse Topic 1 · Discourse Topic 2 · Discourse Topic 3 · Discourse Topic 4 · Discourse Topic 5 · Discourse Topic 6

Figure.5: Fields of political action, political genres and discourse topic (Reisigl 2007: 34-5)

It is worth here also to mention that the DHA aims at investigating the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, and discourse analysts' big task is to explore how discourse, text and genre change in relationship with sociopolitical change. Before we explain this relationship, first we need to define both intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Before that, we deal with context as a crucial element in interpreting discourse.

1.9.9. Context

The concept of context is very essential element in any approach and study. It has been associated with text linguistics, pragmatics, sociolinguistics and discourse analysis (DA). First, in the field of sociolinguistics, it was defined in terms age, sex, class, etc., and the

linguistic units were associated with these variables. Second, in pragmatics, context was associated with speaker, hearers and other communicative setting. However, in recent approaches like of Tenu van Dijk (2001, 2005), he sees context in cognitive terms, and considers 'context models' play a major role in the recognition and knowledge of the contextual information. He assumes that his theory of 'knowledge' helps a lot to decipher the implicit and the unfamiliar situation, and establish the rules and norms.

Context is an inherent part of DA (Wodak and Weiss 2004), and it is a central concept in discourse historical approach too. Knowingly, the DHA is a triangulatory approach, and it follows this principle of triangulation which takes into account a whole range of empirical observations, theories from various disciplines and methods, as well as background information. One of the salient features of the discourse-historical approach is its endeavor to work interdisciplinary, multi-methodically and on the basis of a variety of different of empirical data. It depends on the object of analysis. It systematically includes the historical, political, sociological and psychological dimensions in the analysis and interpretation of a specific discursive event. Thus, this triangulatory approach is based on the concept of 'context' which takes into account four levels (see **figure.6**):

1. The immediate, language or text internal co-text

2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses

3. The extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of specific 'context of situation' (middle range theories)

4. The boarder sociological and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to ('grand' theories)

Figure.6: Levels of theories and linguistic analysis

1.9.10. Intertextuality

Intertextuality means that texts are linked to other texts. Such connection can be established by many ways such as: either through explicit reference to a topic or main actor; through references to the same events; by allusions or evocations; or transfer of main arguments from one text to the next, and so forth. Norman Fairclough (1992, p. 84) said about intertextuality:

> Intertextuality is basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth. In terms of production, an international perspective stresses the historicity of texts: how they always constitute additions to existing, chain of communication"…consisting of prior of text to which they respond.

In CDA, textual analysis involves both linguistic and intertextual analysis. Intertextuality means also the way in which 'discourses are always connected to other discourses'. It is a very particular concern to CDA. It is a preoccupation of institutional discourses. For example,

if we take the university setting, we could find many types of discourse, teacher-student interaction, written communication between the university authorities and the tutors, staff meetings, etc. an example of intertextuality would be the inclusion of particular terms and expressions of its managerial discourses such as teachers, dean, chef department, rector, etc. in the various discourses at universities. For example, the design or a newly created technological program would be sold to other universities, using discourse techniques borrowed from advertising, so that the boundaries between information are blurred (Andrea Mayr 2008). When new discourses mix, this results in discursive and cultural change. This has been termed as recontextualization by Bernstein (1990). Recontextualization helps show how discourses of one social practice are recontextualized, that is, drawn upon and incorporated, into another. So the example aforementioned represents a kind of recontextualization of the managerial discourses by incorporating them into the university and other institutions discourses.

1.9.11. Recontextualization

Recontextualization is the opposite of de-contextualization (when the element is taken out of its text and context). When an element is transferred to a new context and, thus, it acquires a new meaning, this process is called recontextualization. This kind of process is used a lot in various newspapers. Reporters and journalists, when analyzing political speeches for example, select specific quotes that best suit their general purpose of their articles. They can insert, take off, and transfer elements from context to new context, so that they report articles that fulfill their general goal. The quotations are thus de-and re-contextualized, i.e. newly framed. So these speeches can acquire different meanings following of each specific context of press coverage (Wodak and Meyer, p.28).

As far as recontextualization is concerned with the analysis of the selected newspapers articles of this thesis, it contains the three pivotal elements which could contribute into the

analysis of social actors, substitution, addition and evaluation. First, Substitution means the elements of social practice (social actors and their activities) can be substituted by types, through functionalization, that is, in terms of professional roles or social activities, or through identification, that is, in terms of their physical characteristics. Second, addition means that recontextualization involves adding elements, such as reactions and legitimation (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). Reactions are the actor's feeling, problems, fears, senses, etc. they are prominent features of the text. Third, recontextualization uses evaluation of the social practice that is written about (van Leeuwen, 1993). People and events in each recontextualization are represented according to the goals, values and priorities of the presenters. So those who recontextualize and in control of the media discourse (journalists) are arbiters of social meaning.

2.9.12. Interdiscursivity

We know that discourses are not close units; they are open and often hybrid. This means that subtopics can be created at many points from one topic. Interdiscursivity means that discourses are linked to each other, and we can conceive discourse as topic-related to subtopics of other discourses. For instance, the discourse of climate change refers to subtopics of other discourses (such as international health, global warming, the end of the world, and so on).

Figure.7 represents the interdiscursive and intertextual relationship between discourses, discourse topics, genres (as types) and texts (as tokens). Interdiscursivity is indicated by the two big overlapping ellipses, where discourse A intersected with discourse B. intertextuality is indicated by dotted double arrows. The assignment of texts to genres is signaled by simple arrows. The topics to which a text refers are indicated by small ellipses, and the topical intersection of different texts is signaled by the overlapping small ellipses (Wodak and Meyer 2011, p.67)

Figure.7: Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships between discourses, discourse topics, genres and texts

1.10. Historical background of DHA

The discourse historical approach was first developed by the study which analyzed the emergence of anti-Semitic stereotypical images, or 'feindbid', as it emerged, in public discourses in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim who, for a long time, had kept secret his National-Socialist past (Wodak et al. 1990). The study was an analysis of the linguistic manifestations of prejudice in discourses embedded in the linguistic and social context. This was confronted with the reporting in the United States which was biased in certain aspects. So it was a comparison between the Austrian press and New York Times about Waldheim's story with the historical facts about Wehrmacht atrocities in the Balkans and the deportation of Jews from Greece. The analysis

proved that this distortion was complete and systematic. In this research project, three salient characteristics of the DHA were first established:

- Interdisciplinary research with a special focus on historical embedding.

- Multiple triangulation as a methodological principle combining various perspectives on the research object by including different data (data triangulation), different theories (theory triangulation), different methods (triangulation of methods) and different researchers (investigator triangulation) conducting team work (Flick 2004).

- Orientation towards the practical application of results.

It is important to mention that DHA focuses on the historical dimension of the issue under investigation (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, p. 91). Hence, it engages diachronically with the process of discourse formation and the cognitive relationships between existing diachronic and synchronic discourses and discourse topics in the explanation of discursive processes of production, distribution and interpretation.

1.10.1. Some principles of DHA

There are various principles characterizing the discourse historical approach, they have evolved over time especially since the study on Austrian post-war antisemitism. Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 95) summarize the most important characteristics of DHA as follows:

- The approach is interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity involves theory, methods, methodology, research practice and practical application.

- The approach is problem-oriented.

- Various theories and methods are combined, wherever integration leads to an adequate understanding and explanation of the research project.

- The research incorporates fieldwork and ethnography (study from inside) if these are required for a thorough analysis and theorizing of the object under investigation.

- Research necessarily moves recursively between theory and empirical data. Therefore, we endorse a complex research strategy that combines abductive reasoning (the construction of explanatory hypotheses by observing data and relating them tentatively to previous theoretical models), inductive procedures (an empirical examination of the strength of these hypotheses) and-if possible- deductive (drawing a prognostic conclusion on the basis of a theory).

- Numerous genres and public spaces as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relationship are studied.

- The historical context is taken into account when interpreting texts and discourses. The historical orientation permits the reconstruction of how recontextualization functions as an important process of linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time.

- Categories and methods are not fixed once and for all. They must be elaborated for each analysis according to the specific problem under investigation.

- 'Grand theories' often serve as a foundation. In specific analyses, however, 'middle-range theories' frequently offer a better theoretical basis (Weick 1974)

- The application of results is an important aim. Results should be made available to and applied by experts and be communicated to the public (Wodak and Meyer 2015, pp.31-32)

The DHA principally depend on three clear dimensions. First, it identifies the specific topic or content of specific discourse. Second, discursive strategies are investigated. Strategy means here a more or less intentional plan of practice (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. Discursive strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity. Third, linguistic means (as types) and context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens) are examined (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999).

DHA principally has more concern on broader societal and political discourse, and it seeks to integrate as many of the genres of discourse as possible, as well as the historical dimension of the issue. Wodak puts more emphasis on historical and background knowledge (as Fairclough does), argumentation and classical rhetorical categories.

1.10.2. Its tools of analysis

When analyzing a specific discourse, the DHA serve five strategies (see **table.1** below). Yet, and before mentioning and explaining these strategies, it is important to say that when approaching these strategies in the analysis of data, five questions should be taken into consideration:

- How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?

- What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?

- What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?

- From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?

- Are the perspective utterances articulated overtly, intensified or mitigated?

Wodak and Martin Reisigl (2001) developed a four-step strategy of analysis in their studies regarding racist and discriminatory discourse. They started firstly by pointing out the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse with racist, anti-semitic, nationalist or ethnicist ingredients. Secondly, they investigated these four or five later discursive strategies: Nomination, Predication, Argumentation, Perspectivization, Intensification or Mitigation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). These strategies help achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. Table below shows in detail the objectives and devices of each strategy:

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
referential / nomination	discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena/events, and processes/actions	. membership categorization devices, deictics, . tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches . verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions
predication	discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena/events/processes, and actions (more or less positively or negatively)	• stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g., in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) • explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/ pronouns • collocations • explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) • allusions, evocations, and presuppositions/ implicatures • other
argumentation	justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	• *topoi* (formal or more content-related) • fallacies
Perspectivization/ framing or discourse representation	positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	• deictics • direct, indirect or free indirect speech • quotation marks, discourse markers/particles • metaphors • animating prosody • other
intensification, mitigation	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	• diminutives or augmentatives • (modal) particles, tag questions, use of the subjunctive, hesitations, vague expressions, etc. • hyperboles, litotes, • indirect speech acts (e.g., question instead of assertion) • verbs of saying, feeling, thinking • other

Table.1: Selection of discursive strategies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 73).

First, nomination strategy or referential strategy makes use of the following linguistic devices: membership categorization such as deictics and anthroponyms. Tropes as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches. Verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions. Second predication strategy appears in stereotypical, evaluative attributions of positive and negative traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participles clauses or groups), implicit and explicit predicates, collocations, comparisons, allusion, similes, implicatures, etc. Thirdly, argumentation strategies are reflected in certain topoi (formal or more content-related) to justify political inclusion and exclusion, and to question claims of truth and normative rightness. The fourth strategies are Perspectivization which use devices like direct and indirect speech, quotations, narration, description, metaphors, means of reporting of events and utterances, this is in order to position the speaker's or writer's point of view and to express involvement and distance. The last strategies are intensification and mitigation. They are used to modify (intensify and mitigate) the illocutionary force of utterances by using diminutives or argumentatives, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, hyperboles or litotes, verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, etc.

1.11. CDA and Self /Other representation

The representation of the Self and other is embodied in the representation of various groups within society, e.g. the representation of ethnic, racial and cultural minorities within society, which results in the unequal power relations, produces such hegemonic ideologies that enforce the dichotomous representation of Us vs Them.[6]

An example of this dichotomous representation of Us vs Them can be well understood in the broader international arena, where different groups and identities intermix. Iran nuclear issue has been considered as an international conflict between the West and Iran, between unequal

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[6] For more details, refer to the literature review in the introduction.

powers that represent the dichotomy Us vs Them. This political conflict has many aspects such as economic, cultural and religious.

The ideological dichotomy of Us/Them embodies in discourse structures and takes certain aspects. It is organized by well-known ingroup/outgroup polarization, and it happens by pronouns such as 'us' and 'them', and possessive and demonstrative such as 'our people' and 'those people'. Van Dijk (2006) assumes that ideological discourse is generally organized by a general strategy of *positive self-presentation* (boasting) and *negative other-presentation* (derogation). This strategy may operate at all levels, generally in such a way that our good things are emphasized and our bad things de-emphasized, and the opposite for the others—whose bad things will be enhanced, and whose good things will be mitigated, hidden or forgotten.

This polarization, when applied to discourse, affects all levels of discourse such as those of global and local meanings, lexicon, syntax, sound structures, formats, rhetorical structures and interactional structures. At each level of these we find codification of underlying ideologies. The following **table.2** summarizes some of the ways discourses code for underlying ideologies:

• **Context:** Speaker speaks *as* a member of a social group; and/or addresses recipient *as* group member; ideologically biased context models: subj. representations of communicative event and its participants as members of categories or groups.

• **Text, discourse, conversation:**

Overall strategy: positive presentation/action of Us, negative presentation/action of Them

• Emphasize *Our* good things, and *Their* bad things, and

De-emphasize *Our* bad things, and *Their* good things

MEANING

O Topics (semantic macrostructures)

■ Select/Change positive/negative topics about Us/Them.

O Local meanings and coherence

■ Positive/Negative Meanings for Us/Them are

• Manifestation: Explicit versus Implicit

• Precision: Precise versus Vague

• Granularity: Detailed/fine versus Broad, rough

• Level: General versus Specific, detailed

• Modality: We/They Must/Should...

• Evidentiality: We have the truth versus They are misguided

• Local coherence: based on biased models

• Disclaimers (denying Our bad things): `We are not racists, but...'

O Lexicon: Select Positive/Negative terms for Us/Them

(e.g. `terrorist' versus `freedom fighter')

FORM

O Syntax: (De)emphasize Positive/Negative Agency of Us/Them

■ Cleft versus non-cleft sentences (`It is X who...')

■ Active versus Passives (`USA invades Iraq' versus 'Iraq invaded by USA')

■ Full clauses/propositions versus nominalizations (The *invasion* of Iraq').

O Sound structures: Intonation, etc., (de)emphasizing Our/Their Good/Bad things

O Format (schema, superstructure: overall form)

Positive/Negative meanings for Us/Them in

• First, dominant categories (e.g. Headlines, Titles,

Summaries, Conclusions) versus last, non-dominant categories.

• Argumentation structures, topoi (stereotypical arguments,

e.g. 'For their own good')
O Fallacies that falsely conclude Our/Their Good/Bad things,
e.g. overgeneralizations, authority, etc.
O Rhetorical structures
Emphasizing or de-emphasizing Our/Their Good/Bad things
by
■ Forms: Repetition
■ Meanings: Comparisons, metaphors, metonymies, irony;
euphemisms, hyperboles, number games, etc.
ACTION
O Speech acts, communicative acts, and interaction
■ Speech acts that presuppose Our/Their Good/Bad things:
promises, accusations, etc.
■ Interaction strategies that imply Our/Their Good/Bad
things: Cooperation, agreement

Table.2: Some expressions of ideology in discourse.

Different aspects and characteristics of discriminatory discourses, in which the

dichotomization of Us vs Them is a pivotal recurring theme, have been discussed (Wodak et

al., 1999; Wodak et al., 1994; Wodak et al., 1990; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak

and Matouschek, 1993). These studies have developed comprehensive analytical

methodologies comprising mitigation, argumentation strategies, topoi analysis and other salient discursive features of such discourses.

1.12. Identity construction in discourse

Knowingly, discourse is language in context, and people know each other well through communication and behaviour too. So we present ourselves to other through our choice of language or language variety. Our identities are constructed through the choices we make in language and language itself. All human identities are social in nature because identity is about meaning. Thus, identity and language have a dialectic relationship.

Wodak (2011) made a study about how are identities constructed in discourse. She assumed that part of our identity construction (both individual and collective) is the choices we make of language. Languages and using language manifest 'who we are', and we define reality partly through our language and linguistic behaviour. Thus language and identity have a dialectic relationship. The following assumptions are the basis for her study and they are too applicable to my research:

- Identities are always re/created in specific contexts. They are 'co-constructed' in interactive relationships. They are usually fragmented, dynamic and changeable – everyone has multiple identities.

- Identity construction always implies inclusionary and exclusionary processes, i.e. the definition of ONESELF and OTHERS.

- Identities that are individual and collective, national and transnational are also re/produced and manifested symbolically.

This drives us to formulate the question: who determines who can speak with whom, and how? Who decides on the norms of language use; who sets these norms and enforces them; who determines whether languages, linguistic behaviour and identities are accepted?

The answer to these questions is straightforwardly related to the notion power. Those who have power in hand can use language to influence, to enforce and to gain their interests. So language determines the boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. Identity presupposes the dichotomy Us/Them and there are similarities and differences.

As this study is concerned with the ideological conflict between two different and interdependent nations, it is therefore necessary to look at the term 'national identities'. One of the most influential practitioners of CDA who addressed the issues of political ideologies and national identities is Ruth Wodak. She elaborated that Austrian national identity can change with the evolution the European Union. She is Austrian born and roots, and she refers to 'history' as one of the element that contributed to the development of Austrian national identity.

To see how Austrian national identity is being constructed through discursive strategies, she critically analyzed twenty two public commemorative speeches of political leaders on special national days. In these speeches, they tend to use "legitimate ways of dealing with the past, by selecting affirmative elements from the past which seem useful to justify present interests (Staudinger, 1994: 21; cited from Wodak, et al., 2009: 70). Analyzing commemorative speeches often help identify how politicians express their political values, construct common identities, and promote public consensus.

In another study made on interviews of individuals to investigate attitudes and statements about identities on an individual basis, Wodak explained how deictic forms like "we" and "they", anthroponymic generic terms such as 'Austrian's', 'German's', are used to discursively construct national identities.

1.13. The function of discursive legitimization and de-legitimization

Legitimization and de-legitimization of discourse in politics is closely related to actors and actions. They are actor-oriented (election campaign) and action-oriented (war declaration),

and they are also related to self-representation notion, either negative or positive. Hart (2014, p. 7) argues that legitimization should be envisaged as a macro-function through which interlocutors "seek social approval of the Self", self here is conceptualized either as the individual interlocutor or a social group or an institution the interlocutors are identified with, or seek the "accreditation for social actions".

Those people in power or those who have power attempt to recontextualize actions and actor in accordance to their political interests and ideological biases, and this is in order to legitimize their political convictions and to de-legitimize those of their opponents. Recontextualization, as it is used here, refers to the process of transforming meaning from its original context to acquire different meaning in a new one (Linell, 1998, p. 144). Recontextualization makes the elements of the social practices recontextualized. That is to say: the roles and identities of the actors concerned, the performance styles of the actions involved, timings and settings (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. vii), "pass through the filter of the practices in which they are inserted" (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 12). In practice, the transformed meaning may involve "actual wordings, explicitly expressed meanings, or something only implicit or implied in the original text or genre" (Linell 1998, p. 148).

Legitimization works in political discourse through argumentation. Thus, legitimization is an argumentative practice where the interlocutors (politicians) recontextualize and interpret their political actions to characterize them as legitimate and justified in accordance to their goals and ideological preferences.

Many discourse analysts examine the self-representation of actors and actions on the basis of categorisation. For example, Chovanec (2010) and Sowin´ska and Dubrovskaya (2012) examine the discursive inclusion and exclusion of actors in political discourse to highlight their (de)legitimizing nature. They base their examination on social categorisation associated with the positive qualities of in-group and the negative qualities of out-group.

One of the most recent and interesting categorization of discursive political actions and actor is of van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011). They separately developed theologies that encompass legitimization strategies and categories to account for the justification of political actions. These categories can be summarised in table below.

No.	Legitimization	Delegitimization	Orientation
1	Rationalization	Irrationalization	Action-oriented
2	Positive evaluation of action	Negative evaluation of action	
3	Authorization	Deauthorization	Actor-oriented
4	Positive representation of self	Negative representation of other	

Table.3: (De) legitimization strategies

2.15. Conclusion

As a recapitulation, this chapter has covered many important points and issues that can help to understand the theoretical foundation of this study. It started with CDA and historical background and moved to its principal function as an interdisciplinary approach, it endeavours to respond to questions of the relationship between discourse and society. It aims also to uncover ideologies that are hidden in discourse. Also the chapter explained the term critique which is central to CDA, because it helps to know why the speaker or writer uses certain linguistic structures. Much importantly, critique must be present and used at all level of analysis, from choosing the statement of the problem to collecting the data and at the level of data analysis. Much importantly, discourse and its definition and closely relation to society

have been given a thorough clarification and clarity. As far as this study is concerned, one of the areas that CDA investigates is political discourse. The central question of this domain is about legitimization, the positive representation of the Self and negative representation of the Other and the influence of discourse on the social structure. Thus, DHA, which is an interdisciplinary approach, has come to answer this question by way of its discursive strategies and the linguistic analysis devices pertained to it. Overall, this chapter has already given a clear idea to this question and others, too. It is an important chapter that has provided theoretical concepts and theories to the case study of this thesis. More is to be explained about the kind of discourse (political) concerned in this research in the next chapter. This latter will also provide a good platform to understand the relationship between discourse media, as well as it traces the discourses that spread in Iran since the Islamic revolution 1979 till now.

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Chapter Two

The Nature of Political Discourse and socio-political discourses spread in Iran since 1979

2.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the kind of discourse analysed in this thesis and its medium. Political discourse often re-produced and interpreted in media. The definition of political discourse and its distinction from politics is indispensable here because there should be limits to the field so that I can confine my study to the target goal. It is mentioned in this chapter that political discourse has framework, and this is to come up with ideological concepts that are concerned with this research, such as legitimization, the dichotomy Us/Them and polarization. It is very important to know more about political discourse because every political action has a political goal, and political discourse has a function to serve. Much interestingly, Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach was founded to analyze political discourse, and its aim is to disclose the inequalities, hegemonic attempts and inclusion/ exclusion mechanisms that political discourse carries. All this will be explained.

Besides studying political discourse, I incorporate media discourse and media discourse analysis. Media discourse is a site for ideologies and bias, and the analysis of news media requires different approaches, and this depends on one's perspectives and goals. A sample of theories applied to analyze media texts by different linguists will be illustrated. Moreover, I set a special title called 'ideological analysis of political discourse'. It deals with the uncovered ideologies in discourse in part, and with the socio-political and socio-cognitive approaches to explain the relationship between discourse and society.

The rest of the chapter traces the political stages and happenings Iran has gone through since the revolutionary period until now. It is a diachronic study of all influential discourses that shaped the social and political system of the country. To give a deep attention to the socio-political aspects helps a lot to explain the various interpretations which may be construed from various discourses and the process of discourse production and interpretation. It provides a platform to understand the Iranian political regime before and after the Islamic

revolution, on one hand, and the qualities of the Iranian society, on the other hand. Therefore, we engage with questions such as why and to what end certain discourses are produced and reiterated since then. The study of these discourses involves eight periods: before the Islamic revolution1979, the revolutionary period 1979-1981, war period 1980-1988, economic reform period 1989-1997 (Rafsanjani), political reform period 1997-2005 (Khatami), radical conservative rise 2005-2013 (Ahmadinejad), rapprochement period 2013-2017, and last disengagement period 2017 till now.

2.2. Studying political discourse

The study of political discourse draws back the Greeks who placed emphasis on rhetoric as a case in point. From Cicero (1971) to Aristotle (1991) the concern was principally with particular methods of social and political competence in achieving specific objectives. Yet, modern rhetorical studies become more self-conscious that interface with social theory, communication science and political science. Political discourse analysis, as discourse analysis, becomes to the fore since the early of 1980s and 1990s with the work of Geis (1987). Many earlier studies in the field social semiotics and critical linguistics were considered part of the linguistic view of political linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979; Chilton 1990,1985; Steiner 1985). It was an endeavor to find a balance between linguistic analysis and political comment.

However, in the modern studies when George Orwell showed up, he drew attention to the political potential of language. In his classic article "Politics and the English Language", Orwell (1969, p.225) suggests that 'political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible', and he considers that language is used to manipulate thought. Orwell is famous for his searching and sardonic critic of the way thought is controlled by force under totalitarian estopia (he meant England here). He quoted, "Although the country is not free, nevertheless, unpopular ideas can be suppressed by the use of force". Orwell's observation on

'thought control under freedom' is a raging debate in the United States, a striking example of this is Iran nuclear deal 2015. I shall discuss this perception in the next chapter.

2.3. What is politics and political discourse?

The definition of politics varies according to one's situation and purposes. However, there are two broad stands for politics. On the one hand, politics is a struggle for power between those who maintain the power, and those who seek to resist it. On the other hand, politics is considered as cooperation, as the practices and institutions a society has to resolve different issues like money, influence, liberty and the like. In addition to these two orientations, there is another distinction, the micro and the macro, as Jones et al. (1995, p.5) put it:

> at the micro level we use a variety of techniques to get our own way: persuasion, rational argument, irrational strategies, threats, entreaties, bribes, manipulation – anything we think will work.

At the macro level, it is the political institutions of the state which work hard to maintain and assert power of individual (tyrant), or group (capitalist), and resolve conflict of interest. The conventional linguistic studies of language did not pay attention to the fact that these behaviours mentioned above (both micro and macro extremes) are actually kind of linguistic action, that is, discourse.

The word politics or political potentially arises a difficulty in terms of its broad sense, and the issue it has like power, conflict, control, domination, since these terms may be employed in any discourse. By treating discourse as political, in its most general sense, it can be a danger and really confusing of overgeneralizing the concept of political discourse. To avoid this overgeneralization, one has to delimit the subject matter to formal/informal political context and political actors (Graber 1981). For critical linguistics (Fairclough 1992b) or critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 1993; Wodak 1995) depend primarily on the material for

analysis is often formally political, and the analysts explicitly make themselves political actors.

CDA scholars rely on rather different frameworks to approach politics theoretically and empirically. For instance, van Dijk refused to extend politics to other domains such as medical, educational and even media domain. He also wrote that 'we shall similarly not take all interpersonal talk (not even of gender) as political discourse' (Van Dijk, 1997, p.15). Instead, he defines political discourse as a 'special case of political action, and as a functional and strategic part of the political process' (van Dijk, 1997, p.15).

Chilton (2004) identifies two ways of understanding politics: politics as power struggle and politics as corporative practice of conflict resolution. Both modes of politics can be studied at different levels of analysis: the micro-level and the macro-level. The micro-level includes various techniques such as persuasion, rational argument, threats, bribes, etc. At the macro-level there are the 'political institutions of the state that either serve the purpose of dominant individuals or groups, or serve to resolve conflicts of interests, depending on the perspective taken (Chilton, 2004, p. 3). Chilton concludes that politics goes in mind to represent the world in front of us. This representation functions by way of reasoning, indexicality and a reflexivity that relies on the recursive functions of language for its expression (Chilton, 2004, pp. 201–205).

Wodak understands politics in sociological perspectives. She refers to Chilton and Aristotle in defining politics. For her, politics is the imposition of order and knowledge management, it is the power to include and exclude, and the formation of coalition and alliance (Wodak, 2009; p. 26). Moreover, she stresses politics as a mode of action'I assume that doing politics is highly context dependent, influenced by national traditions and political system, by and the habitus of politicians, the modes of performance, the many embodied

personality features, organizational structures and antagonistic political interests' (Wodak, 2009, p.26)

It is important to know that Fairclough criticized most of the authors aforementioned for not stressing the argumentative nature of politics as deliberation. Fairclough and Fairclough view 'political discourse as primarily a form of argumentation, and as involving more specifically practical argumentation, argumentation for or against particular ways of acting, argumentation that can ground decision' (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 1). They conclude to say that politics is about decision making: 'politics is about making choices and decisions about what to do, what action to take in response to a situation' (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p.26)

Now, it is important to limit the definition of politics and political discourse to the sphere of formal politics. It is the space where political agents organize themselves around certain political goals and try to acquire power in order to realize these goals with the support of discursive practices. Political discourse can be defined by its actors or authors (politicians), who are central players in the polity. What is more, from the interactional point of view of discourse analysis, there are other participants in the political communication such as the public, the people, citizens, the masses. However, there is another complication, which is associated with the delimitation of the field of politics. The political process involves also people as citizens, voters, demonstrators and dissidents. All these recipients are involved in the political discourse. So the broader definition of politics is, the broader scope of political discourse is. Yet, there must be a limit for the range of political discourse, i.e. political discourse is characterized by its 'professional' realm of the activities of politicians, and its institutional settings, such as government, parliaments or political parties. The discourse must be produced by the speaker in her professional role of a politician and in an institutional setting. In a more action-oriented way, we may also say that discourse is political when it

accomplishes a political act in a political institution, such as governing, legislation, electoral campaigning, and so on. Can Küçükali (2017) defines political discourses as linguistic/ rhetorical derivatives of extensive social and economic struggles, the agents of which set the goal of acquiring decisive political power irrespective of their current position in the policy-making process.

2.4. Characteristics of political discourse:

Political discourse is characterized by some features, which can be guide to the readers in their political discourse analyses. To start with, political discourse is not arbitrary. It is planned and prepared beforehand by professional prose writers and spin doctors. It is discursively well-structured and aiming at a persuasive goal to reach a political goal. Before delivering their political speeches, politicians prepare and try to set up and control the situational context to suit their discursive preferences so that there won't be any criticism of their handling of issues.

Second, political discourse is contentious and conflictual. Political discourse is produced against a background of disagreement and against igniting conflict. Political actors are expected to answer and convince their audience, and find solutions to socio-political problems. Political discourse can therefore be seen as a derivation of material conflict which reflects on language. It does not only reflect material clashes but also takes part in the struggle of imposing a particular way of doing politics at the expense of other alternatives (Can Küçükali 2017, p.38).

Third, political discourse is functional. In order to influence the audience, the human psychological emotions, the human minds and personality are central to this process. Approaches to political discourse analysis fundamentally focus on the way in which political discourses are utilized to gain political power and achieve political objectives as well as determining the social indicators which have a repressive or catalyzing influence on achieving

those objectives. This is actually the best way of understanding the dialectical relationship between political hegemony and discourse, Can Küçükali (2017) claims "one needs to benefit more from history, political philosophy and political sociology alongside linguistic analysis in order to comprehend the functions of political discursive practices".

Fourth characteristic is that conflict in political discourse is a sign of a healthy democratic society. Conflict triggers politics, and it is inherent in political discourse. However, DPA claims that the political discourses of powerful actors always tend to be ideologically hegemonic so that the continuation of social and economic suppression (which is a structural hegemony) can be maintained and deepened. Conflict is a way to empower the political discourse of powerful actors, and if politics is seen as an opportunity to have a say in the societal decision-making mechanisms which bring change, conflict is the only way to create such moments of opportunity in a system with high levels of power asymmetry. Mouffe (2013) discusses the relation between conflict and democratic politics:

> As I argued earlier, to institute an order, frontiers need to be drawn and the moment of closure must be faced. But these frontiers are the result of political decisions; they are constituted on the basis of a particular we/they, and for that every reason they should be recognized as something contingent and open to contestation. What characterizes democratic politics is the confrontation between conflicting hegemonic projects, a confrontation with no final reconciliation. To conceive such a confrontation in political, not ethical, terms requires asking a series of strategic questions about the type of 'we' that a given politics aims to create and the chain of equivalences that is called for. (pp. 55–56).

The fifth feature is that political discourse is dynamic and therefore seemingly erratic. Political agents, when delivering their political speeches, are trying to align their political objectives with those of the structural hegemony. Contradictory statement (agreement-

disagreement, conciliation-defiance, inclusion-exclusion) are seen as tactical moves and manoeuvres to achieve the main political-rhetorical objective. For example, when there is a disagreement about a policy issue especially which has an international aspect, political agents use these moves and strength their positions with many inconsistencies, and this is in order to balance between structural hegemony and their own hegemonic projects.

The last feature is that the hegemonic capacity of a political discourse depends on its compatibility with global hegemonic trends. To understand the relation between the hegemony of political discourse and the global hegemony, we can refer to Joseph's (2002) realist theory of hegemony. To him, to create hegemony is first to form a strong ruling bloc, and then reproducing economic, political and cultural conditions in favour of that bloc. The success of a ruling (or historic) bloc and a hegemonic project is assessed by their ability to advance social reorganization according to the dominant trends of a capitalist economy (2002, p. 125).

2.5. The framework of political discourse

The framework within which political discourse operates is wide. Yet, Chilton (2004, p.201-5) sets out five, among others, important propositions which serve as a possible framework for the field of language and politics. To start with, political discourse operates indexically, for example, a politician's choice of language has certain characteristics in terms of the accent or the address form to use, either implicitly or explicitly. Second, political discourse operates as interaction. Dialogues, negotiations and political campaigns are kinds of interaction; they involve agreements, disagreements, interruptions and so forth. Third, modal properties of language subserve political interaction. Politicians use modals like can, could, must, might and should to express variety of statements such as truth, confidence, trust and even legitimatization of actions and positions. Fourth, binary conceptualizations are frequent in political discourse. Most politicians when delivering political speeches show themselves in

positive way, and portray their opponents negatively (van Dijk, 1984; Reisigl and Wodak 2001). This implies the concept of Us and Them, which is most common in the persuasive discourse. Last, political discourse involves metaphorical reasoning. Metaphors are common in political discourse; they are used to argue for a position of an action or a legitimatization, for instance, *being at cross roads, boarding the train, choosing directions* (Musolff, 2004).

2.6. DHA approach to political discourse:

Political texts are full of ideologies, discourses and power and power relations. They are sites of struggle where actors try to dominate each other. Language analysts take critic or criticism as a way to analyze and understand these texts. DHA, in turn, adopts a critical stance to political discourse (Wodak, 2009, p. 32). One of the central aims of DHA is to disclose the inequalities, hegemonic attempts and inclusion/ exclusion mechanisms that political discourse carries, and to realize that, DHA endeavors at:

-Text- or discourse-immanent critique: It aims to discover inconsistencies, (self-) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in text-internal or discourse-internal structures.

-Socio-diagnostic critique: It is concerned with demystifying the – manifestly or latently – persuasive or 'manipulative' character of discursive practices. It makes use of contextual knowledge and also draws on social theories and other theoretical models from various disciplines to interpret discursive events.

-Future-related prospective critique: It seeks to contribute to the improvement of communication (e.g. by elaborating guidelines against sexist language behaviour or by reducing 'language barriers' in hospitals, schools and so forth) (ibid., p. 35).

The Socio-diagnostic critique is very concerned with analyzing the discursive practices, and while doing this, DHA considers four levels of context:

1-Intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;

2-extra-linguisticsocial/sociological variables;

3-history and archaeology of texts and organizations; and

4-institutional frames of the specific context of a situation (ibid., p. 38).

The first point refers to the systematic and strategic use of different linguistic devices by political actors when they try to deliver their speeches and create narratives that can persuade the public. They contextualize and de-contextualize events, notions and ideas to gain the consent of their public, and they bring up different topics and genres. This called 'contagiousness' and 'systematicity' in discourse. History is also important, it has an effect on the political sphere, and it is a support to the politician's discursive choices.[7]

The DHA propose five elements for analysis: predication, argumentation, perspectivation, intensification/ mitigation and nomination. These are defined as types of discursive strategies and they all aim at a positive self-representation and negative other-representation of political actors. Basically, they are utilized in language in order to name, label, group, legitimize/delegitimize and scale opponent actors and their past/ present/ future actions.

Alongside the DHA discursive strategies, the uses of pronouns, adverbs, adjectives, relative clauses, hyperbolic statements, topoi, presuppositions, word choices and many others are micro-linguistic tools for analysis. The DHA focuses on the notion of 'representation' as an element of analysis. If the representation of powerful political actor is investigated and its manipulative character or oppressive elements are exposed, this can afford space for the analysis of less powerful actors.

2.7. Media Discourse

The scope of media has been of great intellectual scrutiny and debate over the last thirty years. Within such fields as cultural studies, media studies, critical theory, semiotics and rhetoric, the production and roles of media have been deconstructed and dissected. So the production,

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[7]For discourse and history, you can refer to chapter 1 or see Wodak, 2009.

or in other precise term, text produced by media are now of great occupancy and analysis by academics, and increasingly by linguists.

The discourse of the news media encapsulates two key components: the news story, or spoken and written text; and the process involved in producing the texts. The first dimension is the most important area that has been receiving focus and analysis by media researchers, particularly as the media texts encode many values and bear ideologies that have great impact on the larger world. Most linguists consider the news text from one of two vantage points: that of discourse structure or linguistic function, or according to its impact as ideology-bearing discourse. This was reflected in Bakhtin's notions of voicing (1986), Goffman's concept of framing (1981), Bell's work on narrative structure and style (1991, 1994, 1998), and Tamen's positioning of the media as agonists and instigators of polarized public debate (1998), they all have led to valuable insights into discourse structure, function, and effect - and have characterized the very significant role the media play in the shaping of public, as well as media discourse. This area has been elaborated and developed within the interdisciplinary framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA), especially by the work of Fairclough's social theory (1992), Fowler's language in the news (1991), van Dijk's work on the relation of societal structures and discourse structures, particularly as this relation implicates racism (1991).

2.8. Media discourse analysis

I shall briefly discuss under this title the development of media discourse analysis, and early work and application, and also talk a little bit about the textual analysis of the news in the press as far as this is very concerned with this research. The research in media approaches began in the United Kingdom. It started with the work of Glasgow University Media Group, collected in the book *Bad News* (1976). This book was a major or canonical example of the study of media language. Researchers tried to ideologically analyze the industrial reporting in

the British broadcast media. Lexical choices, the positioning of information and the use of quotations are evaluated through content analysis and offered as evidence of bias in the press.

The work undertaken by Birmingham University contributed also in the development of media studies. It was an investigation on media texts and media studies approaches. For example, Graddol and Boyd-Barrett's (1994) volume is an early survey of the range of approaches to investigating media texts by scholars working in the British tradition, and details how multifaceted and multidisciplinary the media studies approach can be. Also, the Australian functional linguist M. A. K. Halliday, with his systemic functional framework, contributed in the analysis of oral and written text. The scholar Stuart Hall (1994) discussed audience familiarity with the "negotiated code" of the dominant culture.

Roger Fowler and his associates (1979) also focused on media. Fowler used Halliday's systemic functional framework in term of "transitivity" to study the syntactic patterns of sentences. The point of such research is that events and actions may be described with syntactic variations that are a function of the underlying involvement of actors (e,g. their agency, responsibility, and perspective). Thus, in an analysis of the media accounts of the "riots" during a minority festival, the responsibility of the authorities and especially of the police in such violence may be systematically de-emphasized by defocusing, e.g. by passive constructions and nominalizations; that is, by leaving agency and responsibility implicit(Fowler et al. 1979). Fowler continued in this tradition by focusing also on the British cultural studies paradigm that define news as a product shaped by political, economic, and cultural forces rather than a reflection of reality (Fowler 1991). What is more, he focused on the linguistic tools on his critic on media by using the analysis of transitivity in syntax, lexical structure, modality, and speech acts

Van Dijk (1988) applied the theory of discourse news in the critical studies of international news. He said that news reports in the press, in particular, provide and enrich our social and

political knowledge about the world. In a study done on an article taken from a British newspaper, he concluded that current discourse analysis recognizes that text and talk are vastly more complex, and require separate though interrelated accounts of phonetic, graphical, phonological, morphological, syntactic, micro- and macro-semantic stylistic, superstructural, rhetorical, pragmatic, conversational, interactional, and other structures and strategies. An example of this, he analyzed the news report that appeared on the British newspaper Daily Mail on 21 January 1989[8]. This news item is part of a corpus of news reports, background articles, and editorials in the press about ethnic affairs which I studied as part of projection racism in the press (van Dijk, 1991). The analysis revealed that the western press, the right-wing press in particular, reproduces and emphasize the negative image of minorities, immigrants, and refugees, and thereby contributes to increasing forms of intolerance, prejudice, and discrimination against Third World peoples in Europe and North America.

However, although most of this work was done in UK, until recently, there was a linguistic and discourse analytical work in the media in the USA; it focused on the sociopolitical issues. All in all, all these scholars aforementioned formed the basis of media discourse, and they labored to form theories of news media using national and international stories as data.

The primary goal of media discourse analysis is to find and register the presence of bias or ideology in language, and to investigate power relations in society. The basis of analysis is the social theory rather than the linguistic theory. An example of this clearly shows in the early work of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980), Davis and Walton (1983), and Kress and Hedge (1979).

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[8]It deals with the last act of a dramatic episode that had angered Conservatives, and hence the right-wing press, for a long time: the sanctuary sought by a Sri Lankan refugee, Viraj Mendis, in a Manchester church. After having lived for more than two years in the sacristy of the church, Mendis was finally arrested during a massive police raid on the church, which led to protests not only from church officials, but also from many antiracists and other groups defending the rights of immigrants and refugees. When a last recourse to the courts failed, Mendis was finally put on a plane to Sri Lanka, and it is this event which our news report is about.

2.9. Elites discourse and Racism

When it comes to talk about this whole topic of discourse and racism, it rather takes so many pages and time to cover its main aspects; but it is worthwhile to point out to some points that are directly related to this research. Through researches made by many discourse analysts about racism, the following major questions have been raised and considered the core of the topic:

1. How exactly do members or institutions of dominant white groups talk and write about ethnic or racial minorities?

2. What do such structures and strategies of discourse tell us about under lying ethnic or racial prejudices, ideologies, or other social cognitions about minorities?

3. What are the social, political, and cultural contexts and functions of such discourse about minorities? In particular, what role does this discourse play in the development, reinforcement, legitimation, and hence reproduction of white group dominance?

The study of these questions requires a multidisciplinary approach, and as it is explained earlier in the previous chapter, critical discourse analysis involves many theories and disciplines that are needed to analyze different sorts of texts about dominance, prejudice, racism and inequality. Hence, CDA has engaged since long in analyzing this sort of questions since it is a multidisciplinary theory.

The relation between discourse analysis and racism can be practically analyzed in the study of the discursive reproduction of racism through text and talk. Discourse plays an important role in the production and reproduction of prejudice and racism (van Dijk, political discourse and racism). The study of discourse and racism is concerned with the ways in which white people write and talk about minorities and ethnic/racial affairs, and this discursive enactment and reproduction of racism can be summarized in three modes:

-The white dominant group is able to reproduce its abuse of power only through an integrated system of discriminatory practices and sustaining ideologies and other social cognitions.

-Part of the discriminatory practices are directly enacted by text and talk directed against minority groups, for example, by derogation, intimidation, inferiorization, and exclusion in everyday conversations, institutional dialogues, letters, evaluative reports, laws, and many other forms of institutional text and talk directed to minority groups and their members (Essed, 1991).

-At the same time, however, the social cognitions of white group members about minorities are developed, changed, or confirmed so as to maintain the overall social cognitive framework that supports discriminatory actions in the first place. Whereas discriminatory acts may be verbal or nonverbal, influencing the social minds of white group members is mainly discursive: Majority group members often speak and write about minorities, and thus persuasively formulate and communicate personal and socially shared opinions, attitudes, and ideologies.

One of the racist discourses that deals with the ethnic or racial Others is racist discourse about ethnically different Others. This type of discourse ranges from informal everyday conversations to formal written texts which can be found in news reports, editorials, newspapers opinions and textbooks. This discourse attends to the negative portrayal of *Them* and the positive representation of *Ourselves.* The corollary of this strategy is to avoid or mitigate a positive representation of Others, and a negative representation of our own group. This strategy of negative and positive representation of the self may appear at all levels of text and talk, it can be at the level of visuals, sounds (volume, intonation), syntax (word order), semantics (meaning and reference), style (variable uses of words and word order), rhetoric (persuasive uses of grammar or of "figures" of style), pragmatics (speech acts such as assertions or threats), interaction, and so on.

Actually, there are ways to represent the positive and negative things about 'Us' and 'Them' respectively. To mention but some, active and passive sentences, forms of emphasis and mitigation such as hyperbole and euphemisms are used in the analysis of racist discourse. For more and broad explanation of these forms, methodology chapter involves all these forms and others.

Most of the reproduction of racism derives from various elites discourse such as media messages, textbooks, corporate discourse and particularly political discourse (van Dijk, 1993).Van Dijk studied some parliamentary debates carried on in Great Britain and in the U.S. House of Representatives. Most of these debates dealt with migration of refugees, people seeking asylum and civil rights. The ultimate goal of these debates was to provide minorities with more solid legal means to fight discrimination (van Dijk, 1993).

The elites group, which play an important role in the reproduction of racism, take their power from both material social resources and, much interestingly, from access to various forms of public discourse. Politicians, journalists, columnists, professors, corporate managers, church or union officials, and many other leading elites in society play a role in a complex process in the definition of the ethnic situation. Therefore, they contribute in the production of racism and they combat it, too.

Now, it is very useful to understand the political events and actions that Iran has undergone since the Islamic revolution 1979. We will briefly cast an eye on the socio-political discourses which were spread and governed the political scene in Iran since then. We will see how they have had an influence on Iran's relations particularly with the west, and through this brief look, we reach to know how the west formulated the image of the Other (Iran).

2.10. Iran socio-political discourses before and after 1979

Iran is a country of full and rich social background. Its political regime has gone through many political changes, before and after the revolutionary period 1979. Thus, it has been

characterised by allusion and explicit references to certain historical discourses, events and phases. Iran's nuclear program was reinforced and truly realized due the powerful discourse which shaped the Iranian Islamic revolution 1979. The analysis of texts and discourses pertaining to Iran's Nuclear issue and its animosity to the West (especially US and UK) would be achieved if the diachronic and synchronic aspects of discourse are considered (particularly discourses after the Islamic revolution 1979). This helps to contexlualize and to understand the complex relationship between discourses and society in Iran and Iran's foreign policy regarding nuclear program.

Iran in the twentieth century saw corruption and socio-political deficiencies that led to uprisings and revolution to achieve independence and freedom. The twentieth century also is a period of struggles against colonialism and imperialism, and this has lasted throughout the century and even the twenty first one. So discourses and political stages in Iran are likely to be different and for different purposes.

The Islamic revolution 1979 marked a very important stage in Iran. It had a remarkable influence on the social psyche of today's Iranian public. KhosraviNik (2015) explains in the following: while more recent history, after the 1979 revolutionary stages of Iranian politics, has admittedly left a more prominent mark on the social psyche of today's Iranian public, the representation of Iran in and by the West has overwhelmingly been reducing a complex Iranian political sense to certain snapshots, e.g. the American hostage-taking crisis and Iran's nuclear program, and more recently Iran's nuclear agreement 2015.

2.10.1. Iran before the 1979 Revolution

This period of time witnessed two major events. The first event is the creation of the Iranian constitution (1906-11). The constitutionalists advocated a major shift from traditional, corrupt despots towards a modern system of law (with division of power and measures of accountability), similar to developments in Western nations. The constitutional revolution led

to the creation of the first elected parliament, a vibrant public sphere, and a free press (see Kasravi and Siegel, 2006 for more details on the Iranian constitutional revolution) and marked the beginning of debates on secularisation and modern politics in Iran (Rahnema and Behdad, 1995). As an outcome of this revolution, the ancient system led by Ghajar was abolished by Reza Khan in 1925 and later by Shah. Therefore, many discourses had been emerged during the constitutional revolution as shown in **Figure.9:**

Figure.9: The encapsulation of widespread discourses during the Constitutional Revolution

With the establishment of Reza Khan as a king[9], social and economic life started to be modernised. On the social level, modernisation took a coercive turn. Reza established a a new dress code for ordinary people, and he forcefully wanted to remove hijab for women, but he faced a tough resistance. However, Esposito (1990) maintains that the social reforms brought by Reza suited and benefited the emerging and aristocratic upper-middle classes, and this led

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[9]In December 1925, Reza Khan convened a Constituent Assembly to depose the Ghajar dynasty and offer himself the imperial throne. With Anglo-Russian support, in April of 1926, Reza Khan crowned himself "Shah-in-Shah of Iran", wearing military uniform and royal jewels in the style of his hero, Napoleon (Abrahamian, 1982).

to widen the sociocultural gap between those more westernised citizens and the majority of Iranians.

On the economic level, the coming of Reza Shah to power coincided with the first discovery of oil in Iran under the supervision of Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later called British Petroleum BP). This helped Reza to give a share to urban modernisation and establish his economic policy. He built roads, universities, railways etc.

When Reza Shah abolished the Ghajar 1925, he wanted a country free of clerical influence, and, therefore, he established a policy called "persianisation" under the slogan of 'one country, one nation, one language'. Reza Shah adopted his modernisation policy on the Westernisation of only cultural practices. He also attempted to revive the image of 'glorious past of Persia' and the grand discourse of the 'Persian Empire' with a strict nationalistic ideology. Reza Shah's discourses during his ruling seemed close to modernisation and urbanisation as shown in **figure.10:**

Figure.10: The encapsulation of widespread discourses during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah 1941–1953

The second event is towards the Islamic Revolution. There are a number of reasons that led Iranian public to resent and revolt against the Shah's ruling. The adoption of Reza Shah of Western cultural practices, e.g. free media, free parliament and electoral system, did not really promote the modern life of the Iranians. second, and this is what increased resentment and outrage among the public sphere, the dictatorial control over politics, the centralisation of power in the hands of Shah and the widespread of corruption of the court entourage continued to exist. What is more, the process of 'retradionalisation around religion' did provide the basis for massive political mobilisation. Additionally, the modernisation policy adopted by Reza Shah, which was his father's policy, favoured the wealthy people in Iran (the court entourage), and neglect the traditional Bazzar (merchants) classes.

There are other factors compacted the road to the Islamic Revolution 1979. The absence of any meaningful (secular) political discourse and organisation produced an Islamic Ideology which later developed and solidified by its subordinates. Also, the regime's iron fist policy against its critics and lack of venues to access the public sphere, combined with the memories of failed popular uprisings, created a 'movement of common negativism' against the Shah's regime and the US neo-colonialism (Sreberni-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994:xvii).

In 1978, and as a consequence of Reza Shah's unjust ruling, all the various elements of political and popular resistance came together in calling for social justice, independence, freedom and Islamic revolution for Iran. Reza Shah left the country in December 1978. So this period of Reza Shah in power between 1953 and 1979 was characterised by different discourses that called liberation, freedom, resistance and westernisation. **Figure.11** represents the widespread discourses during Reza Shah Reign:

Figure.11: The encapsulation of widespread discourses during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, 1953–1979

2.10.2. Iran after the Islamic Revolution 1979

After the Islamic revolution 1979, the Iranians tried to establish a political system of governance devoid of despotism and foreign influence. So themes, rhetoric and the macro-frames of discourse were not the same of those before revolution. The post-revolutionary era in Iran witnessed some general phases; each phase has its own grand discourses. Roughly speaking, these phases include: the Revolutionary Period (1979-1981), the War Period (1980-1988), the Economic Reform Period of Rafsanjani (1989-1997), the Socio-Political Reform of Khatami (1997-2005), the Radical Conservative Period of Ahmadinedjad (2005-2013), and the US-Iran Rapprochement Period (2014-2018).

It is important to mention here, before displaying these eras discourses, that each period discourses has not got clear boundaries, and the events of each stage continue to influence the next one, e.g. the Radical Conservative Period of Ahmadinedjad continued into the US-Iran Rapprochement period. Also official discourse topics function in fluid and gradual manner,

e.g. the discourse topics of the Rapprochement Period (2014-2018) had their roots in the period of Ahmadinedjad (2005-2013).

2.10.2.1. Revolutionary Period (1979-1981)

When Mohammed Reza Shah was overthrown unexpectedly, the revolutionary leaders found the situation very critical to encounter; but they were full of defiance and self-confidence to build the country. Violence and struggles among the Iranians continued, and this due to the historical lack of platform for open and transparent debates.

The government of Mahdi Bazargan took the country but was soon resigned. Mahdi Bazargan was too liberal and compromising the US and the West. The American embassy takeover, led by zealous Islamic students endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini, was considered 'the second revolution' against the great Satan and "liberals". Shortly afterwards, the newly formed Islamic Republic Party (IRP)[10] gained power and the majority in parliament. The IRP removed Beni Sadr, Iran's first elected president, who did not believe in the Clerics' direct involvement in political structure.

The Islamic revolutionaries discourse was radical and represented the revolutionaries Us vs Them categorisation, and the revolution was seen as a struggle against the corrupt, colonial West and above all the US. This was declared in Ayatollah Khomeini's first Iranian New Year Speech: We should try hard to export our revolution to the world… Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is a supporter of all the oppressed… We should really settle our accounts with the powers and superpowers and should demonstrate to them that… we shall confront the world with our ideology (Ayatollah Khomeini's First Iranian New Year Speech, cited in Ehteshami, 1995, p. 131)

Other ideologies and discourses called by the Islamic revolutions were: Israel as an illegitimate state, independence as an all-encompassing virtue, working towards self-

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[10]The party was founded by Mohammed beheshti and four other clerics, who formed Khomeini's close circle: Mohammed Javad Bahonar, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Khomeini and Abdolkarim Mousavi-Ardebili.

sufficiency, social justice and fair distribution of wealth. The two mostly propagated slogans were: 'Independence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic' and 'No to the West, No to the east, (only) the Islamic Republic'. **Figure.12** Shows the widespread of ideologies and discourses during the revolutionary period:

Figure.12: The Revolutionary Period discourse (1979-1981)

2.10.2.2 War Period (1980-1988)

The war between Iran and Iraq broke out in 1980. Saddam was a regional Arab force in the region, which drove him for reasons to occupy Iran in a short span of time. The confrontation between the two nations produced some discourse themes such as 'this war is against the believers (Iranians) and non-believers (Iraqis and others). The same for Saddam who declared Ayatollah Khomeini as infidel (Kafir) The ideology of the Iranian Islamic Revolution gave Iraq covert support from the Western world, and it has been documented that US government provided assistance to Iraqi armed forces in terms of logistics, intelligence, finance, etc. (Adib-Moghaddam, 2007; Hoogland, 1991, p. 39).

This war divided the world into countries that supported Iraq especially the West, and countries that stand by Iran, and they are few. This international context further substantiated the widely propagated confrontational discourses of the young Islamic Republic in dichotomising the world into a united Us as the force of virtue versus them as a united coalition of evil. This would bring attention to what Said pointed out in his book 'Orientalism'. He maintains that there is an overarching constructed identity for the East which is not only homogenised but also judged on the basis of the cultural understanding of the West (Said, 1978). The Islamic republic exploits this understanding to defeat the West, and later it became a general ideological virtue.

Dabashi (1993) argues that the construct of the West in post-colonial, nationalist regimes is on par with the construct of the East or the Orient. They both propagate an image of the world with distinctive and ontologically essentialised dichotomies of Us vs Them. Such ontology in post-revolutionary Iran constitutes an over-arching (short-cut) macro-argumentation which manifest itself in several other constructs as 'Islam vs the West', 'Islamic Iran vs the world', 'the revolutionaries (anyone who defies the Other) vs anti-revolutionaries (anyone who does not). **Figure.13**shows the widespread discourses during the War Period (1980-1988).S

The ceasefire resolution (497) made by UN was refused by Iran, and this latter considered UN by official media as illegitimate organisation, which served the colonial and imperialist powers. By 1988, the UN had considered Iran 'an inherently belligerent state'. The American fleet was already present in the Persian Gulf-along with the British- to protect allied interests (UAE and Kuwait). This sparked further tension on Iran, bringing the two nations to military confrontation in the last year of the war.

As pressure increased by US and its allies and the Arab countries, Iran accepted the UN Resolution 598 for an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. Ayatollah Khomeini was

evidently unhappy about the decision, and he metaphorically referred to this decision as drinking 'the goblet of poison'.

Figure.13: War Period discourse (1980-1988)

2.10.5. Economic Reforms Period (1989-1997)

The period after Ayatollah Khomeini's death was ruled by Rafsanjani. It was an era of shift from Khomeini's 'Islamic totalitarianism' to Rafsanjani's pragmatic Islamism' (Ehteshami, 1995). It was also an era of reconstruction of the country. Rafsanjani's ranging discourses focused on economic reforms, privatisation as an economic solution for Iran, investment and business development. Rafsanjani's administration focused on construction rather than the ideological topics of early revolution and war period. Rafsanjani appointed 'a cabinet of construction' constituting of technocrats. Despite Rafsanjani's pragmatic de-ideologisation of the economy at home and foreign policy, socio-political liberalisation was not on his agenda per se (Ansari, 2000, p. 57).

Iran's official policy during Rafsanjani period depended during on moving from the revolutionary confrontation, or what Ehteshami calls 'Third-worldism and populist anti-

imperialist strategies' (ibid., p. 131) to what was termed constructive diplomacy which would lead to the reintegration of Iran into the international order (ibid. p. 144-5). **Figure.14** shows the almost widespread discourses during the economic reform period.

Figure.14: Economic Reforms Period discourse (1989-1997)

2.10.6. Political Reform Period 1997-2005 (Khatami)

When Rafsanjani's presidency ended, Khatami was elected as a president for Iran in 1997. Khatami was an intellectual, moderate cleric, and served as Culture Minister in Rafsanjani's first administration. Though he was not a politician, he suggested a conceptually coherent and socially relevant program of socio-political reform. The most important and controversial theme of his campaign was his assertion that freedom and religion should work in harmony (Ansari, 2000, p. 96).

Khatami was influenced by the pluralist ideology. He encouraged pluralism in the media and the press, which led to the establishment of numerous new newspapers and magazines. His period witnessed (dual) competing ideologies, the conservative/traditional world view advertised by the state-owned media, and the pluralist, reformist ideology.

The reformist policy of Khatami pursued the institutionalisation of civil society, the consolidation of public participation and decentralisation of power. Also it pursued a form of pluralist Islam which could provide the social and cultural cohesion required for democracy to function effectively (Ansari, 2000, p. 116). The reformists tried modernise the political system by making decision-making processes transparent. Ehteshami and Zweiri summarise the aims of the reformist administration as 'rationalising its bureaycracy and putting in a place a more accountable and responsive system of government' (2007, p. 6). **Figure.15** shows the widespread of discourses during Khatami period.

Figure.15: Political Reform Period discourse (1997-2005)

2.10.7. Radical Conservative Rise 2005-2013 (Ahmadinejad)

When Ahmadinejad started his election campaign, his rhetoric was radically different. He promised to help the lower classes in rural areas and to fight against the social inequalities. He seemed a sort of man of the people, in touch of their everyday concerns. He promised to distribute the national wealth (oil revenues) fairly and fight fiercely against the political and economic cronyism of previous administrations.

When Ahmadinejad was elected, he soon shifted his agenda from domestic issues to international ones. Iran's nuclear program was his priority and focus. He showed defiance towards the West and in 2006 the stand-off between Iran and US in particular reached the peak.

Ahmadinejad's discourse seemed radical and aggressive towards US and Israel. He revived many discourses and views of early revolution, e.g. independent Iran vs the world powers, our rights vs their exploitation. These discourses were vividly substantiated by the events and changes of the past century (20th century). However, though the official discourse of the Iranian establishment continues to reproduce the same perspectives of the reformists, the Iranian society has been showing signs of a desire for change and de-ideologicalisation in the social and political fields. **Figure.16** shows the widespread discourses during Ahmadinejad period.

Figure.16: Radical Conservative Rise discourse (2005-2013)

2.10.8. Rapprochement Period (2013-2021)

June 2013 in Iran marked a major and unexpected shift of political events. Election 2013 in Iran was nearly boycotted by Iranians supporting change and reform in the political system. Suddenly, Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and pragmatist cleric, won a landslide election. Rouhani, during the election rallies, promised his supporters to find a way to end international sanctions against Iran's economy. In a press conference 3 days after his victory, he pledged to resolve international confrontation over Iran's nuclear program through "constructive interaction" and "more transparency" with the world. This change of tone relieved the Western powers and made Iran-US rapprochement possible.

When president Rouhani took office in 2013, he represented a refutation of Ahmadinejad's tactics, but not of his basic strategy. Rouhani was a central figure in the national security decision making of Iran for decades. He has long advocated diminishing the level of hostility between Iran and the West. In the 1980's during Iran's war with Iraq, Rouhani held close relations with the commanders of Iran's military and Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) when he served as deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He served for eight years as Head of the Foreign Policy committee of the Iranian Parliament. He understands well Iran's Foreign policy as well as Iran's nuclear issue.

Rouhani's foreign policy prioritised finding a resolution to the nuclear standoff with the West, easing the economic sanctions and amending the regional and international relations which were worsened by Ahmadinejad. Thus, he assigned the task of handling the nuclear talks to Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif. It should be noted that Rouhani had been given approval by Khomeini to move nuclear issues forward with a more open, transparent, and engaging agenda.

The nuclear negotiations initiated by Rouhani with the West saw an intense opposition from the hardliners in Iran; but this was dismissed by Ayatollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader, who showed an unequivocal backing to the talks: "no one should accuse our

negotiation team of reconciling or compromising. These are own children, the children of revolution, who are doing a very difficult task".

When the nuclear deal was signed on 14th July, 2015, the picture of Zarif shaking hands with Kerry after the deal had been agreed upon made the front page of the majority of Iranian papers the following day. This deal was welcomed by people in Iran, and they considered it as an end to the architecture of sanctions. Yet, the hardline and ultra-conservative campaigners sounded more vocal in their criticism, and they believed that Iran had given up to much for little, some of them going as far as to say that Rouhani and the negotiating team had "betrayed our nuclear martyrs".

Rouhani's discourse topics before and during his presidency ranged from his willingness to end confrontation with the West, reconstruct the economy of the country, establish good ties with European countries, open the country for foreign investment, and refusing any sort of meddling into his country domestic affairs. **Figure.17** displays the widespread of discourses during the rapprochement period (2013-2020).

Figure.17: Rapprochement period discourses (2013-2020)

2.10.9. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, we can say that political discourse has been a site for media analysis in the last decade. I just gave spotlights on this issue because it has a direct link to my critical discourse analysis of my research. Some characteristics of the political discourse and examples of the discursive strategies used to deconstruct it have been dealt with in order to support and help answering the problematic of the topic. Also, some spotlights have been shed on media discourse and media discourse analysis in order to understand how media manipulate its discourse for those who have power and domination by constructing different and even contradictory representation of specific political events. This brief talk about

political discourse and media discourse is important in a way that it helps to enlighten us of some realities and helps realize the objective of this study and its research questions.

Also, this chapter two has provided a synchronic and diachronic study of the dominant discourses spread all over the period stretching between 1954 and 2020 in Iran. It also recaps on the political stages within contemporary Iranian history. This will afford my study with a background of Iran's political system and its foreign policy. I included this section about Iran's socio-political history because it is part of what DHA analysis depends, as Wodak and Meyer (2015) state 'The historical context is taken into account when interpreting texts and discourses' (p. 32)

Chapter Three

Media, Self/Other Notions and the Representation of Iran and its Nuclear Issue in the American and other International Press

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part talks about the meaning of media, its content and representation of the world, the politics of media, elites and media in the United States of America, the term bias and stereotyping in media and the liberal view of the American journalists today. I deliberately take only these titles because they can help a lot in widening my view on the pivotal role played by media and their discourse, particularly in the United States of America, in shaping and reshaping the identity. The two terms 'bias' and 'stereotyping' are two indispensable and inevitable means media use for the benefit and interest of their nations. Additionally, it is important that one should be updated concerning the kind of views journalists of the press incline to, liberalism, socialism or conservatism. These different ideologies are inexplicitly manifested in media discourse. Therefore, I come up with a title 'what views do American journalists hold today?' the aim behind this is to know the ideological stand set up in the American press towards Iran and Iran nuclear deal.

The second part talks about Stuart Hall's system of representation, Edward Said's notion of Orientalism, the press in US and Iran, Iran in the eye of US media since 1979, Iran nuclear deal and the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. A thorough discussion is given to Orientalism and representation categorizations because they are the base this research is founded on. In addition, the analysis of this study is founded on two historical decisions, the nuclear deal and US withdrawal from it. The American media have had much to say on both and many opinion and editorial articles of different authors were published. Thus, I try to briefly gather what the international media, including of the US, have reported and portrayed them.

3.2. Understanding media

"*The world is no more than a village*", said Marshall McLuhan[11] in his book *Understanding Media* (p.7). The mankind has been witnessing a remarkable transition from the mechanical ages to the electric ones, when technology exploded the bodies and the senses and extended our central nervous system in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned (McLuhan 1967, p.7).He added that each medium, printing or broadcast, physically affects the human central nervous system in a certain way.

"*The medium is the message*", one of the striking and important phrases that came in his book *Understanding Media.* Notwithstanding its difficult explanation, it is considered a very major start to understand media. The word "medium" as a noun means "vehicle", "channel" or "mode". So it is through this mode of medium that images, information, words and ideas are distributed. The idea of a new medium has an influence on both the individual and society works well because of the existence of the medium itself. McLuhan's quote down shows the importance of medium, and content is only shaped by that medium. Television, radio and newspapers are all sorts of medium; they change the way we live, think and do. He says:

> The instance of electric light may prove illuminating. Whether the light is being used for brain surgery or a night-time game of baseball is a matter of indifference. It could be argued that these activities are in some ways the "content" of electric light. This fact merely underlines the point that the medium is the message because it is the medium [electric light] that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action.

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[11]Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980), a Canadian philosopher in communication theory and he became one of the cornerstones media theory with practical applications in the advertising and television industries. McLuhan coined phrases like "*the medium is themessage*" and the "*global village*" and for his prediction of the Internet medium he could not know in his life time though the invention of the transportation of date from a computer to another cia a telephone line was invented in the Fall 1969 between Stanford, California's military laboratory and Oakland, California's US Armed Forces Headquarters for the Pacific (and at the time the Vietnam war).

McLuhan said that automation (the machine) has affected our lives, and the pattern of human association tends to eliminate jobs, this negative side. However, positively saying, the machine enabled people to have roles and involved them in their work; it is the opposite of the mechanical machine which destroyed them. In reality, many assumed that it was not the machine behind this big transformation of human kind, but it is its meaning or message.

To McLuhan, medium is more important than the content. He considered this latter "ineffectual in shaping the form of human association" (p.9). He went far on that and said the content distracts us from the real effect of the media. However, he supported the idea of getting away from only filling our eyes and ears with information, and we ignore the very change the message brings about. Kroker claims that McLuhan's world is the world of "technological sensorium" (p.54). This means that media is evolving and advancing rapidly due to technology which is imposing itself secretly:

> In order to perceive the "invisible ground rules" of the technological media, we have to learn to think in reverse image: to perceive the subliminal grammar of technology as metaphor, as a simulacrum or sign-system, silently and pervasively processing human existence. (Kroker, p.63)

The effect of medium is great on society. The relationship between society and the medium is reciprocal. The change in medium is an outcome of the social and cultural change.McLuhan did not underestimate the significance of this effect. In his book Media is the Message one can read:

> All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is the message. Any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without knowledge of the media work as environment. (p.26)

After his book understanding media, McLuhan wrote another book titled *Gutenberg Galaxy*. In this book, he described well how we shifted from the old media to the new media. This latter created the so-called "global village"

Today media have shortened time and reduced space and neared people, and as a result of this, action and reaction happen almost at the same time. Now the human awareness is heightened to an intense degree by the new social and political functions brought in the electric age by media. So thanks to the electric media, they actually abolished slavery and racism, and altered the position of the Negro and integrated them in the American society.

3.3. Shaping the media

Media have been shaped by the interplay of politics, economics and technology. They call it the "PET" theory of media. The new medium of technology has been used to transmit mediated content, and it was shaped by politics control and modified by the economics of subscription and advertising revenues. As we have seen in the previous subtitle, the evolution and development of media went through or in parallel with the development of humanity, and it is mainly known that society and media have great influence on each other. Social history and media history go in parallel. Media are both a mirror and window. They reflect the events around us and can be also a major force for social change. Three essential poles shape media, politics, economics and technology, as displayed down in **figure.8**

Shaping the media

POLITICS

COMPETITION

ECONOMICS   TECHNOLOGY

Figure.8: the PET theory of Media

3.4. The Politics of Media

Politicians always express their love and hate to media. They are pleased and at rest when they use them to increase their popularity and serve their agenda. However, they fear them because they are a platform for their opponents. So many politicians are endeavouring to get their hands on media and in a totalitarian dictatorship. If we go back to the past, in Europe many books and manuscripts were banned and burnt by the Catholic Church at that time. At the present time, governments' control media either by ownership or imposing taxations and regulations, various techniques have been used: laws of treason, slander, and libel, licenses and specific media taxes. Now governments are seeking to have control on the web, though this latter has it global nature; but it has still proven very difficult.

Habermas (1989) pointed to 'a long term demise of media as an effective political public sphere, a space for rational debate and discussion of political issues, under the influence of a process of commercialization which goes back to nineteenth century'. We draw from Habermas's talk that media is a pivotal site of information, but this concept needs to be

treated with caution. The representations of media texts are said to be ideologically shaped in so far as they contribute to reproducing social relations of domination and exploitation. Ideological representations are generally implicit rather than explicit in texts, and they are embedded in discourse (reports, interviews, etc.)

There is a kind of complicity between media and the dominant social classes and groups. It is assumed that the complicity between media and the state or governments exists though their conflicts. This complicity takes many forms and cases. There are cases of media moguls(people like Rubert Murdoch, the late Robert Maxwell, or Conrad Black), they owned outlets of media manipulated for their interests, and there are many instances where the state intervene and control the media output and broadcast, like the case of the crisis of Northern Ireland when the British government controlled the coverage of this crisis. When states take control over these media outlets like television, they know its immense power and influence on the audience. USA war against Vietnam, television played a key role in swinging the public opinion against the war and forcing the American troops to withdraw.

3.5. Media's content and representation of the world

Media play the role of showing us what is happening around us and provide a picture of the external world. The representation of media to the world is a topic of controversy and dispute. Many people, groups and individuals complain about the way media are representing them. So the question is what kind of picture do the media present? We need to explore this by looking at the content of media and its representation.

Two main concepts constitute media content are bias and stereotyping. Charges of bias are always thrown to media. Politicians accuse media of being partial in communicating what is happening. Other groups complain about the fact that media misrepresent them, present their lives in one-dimensional picture, and fabricate fake news about them. The term stereotype is

used to indicate that representations are misleading, incomplete or negative of a group of people in society (Kevin 2003, p.123).

3.6. Media Bias

The term bias refers to the tendency to depart from the straight and narrow. Bias in news and information means the systematic inclination to favour 'one side in a dispute, or to favour one interpretation or to sympathise with one cause' (Street 2001, p.17)

The first questions that come into our minds about media bias is: do we trust the media to report the news accurately? Do we think they have a hidden agenda? We would tackle this very important notion of media bias and know specifically types of bias because we do not want to be fallen in being oriented by one view or tendency. The debate over media bias is always a matter of back and forth. The word "liberal" and now it is called "left wing" is what makes the debate complicated. Those who control media are group of people who basically own the most leading outlets that range from national television networks to weekly papers. Eric Alterman, a liberal media critic, explained:

> The relevant media are the elite national media, located largely in the networks, the nation's top five national newspapers, the newsweeklies, the opinion magazines, the executives who run these companies along with the sources, both on- and off-air, who supply them with information and opinions. With a few important exceptions, these media's inhabitants can largely be found living and working in New York or Washington, with an entertainment subsidiary in Los Angeles.

This group of people are called "gatekeepers". Their work is to shape political debates. Vice president Agnew warned his audience about the extent of media executives' power: "These men can create national issues overnight. They can make or break by their coverage and commentary a moratorium on the war. They can elevate men from obscurity to national

prominence within a week. They can reward some politicians with national exposure and ignore others." (Paul Rushmann, J.D. 2006, p.25-26)

3.7. Elites and Media in the United States

Elites and media in the United States are mutually related and interdependent. They both serve each other. Political elites including governments, deputies and independent political figures are dependent on media to report and display their information, and in turn media functions well with the information and reporting of the elites.

The power of media is embodied in its agenda-setting function. Journalists, editors, and news directors shift our attention and influence our perceptions of what is important and crucial of certain events (elections, debates, etc.). Millions of Americans spend their time in using the media to keep track of the unique events surrounding the 2018 presidential contest between Hilary Clinton and Trump. The news media have a great influence on people's thinking. Bernard Cohen says it best with his observation that the news media may not be successful in telling people what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling them what to think about (Cohen, 1963). The news media can set the agenda for public thought and discussion.

CNN, CBS News, New York Times and other media outlets are capable of influencing governments and changing political agendas through their coverage of humanitarian issues (Gowing, 1994; Strobel, 1997). The contrary case media are not independent power from state, they convey the elites' preferences to the public. Herman and Chomsky contend that U.S. media "are effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function, by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship, and without overt coercion" (P. Robinson, 2001, p. 525).

It is widely noticeable that media always go in line with the elites' interests and policies, and this is called the *manufacturing elite consent*. These elites can be in either the

administrative or legislative arms of the government or any other powerful position (Bennett, 1990; Hallin, 1986).

Let us talk about the American journalists, as media elites, and see their influential role in shaping the public opinions, and why we consider their media productions are biased. The American media elites hold different views than most Americans on social and cultural issues. According to Bernard Goldberg, "that is one of the biggest problems in big-time journalism: its elites are hopelessly out of touch with everyday Americans. Their friends are liberals, just as they are. And they share the same values. Almost all of them think the same thing on the big social issues of our time: abortion, gun control, feminism, gay rights, the environment, school prayer."

Media elites are, it is said, quite disconnected from the rest of American society. This thought has roots to the New Class that aroused in 1960s in America. The New Class is well-educated people in the law, universities, politics and government bureaucracies, and they lack respect for institutions such as churches and military. So media elites behave the same. Above that, in 2000, Peter Brown, the Orlando Sentinel's features editor, found that journalists are less likely to get married, have children, own homes, do volunteer work, and even go to churches.

3.8. What views do the American Journalists hold today?

Most American journalists hold liberal views. This was asserted by the conservative commentator James Glassman "the people who report the stories are liberal democrats. This is the shameful open secret of the American journalism. That the press itself… chooses to gloss over it is conclusive evidence of how pernicious the bias is". A survey done in 1981by S. Robert Lichter, a professor at George Washington University, he found that 81 percent of American journalists voted for democrats in every presidential election between 1964 and

1976. Also in 1992, 89 percent of journalists and congressional correspondents voted for Bill Clinton, and 7 percent voted for George H.W. Bush (Paul Rushmann, J.D. 2006, p.29)

On social issues like abortion, gun control and homosexuality, most journalists and reporters have liberal views; they support strict rules on gun control and they are in favor of homosexuality as a lifestyle as heterosexuality. Most journalists in the United States call themselves liberal. They favor and have democratic leanings, and the rest are conservatives and republic. This is a survey made by American Society of Newspaper Editor (ASNE) in 1996 (Paul Rushmann, J.D. 2006, p.30-31)

There is a question concerning how do the journalists select their stories when reporting news, and what views do they inject into these stories? Brent Bozell, the president of the Media Research center, insisted that the media are anything but objective: "the media are partisan players. They see their role as journalists as not to inform, but to persuade". According to Brent Bozell, one way of injecting liberal bias into the news is through story selection. Stories that hold liberal views always lead the newscast and appear on page one. However, stories that tend to discredit the liberal point of view are routinely suppressed. Moreover, journalists in United States have liberal tendency, and this is expressed in their news by their spokesmen and experts. Jeffrey Friedman, the editor of *Critical Review* magazine, contended that "reporters put their views into the mouths of experts so they can appear to be taking adequate account of the world's complexity."[12]

The most prominent and read newspapers in the United States are New York Times and Washington Post. They both hold the most educated and influential journalists and they tend to vary their reports, stories and articles from political to social and cultural. People in the US widely read these outlets, and depend on their sources of information and analysis. As this research refers to both these newspapers analysis of Iran deal and its aftermath, they are

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[12] Jeffrey Friedman, "Honestly Biased," National Review Online, December 22, 2004. Available at *http://www.nationalreview*.com/comment/friedman 200412220817.asp.

worthwhile of knowing their backgrounds, orientations, and tendencies. However, the questions which ought to be asked here are: are the elites of these newspapers liberal or conservatives or republics? To what extent do we trust in their sources of information?

3.9. Stereotyping

Stereotyping is an important concept in media analysis. It was developed by Walter Lippmann (1922). He used it to explain the media's misleading and manipulated representation of the world. Stereotypes are a sort of 'the picture in our heads of the world outside', they are 'mental maps' composed of different kinds of categories (Lippmann, 1965). Stereotyping is the process of categorisation (like we categorize society in mothers, fathers, teenagers, communist, republicans, school teachers, farmers, miners, politicians and so forth). So this term is important in communication and understanding the environment.

Lippmann went further and regarded that stereotyping is 'inadequate and biased, endorsing the interests of those who use them, as obstacles to rational assessment, and as resistance to social change' (Pickering, 2001, p.18). So there is a contradiction in saying, on one hand, that Stereotyping is good to understand the world, and on the other hand, it is biased and restricts the view towards the world. This contradiction is actually used to explore the nature of media representations.

Stereotyping in media occurs in three distinct ways. First, media distorts the real presence or prevalence of a group in society. This can be done by under-representation of a group in the media, over-representation, or misrepresentation. The second kind of media stereotyping is the narrow and fixed representation of a whole group of people. That means media stereotyping occurs when the roles, behaviour or personal characteristics of a particular group are portrayed in a limited fashion. For example, young black men are stereotyped by linking their behaviour with violent or criminal activity. The final form of media stereotyping is the delegitimising of a group by comparison with idealised images of how people ought to

behave. Thus a group of people can be marginalized by their portrayal as an unrepresentative minority or denigrated by being presented as abnormal and peculiar, or excluded by only appearing in the media when they present a problem (Kevin 2003, p. 131)

3.10. Discourse and Representation

Before we come to understand the concept "*Other*" and its representations, there must be a general look at *"Representation"* itself and its relation to language, meaning and culture. Representation has come to occupy a pivotal place in the study of language and culture. When we talk about representation, we produce language to mean something or somebody. So language and meaning are connected to culture. But what does representation have to do with culture and meaning? 'Representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully to other people' (Hall, p.15). We represent the world by language, signs, and images.

However, this is just a simple process of representation. As a matter of fact, there are a number of approaches which explore how language is used to represent the world, the reflective, the constructionist and the intentional. Does language simply reflect a meaning which already exists out there in the world of objects, people and events *(reflective)?* Does language express only what the speaker or writer or painter wants to say his or her personally intended meaning *(intentional)?* Or is meaning constructed in and through language *(constructionist)?*

This particular research is more concerned with the constructionist approach because it has had a significant impact on cultural studies in recent years. Three questions might be asked in this context: What does the word **representation** really mean, in this context? What does the process of representation involve? How does representation work?

Representation means to describe and depict something, to call it up in the mind by imagination, description or portrayal. It also means to symbolize or to substitute, like in the

example, in Christianity, the cross represents the suffering and crucifixion of Christ. So, the cross represents the crucifixion, and this is how we give meaning to things through language. Sometimes we do not have concrete objects present in front of us, but we do think of them as concepts in mind, as the linguists are fond of saying 'Dogs bark'. But the concept of "dog" cannot bark or bite.' The word 'Dogs' is a linguist sign which we use in English as an object who bark and bite. Representation is the production of the meaning of the concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language which enables us to *refer to* either the 'real' world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events (Hall, p.17).

Each of us has a conceptual map in mind to understand and interpret the world around us. We are able to communicate and establish a communicative channel when we share the same background knowledge, and thus we belong to the same culture. That is why 'culture is sometimes defined as shared meanings or shared conceptual maps'. We infer from this that the shared culture and the shared language are both contributive to represent the world around us. So representation is built up on two systems: the conceptual maps and language.

One very good question which enable us to understand representation well is how do people, who share the same language and conceptual meanings and belong to the same culture, know this object 'TREE' stands or represent 'a large plant that grows in nature'? The truth is that the meaning is not in the object or word 'TREE' itself, but it is we who give meaning to it, the meaning is constructed by our representation. It is constructed and fixed by the *code,* which sets up the correlation between our conceptual system and our language system in such a way that, every time we think of a tree, the code tells us to use the English word TREE. Codes fix the relationships between concepts and signs. They stabilize meaning within different languages and cultures. They tell us which language to use to convey which idea.

This leads us to talk about **the constructionist approach** to construct meaning. This approach stresses that it is the language system that we use to represent our concepts. It is social actors who use their conceptual map and language and other representational systems to construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and to communicate about the world meaningfully to others (Hall, p.17).

This approach owes a great deal to the work and influence of the Swiss linguist Saussure. His importance to representation lies in his definition of language "as a system of signs". He analyzed the sign into the **form** (the actual word, image, photo, etc.), and the **concept** in our heads. He called the form as signifier, and the concept as signified, the correlation between these two elements which sustains representation, of course fixed by our cultural and linguistic codes. Also Barthes called the first one as denotation, which is the simple and basic and descriptive level, where consensus is wide and most people would agree on the meaning (tree), and the second as connotation which is the interpretation of the signifier. Barthes suggests that this level of signification is 'more general, global and diffuse. It deals with fragments of an ideology ... These signifieds have a very close communication with culture, knowledge, history, and it is through them, so to speak, that the environmental world (of the culture) invades the system [of representation]' (Barthes 1967, pp. 91-2).

Meaning and representation are much dependent on the human cultural interpretation. The semiotic approach considers that representation is understood on the way words functioned as signs within language, and it confines the process of representation to language. However, Michael Foucault was concerned in the production of knowledge (which is representation) through what he called **discourse** (rather than just language). Foucault's discursive approach studied discourse as a system of representation. By discourse, he meant, 'a group of statements which provide a language for talking about- a way of representing the knowledge about- a particular topic at a particular historical moment. Discourse is about the production

of knowledge through language. But since all social practices entail *meaning,* and meanings shape and influence what we do- our conduct- all practices have a discursive aspect' (Hall 1992, p. 291).

3.11. Stuart's Representation of the 'Other'

There are a number of questions that immediately come into our minds when we attempt to figure out the differences between people, races, countries and so forth. Among these questions are: how do we represent people and places which are significantly different from us? Why is 'difference' so compelling a theme, so contested an area of representation? What is the secret fascination of 'otherness', and why is popular representation so frequently drawn to it? What are the typical forms and representational practices which are used to represent 'difference' in popular culture today, and where did these popular figures and stereotypes come from? Through all these questions we try to understand how the 'spectacle of the Other' works, and then we apply the ideas discussed to the issue of this research, Iran as a country representing the Other in the American press.

If we look at the differences that do exist between Iran and the west (the united states of America mainly), economic, political, social or religious, we should engage with Hall's[13]questions related to representation of the other. Among these questions: how do we represent people and nations, like Iran, which are significantly different from the west? In

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[13] **Stuart McPhail Hall** FBA (3 February 1932 – 10 February 2014) was a Jamaican-born British Marxist sociologist, cultural theorist and political activist. Hall, along with Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams, was one of the founding figures of the school of thought that is now known as British Cultural Studies or The Birmingham School of Cultural Studies. Hall's work covers issues of hegemony and cultural studies, taking a post-Gramscian stance. He regards language-use as operating within a framework of power, institutions and politics/economics. This view presents people as *producers* and *consumers* of culture at the same time. (Hegemony, in Gramscian theory, refers to the socio-cultural production of "consent" and "coercion".) For Hall, culture was not something to simply appreciate or study, but a "critical site of social action and intervention, where power relations are both established and potentially unsettled"

Hall became one of the main proponents of reception theory, and developed Hall's Theory of encoding and decoding. This approach to textual analysis focuses on the scope for negotiation and opposition on the part of the audience. This means that the audience does not simply passively accept a text—social control. Crime statistics, in Hall's view, are often manipulated for political and economic purposes. Moral panics (e.g. over mugging) could thereby be ignited in order to create public support for the need to "police the crisis". The media play a central role in the "social production of news" in order to reap the rewards of lurid crime stories (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuart_Hall_(cultural_theorist))

Hall's terms, how do we represent Iran which is significantly different from us (American people)? Let us first see how language represents the other. Hall (1997, p.1) states:

> In language, we use sign and symbols, whether they are sounds, written words, electronically produced images, musical notes even objects, to stand for or represent to other people our concepts, ideas and feelings. Language is one of the media through which thoughts, ideas and feelings are represented in culture. Representation through language is therefore central to the process by which meaning is produced.

The question of representation of the Other, which is potentially different from 'Us', depends on the sharing culture. If we have the same culture, we see or represent the world with the same interpretation. Thus, culture depends on its participants interpreting meaningfully what is happening around them, and making sense of the world, in broadly similar ways (Hall 1997, p.2). So, Hall gives emphasis to cultural practices to represent the others. It is participants in culture who give meaning to people, objects and events:

> It is by our use of things, and what we say, think and feel about them—how we represent them— that we give them meaning. In part, we give objects, people and events meaning by how we use them, or integrate them into our everyday practices. It is our use of pile of bricks and mortar which makes it a 'house'; and what we feel, think or say about it that makes it a 'house' a 'home'. In part, we give things meaning by how we represent them, the words we use about them, the stories we tell about them, the images of them we produce, the emotions we associate with them, the ways we classify and conceptualize them, the values we place on them (1997, p.3).

Another question suggested by Hall about the representation of the Other is: how do we represent people and places which are significantly different from us? One potential answer offered by Hall is that difference is essential for the construction of meaning and identity. Without difference, meaning could not exist. For instance, Saussure argues that the word

'black' means, not because there is some sense of 'blackness', but because we can contrast it with its opposite 'white'. It is the difference between white and black which signifies, which carries meaning. Hall (1997, pp.234-235) said that difference helps to construct identity:

> We know that it is to be 'British', not only because of certain national characteristics, but also because we can mark its 'difference' from its 'others'—Britishness is not-French, not-American, not-German, not-Pakistani, not- Jamaican and so on.

So we can determine meaning by the opposite. Binary oppositions, white and black, day and night, masculine and feminine, British and alien, can contribute to the diversity of the world. Jacques Derrida argued that there are very few neutral binary oppositions. One pole of the binary, he argues, is usually the dominant one, the one which includes the other within its field of operations. There is always a relation of power between the poles of a binary opposition (We should really write, **white**/*black*, **men/***women,* **masculine**/*feminine*, **upper** class/*lower class,* **British/** *alien* to capture this power dimension in discourse.) (Derrida, 1974). Douglas (1966) argued that social groups impose meaning on their world by ordering and organizing things into classificatory systems. So, binary oppositions are crucial for all classifications.

The second argument by Saussure is we need 'difference' because we can only construct meaning through a dialogue with the 'Other'. The Russian linguist Mikhail Bakhtin[14] (1981, pp.293-294) studied language in terms of how meaning is sustained in the dialogue between two or more speakers. He said "meaning does not belong to any one speaker. It arises in the give-and-take between different speakers". Bakhtin argued that meaning is established

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[14]Mikhail Bakhtin was a Russian philosopher, literary critic and scholar who worked on literary theory, ethics, and the philosophy of language. His writings, on a variety of subjects, inspired scholars working in a number of different traditions (Marxism, semiotics, structuralism, religious criticism) and in disciplines as diverse as literary criticism, history, philosophy, sociology, anthropology and psychology. Although Bakhtin was active in the debates on aesthetics and literature that took place in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, his distinctive position did not become well known until he was rediscovered by Russian scholars in the 1960s. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Bakhtin)

through dialogue, it is fundamentally dialogic. So we need the 'Other' to interact and interplay with them. So the 'Other', in short, is essential to meaning.

The most important and concerned theory of explaining the role of difference is the psychoanalytic explanation (Hall, p.237). The argument here is that the 'Other' is fundamental to the constitution of the self, to us as subjects, and to sexual identity:

> According to Freud, the consolidation of our definitions of 'self' and of our sexual identities depends on the way we are formed as subjects, especially in relation to that stage of early development which he called the Oedipus complex (after the Oedipus story in Greek myth). A unified sense of oneself as a subject and one's sexual identity-Freud argued - are not fixed in the very young child. However, according to Freud's version of the Oedipus myth, at a certain point the boy develops an unconscious erotic attraction to the Mother, but finds the Father barring his way to 'satisfaction'. However, when he discovers that women do not have a penis, he assumes that his Mother was punished by castration, and that he might be punished in the same way if he persists with his unconscious desire. In fear, he switches his identification to his old 'rival', the Father, thereby taking on the beginnings of identification with a masculine identity. The girl child identifies the opposite way- with the Father. But she cannot 'be' him, since she lacks the penis. She can only 'win' him by being willing, unconsciously, to bear a man's child- thereby taking up and identifying with the Mother's role. And 'becoming feminine'

These explanations of 'difference' and the 'Other' are both necessary and threatening at the same time. First, they have to come to play an increasingly significant role. Second, difference is ambivalent. It can be positive and negative. It is both necessary for the production of meaning, the formation of language and culture, for social identities and a subjective sense of the self as a sexed subject, and at the same time, it is threatening, a site of

danger, of negative feelings, of splitting, hostility and aggression towards the Other (Hall 1997, p.238)

Now, let us explore one example of the repertoire of representation and representational practices which have been used to mark racial difference and signify the racialized Other in western popular culture. There are three major moments when the west encountered black people, giving rise to issue of racial difference. The first began with the sixteenth-century contact between European traders and the West African kingdoms, which provided a source of black slaves for three centuries. Its effects were to be found in slavery and in the post-slave societies of the New World. The second was the European colonization of Africa and the 'scramble' between the European powers for the control of colonial territory, markets and raw materials in the period of 'high Imperialism'. The third was the post-World War 11 migrations from the 'Third World' into Europe and North America.

An example that embodies racial difference is from the period of plantation slavery and its aftermath in the USA. The concept of the racialized ideology did not appear until slavery was severely challenged by the abolitionists in 19th century. Frederickson (1987) sums up this racial difference which took place in this period:

> Heavily emphasized was the historical case against the black man based on his supposed failure to develop a civilized way of life in Africa. As portrayed in proslavery writing, Africa was always and had been the scene of unmitigated savagery, cannibalism, devil worship, and licentiousness. Also advanced was an early form of biological argument, based on real or imagined physiological and anatomical differences especially in cranial characteristics and facial angles - which allegedly explained mental and physical inferiority. Finally there was the appeal to deep-seated white fears of widespread miscegenation [sexual relations and interbreeding between the races], as pro-slavery theorists sought to deepen white anxieties by claiming that

the abolition of slavery would lead to intermarriage and the degeneracy of the race. Although all these arguments had appeared earlier in fugitive or embryonic form, there is something startling about the rapidity with which they were brought together and organized in a rigid polemical pattern, once the defenders of slavery found themselves in a propaganda war with the abolitionists.

(Frederickson, 1987, p.49)

This racialized discourse is structured by a set of 'binary oppositions'. There is the powerful opposition between "Civilizations" (white) and "Savagery" (black). There is the opposition between the biological or bodily characteristics of the "black" and "white" races, polarized into to their extreme opposites—each signifiers of an absolute difference between human types or species. Racial theory applied the Culture/Nature distinction differently to the two racialized groups. Among whites, 'Culture' was opposed to 'Nature' amongst blacks, it was assumed, 'Culture' coincided with 'Nature' whereas whites developed 'Culture' to subdue and overcome 'Nature', for blacks. 'Culture' and 'Nature' were interchangeable. Above all that, according to the theory of 'polygenesis', blacks and whites had been created at different times. David Green (1984) discussed this and tried to draw the distinction between the representation of the body and the representation of the socio-cultural knowledge, and this distinction was in relation to ethnography and anthropology:

Though not immune to the 'white man's burden' [approach), anthropology was drawn through the course of the nineteenth century, even more towards causal connections between race and culture. As the position and status of the 'inferior· races became increasingly to be regarded as fixed, so socio-cultural differences came to be regarded as dependent upon hereditary characteristics. Since these were inaccessible to direct observation they had to be inferred from physical and behavioural traits which. In turn, they were intended to explain. Socio-cultural differences among human populations

became subsumed within the identity of the individual human body. In the attempt to trace the line of determination between the biological and the social, the body became the totemic object, and its very visibility the evident articulation of nature and culture. (Green 1984, pp. 31-2)

Green asserted that the body and its meanings came to have such resonance in popular representations of difference and 'otherness'. The body became a discursive site through which much of this 'racialized knowledge' was produced and circulated.

Talking about the representation of differences between the whites and blacks has its history in the attempt to reduce the culture of blacks to nature, or *naturalizing difference*. Naturalization is a representational strategy meant to fix difference, and thus secure it forever. It is an attempt to 'halt the inevitable 'slide' of meaning, to secure discursive or ideological 'closure'. Blacks were discriminated against as they were slaves, they has no right to stand as long as whites were standing, white women rode and slave men ran after them shading them from the Louisiana sun with an umbrella. Blacks were represented and reduced to their essence. Laziness, simple fidelity, mindless 'cooning', trickery, childishness belonged to blacks as *a race, as a species.*

3.12. Said's World of "Orient and Occident"

Edward Said's[15] work of Orientalism is such a useful in the representation of Iran in the American media. Said demonstrated how discursive practices were deployed in order to symbolically divide the world between Orient and Occident, East and West. Said (1979, p.12)

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[15]Edward Said was a professor of literature at Columbia University, a public intellectual, and a founder of the academic field of postcolonial studies. A Palestinian American born in Mandatory Palestine, he was a citizen of the United States by way of his father, a U.S. Army veteran.
Said became an established cultural critic with the book *Orientalism* (1978) a critique (description and analyses) of Orientalism as the source of the false cultural representations with which the Western world perceives the Middle East—the narratives of how The West sees The East. The thesis of *Orientalism* proposes the existence of a "subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo–Islamic peoples and their culture", which originates from Western culture's long tradition of false, romanticized images of Asia, in general, and the Middle East, in particular. That such cultural representations have served, and continue to serve, as implicit justifications for the colonial and imperial ambitions of the European powers and of the U.S. Likewise, Said denounced the political and the cultural malpractices of the régimes of the ruling Arab élites who have internalized the false and romanticized representations of Arabic culture that were created by Anglo–American Orientalists.

associated the "Orient" with the 'Other', and an integral part of European material civilization and culture:

> The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the other. The orient is an integral part of European material civilization.

Said (1979, p.3) defined orientalism a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient. Said went on and said that Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and the Occident. Said (1979, p.4) contends that the Orient, as much as the Occident, is not an interface of nature. It is rather an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery and vocabulary that has given it reality and presence for the west. It would be wrong to assume that the Orient is "essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality"; but it is about the East as created consistency and that "regular constellation of ideas" (p.6). These ideas, cultures, and histories cannot be understood unless they are studied with their force. So, the relationship between the Orient and Occident is a matter of power, domination and hegemony. This brings us, Said explains, to another concept that Orientalism is not a "structure of lies or myth which would simply blow away. What is more, it is not an airy European fantasy about the orient; but orientalism is a created body of theory and practice:

> …but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied-indeed, made truly productive-the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture.

Said (1979, p.6) claims that it is the cultural hegemony that gives durability to orientalism. This idea was taken from Gramsci's distinction between civil and political society. This latter consists of state institutions like army, police and the central bureaucracy, and the former (civil society) is made of voluntary affiliations like schools, families, and unions. So we find culture operating in the former. In any society, certain cultural forms and ideas predominate over others: the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as 'hegemony' (p.7). Said came to conclude that Orientalism is to be defined not mere political subject matter, but it is a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philogical texts:

> Therefore, Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious "Western" imperialist plot to hold down the "Oriental" world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philogical texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of "interests" which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world: it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw… (p.21)

Throughout the years, numerous academics including Said, Sardar, Karim and Little have argued that Orientalism is the dominant ideology of western relations with states that are of

primarily Muslim orientation. In the case of Iran, orientalism uses such cultural and social terms to distinguish the Other. This cultural and social reality is not only different but is in binary opposition to its western counterpart (Said, 1994; Izadi; Saghaye-Biria, 2007: 143).

Over the last years, particularly after the cold war, western media, the American and British mainly, developed narratives about Islam as a source of instability and violence in the western countries. Iran has been frequently accused of being a country delivering terrorism to the western world. J.W.Bush, after 9/11, accused Iran of terrorism and classified it in the list of countries of "axe of devil". In his study, Karim (2000) discovers the prevalent use of orientalist images in the depiction of Islam and Muslims among western media, and argues that the construction of the image of "Islam as a threat" has developed into a dominant global discourse.

Said in his book "Orientalism" describes the Orient as one who is in contrast or opposition to the western countries and an integral part of European material civilization and culture:

> The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture (Said 1979, p.2).

Said also defines Orientalism as "a style of thought based upon ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and (most of the time) the Occident". Writers who base their writings on this thought, Said identifies, are most poets, novelists, philosopher, political theorists, economist, and imperial administrators (p.2)

A very key characteristic of the Orient Vis a vis the Occident, Said points out, is that "the relationship between the Orient and Occident is a relationship of power, of domination, of

varying degrees of complex hegemony, and is quite indicated in the title of K.M Panikkar's classic Asia and Western Dominance" (p.5).The example which may represent this identification of Said is the Flaubert's encounter with an Egyptian courtesan, which produced a widely influential model of the Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence or history. He spoke and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy and male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and to tell his readers in what way she was "typically Oriental". Said argued that Flaubert was in a position of strength, and this instance stands for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, and the discourse about the Orient that it enabled (Said, 1979: p.6)

Another fact that gives Orientalism durability and sustainability and strength is hegemony. Hegemony, in Gramsci's terms, is considered as cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; it a cultural leadership and to be found not in totalitarian society, but in civil one.

Orientalism is much related to Europe. It is, as Said called, a sign of European-Atlantic power. It is a collective notion identifying "us" European as against all "those" non-European. This implies the European cultural hegemony is dominant in and outside Europe; as a precise word, the European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. Thus, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority. This means that the westerner always has the upper hand and puts the Orient in an inferior position.

Much interestingly, Orientalism is fundamentally political doctrine willed over the Orient because this latter is weaker and inferior.

3.13. Media, Ideology, and Orientalism

It is very interesting to understand the function of news media in spreading and dominating ideologies of society. Herman and Chomsky (2002) argue that commercial media institutions form and define people's norms and beliefs according to the social, political and economic interests dominating the state. So the media are a key instrument for domination. Gramsci (1971) contends that the ruling groups in democratic societies gain dominance through a double process of coercion and persuasion and that the media are among the key institutions of persuasion in modern societies.

Not only are media a source of domination. They have become the dominant sources of hegemony in the civil societies of modern capitalist states (He and Madrid 1986). Giltin (2003) contends this hegemonic function of media:

> Every day, directly or indirectly, by statement and omission, in pictures and words, in entertainment, news and advertisement, the mass media produce fields of definition and association, symbol and rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifest and concrete. (p. 4)

Orientalism plays a major role in establishing relations between the West and the rest of the world. The scholar Said (1978, 1981, 1994) argued that Orientalism is the dominant ideology of Western relations with the Islamic world. Orientalism employs a realistic narrative, which assumes a distinct social and cultural reality about the Orient, discovered by the efforts of Orientalists and assumed to be "true": a reality that is different from its counterpart, the West (Said 1994).

An important feature of orientalism, which is important to this study, is that the orientalist discourse relies on binary language (Said 1978). According to Said, Orientalism, as a style of thought, is a dichotomous Western worldview based on "an ontological and epistemological distinction" (p.2) between the so-called Orient and the West. As a matter of truth, this dichotomy of dividing the globe originates from a structuralist view of language (de Saussure

1959). De Saussure argues that the universal structuring principle in all human language is that of binary oppositions. Thus, media depend on this binary language in producing the news. According to Switzer, McNamara, and Ryan (1999), news narratives are primarily based on binary signs, reducing reality to "discrete, dichotomous 'facts'" (p. 33). Switzer et al. contend that binary language and the tendency to define the world in terms of opposites provide the sociocultural foundation of ideology. Among the binary vocabulary of orientalism are East versus West, despotism versus democracy, cruelty versus fair treatment, irrational versus rational and cunning versus trust (Baldwin, Longhurst, McCracken, Ogborn, & Smith, 2000, p. 171).

Van Dijk (1998b) called this ideological dichotomy "ideological square". Its discourse depends on emphasizing the good properties/actions of "us" and the bad properties/actions of "them." Also, the discourse also mitigates the bad properties/actions of the in-group and the good properties/actions of the out-group.

3.14. Orientalism and Iran

The ideology of orientalism has been a very central subject of many studies done in the area of identity and gender. The ideology of orientalism has historically played a role in Iranian-American relations. It is the remarkable difference between the two nations, Iran and the United States, which has led historians, anthropologists and discourse analysts to write and say much throughout the years. Edward Said (1979) provides such a good example of the role played by orientalism regarding Iran's nuclear issue in his book "Covering Islam".

In 'Covering Islam', Said (1981) brought attention to the prevalence of orientalist depictions of Islam and Muslims. In chapter two called "the Iran story", Said opens it with saying "in any event, we must start to take stock of the origins of what Iran has been to Americans in the general context of the United States and Western relations with the Islamic World". Iran has been unknown to the western observers and media analysts, and since the

Iranian revolution 1979, they depicted Iran as an enemy, a terrorist and a threat to their nations. "Muslims", "Islam" and "Islamic", "sunni", "Mohamedanism", "Mecca" are all label that identify the Iranian people, and they used them in undefined manners. Since the Iranian revolution 1979, Iran has been depicted as a threat and a terrorist nation in almost American newspaper; New York Times and Washington post are among those. Therefore, this negative representation of Iran has supplied the cultural logic of U.S. foreign policy since the events of the Iranian revolution of 1979(McAlister, 2001).

3.15. The American and Iranian Press

This research paper takes the American and Iranian press as a case study of the data selected. It is beneficial to attend to this specific genre (press) and know the linguistic practice of the newspapers in US and Iran in general, and regarding the Iran's nuclear issue in particular. Moreover, a brief history of the development of the press in both nations is to be discussed.

3.15.1. The press in Iran

If we read the history of the press and journalism in Iran, it is so entangled with the political development of the country. All the historically marked political events and the various forms of the Iranian authoritarian governance, before and after the Islamic Revolution 1979, would provide a rich account of the newspapers role in Iran and turn the press into the most significant realm of political struggle. As Shahidi (2007; p. x) argues, it is no coincidence that 'the issue of the press has been at the heart of political (violent) competitions and struggles'.

As a matter of fact, the press in Iran has not passed the political confrontations and struggles. The state still has its control and power over the press. The state's concentrated economic and political power has hindered the development an independent and liberal press in Iran.

The newspapers in Iran after the Revolution 1979 played a major role in providing awareness and enlightening the Iranian public. Extensive content analysis of the press in this

period shows 'a deep hatred of imperialism, colonialists and foreign powers, as well as resentment to Shah, monarchy and Pahlavi regime (Mohsenian-Rad, 1996: 303).

A boom in the Iranian press occurred when the first post-revolutionary Act was re-introduced. This act guaranteed an absolute freedom of the press. However, at the same time the state shut down 22 newspapers, and whoever wants to set up a TV channel or a newspaper, the government must supervise and has control over them. The number of newspapers titles reached to 200 after the Revolution, and it started to drop sharply during the war with Iraq. The role of the state in the press was dominant, and all what the journalists write or report must be controlled.

After the wartime period and during the reconstruction period of Rafsanjani, the press started to grow again. Yet, by 1997 the press in Iran has seen the most prosperous period in time. Shahidi (2006:8) made a survey on the content of the Iranian press between 1994 and 1999, and he concluded that the amount of sensitive criticism, designed to challenge the authorities, had increased tenfold. For the first time since the revolution, the press criticized the President frequently, going all the way to the Supreme Leader (ibid.: 14). This second post-revolutionary 'spring of the press', which lasted only from 1997 to 2000, witnessed a large circulation of the press, the quality of the content, the diversity of the views covered and the analytical turn in press journalism in post-revolutionary Iran.

3.15.2. The press in US

The history of the newspapers in America goes back to early 18 century of the publication of the first colonial newspaper. The first newspaper in the American colonies was published in 1690 (Benjamin Harris's *Publick Occurrences both Foreighn and Domestick*). Most the newspapers of the time were not objective, and they were fiercely partisan publications that editorialized against the tyranny of the British government.

By 19 century the number of the newspapers started to grow, and they gradually became as mouthpieces for their publishers rather than partisan. In 1833 Benjamin Day opened the New York Sun and created the "Penny Press", this latter played a major role in American journalism and technological advancement such as telegraph and faster printing presses as the nation was experiencing rapid economic and demographic growth.

By 20 century newspapers thrived with the advent of radio, television and later internet. Major newspapers had become profitable powerhouses of advocacy, *muckraking¹⁶* and *sensationalism¹⁷*, along with serious and objective news gathering.

3.16. Iran in the eye of American media since 1979

The Iran-US relation has seen many stages of conflicts and disagreements. The relations started to see a remarkable and unstable turn when the Iranian students seized the American embassy in November 4th, 1979.The American media had a full coverage and this event thrusted the American media to write incessantly about Iran and its political practices. Fortunately, the united states of American did not take military action after Iran took their diplomats as hostages, and the dispute lasted long until 1982 when both countries reached an agreement to free the American hostages and, by turn, from this point, we must start to take stock of the origins of what Iran has been to Americans in the general context of united states and western relations with Islamic world: how it has looked, how it was literally presented and re-presented to Americans by the media day after day.

We try to focus on three main stages of conflicts Iran –US relation has undergone. The aftermath of the American hostages crisis in 1979, Iran as an axe of terrorism after 11th

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¹⁶The **muckrakers** were reform-minded journalists in the Progressive era in the United States (1890s–1920s) who exposed established institutions and leaders as corrupt. They typically had large audiences in popular magazines. The modern term generally references investigative journalism or watchdog journalism investigative journalists in the US are often informally called "muckrakers" (Wikipedia).

¹⁷In journalism, **sensationalism** is a type of editorial tactic. Events and topics in news stories are selected and worded to excite the great number of readers and viewers. This style of news report encourages biased impressions of events rather than neutrality, and may cause a manipulation to the truth of a story. Sensationalism may rely on reports about generally insignificant matters and portray them as a major influence on society, or biased presentations of newsworthy topics, in a trivial, or tabloid manner, contrary to general assumptions of professional journalistic standard (Wikipedia).

September, and Iran nuclear agreement with the west in 2014 in Vienna. In light of this, we try to investigate how Iran has been portrayed in the American media, and we discuss also how Iran has appeared to Americans during the most intense period of the crisis.

At the outset of the hostage crisis, the Iranians were using the media for their advantage. They continued to broadcast news not only about Iran but Arab-Israeli conflict, the presence of Americans in Afghanistan. Even Iranian officials claimed that this was to turn the Americans against their government at that time. Nevertheless, it was a miscalculation from the Iranians. Later on American consumers of news understood that Iran was a mere militant, dangerous and anti-American.

The story of Iran has still spilled the foam of reporters of different international media, and it has been considered as a good occasion for media's performance to analyze and examine such an agonizing issue. The view of Iran in the eye of American media has never changed since the Embassy Hostage 1979. Iran as an Islamic Shi's country provoked *Time* to issue "Ideology of Martyrdom" as a title in its pages on November 26. Also, *Newsweek* featured a page entitled "Iran's Martyr Complex" on November 26. There seemed a great enmity of the west toward Iran as an Islamic nation, and towards "Islam in particular. The professor J. C. Hurewitz from Colombia University, when asked by an ABC reporter on November 21whether to be a Muslim Shi'ite meant being "anti-American", responded with categorical affirmative.

In the heart of the crisis, major television commentators like Walter Cronkite of CBS and Frank Reynolds of ABC depicted the 'Muslims hatred of America'. Worse than that, in a program held by Reynolds on December 7th, it accused Mohammed (PBUH) of being 'self-proclaimed prophet (never happened), and Ayatollah is 'reflection of God'. The program continued to show pictures of Shi'ite beating themselves, and this an accusation of Islam being unpleasant religion.

When talking about Islam, the norms of common sense and normal rules that command languages and societies withdraw. An article was written by Michael Walzer in the *New Republic* December 8th issue called "the Islam Explosion", he said wherever the was Islam, there was conflict, war and murder, "Islam clearly played an important role.". So the Americans considered that Islam was at war with them, and they had to join the battle with eyes open.

In the front page of *Atlanta constitution* on November 8th, it was said that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was behind the embassy takeover. On December 10th, there was an interview on NBC's Today Show between Amos Perlemutter and Hasi Carmel. They were asked if allegations about "a coincidence of interests" between the Soviet Union, the PLO, and "radical" Muslims in Iran: was it true that all three forces were *actually* involved in the embassy operation? Well, no, they replied, but there was this coincidence of interests (p.91).

"Where there are Shi'ites, there is trouble," a big title written by B.Drooz in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, this was also confirmed by New York Times on November 18th, 1979: "Embassy seizure is linked to both Shi'ite approval of authority and anger over the Shah" the American press almost considered the American embassy occupation as a cout to topple or overthrow Shah, and paved the way to Aya-tollah Khomeini to take control.

This act had actually brought an inaccurate and confusing image to Islam, and this latter appeared frightening to the western world. For example, Moharram[18] was described by reporter Randy Daniels as a period when Shi'ite Muslims "celebrated Mohammed's challenge to world leaders" it is completely wrong statement here. But it is high time to talk about how

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[18]It is one of the four sacred months of the year when warfare is forbidden. It is held to be the second holiest month, after Ramadān. The Tenth day of Muharram is known as the Day of Ashura. Better known as part of the Mourning of Muharram, Shia Muslims mourn the tragedy of Imam Hussein's family, and Sunni Muslims practice fasting on Ashura.

the western world reported that Islam was a threat to them, especially the American interests, and how the American press has attended to it.

The *New York Times* newspaper was considered at that time as America's leading newspaper, and that was because of, as Said put it:

> its catholicity, level of expert reporting, responsibility, and, most important, its ability to write credibly from the viewpoint of national security give it a force of unique gravity In others words, the *Times* can speak authoritatively about a subject and also make that subject pertinent to the nation; it does so deliberately and, it seems, successfully. ….. *The Times* had now reached a critical mass, not a mass in terms of readers and advertisers, although this was inextricably linked to it. No, it had reached a critical mass of reporting and expertise. It now genuinely covered the world, covered Washington, covered the nation and the city with its own staff men and women, and these were not merely journeymen. They were the best reporters and editors who could be obtained (p.92).

When Shah was toppled and Iran fell in 1979, an era of anti-imperialism and the dominant Islamic rule began, and The Times held this occasion to turn to Islam at last. On December 11, an article of two full pages was devoted to a symposium entitled "The Explosion in the Moslem World". Seven scholars from the Islamic world participated in it, and their conversation turned around if Islam was a threat the western world. The scholars debated this question and they were trying to subdivide "Islam" into its more important components, whereas the times went directly to the point if the power of Islam is **inimical** or friendly to the interests of the United States.

The *Times* published a series of four long article written by Flora Lewis, all attempting seriously to deal with Islam in crisis ("Upsurge in Islam," December 28, 29, 30, 31). She tried to delineate Islam's diversity and complexity, and she made statements about the Arabic

language and the Islamic mind that would be considered either racist or nonsensical if used to describe any other language, religion, or ethnic grouping.

Lewis's views on Islam were orientalist, and she could describe the Islamic revolution as equivalent to Marxism-Leninism, and also Bernard Lewis (not a relative of Flora Lewis) was an orientalist and kept up his attacks on Islam through 1980s and 1990s, and he reported that Islam was a static, occasionalist, determinist and authoritarian theology. But both Flora Lewis and Bernard Lewis were not referred to to get a coherent view about Islam.

Said (1997) drew his readers' attention to the fact that the article published by Flora Lewis in *Times* did not really reflect the correct and real image of Islam:

> she discusses neither the great theological and moral issues debated all across the Islamic world (how can one talk about Islam today and never once mention the conflict raging between partisans of *ijtihad*—individual interpretation—and partisans of *taqlid*—reliance on the interpretation of authorities—as modes of Koranic interpretation?) nor the history and structure of the various Islamic schools fueling the "upheaval" she tries to document. (1997, p.95)

3.16. Iran-US rapprochement and Geneva 2015 Deal (2013-2018)

After a hard and intense negotiations and tough bargaining, the United States could promote an understanding between the P5+1 and Iran to sign a nuclear agreement in Vienna July 14, 2015. This historic deal aims at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and abandons its nuclear program, and, in turn, Iran cou wld resume its relations with other countries by lifting sanctions against it. However, the questions that come into our minds are: why did Iran call and agree to this deal? Why did the US and its allies want this deal? How did the opponents of this deal (within the US and Iran) behave?

There are a number of reasons that can explain the Iranian behaviour. First, Iran was under economic sanctions that crippled and isolated the country. These sanctions had gross effects

on its trade and investment relations with other countries. Second, Iran was politically isolated since the Islamic revolution 1979. Third, the Iranian government wants to improve the economy and trade of the country, build the infrastructure and normalize its relations with other countries. These reasons, and there are others, led Iran to stay in table and negotiate with the P5+1 a deal that may end its suffering and isolation.

The Americans and their allies (France, Germany, Russia, Great Britain, China) pushed for this deal for a host of reasons. First of all, they are champions of proliferation. For the Americans, proliferation by adversaries such as Iran is considered a potential threat to the US administration, and, therefore, it is not tolerated. Another fact is that the Iran-US relations were in hostility and this due to the reason that Iran attempted to acquire and build nuclear technology. Second, the American did not hide their fear from the fact that Iran became a regional heavy-weight country in the gulf region, its promotion of terrorism, and Iran's membership in the nonproliferation Treaty enabled Tehran to establish a civil nuclear program.

3.16.1. Iran Nuclear Deal 2015

The day 14th July, 2015 certainly marks a significant date in the Iran-US relation. Both parties came to Vienna to sign a comprehensive deal regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. The deal was signed at times characterised by threats of war and confrontation. The deal now has received acceptance and disagreement from different critics, it certainly remains a point of contention for years to come.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) unveils its clear objectives to the world and to those who suspected that Iran was attempting to develop a nuclear weapons. The deal includes a commitment of Iran to suspend its nuclear weapons programme, and, in exchange, Iran benefits of lifting sanctions that lasted for long and crippled its economy. Furthermore,

the international community accepts Iran's right to a verifiable civil nuclear programme aimed at peaceful purposes.

The deal was reached after a marathon of hard negotiations. Several factors played role in the success of the deal. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, China, Russia, France and Germany) appeared united to support and sign the agreement, and they forced the Iranian delegation to see the negotiation as legitimate and serious. The European Union (EU) also supports the deal and cultivated the level of trust between all sides and proves its vital role in the success of the negotiation.

While the deal was endorsed and welcomed by almost leaders of great nations, as well as the secretary general of the United Nations Ban Ki-Mon, it was also reacted to it differently. For example, in Iran moderate conservatives and centrists described it as a positive agreement. Hassan Rouhani, elected in 2013, considered it as a new chapter to work towards growth and development. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is known by his anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, carefully praised this step, but he did not fully endorse it. However, the hardliner in Iran stand against Rouhani's policy of negotiation, and viewed this latter as dangerously accommodationist and as having crossed too many red lines.

In the united states, despite that the democrats considered the deal as a big victory, the republicans, by their representatives and leaders in the US senate, condemned the deal and accused Obama of cutting too weak a deal with Iran. John Boehner, the House speaker, called the agreement "an alarming departure from the White House's initial goals". The senator McCain, a well-known figure, warned that the deal "not only paves Iran's path to nuclear capability; it will further Iran's emergence as a dominant military power in the Middle East. However, Democratic Party has been more supportive to Obama's initiative. Hilary Clinton expressed her support to the deal and promised to work together to fully achieve it.

Though the deal was approved the House of Senate, it remains an issue of big contention and dispute between the two parties in US. The presidential election 2016 made Iran deal as a priority of its agenda and point of big pressure against the democrats.

However, two central figures played an important role in the success of the agreement, President Rouhani and President Obama. First, though Rouhani has been opposed and criticized by hardliners and many Iranians, he chose the path of direct negotiation with the US to secure a deal. This choice came out of many reasons. The country has been crippled by the unsuccessful policies and the corruption of previous presidents (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), and the Iranian economy proved to be in steep downward spiral out of the financial and economic international sanctions. Though the supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini was known by his enmity to the West, he shifted his view to the nuclear negotiations and accepted the deal. The reason behind that is that there have been warning signs about the Iranian regime and the increasing political dissent within the country since 2009 in the aftermath of the election of Ahmadinejad as a president.

For Obama, many American politicians considered him a gambler to engage with Iran in a deal that would carry many stakes. From his first term of presidency, Obama endeavors to strike a deal with Iran, and he depended on diplomacy rather than military attacks. Before closing his presidency, Obama believed in diplomacy to strike a nuclear deal, and he saw in the necessity of signing this agreement the opportunity to give further credence to his vision of a US foreign policy with a renewed reliance on diplomacy. Other figures from both sides played a significant role in realizing the deal are Zarif (Iranian foreign minister) and John Kerry (US Secretary of State).

All these actors and their speeches (discourse) regarding Iran nuclear issue will be analyzed in the period stretching from 2015 till 2020, focusing on the main incidents between

the nations. The analysis focuses on the representation or framing in discourse of the representatives of Iran nuclear issue through the notion of Self/Other representation.

3.16.2. The portrayal of Iran nuclear deal across international newspapers

The following day after Iran nuclear deal was signed on July 14th, 2015, different international media raced to write on their front pages about the historic nuclear deal between Iran and P5+1 (United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom, and Germany). So, the international media coverage of Iran's deal 2015 is critically important to public understanding of the issue. Different media outlets such as televisions, radios, and newspapers and Internet publications have tried to frame the coverage in a manner which is consistent to the context of Iran-US conflict. They are playing an important role in delivering the public with information about happenings from which they are far removed (physically and culturally). Now let us see what different international media think about Iran nuclear deal.

The British Media

In a video owned by *BBC World Service* in London and released on Monday 2, November, 2015, 6.45pm, the BBC's speaker Nik Gowing has debated Iran's deal 2015 issue in an excellent panel. The motion of this panel is "the nuclear deal with Iran won't make the world a safer place". So, the deal, to sum up, reached between Iran and six world powers in July 14th, 2014 is a major diplomatic breakthrough. In exchange for Tehran halting its nuclear weapons program, the west will lift the sanctions that have been crippling Iran's economy for the last decade. The deal was hailed by president Obama as 'a historic understanding' and met with cheers of approval from around the world. However, of course, the panel agreed, the agreement does not guarantee that Iran will never get the bomb some time in the future. But its supporters argue that in a complex world it is the best option going. There will be pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities for at least 10 years. The freeing up of over 100 billion pound of frozen assets will increase Iran's stability, and improved communication and

trade between Iran and other countries with strengthen the hand of those Iranians who want their nation to be part of the modern world.

That is the line of those who support the deal. But to others, including Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, it is so much as historic understanding as a terrifying historic mistake. Once the agreement's restrictions expire in around 2025, what is there to stop the Mullah cranking up their nuclear program and producing the bomb? In the meantime, relaxing sanctions will allow the Tehran to channel ever more funds to murderous regimes such as Assad's Syria, and the terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah.

The historic nuclear deal between the west and Iran got a mixed reception from Britain's national press. Some newspapers hailed it as a triumph (*Guardian, Daily Mirror*). Some thought it unacceptable (*Times, Sun*). Several were wary (*Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Independent*). All recognized what it means for US President Barack Obama. It could well be the legacy that defines his presidency in the future. But not all were convinced he should have dared to make, as in the Times's headline over its leading article, a reckless gamble.

The Times contended that Obama has been guilty of "appeasement for the sake of a presidential legacy" and that his "gamble that will make life more dangerous for Iran's neighbors and more difficult for future US presidents".

If the agreement with Iran is honored, said the Telegraph, "then Iran's bomb-making potential will be dramatically curtailed. But that is a big if".It pointed to possible "flaws" in the deal and the "genuine concerns" of Israel and the Gulf states who do not trust the Islamic Republic. But, in its view, "a deal had to be negotiated" and said:"Perhaps the Vienna agreement marks a turning point – but we still need to be wary of an unshackled Tehran".

The Mail, in its turn, was also worried about whether Iran can be trusted or not? "Seen in the most optimistic light", it said, it might gain the west "a powerful ally in the fight against IS". But it recognized that the deal is controversial: "Barack Obama may hail a rare foreign

policy triumph. But the west must be ready to reimpose sanctions at the first hint of treachery from Tehran".

The Mirror was much more enthusiastic about the outcome of the deal, seeing it as a "ray of hope" and believing "the world is a slightly safer place today".It contended: "Ten years of tense negotiations to bring Tehran in from the cold is a triumph for political and economic pressure over the hawks who would have started another war...", "The landmark agreement tacitly acknowledges the important truth that Iran, not the USA or Britain, is best placed to confront and defeat the terrorists of the Islamic State... we should celebrate the success of dull diplomacy".

Similarly, *the Guardian*, in a leader headlined "a triumph of diplomacy", viewed the deal as "a victory for patient diplomacy". It continued:"Credit goes to the tireless US secretary of state, John Kerry, but also to America's partners: Germany, France and Britain, including the former European high representative on foreign affairs, Baroness Ashton, and, in spite of tensions over Ukraine, also to Russia, and, to a lesser extent, China. Credit, too, to the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, who has had to face down suspicious hardliners at home".

The Israeli Media

The Israeli media coverage was taken from The New Arab Newspaper by its reporter Nidal Mohammed Watad. Date of publication is July 15, 2015. So, he reported that the widespread Israeli media coverage of the nuclear agreement between six world powers (Germany, France, China, Russia, US and Britain) and Iran was accompanied by bitter cries of politicians from right to left alike who described the deal as national disaster. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke during a news conference in Jerusalem, July 14th, 2015, saying that Israel would not be bound by the nuclear deal and would defend itself. However, the Israeli commentators seem to agree that the landmark agreement has resulted in the birth of an internationally recognized regional power, as a partner and part of the solution more than it is

part of the problem. Amos Harel and Zvi Barel in *HAARETZ* newspaper and Alex Fishman in *YNETNEWS* agreed that the deal is inconvenient reality and poses major challenges for Israel, but they also added that despite its disadvantages, it was not catastrophic for Israel's security.

In contrast, as expected the pro-Netanyahu newspaper *ISRAEL HAYOM*, funded by American casino mogul Sheldom Adelson, was the only outlet that adopted Netanyahu's melancholy narrative. Israel Hayom reporter Boaz Bismuth said for example the deal was a mark of disgrace on the international and western community. Also Dan Margalit said that the new situation will force Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the gulf to institutionalize security cooperation amongst them in order to deter Iran. In *Haaretz*, Arab affair commentator Zvi Barel said that the most important aspect of the deal was how Iran was dealt with during the negotiations as an equal to the other negotiating countries. He believes this raises questions on the future repercussions, and whether the deal will pave the way to accept Iran as a legitimate partner regionally and internationally.

Another person who tried to break out of the unified media chorus line was Ben-Israel. He is one of the greatest experts on the Iranian research program and its significance for Israel. In an article written for the Israeli daily *Yedioth Ahronoth*, he argued that the deal has several positive aspects. He said the agreement is not as dangerous as it is perceived by the Israeli public and decision-makers. "What we have here is a non-dialogue between people who do not want to listen. The agreement is not bad at all; it is even good for Israel. The president of the United States said that the deal distances Iran from a nuclear bomb for a decade or two, and he is correct. It distances the threat for a long time, it averts an atom bomb for 15 years, and that's not bad at all".

Ben-Israel told Al-Monitor that he was disappointed over the way the important discussion of the nuclear deal has taken place in the media, and the lack of impact his words had on the public. "This shows the great problem affecting the Israeli media. Our media is not a

dictatorship media, yet no dissenting voice is heard. On the other hand, every junior Knesset member suddenly becomes a nuclear expert and explains why the deal is terrible"

The Iranian Media

The Iranian media said that the signing of this historic deal is a "day of truth". This expresses the excitement of the Iranian media and the Iranian people who were awaiting this deal to end their sufferings. Iranian media coverage of the negotiations and agreement has been marked by longing, positivity and support. The celebration of this deal was successful and in line with Islamic law, and national customs. Iranian media took creative approaches to herald the nuclear deal. Let us take a roundup reaction of some newspapers.

Asia newspaper dedicated its front page almost entirely to one word: "DEAL". Iraj Jamshid, the editor in chief of Asia, wrote that since the Rouhani administration took office, Asia has made an extra effort to follow and report on the nuclear negotiations. He also noted that Asia was aware of this new government's ability to handle and resolve the nuclear issue.

Etemaad, a reformist newspaper declared "the world changed", and called the deal a "diplomatic revolution". Etemaad's editor argued that very few events throughout history make an impact on the world and, he wrote, "Without exaggeration this deal is one of those events that will change the world". Interestingly, *Shahravad* newspaper describes the deal as "An atomic explosion without a bomb". The paper quotes president Hassan Rouhani: "In order to have peace, one must compromise and pay, and even fight, but fight only at the negotiating table". *Shahravad* columnist Armin Montazeri writes that the deal will help Iran reach its ultimate long-term goal, which is to become the most powerful country in the region by 2025. "It is as if the world powers have realized that they cannot prevent Iran from doing so", he writes, and have concluded that "they need Iran's mental and physical support to fight against radicalism in the region".

Last but not least, *Ebtekar* devoted its front page to a mash-up image of Zarif and Mohamed Mossadegh, the former Iranian prime minister who nationalized the Iranian oil industry in 1951. The headline reads "the beginning of an Iranian era". Ebtekar compares the nuclear deal to that of the nationalization of oil and believes that the people of Iran will remember the date July 14, 2015, just as they remember Marsh 19, 1951.

The American Media

The media in the United States are divided in two, against and with, concerning the support of Iran's Deal 2015. The conservative media like *Fox News* and *The Washington Post* continue to wage a campaign to attack this historic deal. Anarticle on the front page of Washington Post on September 1ˢᵗ, 2015 reported on a Quinnipiac Survey of 1,563 registered voters taken August 20-25 that suggested that the deal reached by U.S and the world powers with Iran to limit Iran's nuclear program is unpopular with voters. According to *the Post*:

> House and Senate Democrats appear to get little politically, at least in the near term, out of going on the record for or against the Iran deal -- except yet another chance to take one for the team. A Monday Quinnipiac University poll revealed that just 25 percent of Americans support the deal, while 55 percent oppose it, yet Obama is close to his magic number of 34 in the Senate to save the deal from   Republicans in Congress. (*The Washington Post*, 9/1/15)

A Fox News national security analyst KT McFarland says: Iran Will "Very Likely" Expand Weapons Programs after Nuclear Deal. He considered Iran as a nuclear explosion, and must be severely sanctioned; otherwise a nuclear holocaust in the Middle East will happen if Iran goes through. He declares:

> Nothing's inevitable, and everything's preventable. But this Iran getting its hands on nuclear weapons and an Iran that talks about annihilating Israel, death to America, other countries in the region responding by getting nuclear weapons programs of their own. If nuclear weapons are awash in the Middle East, I think it's only a matter of time

before somebody uses one. Accidentally, inadvertently, or intentionally, but that's a part of the world that could see a nuclear explosion. (*Fox News*, America's Newsroom, 8/17/15)

Another Fox Analyst Ed Rollins contends that U.S. Must "Kill This Deal":

It's becoming more and more clear that the issue is the money and what they do with the money than just the nuclear weapon. Everybody's talked about the nuclear weapon, Khomeini has a new book, the Supreme Commander, called Palestine in which he basically said the nuclear weapon is to keep Israel from doing anything back to them, that they're going to take Israel out by the war of attrition, by Hezbollah, Hamas, what have you. And I think that's very accurate. So, we put sanctions on initially when they kidnapped and took over our embassy in 1978. So I think the reality is -- I don't care where our friends go. I think America has to take a stand here, and it's very, very important that we basically kill this deal. (Fox News, Sunday Morning Futures, 8/2/15)

However, *The New York Time* reported on August 8th, 2015: **"29 U.S. Scientists Praise Iran Nuclear Deal." This report did by William J. Broad**. He stated 'Twenty-nine of the nation's top scientists — including Nobel laureates, veteran makers of nuclear arms and former White House science advisers — wrote to president Obama on Saturday to praise the Iran deal, calling it innovative and stringent'.

The NBC News reported by Andrea Mitchell on August 19, 2015 '**Deal Between Iran And The IAEA Aims To "Close The File" On Past Activity At Parchin Only, And Not The Long-Term Inspection Regime As Part Of The Landmark Deal'**. *The NBC News* **explained that** the side deal between the IAEA and Iran pertains only to past military nuclear

activity at the Parchin military site, and "not the long-term inspection regime agreed to for the remainder of the nuclear deal":

Iran is required to "close the file" on past military dimensions of its nuclear program before it can get sanctions relief and proceed with the long-term nuclear deal negotiated in Vienna (*NBC News* 8/19/15).

But, Wednesday night, two senior U.S. officials told *NBC News* that the unusual arrangement between the IAEA and Tehran relates only to past military activity and that UN inspectors, including IAEA Director Yukiya Amano, would be on site to supervise the Iranians at every step of the way (*NBC News* 8/19/15).

Both sides agree the controversial arrangement only involves Parchin and military activity -- not the long-term inspection regime agreed to for the remainder of the nuclear deal. The administration claims the future inspection regime is unprecedented in its intrusiveness. (*NBC News* 8/19/15)

The NPR News also reported on July 20, 2015 that 'Nuke Inspectors Gear Up For Iran, But Americans Unlikely To Be Included'. *NPR* explained how the U.S. will most likely not directly inspect Iranian sites because the language in the agreement allows for only inspectors from countries that "have diplomatic relations with Iran" to protect the objectivity of the inspections:

The language in the agreement says that Iran "will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran."(*NPR*, 7/20/15)

Since the U.S. and Iran broke off ties after the 1979 Islamic revolution, it appears unlikely that any American inspectors will be getting a first-hand look at the Iranian nuclear facilities (*NPR*, 7/20/15).

U.S. officials say they will make sure the IAEA has what it needs. Jon Wolfsthal, a nuclear expert in the White House, told the Atlantic Council that the Obama administration is already offering technology to ensure Iran adheres to strict limits on its uranium enrichment program. (*NPR*, 7/20/15)

The Saudi Arabia Media

Saudi Arabian media attacked Iran's nuclear deal with world powers on Wednesday, with cartoonists depicting it as an assault on Arab interests and columnists decrying the focus on Tehran's atomic plans instead of its backing for regional militias.

Riyadh's official reaction to the deal was a terse statement that welcomed any agreement that would ensure Iran could not develop a nuclear arsenal, but stressed the importance of tough inspections and the ability to reimpose sanctions quickly. In private, however, Saudi officials fear an Iran released from international pressure and economic sanctions will have more freedom and money to back allies across the region who are opposed by Riyadh.

A cartoon in *Asharq al-Awsat*, a pan-Arab daily close to King Salman's branch of the ruling family, showed a trampled body marked "Middle East", with a placard saying "nuclear deal" sticking from its head. The top-hatted and turbaned silhouettes of America's Uncle Sam and an Iranian cleric ran across the body hand in hand, portraying a widely voiced concern that Washington's quest for a deal means it has realigned with Tehran at Arab expense. A Saudi official on Tuesday told Reuters he feared the agreement would make the Middle East more dangerous if it gave too many concessions to an Iranian government that Riyadh blames for turmoil in Yemen, Syria and Iraq.

In *al-Jazirah daily*, columnist Jasser al-Jasser wrote an article headlined "A terrorist Iran instead of a nuclear Iran", alluding to his fear that the deal would simply allow Tehran to back Shi'ite Muslim militias and militants. A concern that such Iranian involvement in Arab countries was feeding the sectarian conflict that allowed Islamic State to thrive was evident in

a cartoon in the Saudi daily al-Watan, also owned by a branch of the ruling family. It showed an Iranian cleric with a malignant facial expression turning the spigot on an oil pipeline marked "nuclear deal", from which dollar bills were pouring into the mouth of a masked militant labelled "terrorism".

In a column on the front page of *al-Hayat*, another Saudi-owned Arab daily, Ghassan Charbel also linked the deal to Islamic State, but he argued that it was shared fear of the group that had prompted Iran and the United States to agree. "A third man contributed to achieving the agreement without showing up or calling for it. His name is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi," he wrote, referring to the militant group's self-declared caliph.

3.17. US Exit from the Iran's deal 2015

Iran and US were in a nuclear agreement till 2018. When Donald Trump started his election campaign in 2016, he was a vocal critic of this agreement. He pledged to stop US commitment to the deal made with Iran and re-negotiate it. On April 19, 2017, the secretary of state Rex Tillerson told reporters that the administration will "review completely the JCPOA itself."[19] Tillerson considered Iran's nuclear program is grave risk to the world "Iran's nuclear ambitions are a grave risk to international peace and security," Tillerson argued that the "JCPOA fails to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran; it only delays their goal of becoming a nuclear state".

When Trump administration completed reviewing the deal, trump announced that the Administration would not issue an INARA-specified compliance certification, and that he would direct his Administration to "work closely with Congress and our allies to address the deal's many serious flaws so that the Iranian regime can never threaten the world with nuclear weapons." Trump demanded the congress a new legislation that would amend the Iran nuclear

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[19] An April 18 letter from Tillerson to Congress stated that this NSC-led review "will evaluate whether suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the JCPOA is vital to the national security interests of the United States."

agreement. A senior Administration official explained the same day that Trump "hopes to see an amendment to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act" which must:

- "demand that Iran allow timely, sufficient and immediate inspections at all sites that are requested by international inspectors from the IAEA";

- "ensure" that Iran does not become capable of producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than one year;

- allow the United States for an indefinite period of time to reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions if Iran does not comply with these new criteria; and

- "state explicitly ... that we view Iran's long-range missile programs and nuclear weapons as inseparable and that Iran's development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions."

On May 8, 2018, president Trump said that the US would no longer participate in the JCPOA, and he would re-impose the sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the JCPOA. Trump ordered secretary of State Pompeo to issue an agreement that would take into account steps to impose sanctions and the following elements:

- "First, Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.

- Second, Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy water reactor.

- Third, Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.

- Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.

- Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on spurious charges.

- Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

- Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of Shia militias.

- Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work toward a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.

- Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.

- Iran, too, must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease harboring senior al-Qaida leaders.

- Iran, too, must end the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] Qods Force's support for terrorists and militant partners around the world.

- And too, Iran must end its threatening behavior against its neighbors—many of whom are U.S. allies. This certainly includes its threats to destroy Israel, and its firing of missiles into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It also includes threats to international shipping and destructive ... cyberattacks."

Decision of trump to leave the Iran agreement marks a remarkable shift in the United States policy towards Iran nuclear issue for the next coming years. After the leniency shown during Obama presidency, trump came to change the strategy and to make the US tougher on Iran than ever. During a press briefing introduced by Secretaries Pompeo and Mnuchin, they explained that that they "decided to create joint teams of senior officials to visit every region of the world. These teams were launched on June 4th; this was for pressing Iran to stop its nuclear programme.

3.19. Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with essential ideas about media, its politics and content, Said's notions of Orient and Occident, Stuart Hall's representation of the Other and US-Iran rapprochement period (2013-2020). The chapter has laid out the main concepts of Orientalism and binary opposition that is built by dividing people between white and black, northern and southern, good and bad, and orient and occident. The chapter also has displayed some main stations of the US-Iran conflict throughout history, and this can help readers to understand the kind of relations between these two nations. Some events have been given a thorough explanation, especially events that are concerned with the representation of the Self and Other. All these concepts and events dealt with will certainly add another back-up theory to my study. At last, I have also explained Iran nuclear deal and Trump's order to pull US out of the JCPOA, because they are two historical decisions that US and Iran shaped, and they represent the topics the American press addressed. I have tried to explain reasons behind these decisions and how different international media portrayed these events. This chapter is going to help a lot in the analysis part. All the theories and concepts presented here will help answer the research problem and also help in gathering the data relevant to the research concern. Therefore, the next chapter will be devoted to explain the methodology of the research and textual analysis.

Chapter four

Research Methodology and Textual analysis

4.1. Introduction

This chapter begins with an overview of the methods adopted in the self and other representation and a meticulous explanation of the methodology designed for this research. The methodology adopted here includes the approaches and methods of analysis, the sampling data and an overview of both newspapers, New York Times and Washington Post. The chapter also includes the textual and data analysis of NYT and WP discourses using both a qualitative approach embodied in Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) and a quantitative one. The chapter concludes with the discussion of the findings. It explains the outcome of the analysis and discusses the implication of the study. The general conclusion brings all those findings of the study and discusses the contributions to the field of (political) discourse analysis.

4.2. An overview of methods adopted in the Self and Other representation

One of the undertakings of CDA is that it deals with the discursive representation of social actors, events and situation. As far as this research is concerned with political discourse, the discursive construction/representation pursues the purpose of promoting a particular political idea or action at the micro-level and a particular ideology or power relation at the higher (macro) level. Politicians and decision-makers, in order to emotionally persuade their readers, use certain rhetorical strategies like *victimisation*, *humanitarianism*, *empathy*, *dramatization, metaphor* and *hyperbole* as key means in constructing representations that serve their ideological purposes (van Dijk, 2000). Reinke de Buitrago (2016) maintains that politicians also emotionalise the representation of 'Self' and 'Other' in order to legitimise their policies.

The choice of methods and approaches of analysis primarily depends on the nature and context of data selected, as well as the research questions put forward for the research. The Self/Other representation topic has been dealt with in many studies, and almost the approaches used were for the analysis of discursive qualities of demarcation of 'Us' vs

'Them' on the basis of factors such as race, group, ethnicity, religion, social class, nationality, language/dialect, gender etc.[20]

Most discourse analysts varied their terms of analysis of such topic like this one in investigation. For example, van Dijk asserts that meaning cannot be deciphered at the formal structure, and he argues that there are topics and themes can be analysed by referring to the schematic knowledge, argumentation and topoi.

In CDA, there exist mechanisms and analytical categories. Flowerdew et al. (2002) believe that there are general strategic trends and ideological rhetoric for representing Self and Other. Therefore, based on this understanding, this research adopts Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach to examine the representation of social actors in discourse. I use this approach because it can serve to analyse the kind of data selected.

4.3. Methods in the Discourse Historical Approach

The Discourse Historical Approach accentuates historicity in discourse production and comprehension, and it attempts to incorporate various levels of historical analysis in the contextualisation and explication of linguistic analysis (KhosraviNik 2015, p.107). Methodology to DHA aims to be abductive and pragmatic, because the categories of analysis are first developed in line with the research questions, and a constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is suggested.

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[20]For CDA studies on anti-Semitism and anti-foreigner discourses in the Austrian context, see Wodak et al. (1994), Wodak et al. (1990), Mitten (1992), Wodak and Matouschek (1993), Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), and Reisigl and Wodak (2001). On the representation of refugees, asylum-seekers and immigrants in the British context, see Hartmann and Husband (1974), van Dijk (1987, 1991), Lynn and Lea (2003), Jones (2006), and KhosraviNik (2008, 2009, 2010b). See van Dijk (1987) for discriminatory discourses in the Dutch context and van Dijk (2005b) in the context of Spain and Latin America. On the role of language in asylum application procedures in Belgium, see Blommaert (2001b). For a study of French parliamentary discourses on immigration and nationality, see Van der Valk (2006). For an investigation of extreme negative representation of the Romani community in Romania, see Tileaga (2005); and see Pietikainen (2003) for a representation of the aboriginal Sami community in Finland. For research in the Hong Kong context and a representation of immigrant Chinese, see Flowerdew, Li and Tran (2002). On racism in the USA, see Santa Ana (1999); and for a representation of native New Zealanders, see Wetherell and Potter (1992). Finally, for research on the discursive dimensions of the representation of immigrants in Australia, see Teo (2000), Malcolm and Sharifian (2002) and Clyne (2005).

Van Dijk and Ruth Wodak, while analyzing topics pertaining to self and other representations in discourse[21], have applied many analytical tools and linguistic devices and they created new ones, too. Van Dijk incorporated his cognitive psychology approach in his analysis, yet, Wodak incorporated historicity in discourse production and interpretation

In their studies racist and discriminatory discourse, Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl developed a four-step strategy of analysis to move from theory to applied discourse analysis and to help define the strategies of Self- and Other-Presentation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). First, it is necessary to establish the specific *contents* or *topics* of a specific discourse (Racism, Nationalism, and anti-Semitism). Second, the investigation of the *discursive strategies*[22] is involved (argumentation strategy is among them). Third, the analysis and examination of *linguistic means* (as types) and specific, context-dependent *linguistic realisations* are involved too.(Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 93).

The discourse historical approach (DHA) is specifically oriented towards finding answers to the following questions as well as accounting for the discursive strategies through which certain perspectives are realized:

1. How are persons/objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?

2. What characteristics and qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?

3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?

4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?

5. Are the respective utterances overtly articulated, are they intensified or mitigated?

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[21]Van Dijk (1984, 1987, 1991, 2005b) characterises the qualities of racist, xenophobic discourses in various contexts and focuses on immigrants, asylum-seekers and ethnic minorities as out-groups. In the meantime, anti-Semitic/racist, and xenophobic ideologies have been the focus of many studies by Wodak (1996b, 1997, 2001b; 1994; 1990), Reisigl & Wodak (2001) and Wodak & Matouschek (1993).

[22]'Strategy' generally means 'a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. Discursive strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 94).

According to these five questions, there are five types of discursive strategies to be elaborated, as shown in the table below:

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
referential / nomination	discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena/events, and processes/actions	. membership categorization devices, deictics, . tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches . verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions
predication	discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena/events/processes, and actions (more or less positively or negatively)	• stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g., in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) • explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/ pronouns • collocations • explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) • allusions, evocations, and presuppositions/ implicatures • other
argumentation	justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	• *topoi* (formal or more content-related) • fallacies
Perspectivization/ framing or discourse representation	positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	• deictics • direct, indirect or free indirect speech • quotation marks, discourse markers/particles • metaphors • animating prosody • other
intensification, mitigation	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	• diminutives or augmentatives • (modal) particles, tag questions, use of the subjunctive, hesitations, vague expressions, etc. • hyperboles, litotes, • indirect speech acts (e.g., question instead of assertion) • verbs of saying, feeling, thinking • other

Summary of methods in the Discourse-Historical Approach
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 94)

The DHA is applied in this research of the Self/Other representation of Iran and legitimation/de-legitimation of the Self and the Other actions and discourses respectively in

the American press. In this study, DHA operationalizes its discourse analysis in three steps: the first identifies the general discourse topics, the second investigates the discursive strategies used to legitimize discourses under analysis, and the third examines the relevant context in which discourses are embedded.[23] The context of research and types of data gathered of this specific topic are most relevant to the DHA's discursive strategies. In fact, there have been a number of researches using DHA with the same topic, but with different data, time, context and research objectives. This research focuses on the period stretching from 2015 till current days (2020), when there have been different discourses emerged. In light of this, the analysis of data focuses on the following strategies:

Referential strategies aim to analyze the discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions. In doing this, it refers to the membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponymies, synecdoches and topical references via biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies, as well as by reference to verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions.

Predicational strategies target to analyze the discursive qualifications of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (positively or negatively). These are associated with stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit and explicit predicates (adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrase, infinitive clauses, collocations, allusions evocations and so on).

Argumentation strategies use a number of topoi to justify and question claims of truth and negative/positive attributions, e.g. positive and negative treatment, discrimination, social and political inclusion and exclusion.

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[23] Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse Historical Approach", Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (3rd ed.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London, Sage, 2016, p. 32-33.

Perspectivization strategies are discourse representations or framing by which the speaker expresses his/her involvement in discourse, position his point of view in a report, description, narration or quotation of discriminatory events or utterance.

Intensification or mitigation strategies imply how are discursive strategies, arguments, claims or points of view intensified or mitigated by linguistic means.

Figure.18 sums up the selected strategic aspects of self- and other-presentation:

Positive self-presentation and
negative other-presentation → Reference
Perspectivation and involvement
Argumentation
Predication
Intensification or mitigation

Figure.18: Strategies of self- and other-representation

Under all these discursive strategies, there are devices of analysis. Reisigl and Wodak proposed these analytical categories of the DHA, and this depends on the context of study and data selected for analysis. The following devices are to be used in the analysis of data selected during all this period between 2015 till current days, and the Iran specific discourse which involves different topics:

4.4. Topoi

The discourse historical approach makes use and considers the analysis of topoi as essential in the argumentation structure of discourse. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) characterise topoi (loci) as 'parts of argumentation which belongs to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises'. They are the content-related warrants or conclusion rules which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion (the claim), in other words, they justify the transition from the argument to the conclusion (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 74-5).

Van der Valk (2003), drawing on the French philosophers, defined topoi as *common places*, *lieux communs* in French. She summarises that topoi are a system of public

knowledge, a discursive resource in which one may find arguments or a sustaining conclusion. There has been a consensus over the use of topoi in social and political arena. She further asserts that topoi are effective in persuasion and hence applicable to argumentation analysis in CDA, they 'provide standard arguments, typical for specific issues' (ibid.).Myers (2005) refers to "commonplaces" as being 'at the heart of legitimate public opinion', and he argues too that commonplaces invoke a sense of shared experience and provide 'perspective', 'ironic predictability' or 'scepticism' (ibid.: 536).

Kienpointner (1997) sees topoi as "search formula" which tell you how and where to look for arguments, and help in the transition from argument to conclusion (1997: 226). He asserts that topoi depend on context in finding arguments, and this is in line with DHA which considers context as a crucial aspect of explanation.

> General topoi are applicable to all sorts of debates, issues and situations … As the general topoi are likely to be accepted by all participants in a discussion, they provide common ground. However, there are no standardised 'recipes' for the application of general topoi. They have to be adapted to specific contexts of argumentation. To do this, one needs intuition and creativity. (ibid.: 233)

Zompetti (2006: 20) views topoi as 'a decoding system, allowing the researcher to scan material to allow the topoi to pinpoint specific and general types of arguments' (ibid.). The application of topoi analysis helps in developing 'critical thinking' which can enable 'people to question issues in order to uncover hidden meanings, agendas, and purposes' maintaining that:

> Topoi offer us a systematic, organized process whereby we can acquire, interpret, manage and use information (in the form of arguments) critically … if topoi help us to identify and understand arguments quickly, then they also enhance that aspect of critical thinking. (2006: 23)

Topoi can function either on reasonable or fallacious bases. There are rules for rational disputes and constructive arguing which allow discerning reasonable topoi from fallacies. Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 110), following the pragma-dialectical approach of Van Eemeren and Grootendorsi (1992), summarize these rules as: 'the freedom of arguing, the obligation to give reasons, the correct reference to the previous discourse by the antagonist, the obligation to 'matter-of-factness', the correct reference to implicit premises, the respect of shared starting points, the use of plausible arguments and schemes of argumentation, logical validity, the acceptance of the discussions results, and the clarity of expression and correct interpretation'.

This research which investigates positive self and negative other-presentation requires argumentative strategies, and topoi are parts of argumentation. A list of different topoi is given in **table.4**

TABLE 4.2   List of topoi

1	Usefulness, advantage	9	Finances
2	Uselessness, disadvantage	10	Reality
3	Definition, name-interpretation	11	Numbers
4	Danger and threat	12	Law and right
5	Humanitarianism	13	History
6	Justice	14	Culture
7	Responsibility	15	Abuse
8	Burdening, weighting		

Table.4: List of Topoi

The topos of **usefulness** or **advantage** can be explained by means of the following conditional: if an action is needed and useful, one should do it (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).This topos is categorized into three subtypes: 1) the advantage of all, 2) the advantage of us, and 3) the advantage of them (p.74).

The topos of **uselessness** and **disadvantage** is also a specific casual argumentation and it relies on conditional too. It can be paraphrased: if one can anticipate that the prognosticated

consequences of a decision will not happen, or if other political actions are more likely to lead to the declared aim, the decision has to be rejected. If existing rulings do not help to reach the declared aims, they have to be changed.

The topos **of definition** or topos of name-interpretation or locus a *nominis interpretation* can be traced back to the following conclusion rule: if an action, a thing or a person (group of persons) is named/designated (as) X, the action, thing or person (group of persons) carries or should carry the qualities/traits/attributes contained in the (literal) meaning of X.

The topos of **danger** or topos of **threat** is based on the following conditional: if a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not perform it or do it. Or, if there are specific dangers or threats, one should do something against them.

The topos of **humanitarianism** can be paraphrased by the following conditional: 'if a political action or decision does or does not conform with human rights or humanitarian convictions or values, one should or should not perform or take it'. This topos can be employed in every situation where one argues against unequal treatment and discrimination and for the recognition of 'racialized', ethnic, religious, gender or other differences.

It is closely connected with the topos of **justice** that is based on the principle and claim of 'equal rights for all'. As a conditional phrase, it means that if persons/actions/situations are equal in specific respects, they should be treated/ dealt with in the same way. For example: as far as social security is concerned, workers should be treated equally, that is to say, irrespective of their citizenship, as they make the same social security payment contributions.

The topos of **burdening or weighing down** is to be regarded as a specific causal topos (a topos of consequence) and can be reduced to the following conditional: if a person, an institution or a 'country' is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens. Within this context, one can find the metaphorical phrase '*das Boot ist voll'*, 'the boat is full/overcrowded'.

The topos of **reality** can be paraphrased as follows: because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made. A general example would be: social, political and economic realities have changed and the Asylum Act no longer fits. Therefore, the law must also be changed.

The topos of **history** can be described as follows: because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to (history teaches lessons).

The topos of **culture** is based on the following argumentation scheme: because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise in specific situations.

The topos of **abuse** can be explained by the conclusion that: if a right or an offer for help is abused or violated, the right should be changed, or the help should be withdrawn, or measures against the abuse should be taken.

4.5. Analysis of the context

DHA considers context a crucial element to understand language. This could be explained in points of recontextualisation. This feature is so important in analyzing the discourse of this study. Recontextualisation in discourse relates to the concepts of inter-textuality and inter-discursivity. Martin and Wodak (2003, p. 7) consider it as 'formulating and reconstructing the past in different genres and discourses, overtime'. Recontextualisation involves not only a process of thrusting new meaning onto a text/discourse transferred and transformed from a different context, but also of invoking and perpetuating the assumption and 'old knowledge' repertoire of the new context and thrusting it onto the imported discourse. Recontextualisation can be analyzed by tracing the history and trajectory of related documents and their textual transformations in detail (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 124).

4.6. Sample Design

This title covers the newspapers genre (type) chosen for analysis, an overview of the newspapers and their historical background, the process of selecting data, and the data collection procedures.

4.6.1. Type of data

Media have many different genres. The genre chosen for the investigation of this study is newspaper. Newspapers (American ones) generally are divided into sections or sub-genres (opinion, editorials, etc.). The data of the study are taken from opinion and editorial as well as analysis articles. These three sections contain commentaries, topic analysis of either the public or the newspapers themselves. Opinions are defined as evaluative beliefs, beliefs that presuppose value, and that involves a judgement about somebody or something (van Dijk, 1998). Discourse opinions are personal views of the writer or the expert of the issue. Editorials are the institutional voice of the newspaper and they express the newspaper's stands and attitudes towards national or international issue. Editorials are usually organized along three schematic categories. They define the situation and give a summary of the news event. They present an evaluation of the situation—especially of actions and actors. They advance pragmatic conclusions in the form of expectations, recommendations, advice, and warnings (van Dijk, 1992). Both opinion articles and editorials are deliberately made to persuade the readers towards a certain topic using some argumentative and persuasive strategies. It was mentioned by Faroukhi and Nazemi (2015) that they "deliberately influence the social cognition of their readers by making use of different persuasion and argumentation strategies and devices" (p. 155). I chose three sub-genres because they discuss diverse issue from different perspectives; they are place for expressing different ideologies, and above all, CDA is mostly interested in this type of the discursive manifestations of these sub-genres (opinions, editorials and analysis)

4.6.2. Selected newspapers

4.6.2.1. New York Times newspaper

It is sometimes called The Times. It is an American newspaper based in New York City and founded in 1851 by Henry Jarvis Raymond and former banker George Jones. It has long been regarded within the industry as national newspaper of record; it is ranked the third of circulation in US. Its motto is "All the News That's Fit to Print". Moreover, The Times has been organized into different sections, News, Editorials/Opinions-Columns/Op-Ed, New York (metropolitan), Business, Sports of The Times, Arts, Science, Styles, Home, Travel and other features.

The New York Times editorial page is often regarded as liberal. Since 1960, the newspaper has endorsed the Democratic Party nominee in every presidential election. However, The Times did endorse moderate Republican Mayor of New York City Rudy Giuliani in 1997 and Michael Bloomberg in 2005 and 2009. The *Times* also endorsed Republican New York state governor George Pataki for re-election in 2002.

The Times relies on its own in-house stylebook rather than The Association Press Stylebook. When referring to people, the newspaper generally uses **_honorifics_**[24] rather than unadorned last names. In August 2014, the *Times* decided to use the word "torture" to describe incidents in which interrogators "inflicted pain on a prisoner in an effort to get

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[24] An honorific is a title that conveys esteem, courtesy, or respect for position or rank when used in addressing or referring to a person. Sometimes, the term "honorific" is used in a more specific sense to refer to an honorary academic title. It is also often conflated with systems of honorific speech in linguistics, which are grammatical or morphological ways of encoding the relative social status of speakers. Honorifics can be used as prefixes or suffixes depending on the appropriate occasion and presentation in accordance with style and customs.

information." This was a shift from the paper's previous practice of describing such practices as "harsh" or "brutal" interrogations.

The paper maintains a strict profanity policy. It does mention words and phrases of profanity when the news has value. For example, the *Times* has on occasion published unfiltered video content that includes profanity and slurs where it has determined that such video has news value. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign, the *Times* did print the words "fuck" and "pussy" among others, when reporting on the vulgar statements made by Donald Trump in a 2005 recording.

In mid-2004, the newspaper's then-public editor Daniel Okrent wrote once that the New York Times did have liberal bias in news coverage of certain social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Elizabeth Spayd, The Times editor, wrote in 2016 that Conservatives and many Moderates accuse the paper of harbouring liberal bias.

A 2015 study found that *The New York Times* fed into an overarching tendency towards national bias. During the Iranian nuclear crisis the newspaper minimized the "negative processes" of the United States while overemphasizing similar processes of Iran. This tendency was shared by other papers such as *The Guardian*, *Tehran Times*, and *The Fars News Agency*.

The *New York Times* newspaper was considered as America's leading newspaper during the American hostage crisis and that was because of, as Said put it:

> its catholicity, level of expert reporting, responsibility, and, most important, its ability to write credibly from the viewpoint of national security give it a force of unique gravity. In others words, the *Times* can speak authoritatively about a subject and also make that subject pertinent to the nation; it does so deliberately and, it seems, successfully. ….. *The Times* had now reached a critical mass, not a mass in terms of readers and advertisers, although this was inextricably linked to it. No, it had reached a

critical mass of reporting and expertise. It now genuinely covered the world, covered Washington, covered the nation and the city with its own staff men and women, and these were not merely journeymen. They were the best reporters and editors who could be obtained (p.92).

4.6.2.2. The Washington Post newspaper

Washington post is an American daily newspaper published in Washington, D.C. It is the most- widely circulated newspaper within the **Washington metropolitan area**[25]and has a large national audience. On May 2013, its average weekday circulation was 474,767 making it the seventh largest newspaper in US by circulation (behind USA Today, Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Daily News, and the New York Post). The newspaper has won 69 **Pulitzer Prizes**[26], the second-most of any publication, after the New York Times. The newspaper is known for its **political reporting**. It was founded in 1877 by Stilson Hutchin (1838–1912), and in 1880 it added a Sunday edition, becoming the city's first newspaper to publish seven days a week.

Unlike *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*, The Washington Post does not print an edition for distribution away from the East Coast. In 2009, the newspaper ceased

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[25]The **Washington metropolitan area** is the metropolitan area centered on Washington, D.C., the capital of the United States. The area includes all of the federal district and parts of the U.S. states of Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia. It is part of the larger Baltimore–Washington metropolitan area.

[26]The **Pulitzer Prize** is an award for achievements in newspaper, magazine, online journalism, literature and musical composition within the United States. It was established in 1917 by provisions in the will of Joseph Pulitzer, who had made his fortune as a newspaper publisher and is administered by Columbia University. Prizes are awarded yearly in twenty-one categories. In twenty of the categories, each winner receives a certificate and a US$15,000 cash award. The winner in the public service category is awarded a gold medal.

publication of its *National Weekly Edition*, which combined stories from the week's print editions, due to shrinking circulation. The majority of its newsprint readership is in the District of Columbia and its suburbs in Maryland and Northern Virginia.

Prior the Iraq invasion 2003 by US, the journalist **Bill Moyers** said that there were 27 editorials supporting the Bush administration's ambitions to invade Iraq. Some journalists such as **Walter Pincus** were ordered to cease critics towards the administration. On March 26, 2007, **Chris Matthews** said on his television program, "Well, *The Washington Post* is not the liberal newspaper it was, Congressman, let me tell you. I have been reading it for years and it is a **neocon**[27] newspaper". In 2009, the Post was criticized by its unfair reporting on liberal politicians, including Vice President Al Gore and President Barak Obama.

The Post has endorsed a number of political candidates, republicans and Democrats. On October 17, 2008, the Post endorsed Barack Obama for president of the United States. On October 25, 2012, the newspaper endorsed Obama's re-election. The paper has never endorsed a Republican for president. On September 28, 2020, it endorsed Joe Biden for 2020 united states presidential election.

In February 2017, the *Post* adopted the slogan "Democracy dies in Darkness" for its masthead.

4.6.3. The Sampling Data

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[27]**Neoconservatism** is a political movement born in the United States during the 1960s among liberal hawks who became disenchanted with the increasingly pacifist foreign policy of the Democratic Party and with the growing New Left and counterculture of the 1960s, particularly the Vietnam protests. Some also began to question their liberal beliefs regarding domestic policies such as the Great Society. Neoconservatives typically advocate the promotion of democracy and interventionism in international affairs, including peace through strength, and are known for espousing disdain for communism and political radicalism.

The data selected for this study are from online version of daily New York Times and Washington Post. These data have been selected in the period when, first, the United States and its allies signed the Iran nuclear deal in July 14th, 2015, with Iran. Second period is when Trump announced to cancel and dissolve Iran nuclear agreement and pull US out of the JCPOA in 2018. The data will be accurately selected in terms of period of time, their relevance to the research questions and the approach of analysis applied. The data are headlines, statements and excerpts. They will be taken from the opinion and editorials sections of both. I choose New York Times and Washington post because they have moderate position in US media, and they are considered among the leading newspapers in the country, also they have wide range of public reading and they almost cover many international political issues.

So the analysis will combine the discursive strategies of Wodak's approach (DHA) with recontextualisation. The analysis procedure is divided into New York Times textual analysis and Washington post one. It starts by New York Times newspaper. Some samples will be taken and explained for each discursive strategy, their linguistic and pragmatic meaning. A quantitative approach is employed in the analysis to count the occurrence of the Self (US and its allies) and Other (Iran and the nuclear deal) in each newspaper from 2015 till 2020.

4.7. Textual analysis of New York Times

4.7.1. Introduction

This part of analysis investigates the representation of different social actors (Iranians and American and their allies) and their actions and practices as well as the Iran nuclear deal in New York Times selected articles. To uncover the discursive strategies employed by the newspaper to represent the social actors and their discourses, I conducted a detailed analysis by drawing on Wodak's referential, predicational and argumentative (topoi) strategies and the analysis of context (recontextualisation).

The first phase of analysis begins with representation of the Self/Other and the deal during Iran deal 2015. Here I examined how are US and its allies, Iran and Iran deal referred to. I also examined how US and its allies and Iran are predicated. Last, I investigated the topos used by the newspaper to argue for or against the Iran nuclear deal and Iran's nuclear practices, and I used recontextualisation and interdiscursivity to read some inherited ideologies in the text. Finally, I bring these findings together to demonstrate the ways these social actors build their discourse to construct an account of Iran nuclear deal. The second phase takes the same steps but it is about the representation of the Self/Other and the deal during Trump's order to pull US out of the nuclear deal 2015. The accounts of this analysis will bring together to draw the final conclusion about the kind of discourse about Iran during Trump presidency.

4.7.2. Discourse topics analysis

The analysis of discourse topics of this study are exclusively related to Iran nuclear deal that took place during the period stretching between 2015 and 2020. The study focuses on two major events that would provide enough and various data to the research analysis and help realize the objectives of the study. These events were fully reported and analyzed in New York Times' different sections: Iran nuclear deal 2015 and Trump's order to pull US out of the JCOAP on May 8th, 2018. The tables below show the number of articles on Iran nuclear deal between 2015 and 2020.

2015	Articles	2017	Articles	2018	Articles	2019	Articles	2020	Article
July	32	July	10	July	10	July	19	July	21
Aug	24	Aug	17	Aug	17	Aug	15	Aug	16
Sept	17	Sept	20	Sept	30	Sept	10	Sept	11
Oct	16	Oct	25	Oct	42	Oct	16	Oct	22
Nov	12	Nov	30	Nov	40	Nov	22	Nov	29
Dec	10	Dec	35	Dec	35	Dec	30	Dec	39
Jan	9	Jan	22	Jan	29	Jan	31	Jan	40
Feb	6	Feb	16	Feb	22	Feb	28	Feb	41
Mar	5	Mar	10	Mar	19	Mar	30	Mar	33
Apr	3	Apr	5	Apr	21	Apr	20	Apr	11
May	1	May	2	May	22	May	11	May	9
June	1	June	1	June	20	June	17	June	3

The number of articles on Iran nuclear deal between 2015 and 2020 in NYT

The table shows that articles on Iran nuclear deal witness an increase and high number during the first weeks of July and August 2015, November and December 2017, October and November 2018. The NYT wrote many articles due to the freshness and up-to-date events of the nuclear deal. These articles are the basis for both NYT data selection, and they are assumed to be the most articles that represent the data which go along with DHA and answer the hypotheses.

4.7.3. Representation of the Self/Other and the deal during Iran deal 2015 in New York Times

First, the analysis of discourse topics of New York Times newspaper mainly focuses on the opinions and analysis of Iran nuclear deal that was struck between Iran and P5+1 on 14th July, 2015. The analysis mainly focuses on how the discursive strategies of the newspaper depict the self/other representation of the deal and the actors involved (participants) in the deal. These participants are the P5 group including the United States which represent the notion *us* and Iran leaders who represent the *other*. The discourse topics to be analyzed are those which

come after the day of the deal 14th July, 2015, and last till the end of 2016. The table below shows the number of articles found in New York Times about Iran nuclear deal in 2015 and 2016.

The new York times	Iran's Nuclear Deal 2015	2015-2016
Total Numbers of Articles Analyzed	All retrieved from the New York Times archive	5
Number of Articles in 2015	The New York Times	4
Number of Articles in 2016	The New York Times	1

Table.5: Number of Articles Found in the New York Times for Iran's Nuclear Deal 2015

Figure.19 below also shows the topics discourse discussed regarding the nuclear deal in the period between 2015 till 2016.

The NYT's discourse topics on Iran nuclear deal during 2015

Topic1**Iran is a terrorist superpower**

Topic2 **Iran is untrustworthy**

Topic 3 **Iran deal is historic and specific**

Topic 4 **US and its allies as initiator of the deal**

Topic 5 **Israel and Saudi Arabia oppose the deal**

Topic 6 **sanctions lifting**

Topic 7 **the deal as a new chapter in US-Iran relations**

Topic 8 **Iran as a threat in the Middle East**

Figure.19: The NYT discourse topics about Iran and Iran deal 2015

4.7.3.1. Referential strategy: Self (US and its allies)

Table below shows the number of occurrence of US and its allies in New York Times newspapers. The United States was the first social actor in the corpus in terms of saliency of its presence. It was the most recurrent social actor in the New York Times (65 times), and then come US's allies (28 times)

Self (West) actors	US actors	EU actors
Number of occurrences	65	28

Table.6: Presence of the US and its allies in New York Times

According to the number of occurrence in table, the United States is the first major social actor attended to in New York Times' discourse. From reading the articles about Iran's deal, there are three distinct types of representing the Americans: Obama and his administration (referred as Obama, president Obama, Obama and his administration, Mr.President, He, I, the white house), America as a nation (referred as US and We) and American critics of the deal (Israel's prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Republicans, the NYT's critics). The EU represents also the self. It occurs many times and it is represented by the Americans' allies (France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia) or some European critics of the deal.

Throughout the whole analysed articles, it seems that the New York Times refers to the Self by focusing on "Mr. Obama", "Obama administration", "white house", "Congress" and "American officials", or it uses the pronoun "I" which expressed in quotations.

> **Mr. Obama**, in an early morning appearance at the White House that was broadcast live in Iran, **began what promised to be an arduous effort to sell the deal** to **Congress** and the American public, saying the agreement is "not built on trust — it is built on verification." *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015
>
> He made it abundantly clear he would fight to preserve the deal from critics in **Congress who are beginning a 60-day review**, declaring, "**I will veto any legislation** that prevents the successful implementation of this deal." *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015

But **American officials also acknowledged** that after the first decade, the breakout time would begin to shrink. It was unclear how rapidly, because Iran's longer-term plans to expand its enrichment capability will be kept confidential. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

In the long run-up to Tuesday's nuclear agreement with Iran, **the Obama administration repeatedly suggested that the accord was part of a larger strategic shift** in Washington's approach to Iran. (The New York Times Op-Ed, 15 July 2015)

The White House can hope that will happen but should not expect it. (The New York Times Op-Ed, 15 July 2015)

The main reference to the self in New York Times' content is first President or Mr. Obama and then 'we'. The pronoun '**we**' here refers to either America or Obama administration. They are used systematically whenever the need arises to stress their accomplishment and success in signing the nuclear deal with Iran.

Today, because **America negotiated from a position of strength and principle**, **we have stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region**.*The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

Mr. Obama said, "But really, what that involves is eliminating the presence of knowledge inside of Iran." Since that is not realistic, the president added, "The question is, Do**we** have the kind of inspection regime and safeguards and international consensus whereby it is not worth it for them to do it? **We have accomplished that**. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

President Obama did not set out to change Iran but **he has created a framework** that, over a decade, might. (The New York Times Op-Ed, 16 July 2015)

The New York Times sometimes also uses some references, such as Europe, EU, China and American ministers like the US foreign minister Mr. Kerry, in reference to the Self. All these references denote the West or western countries which are involved in Iran's nuclear deal file and and political figures involved in negotiations.

Defending the outcome, **Mr. Kerry told reporters** here that China and Russia had favored lifting the entire arms embargo immediately, suggesting he had no choice but to try to strike a middle ground. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

Diplomats also came up with unusual procedure to "snap back" the sanctions against Iran if an eight-member panel determines that Tehran is violating the nuclear provisions. The members of the panel are **Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia**, the United States, the **European Union** and Iran itself. A majority vote is required, meaning that Russia, China and Iran could not collectively block action. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

The New York Times makes also reference to the self by considering some countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries as their allies. This means that the NYT always stresses and pays attention to the block of these countries and their attitude towards Iran, which is extremely against its nuclear activities.

> Mr. Obama will also have to manage the breach with **Mr. Netanyahu and the leaders of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states who have warned against the deal**, saying the relief of sanctions will ultimately empower the Iranians throughout the Middle East. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

The other group which is included in the Self is those who are against the deal, namely, the Republicans. They are very critic and they condemn the deal from the outset. Additionally, the self is represented by America as a state or government and American sanctions which are posed on Iran, and also by major world powers.

> **The Republican presidential candidates fell all over themselves today trying to see who could condemn the nuclear deal with Iran** the most quickly and in the most cataclysmic terms. (The New York Times Op-Ed, 14 July 2015)
>
> So what do the **critics**, from **Republican presidential** hopefuls to the Israeli government, seek in place of the deal with Iran that verifiably blocks Tehran's path to a nuclear weapon… Presumably, they want what would have happened if negotiations had collapsed. (The New York Times Op-Ed, 16 July 2015)
>
> **The Republican presidential** hopefuls repeated that formula today — condemnation of the deal with no credible alternative to offer. (The New York Times Op-Ed, 14 July 2015)
>
> The final deal with Iran announced by **the United States and other major world powers does what no amount of political posturing**… (The New York Times Editorial, 14 July 2015)

The New York Times referential strategy is sometimes explicit and implicit. It is explicit when it refers to the doers of the action in its proper name, such as US, diplomats and the world. It is implicit when it refers to names like international consensus, international response, international disunity and international Atomic Energy Agency. Such names like these are usually dealt with in the written press. It has been noticed in NYT newspaper that

these explicit and implicit names represented as against Iran political system and they are

peace keepers in the world.

> **Diplomats also came up with unusual procedure to "snap back" the sanctions** against Iran if an eight-member panel determines that Tehran is violating the nuclear provisions. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

> Those bans would be removed even sooner if the **International Atomic Energy Agency reached a definitive conclusion that the Iranian nuclear program is entirely peaceful**, and that there was no evidence of cheating on the accord or any activity to obtain weapons covertly. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

> A collapse of the talks would have freed Iran to go forward and left America struggling to maintain a sanctions regime weakened by **international disunity**. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 19 July 2015)

4.7.3.2. Referential strategy: Other (Iran)

Other actors	Iranians actors
Number of occurrences	32

Table.7: Presence of Iran in New York Times

'Iran' is the second most recurrent noun mentioned in The New York Times' discourse. The

newspaper refers to Iran with different nouns, positive and negative, passive and active, and

neutral and collective. This nomination has its implications. Authors of New York Times

labeled Iran with different nouns such as 'terrorist nuclear superpower', 'Iran's ability',

'Iran's long-term plan' and 'Iran', but 'Iran' is the dominant word.

> Almost as soon as the agreement was announced, to cheers in Vienna and on the streets of Tehran, its harshest critics said it would ultimately empower **Iran** rather than limit its capability. Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, called it a "historic mistake" that would create a "**terrorist nuclear superpower**." *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

> Yet, it left open areas that are sure to raise fierce objections in Congress. It preserves **Iran's ability to produce as much nuclear fuel** as it wishes after year 15 of the agreement, and allows it to conduct research on advanced centrifuges after the eighth year. Moreover, **the Iranians won the eventual lifting of an embargo** on the import

and export of conventional arms and ballistic missiles. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

But American officials also acknowledged that after the first decade, the breakout time would begin to shrink. It was unclear how rapidly, because **Iran's longer-term plans to expand its enrichment capability** will be kept confidential. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

Secretary of state, John Kerry, who led the negotiations for the United States in the final rounds, sought in his remarks Tuesday to blunt criticism on this point. "**Iran will not produce or acquire highly enriched uranium**" or plutonium for at least 15 years, he said. Verification measures, he added, will "stay in place permanently." *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

The New York Times also does focus and accompany Iran or the Iranian regime with the adjective 'Islamic', and sometimes make reference to Iran as a state with 'Iranian officials'.

Nevertheless, some mysteries remain. For example, it is not clear whether the inspectors would be able to interview the scientists and engineers who were believed to have been at the center of an effort by **the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to design a weapon** that Iran could manufacture in short order. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

Iranian officials, however, have said that **Iran should be treated like any other nation**, and not be subjected to an arms embargo if it meets the terms of a nuclear deal. *The New York Times*, July 14, 2015.

There are also occasional, negative and radical references to Iranian officials and regime; the newspaper described them as hardline, anti-American, anti-Semitic. This is to make clear distinction between ordinary people in Iran who cheered the nuclear agreement and those politicians who always discourage any step toward US-Iran rapprochement.

An article by Erdbrink on July 16, 2015, was titled: "Iranian Hard-Liners Say Nuclear Accord Crosses Their Redlines." The use of the term '**hard-liners**' conveys an image of rigid, radical people.

There are also references to Iran (Other) describing it as an untrusty nation and regime. Though the nuclear deal reached is for the advantage of the west and Iran, several articles in NYT tend to always insist on the negative representation of Iran. An article by Harris & Shear (July 15, 2015) published just after the deal was reached, quoted Senator Tom Cotton as

saying the deal was a "nuclear agreement with an **outlaw regime** and the American people will repudiate this deal and Congress will kill the deal with a veto proof majority" (p. 2)

Republicans and independents, as opponents of Obama's decision to sign an agreement with Iran, have not always put trust in the Iranian regime, and they have called for inspection of Iran's nuclear buildings. The NYT reported these evaluative references of untrustworthiness in several themes such as 'inspection','remain undecided' and 'republicans' negative reaction to the deal'. For instance, the independent senator, Angus King claimed in an article that "he would **seek consultation from a former weapons inspector** and a nuclear physicist before agreeing to side with Democrats" (Steinhauer & Weisman, July 15, 2015, p.1). The article concluded by focusing on the theme that Iran is untrustworthy again by stating that even though a deal had been reached there were still concerns:

> The most significant worry for Democrats and Independents is the inspection regime in the nuclear deal, which falls short of decreeing it can be done, anytime, anywhere – which ultimately is what caused Democrats to **remain truly undecided until the hearing date on the nuclear accord in Congress.** (p. 3).

The Republican reaction to the deal came in what the senator Bob Corker was quoted as saying "we're driving at this based solely on our **own instincts**" (Baker, July 15, 2015, p. 6), meaning that United States Congress could not trust Iran's words and commitments to the deal. Also, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina was quoted as saying "Mr. Kerry's argument that the deal would empower **Iranian moderates is a gross misunderstanding of Iran**" (p. 6). Graham was implying here that there is no such thing as a moderate in Iran and all Iranians are radicals who cannot be trusted.

Many articles have been written about Iran as a cheating and untrusty regime, and this is clearly noticed in what Senator Jim Risch, a Republican in Idaho, told John Kerry that: "One thing that **bothers me** is the billions of dollars that Iran is going to get if sanctions are lifted…Everything we are trying to do in the world has their fingerprints on it trying to do us

in" (Steinhauer, July 23, 2015, p. 2). Also, David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security and a former weapons inspector in Iraq claimed: "Iranians are **practiced at cheating**; you can't count on them to make a mistake" (p. 1).

The other theme that NYT refers a lot in Iran nuclear issue overall is **Iran is a terrorist nation**. It has been dealt with since Iran's Islamic Revolution 1979, notably American Hostage crisis. Though Obama's administration initiative of the nuclear deal 2015, US still consider Iran as a nation spreading terrorism in the world. Republicans are most people in US who always and explicitly call Iran a terrorist nation. For example, in one article General Martin E. Dempsey was quoted as telling Congress that the "nuclear deal with Iran would not stop the Iranian government from funding organizations that the United States labelled as **being terrorist groups**" (Cooper & Harris July 29, 2015, p.1). The Republican senator Ted Cruz said: "Kerry should apologize to families of American military forces who were killed in Iraq by **Shiite forces** using weaponry provided by Iran" (p.3).

There are also referential expressions in NYT that point to Iran as an unpredictable and uncertain in its relations to the West in general. The editorials in the New York Times on July 18th, 2015, titled "The Morning After the Iran Deal," focussed on this point "human rights, terrorism, and ballistic missiles, sanctions under United States law, will remain in place indefinitely in order to keep pressure on Iran" (p. 1). The NYT always brings the issues of human rights, terrorism, and ballistic missiles and sanctions to the front of its pages and considers them as key points of argument. Another article by Gordon & Sanger (July 19, 2015) focused on Kerry's warning to Congress about voting against the deal: "If Congress says 'no' to this deal, then there will be no restraints on Iran. There will be no sanctions left. Our friends in this effort will desert us" (p. 2).

4.7.3.3. Referential strategy: Iran nuclear deal

newspaper	New York Times
Number of occurrences of the deal	17

Table.8: Presence of the deal in New York Times

The central term in Iran nuclear deal issue since 2015 has been the term 'nuclear deal' or 'the deal'. It is a frequent and recurrent word and is mentioned (17 times) more than any other terms that have a direct and important relation to the topic. It is a target term that NYT uses when it refers to display it as bad or good, negative or positive, unimportant or important, etc. the NYT uses adjectives or phrase to describe the deal such as in the following excerpts:

> So, yes, we could have gotten a **better deal**. (*The New York Times Op-Ed, 19 July 2015*)

> It puts strong**, verifiable limits on Iran's ability** to develop a nuclear weapon for at least the next 10 to 15 years and is potentially one of the most consequential accords in recent diplomatic history, with the ability not just to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but also to reshape Middle East politics. (*The New York Times Editorial, 14 July 2015*)

Most of the world leaders reacted to the deal positively, and they welcomed it. It has been referred in NYT with some key referential such as 'specific', 'historic', 'preferable' and 'new chapter'.

> Compared with many past efforts to slow a nation's nuclear program-including deal struck with North Korea 20 years ago — **this agreement is remarkably specific.** Nevertheless, **some mysteries remain**. For example, it is not clear whether the inspectors would be able to interview the scientists and engineers who were believed to have been at the center of an effort by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to design a weapon that Iran could manufacture in short order. *New York times July 14, 2015*

> In building his argument for the deal, Mr. Obama stressed that **the accord was vastly preferable to the alternate scenario**: no agreement and an unbridled nuclear arms race in the Middle East. "Put simply, no deal means a greater chance of more war in the Middle East," he said. He said his successors in the White House "will be in a far stronger position" to restrain Iran for decades to come than they would be without the pact. *New York times July 14, 2015*

Tehran - 14 July 2015 SOUNDBITE (Farsi) Hassan Rouhani, Iranian President: "**The page of the past 12-year period**, which was accompanied by illusions from the world powers and spreading of these illusions in the society and public opinion, **has completely turned and a new chapter has begun**. This new chapter opens on the basis that the solution to problems in the world can have a shorter and less costly path as well." *New York times July 14, 2015*

Jerusalem - 14 July 2015 SOUNDBITE (English) Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli prime minister: // (SOUNDBITE) (English) BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, PHILIP HAMMOND, SAYING: "Well first of all **the removal of the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon is a game changer** in terms of our ability to engage with Iran. The lifting of the sanctions means that our businesses will be able to invest in Iran. *New York times July 14, 2015*

However, the NYT always gives part of its reports to Israel, specifically in the Iran nuclear issue. It has reported that Israel opposes the deal and considers it as 'mistake. This negative representation of the deal in the newspaper aims at de-legitimizing the nuclear agreement signed between P5 and Iran.

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli prime minister said: "**this deal is a historic mistake** for the world" and will allow "to continue to pursue its aggression and terror in the region" *New York Times July 14, 2015*

Congress gets to review and vote on it. Powerful forces, like Mr. **Netanyahu, have vowed to defeat it**… (*The New York Times Editorial, 14 July 2015*)

It is also interesting that NYT refers, in reporting about the representation of Iran nuclear deal, to what the American Republicans and Democrats said regarding it. NYT's section Opinion-Editorial has attended to this issue, and via some Republicans and Democrats, NYT's themes have been varied between legitimate and illegitimate, negative and positive, but they all incline to display it as a threat. Examples of this are in the following:

Gov. Scott Walker of Wisconsin, who reportedly has been getting briefings on foreign affairs because he's the governor of a Midwestern state with no actual experience in the area, announced: "**The deal allows Tehran to dismantle U.S. and international sanctions without dismantling its illicit nuclear infrastructure — giving Iran's nuclear weapons capability an American stamp of approval**." (*The New York Times, 14 July 2015*)

"Based on what we know thus far, **I believe that this deal undermines our national security**," said Marco Rubio, the Florida senator. Mr. Rubio said the United States should ratchet up sanctions until Iran agrees to completely dismantle its nuclear

program. It's long been clear that won't happen, and it could never be verified in any case without a deal like the one Mr. Obama and other world leaders signed. (*The New York Times, 14 July 2015*)

The same applies to a comment by Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey, who said: "**The deal threatens Israel, it threatens the United States, and it turns 70 years of nuclear policy on its head**." It does not do those things. 285. (*The New York Times, 14 July 2015*)

4.7.3.4. Predicational strategy: Self (US and its Allies)

Predicational strategies target to analyze the discursive qualifications of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (positively or negatively). These are associated with stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit and explicit predicates (adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrase, infinitive clauses, collocations, allusions evocations and so on)

In predicational terms, the NYT's discourse focuses much on the actors involved in Iran deal and their actions. The newspaper depicts US and its allies (they represent Us) with evaluative attributions of positive descriptions and traits through some linguistic descriptions such as active verbs, adjectives, prepositional phrases and collocations. This is mostly seen in the newspaper's section 'opinion' articles denoting the Self (our) active, important, positive role and determination to achieve a deal which can halt Iran's nuclear ambitions. These are some of the predications and positive discourse presented by NYT via an interview held with President Obama on July 15, 2015, interviewed by Thomas L. Friedman about Iran deal 2015which are attributed to the Self:

> "I think that criticism is misguided. Let's see exactly what we obtained. **We have cut off every pathway for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon**. The reason **we were able to unify the world community around the most effective sanctions regime** we've ever set up, a sanction regime that crippled the Iranian economy and ultimately brought them to the table, was because **the world agreed with us**, that it would be a great danger to the region, to our allies, to the world, if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon.(Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)
>
> I (Thomas L. Friedman) asked the president, why should the Iranians be afraid of us?

"Because **we could knock out their military** in speed and dispatch if **we chose to**," he said, "and I think they have seen **my willingness to take military action** where I thought it was important for U.S. interests. (Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

"It is a practical, common-sense position. It's not naïve; it's a recognition that **if we can in fact resolve some of these differences, without resort to force, that will be a lot better for us and the people of that region**." (Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

"What I can tell you is that that process is in train. Now, with respect to the Israelis, **I think it's _fair_ to say that under my administration, we've done more to facilitate Israeli capabilities**. And I've also said that **I'm prepared to go further** than any other administration's gone before in terms of providing them additional security assurances from the United States. The thing **I want to emphasize is that people's concerns here are legitimate**. Hezbollah has tens of thousands of missiles that are pointed toward Israel. They are becoming more sophisticated. The interdiction of those weapon flows has not been as successful as it needs to be. **There are legitimate concerns on the part of the gulf countries about Iran trying to stir up and prompt destabilizing events inside their countries.**" (Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

Verbs like 'able to', 'to unify', 'agree with', 'knock out', 'have done more to facilitate', 'resolve', and adjectives such as 'am prepared to go', 'legitimate', 'fair' mentioned by president Obama denote a positive representation to the Self, that **'We'** have to do **Our** best and **Our** Possible, and they also express legitimate concern and actions the Self (Us) should perform.

4.7.3.5. Predicational strategy: Other (Iran)

The discursive predicational representation strategy of the 'Other' is mostly opposite to the 'Self's' one. It is characterized by negative and de-legitimising the 'Other'. Tough Iran signed a nuclear accord with the West which would abandon its nuclear industry, and in return, economic sanctions would be lifted on Iran; this latter has been depicted in NYT as an anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic, sponsors terrorism and it is taking profit of lifting the sanctions to empower its nuclear program. These themes are spread in NYT's opinion, editorials and new analysis sections. These predications are represented by verbs, adjectives,

phrases and nouns. All convey negative attributions. The following excerpts from NYT

explain this:

> These limits mean that **if Iran ever decides to violate** the agreement and make a dash for a nuclear bomb, **it will take a year to produce the weapons-grade fuel** needed for a single bomb, compared with a couple of months now. (*The New York Times* Editorial, 14 July 2015)

> "With respect to Iran, it is a great civilization, but **it also has an authoritarian theocracy** in charge that is **anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic, sponsors terrorism**, and there are a whole host of real profound differences that we [have with] them," said the president. "And so, initially, we have a much more modest goal here, which **is to make sure Iran does not have a nuclear weapon**.…(Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

> "What's interesting, if you look at what's happened over the last several months, is **the [Iranian] opponents of this deal are the hard-liners and** those who are most invested in **Iran's sponsorship of terrorism**, most invested in **destabilizing Iran's neighbors,** most virulently anti-American and anti-Israeli. And that should tell us something, because those hard-liners are invested in the status quo in which Iran is isolated, and they are empowered. They become the only game in town. (Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

The other theme that could be found in NYT's articles concerning Iran nuclear issue is Iran as

an untrusty regime and its unwillingness to cooperate with the world.

> "**Nobody has an interest in seeing [the Islamic State]control huge swaths of territory between Damascus and Baghdad**. That's not good for Iran. It makes it very difficult for them to sustain a buffer, which has always been a significant motivator for them since the Iraq-Iran War. It's not good for the Saudis. It leaves them vulnerable in all sorts of ways, and the truth of the matter is that, most importantly, it's not good for the people there.

> The deal… would obviously have provided more cause for celebration if Iran had agreed to completely dismantle all of its nuclear facilities. But the chances of that happening were effectively zero, and… **no one can erase the knowledge Iranian scientists have acquired after working on nuclear projects for decades**.(*The New York Times* Editorial, 14 July 2015)

> "Well, **I haven't learned yet to trust the Iranian leadership**," said Mr. Obama, "although I think that what John Kerry learned in his interactions with Foreign Minister Zarif — and that then traces back to President Rouhani — is that when you nail down an agreement, they do seem to follow it to the letter, perhaps thinking there may be a loophole here or there, which is why you have to button this stuff down. But the notion that **once you put something down on paper that somehow they're just going to ignore it and try to pocket what they've gained, that's not what we saw during the last two years of the interim agreement**. There is, I think, **restraints**

that they feel when they have an agreement and they have a document that they need to abide by it. So I think we've learned that." (Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

Another frequently occurring theme which is always brought up in the American press is 'Iran as a threat to the stability of the world'. In this case the representation of the Iran (Other) is associated with negative words such as threat, nuclear bomb, and supports violence.

As for Iran's current compliance, of course it's complying. The deal gave Iran the best of all worlds. It weakened U.N. restrictions on its right **to develop, test and field ballistic missiles — a critical component for a nuclear weapons capability that the Iranians haven't fully mastered**. It lifted restrictions on Iran's oil exports and eased other sanctions, pumping billions of dollars into a previously moribund economy. And **it allows Iran to produce all the nuclear fuel it wants come the end of the next decade**.(New York Times, May 1, 2018)

That's the significance of Benjamin Netanyahu's show and tell on Monday of what appears to be a gigantic cache of pilfered Iranian documents detailing Tehran's nuclear work. The deal's defenders have dismissed the Israeli prime minister's presentation as a bunch of old news — **just further proof that Iran once had a robust covert program to build a bomb**.(New York Times, May 1, 2018)

Yes, Iran is permanently enjoined from building a nuclear weapon, even after the limitations on uranium enrichment expire. But why believe this regime will be faithful to the deal at its end when it was faithless to it at its beginning?(New York Times, May 1, 2018)

Another approach is to increase pressure on Iran in non-nuclear areas, resulting in a crisis that would give hard-line opponents of the deal in Tehran cause to pull the plug — and let Washington off the hook. There is no shortage of objectionable Iranian behavior. **In addition to the ballistic missile tests, the government provides lethal aid to Houthi rebels in Yemen, harasses shipping in the Persian Gulf, sustains the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, backs Hezbollah and Hamas, supports violent Shiite militias in Iraq and represses its own people**. (New York Times, February 17, 2017)

In another article entitled '**A Good Deal for Israel**,' Iran was described as a Nazi in its actions, and it helped US in toppling the Taliban regime. These predicational themes below represented Iran with negative morals and de-legitimized its actions.

Mr. Netanyahu often warns that Iran is like Nazi Germany in 1938, fooling naïve appeasers even as it plans a cataclysm for Jews. But only those who never see merit in any proposal and never initiate their own could respond as the Israeli leader has.(New York Times, July 19, 2015)

Indeed, Iran will be allowed to retain its nuclear infrastructure instead of dismantling it, and most parts of the agreement are limited to 10 to 15 years, instead of being permanent. It remains to be seen what inspections Iran will actually allow, and the dispute resolution mechanism is cumbersome. (New York Times, July 19, 2015)

Iran aided the US in toppling Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and, at the same time, Tehran, and its cat's paw, Hezbollah, have propped up the Syrian regime while it has perpetrated a genocide against its own people, mostly Syrian Sunnis. We need to confront Iran's regional behavior when it contradicts our interests, but align with it when it comports with our interests. We want to balance the autocratic Sunnis and Shiites, not promote either. Neither share our values. (New York Times, July 19, 2015)

4.7.3.6. Argumentative strategy (topos)

If we read most articles of New York Times regarding Iran nuclear deal 2015, especially during 2015 year, they focus on the benefit and disadvantage of this accord to both Iran and US. Therefore, the general macro-argumentation of the discourse on Iran nuclear deal in NYT is based on the topos of advantage and disadvantage (usefulness and uselessness). According to topos of advantage or usefulness, "if an action will be useful then one should perform it". This topos is categorized into three subtypes which include 1) to the advantage of all, 2) to the advantage of 'Us', and 3) to the advantage of 'Them' (p.75). The topos of **uselessness** or **disadvantage** states that "if existing situation or rulings do not help to reach the declared aim, they have to be changed" Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 75)

Other topos can be found regarding Iran deal are topos of threat and danger, topos of reality and pragmatism and topos of responsibility. NYT makes use of them but not the same degree as the topos of usefulness and uselessness. Topos of **threat** or **danger** states that "if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them" or "we are right because they are (constructed as) a threat" (p.77). I added this topos because NYT seems to distinguish between Iran (Other) as a threat and danger, and US (Self) as good and peaceful. Topos of **reality and pragmatism** can be paraphrased as: "the necessity of an action because

the reality is as it is" (p.79). I added this topos because authors of NYT use it to explain that the current situation (signing the nuclear deal between US and Iran) is necessary to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions. Topos of **history** can be paraphrased as follows: "because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation" (P.76). I added this topos to the study because it has been noticed in most articles by NYT regarding Iran nuclear deal that authors make their predications of the future basing their arguments on past occurrences (happenings).

Topos identified in New York Times
1- **Topos of advantage and usefulness**
2- **topos of uselessness or disadvantage**
3- **Topos of threat or danger**
4- **Topos of reality and pragmatism**
5- **Topos of history**

Table.9: List of topos identified in NYT

A. Topos of advantage and usefulness

The excerpts below show the advantages of the deal for both Iran and the West. This is expressed by the arguments used by NYT, and this is to convince the opponents of the deal, and to show the importance of the deal for both Us and Them.

> **The best analogy for the deal with Iran is the arms control agreements** of the Cold War. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) limited Soviet modernization of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and granted the United States an unprecedented degree of access to a closed society. Like the earlier agreements with the Soviet Union, **the deal reached with Iran on Tuesday substantially reduces the potential nuclear threat** from an adversary and **provides access to a relatively closed society**. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 15 July 2015)

> **It increases the distance between Iran and a bomb** as it reduces the distance between Iran and the world. **It makes the Middle East less dangerous** by forestalling proliferation. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 16 July 2015)

For at least the next decade, **Israel will not have to live under the threat of a nuclear Iran** and will not face the danger of annihilation. For Israel, that is a major achievement. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 19 July 2015)

The accord simply offers sanctions relief in exchange for extensive limits on Iran's ability to enrich uranium… **In exchange, and under tight controls, financial sanctions and the ban on oil sales will be lifted**, allowing Iran much-needed access to frozen funds and Western investment. The accord's benefits far outweigh its costs. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 15 July 2015)

B. Topos of disadvantage and uselessness

Despite the deal has many advantages and brought benefits, especially for Iran, NYT estimates its disadvantages and expects the uselessness over the next 15 years ahead. The disadvantages of the deal are particularly mentioned by the anti-deal group as Israel, American Republicans and some Arab countries. The statements below, which are from NYT's Opinion section, argue against the deal:

This accord has the merit of condemning the United States and Tehran to a relationship — however hostile — over the next 15 years. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 16 July 2015)

The prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, responded to the Iran deal as expected: It is bad, endangers Israel, he argued; we are against it and will be the only American ally not only to oppose it, but to go down gloriously, fighting a battle in Congress that we are destined to lose. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 16 July 2015)

The agreement also does not address Iran's destructive regional role, including its support for terrorism. In fact, the added revenue it will receive as a result of the relaxation of sanctions may enable more aggressive action. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 16 July 2015)

C. Topos of threat or danger

This topos is based on "we are right because they are (constructed as) a threat". The discourse of Iran nuclear deal during 2015 and 2016 sounds less sharp towards Iran. In synchronic terms, the American press has always regarded Iran and its regime as a threat due to its nuclear weapon program. However, the construction (or the depiction) of Iran in NYT in

after-the-deal period focused on Iran as an open country, ready for collaboration with the West and also considers Iran a danger and not trusty.

The discourse of negativity related to Iran has always existed vis-à-vis its nuclear program and its acts of terrorism. NYT constantly refers to the issue of "imposing sanction on Iran" considering Iran as a threat to the world, and it considers the deal as the door which allow Iran to get billions of dollars to build its economy. This theme and others are a substantial body of argumentative content for the topos of threat in New York Times.

> **A collapse of the talks would have freed Iran to go forward and left America struggling to maintain a sanctions regime weakened by international disunity**. Israel would have remained isolated, left only with the military option. These are hardly desirable outcomes. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 19 July 2015)

> That said, **no one should have any illusions about Iran, which considers Israel a sworn enemy; often condemns the United States; supports Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations; and aspires to greater influence in the region**. Once sanctions are lifted, it stands to gain access to billions of dollars from accounts in international banks that have been frozen and from new oil exports and other business deals.

> **American officials say that Iran will get that money over time, and that its immediate priority will be to deal with pressing domestic needs**. More important, many American sanctions will remain in place even after the deal is implemented, including those relating to Iran's support for terrorism and its human rights violations. **The United States has to be extremely vigilant in monitoring how Iran uses those new funds and in enforcing those sanctions**.

D. Topos of reality and pragmatism

I combined the topos of reality with the topos of pragmatism because the first one is based on the assumption that "because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made", and this can be interpreted as Iran's nuclear program is a reality and it should be stopped. The second one assumes that one could evaluate a situation or an action depending on the current conditions rather than on fixed principles. The authors of NYT depend on these topoi to evaluate Iran nuclear deal 2015 as an achievement and a triumph and

a deal that has many deficiencies. The excerpts below express the situational reality of the deal (the first excerpt) and the pragmatism of NYT's analysis (the second excerpt):

> So, yes, **we could have gotten a better deal**. Israel wanted something different (as did the United States), but this is the agreement that was reached — and **despite its faults, it is not a bad one**. (*The New York Times* Op-Ed, 19 July 2015)

> "And what we were able to do," the president continued, "is to say to them, '**Given your past behavior, given our strong suspicion and evidence that you made attempts to weaponize your nuclear program**, **given the destabilizing activities that you've engaged in in the region and support for terrorism**, it's not enough for us to trust when you say that you are only creating a peaceful nuclear program. You have to prove it to us.' **And so this whole system that we built is not based on trust; it's based on a verifiable mechanism**, whereby every pathway that they have is shut off." (Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

The author in the first excerpt agrees explicitly with the deal by saying '*yes*', and at the same time he counters what he agreed to by using '*but*'. In the second excerpt, Obama argues by the reality that Iran is still weaponizing itself and spreading terrorism and destabilizing the region, therefore, the deal (this whole system) could shut the pathway towards developing nuclear capabilities. However, Obama continues to say that the deal is not built on trust, but it is based on verifiable mechanism, and this is a kind of pragmatism. Here I can conclude that the U.S. and its allies (representing the 'Self' or 'We') should accept the deal because it is the best option available for 'Them'.

E. Topos of history

Arguments from history are added to this study because the history of US-Iran has been long and it is full of occurrences. Topos of history considers that the occurrence of an event or an action in the past as a proof for its recurrence in the future and present. There have been attempts to strike nuclear deal with Iran since 2003 but they failed. Now the nuclear agreement 2015 in Geneva is an occurrence of the past. The excerpt below explains how Obama refers to the past and takes an experience of Reagon's Administration in dealing with the 'evil empire' which is the 'Other' and to settle down differences without resort to force:

"You know, I have a lot of differences with Ronald Reagan, but where I completely admire him was his recognition that if you were able to verify an agreement that [was negotiated] with the evil empire that was hellbent on our destruction and was a far greater existential threat to us than Iran will ever be," then it would be worth doing, Mr. Obama said. "**I had a lot of disagreements with Richard Nixon, but he understood there was the prospect, the possibility, that China could take a different path**. You test these things, and as long as we are preserving our security capacity — as long as we are not giving away our ability to respond forcefully, militarily, where necessary to protect our friends and our allies — that is a risk we have to take. It is a practical, common-sense position. **It's not naïve; it's a recognition that if we can in fact resolve some of these differences, without resort to force, that will be a lot better for us and the people of that region**." (Thomas L. Friedman interviews Obama about Iran deal 2015, New York Times July 14, 2015)

To recap, the depiction of the Self, Other and Iran deal in New York Times during the two years after the deal (2015-2016) is quite explicit. The Self was referred and predicated with good qualities and actions, and the Other was given bad qualities and considers his actions and practices illegitimate and evil. Iran nuclear accord was described as positive and a historic accord, but also it was considered as flawed and bad. Therefore, the discourse of New York Times towards the deal and Iran was shaped by different opinions of the authors of the paper. The argumentative strategy used by NYT aims at legitimating the self and its discourse and de-legitimating the Other and its practices. This has produced an ideological dichotomy of Us/them which is an inherited and hidden ideology in the discourse of NYT.

4.7.4. Representation of Self/Other and the nuclear deal in Trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP

The new York times	Trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP	2017 and 2021
Total Numbers of Articles Analyzed	All retrieved from the New York Times archive	8
Number of Articles in 2017	The New York Times	5
Number of Articles in 2018	The New York Times	1
Number of Articles in 2020	The New York Times	1
Number of Articles in 2021	The New York Times	1

Table.10: Number of article found in NYT about Trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP

4.7.4.1. Thematic analysis

Several articles have been written about the trump's order to pull US out of the deal. These articles revolve about many themes. These themes are revealed by many topics in NYT newspaper, framing the issue in different ways. Table below presents the topics:

The NYT discourse topics on Trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP

Topic1 Iran as a terrorist country

Topic2 putting back sanctions

Topic 3 US withdrawal from JCOAP

Topic 4 the nuclear deal 2015 is a disaster

Topic 5 the threat of Iran nuclear program

Topic 6 Iran still enriching uranium

Figure.20: The NYT discourse topics about Trump's order to pull US from JCOAP

4.7.4.2. Referential strategy: Self (US and its allies)

Self (West) actors	US actors	EU actors
Number of occurrences	59	25

Table.11: Presence of the Self in New York Times

The New York Times adopts a referential strategy which is explicit and unanimous. All the names referred to in the paper are either proper nouns, country names or descriptive ones. All

these names denote the notion "Us" which is either "Americans", "US government", "European countries" or some "Arab countries". The excerpts below are taken from an article entitled "***Behind Trump's Termination of Iran Deal Is a Risky Bet"***, published in NYT on May 8, 2018 explaining Trump's termination of Iran deal 2015:

> WASHINGTON — For **President Trump** and two of **the allies he values most — Israel and Saudi Arabia**— the problem of the Iranian nuclear accord was not, primarily, about nuclear weapons. *New York times May 8, 2018*
>
> **Mr. Trump** and **his Middle East allies** are betting they can cut Iran's economic lifeline and thus "break the regime," as one senior European official described the effort. In theory, America's withdrawal could free Iran to produce as much nuclear material as it wants — as it was doing five years ago, when **the world** feared that it was headed toward a bomb. *New York times May 8, 2018*
>
> But **Mr. Trump's team dismisses that risk**: Iran does not have the economic strength to confront **the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia**. And Iran knows that any move to produce a weapon would only provide Israel and the United States with a rationale for taking military action. *New York times May 8, 2018*
>
> It is a brutally realpolitik approach that **America's allies in Europe have warned** is a historic mistake, one that could lead to confrontation, and perhaps to war. *New York times May 8, 2018*
>
> **The three leaders, America's closest European allies, essentially rejected his logic.** They noted that **the United Nations Security Council resolution** that embraced the Iran deal in 2016 "remains the binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute about the Iranian nuclear program." *New York times May 8, 2018*

Three main groups are referred to in NYT, Mr. Trump and his administration, the United States of America and US allies (Europeans, Israel and Saudi Arabia). These groups are common in almost articles and they come as 'doers of actions'. They construct the Self and they oppose Iran's (Other) nuclear program.US allies (Europeans) denote specific Western countries which are involved in Iran's nuclear deal 2015 and they are mentioned several times in a range of articles. Yet, 'Trump' is the most frequent reference of the Self in this article.

It has been noted in this articles that there are two types of references, implicit and explicit. The explicit reference denoting the Self is "the world" and the implicit one is the United

Nations Security Council resolution. The last type is used in many articles regarding Iran nuclear issue, and it constitutes the Self's actions and decisions.

What is remarkable is that the discourse of NYT has given the Self legitimacy and right to launch actions against the Other. This seemed in the verbal actions such as 'dismisses that risk', 'cut Iran's economic lifeline', 'warned it is a historic mistake' and break the regime'.

4.7.4.3. Referential strategy: Other (Iran)

Other actors	Iranians actors
Number of occurrences	27

Table.12: Presence of the Other (Iran) in New York Times

The New York Times discourse during Trump presidency 2018 seemed different from the same paper discourse during Obama presidency regarding Iran nuclear deal. NYT's choice of describing the Other (Iran) varies between general and official names and some specific and occasional references.

> In a speech in March at the Brookings Institution, Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, asserted that **Iran was "<u>the biggest problem we face in our region."</u>** He blamed Iran for interfering in neighboring countries, backing allied armed groups in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere, and supplying Yemeni rebels with ballistic missiles they fired at his country. *New York times May 8, 2018*

> Even if its restrictions on nuclear weapons were tightened and extended, "the agreement by itself does not solve the problem of Iran," Mr. Jubeir said. "**<u>Iran must be held accountable.</u>**" *New York times May 8, 2018*

> But Mr. Trump's team dismisses that risk: **<u>Iran does not have the economic strength to confront the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia.</u>** And Iran knows that any move to produce a weapon would only provide Israel and the United States with a rationale for taking military action. *New York times May 8, 2018*

> Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pressed Mr. Trump to abandon an arrangement that the Israeli leader has always detested. But Mr. Netanyahu's own military and intelligence advisers say Israel is far safer with an **<u>Iran whose pathway to a bomb is blocked, rather than one that is once again pursuing the ultimate weapon.</u>** *New York times May 8, 2018*

> To Mr. Netanyahu, this was proof that **Iran could never be trusted** and that <u>it had reached the nuclear deal under false pretenses</u> by pretending it never had a weapons program. To Mr. Trump and his allies, the Israeli discovery said less about Iranian nuclear capability than it did about Iranian perfidy. *New York times May 8, 2018*

The occasional evaluative references to Iran are mentioned by the author of this article or even by Trump in his speeches, this is to reinforce his arguments against Iran as a regime spreading terrorism and waging instability in the region, a country of radicals and hardliners. Describing Khamenei as "the new/dangerous Hitler" and referring "aging theocracy" to the Iranian regime are references to the ideology of We/Them and to distinguish between the Self and Other, and also it is negative representation to the Other (Iran):

> The Saudi case against Iran has been bolstered in recent months by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has repeatedly referred to **Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as "the new Hitler."** *New York times May 8, 2018*

> "Many countries around the world and in Europe did not realize how **dangerous Hitler** was until what happened, happened," Prince Mohammed said in a recent interview with the CBS News program "60 Minutes." "**I don't want to see the same events happening in the Middle East.**" *New York times May 8, 2018*

The NYT's discourse towards Iran seemed influenced by the dangerous nuclear actions of the Iranian regime and its enmity towards the west. The opinion discourse has deepened to worse the image of Iran and its leaders and described them by the metaphor "the new Hitler" and "dangerous Hitler". Also, Iran was displayed with a negative image by belonging negative actions to it, and this is represented by adjectives, clauses and noun phrases like 'untrusted', 'pathway to bomb' and 'Iran does not have the economic strength'. This reinforces the idea that the opinions discourse of NYT has been influenced by Trump's order termination of Iran nuclear deal. Thus, the paper's discourse has deepened and reinforced the ideology Us/Them.

4.7.4.4. Referential strategy: Iran nuclear deal

newspaper	New York Times
Number of occurrences	**18**

Table.13: Presence of the nuclear deal in New York Times

Almost the articles and speeches about Iran nuclear deal during Trump period represent the deal with negative references. The NYT uses evaluative and descriptive negative references (adjectives, nouns, noun phrases) and represent the deal as disastrous, dangerous and a historic mistake. The discourse of the evaluation of the deal seems decisive and sharp toward Iran Vis a Vis the discourse in Obama period. The author of NYT, in an article published on May 8, 2018, focuses on speeches of Trump and analyses them concentrating on the negative discourse of (negative) representation.

> And now, suddenly**, the world may well be headed back to where it was in 2012: on a road to uncertain confrontation, with "very little evidence of a Plan B," as Boris Johnson**, the British foreign minister, said on a visit to Washington. *New York Times* May 8, 2018)

> Exiting the deal, with or without a plan, is fine with the Saudis. They see **the accord as a dangerous distraction** from the real problem of confronting Iran around the region — a problem that Saudi Arabia believes will be solved only by leadership change in Iran. *New York Times* May 8, 2018)

> Then came Mr. Trump, with his declaration that **the deal was a "disaster"** and his vow to dismantle it. That is exactly what he has now done, but at a huge cost. *New York Times* May 8, 2018)

> It is a brutally realpolitik approach that America's allies in Europe have warned is **a historic mistake, one that could lead to confrontation, and perhaps to war**. *New York Times* May 8, 2018

Another article by Bret Stephens on May 1, 2018, an opinion Columnist in NYT, considers the deal as a gain for Iran to reinforce and go ahead with its nuclear program and he describes it with negative adjectives such as 'null' and 'void'.

So much, then, for all the palaver about the deal providing an unprecedented level of transparency for monitoring Iranian compliance. So much, also, for the notion that Iran has honored its end of the bargain. It didn't. This should render **the agreement null and void.** *New York time May 1, 2018*

As for Iran's current compliance, of course it's complying. **The deal gave Iran the best of all worlds**. **It weakened U.N. restrictions on its right to develop**, test and field ballistic missiles — a critical component for a nuclear weapons capability that the Iranians haven't fully mastered. It lifted restrictions on Iran's oil exports and eased other sanctions, pumping billions of dollars into a previously moribund economy. **And it allows Iran to produce all the nuclear fuel it wants come the end of the next decade**. *New York Times May 1, 2018*

But **the deal now in place allows Iran to amble toward a bomb**, even as it uses the financial benefits of the agreement to fund (in the face of domestic upheaval and at a steep cost to its own economy) its militancy in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and especially in Syria. *New York Times May 1, 2018*

WASHINGTON — Standing next to Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, at a news conference Wednesday, President Trump inveighed against the nuclear agreement with Iran, declaring it **"one of the worst deals ever made."** On this matter, Mr. Trump has been consistent — he has called **the deal "terrible," "a disgrace," "stupid" and "catastrophic,"** and said his No. 1 priority as president would be to dismantle it. *New York Times February 17, 2017*

The construction of the Iran deal in NYT during Trump presidency through the referential strategy aims at de-legitimizing the Other by associating it with negative adjectives as "flawed", "horrible", and phrase nouns as "decaying and rotten structure". Also, the author of the article published on May 8, 2018 by Mark Landler entitled "Trump Abandoned Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned", associates the deal with negative verbs in order to de-legitimize it:

The president, however, framed his decision as the fulfillment of a bedrock campaign promise and as the act of a dealmaker **dissolving a fatally flawed agreement**. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

"This was a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made," a grim-faced Mr. Trump said in an 11-minute address from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House. **"It didn't bring calm, it didn't bring peace, and it never will."** *New York Times May 8, 2018*

In his announcement, Mr. Trump recited familiar arguments against the deal: **that it does not address the threat of Iran's ballistic missiles or its malign behavior in**

the region,and that the expiration dates for the sunset clauses open the door to an Iranian nuclear bomb down the road. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Even if Iran was in compliance, he said, it could "still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a short period of time." In fact, **under the deal, the limits on Iran's uranium enrichment and stockpiles of nuclear fuel mean that Iran would not be on the verge of a nuclear breakout until 2030.***New York Times May 8, 2018*

Still, Mr. Trump said, the United States and its allies could not stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon **"under the decaying and rotten structure of the current agreement."** *New York Times May 8, 2018*

"The Iran deal is defective at its core," he concluded. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

"No rhetoric is required," Mr. Kerry said in a statement. "The facts speak for themselves. Instead of building on unprecedented nonproliferation verification measures, **this decision risks throwing them away and dragging the world back to the brink we faced a few years ago**." *New York Times May 8, 2018*

4.7.4.5. Predicational strategy: Self (US and its allies)

Predicational strategy is the second essential aspect of Self and Other representation. Predication is the very basic process and result of linguistically assigned qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena. Predications are linguistically more or less evaluative, explicit or implicit, specific or vague/evasive. Predicational strategies are realised by specific forms of reference (denotation, connotation), by attributes (adjectives, apposition, propositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses and infinitive clauses), by collocations, by similes, by explicit comparison, by metaphors, etc.

The language of NYT in presenting the Self is professional and takes a journalistic approach. It displays the Self as the opposing party to the Other and the one who has the right to accept or refuse acts. This is legitimised through negative predicational themes for the Other and positive predicational themes for the Self. Most of the predictions of Self presentation are framed in such a way that 'Us' is the group which 'reimpose the sanctions', 'dissolving a fatally flawed agreement', 'patient', 'he has the right' and 'success of his pilicy'. The paper maintains third-person (He, They) perspectives on reporting the position and the

assumed responsibility of the Self group. The following excerpts are probably the NYT's

discourse about positive Self-presentation:

The United States will now reimpose the stringent sanctions it imposed on Iran before the deal and is considering new penalties. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

The president, however, framed his decision as the fulfillment of a bedrock campaign promise and as the act of a dealmaker dissolving a fatally flawed agreement. He predicted his tough line with Iran would strengthen his hand as he prepared to meet North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, to begin negotiating the surrender of his nuclear arsenal. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Three times previously, the president's aides had persuaded him not to dismantle the Iran deal. **But Mr. Trump made clear that his patience had worn thin**, and with a new, more hawkish cohort of advisers — led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the national security adviser, John R. Bolton — **the president faced less internal resistance than earlier in his administration.** *New York Times May 8, 2018*

While Mr. Trump had long scorned the Iran deal, threatening repeatedly to rip it up during the 2016 presidential race, **his impulse to act now was reinforced by what he views as the success of his policy toward North Korea.** He has told aides and foreign leaders that his policy of maximum pressure had forced Mr. Kim to the bargaining table, and that a similar policy of overwhelming pressure would enable the United States to extract a better deal from Iran. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

In July, President Trump reluctantly agreed to confirm that Iran is complying with the terms of the nuclear agreement. But now, analysts say **he is actively looking for ways to get the United States out of the deal**. (article by David E. Sanger entitled: Trump seeks way to declare Iran in violation of nuclear deal. NT on July 27, 2017)

American officials have already told allies they should be prepared to join in reopening negotiations with Iran or expect that the United States may abandon the agreement, as it did the Paris climate accord. And according to several foreign officials, **the United States has begun raising with international inspectors in Vienna the possibility of demanding access to military sites in Iran where there is reasonable suspicion of nuclear research or development**.

Mr. Trump has enormous latitude to abandon the accord. It was never a treaty because President Barack Obama knew that opposition to the agreement in the Republican-dominated Senate was so great that he could never get the two-thirds majority needed for ratification. Instead, he made an executive agreement, one that his successor could eliminate by merely disregarding the accord's requirement to waive sanctions against Iran *New York Times May 8, 2018*

The NYT's rhetoric relies heavily on positive Self-representation and Self-legitimation

against the negative Other representation and Other-delegitimation. The Self actors such as

Trump, American officials are predicated as people who are willing, patient, active and keep promise on order to save their country interest and the interest of their allies. All sorts of the Self predicational themes were brought up and shaped by the paper to create such a disparity between the United States and Iran.

4.7.4.6. Predicational strategy: Other (Iran)

The representation of Iran in New York Times is substantial and focuses on several political themes related to Iran nuclear issue including Iran nuclear deal. Referring back to Iran history with the west, with the United States in particular, this would revive and provide an old knowledge which is crucial for the legitimacy of the Self and the evilness of the Other.

One of the main themes in NYT is 'Iran did not stop its nuclear enrichments and nuclear program'. This theme provokes the news that Iran is breaking the nuclear accord with the West (P5 including US) with its advancing nuclear activities. So Iran is predicated as 'did not take the steps agreed', 'Iran's answers… were obfuscating and stonewalling', 'Iran is building a nuclear weapon', above all? 'the deal was founded on a lie' which means Iran is breaking its commitment. The following excerpts explain this:

> "The sanctions lifting will only occur as **Iran takes the steps agreed**, including addressing possible military dimensions." **But Tehran did not "take the steps agreed." The deal was founded on a lie.** *New York Times May 1, 2018*

> **Two lies, actually. The first was Iran's declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency**, prior to the implementation of the deal, of the full extent of its past nuclear work. This was essential, both as a test of Tehran's sincerity and as a benchmark for understanding just how close it was to being able to assemble and deliver a nuclear warhead. *New York Times May 1, 2018*

> "**Iran's answers and explanations for many of the I.A.E.A.'s concerns were, at best, partial, but overall, obfuscating and stonewalling**," David Albright and his colleagues at the nonpartisan Institute for Science and International Security wrote in December 2015. *New York Times May 1, 2018*

> Yes, **Iran is permanently enjoined from building a nuclear weapon, even after the limitations on uranium enrichment expire**. But why believe this regime will be

faithful to the deal at its end when it was faithless to it at its beginning? *New York Times May 1, 2018*

Iran has long said that its most sensitive military locations are off limits. That issue came to a head in 2015 when international inspectors demanded access to Parchin, a military base near Tehran where there was evidence of past nuclear work. A compromise was worked out in which Iran took environmental samples itself, under surveillance by agency inspectors. The inspectors found little, but the precedent of how the inspection was carried out was cited by critics of the deal as evidence **that the Iranians could hide work on uranium enrichment or other technology in off-limits military facilities.**(article by David E. Sanger entitled: Trump seeks way to declare Iran in violation of nuclear deal. NYT on July 27, 2017)

One of Mr. Trump's complaints about the 2015 deal is that it covers only nuclear activity, not support for terrorism, or missile testing, or Iran's activities in Syria and Iraq. The State Department complained that an Iranian launch of missile into space on Thursday violated the spirit of the nuclear accord. (article by David E. Sanger entitled: Trump seeks way to declare Iran in violation of nuclear deal. NYT on July 27, 2017)

So the rhetoric of the paper seemed to focus on Iran nuclear activities that were unstoppable.

The predicational strategy for construction of the Other is well detailed. It depicted Iran through the threat of its nuclear activities and terrorism. Such predications employed by the paper are 'building a nuclear weapon','support for terrorism','hide work on uranium enrichment' and 'Two lies', as well as key verbs such as 'support', 'hide' and 'lie'.

4.7.4.7. Argumentative strategy (topos)

The study uses Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (2001), argumentative strategies.

Argumentation strategies use a number of topoi to justify and question claims of truth and negative/positive attributions, e.g. positive and negative treatment, discrimination, social and political inclusion and exclusion as shown in table.1 below.Also, qualitative analyses are carried out to describe the findings.

1 Usefulness, advantage	9 Finance
2 Uselessness, disadvantage	10 Reality
3 Definition, name-interpretation	11 Numbers
4 Danger and threat	12 Law and right
5 Humanitarianism	13 History
6 Justice	14 Culture
7 Responsibility	15 Abuse
8 Burdening	

Table.14: List of topoi

Source: Wodak & M. Meyer, 2001, p.74

4.7.4.7.1. Data analysis

The data was analyzed based on the argumentative strategies (topoi) of advantage, disadvantage, threat, reality, and history proposed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001). According to topos of advantage or usefulness, "if an action will be useful then one should perform it". This topos is categorized into three subtypes which include 1) to the advantage of all, 2) to the advantage of us, and 3) to the advantage of them (p.75). The topos of **uselessness** or **disadvantage** states that "if existing situation or rulings do not help to reach the declared aim, they have to be changed" (p.75). Topos of **threat** or **danger** states that "if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them" (p.77). Topos of **reality** can be paraphrased as: "the necessity of an action because the reality is as it is" (p.79). Topos of **history** can be paraphrased as follows: because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation

(P.76). In the following analysis, I will introduce the argumentative strategies (topos) employed in the excerpts selected accompanied by a discussion of the purpose they serve.

A. Topos of advantage and usefulness

As mentioned in the definition of this topos, the application of topos of advantage is likely to be divided into two subcategories: first, the advantages of the deal to US and its allies who represent 'Us'. The goal behind striking the Iran nuclear deal 2015 is to hinder Iran from developing its nuclear capacity and stop its nuclear program. Also, the deal is good for the security of US and its allies.The excerpts employed by NYT are to show the usefulness of having this deal, and it is for the advantage of Us:

> **It reaffirms and strengthens** Iran's commitment, under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to never acquire a nuclear weapon. **It imposes powerful constraints on Iran's ability** to quickly amass a stockpile of fissile material for a bomb. **It includes an inspections regime** perhaps more rigorous than any other. And it pays for all of that with Iran's own money. *New York Times February 17, 2017*

> Maybe President Trump's bluster masks a growing recognition within the administration that **the deal is a good one for America's security and that of our allies.** *New York Times February 17, 2017*

> I opposed the Iran deal, but immediately after it came into effect, **I believed that we should honor it scrupulously and enforce it unsparingly**. *New York Times May 1, 2018*

Second subcategory is the one advantageous to 'Them' (Iran). The nuclear deal lifted the economic sanctions put on Iran since 2003, lifted restrictions on Iran's oil exports and allowed Iran to produce nuclear fuel. Above all, it weakened U.N. restrictions on Iran to develop and test ballistic missiles. Thus, the advantages of Iran (Them) seem in opposition to the advantage of US and its allies (Us), and the excerpt below gives born to the ideological dichotomy of 'us' versus 'them':

> As for Iran's current compliance, of course it's complying. **The deal gave Iran the best of all worlds**. **It weakened U.N. restrictions on its right to develop, test and field ballistic missiles** — a critical component for a nuclear weapons capability that the Iranians haven't fully mastered. **It lifted restrictions on Iran's oil exports and**

eased other sanctions, pumping billions of dollars into a previously moribund economy. And **it allows Iran to produce all the nuclear fuel** it wants come the end of the next decade. *New York Times May 1, 2018*

Having a look at all the articles of NYT, little has reported about the advantages and usefulness of the deal when Trump pull his country from the JCPOA. This presupposes that NYT has shifted its discourse from focusing on the positive side of the deal to its negative one. This is explained in the following topos of disadvantage.

B. Topos of disadvantage and uselessness

Topos of disadvantage and uselessness seems so apparent and critical in the Trump period of presidency. It is also different in nature and critic regarding the dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them'. The deal was described as 'null', 'void', 'terrible', 'catastrophic', 'it did not bring calm', etc. This means that the United States and its allies (Us) did not achieve their goals such as stopping Iran's nuclear enrichment and nuclear program, and it did not address the threat of Iran's ballistic missiles. The following excerpts explain this:

> So much, then, for all the palaver about the deal providing an unprecedented level of transparency for monitoring Iranian compliance. So much, also, for the notion that Iran has honored its end of the bargain. **It didn't**. **This should render the agreement null and void.** *New York Times May 1, 2018*
>
> **But the deal now in place allows Iran to amble toward a bomb**, even as it uses the financial benefits of the agreement to fund (in the face of domestic upheaval and at a steep cost to its own economy) its militancy in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and especially in Syria. *New York Times May 1, 2018*
>
> Standing next to Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, at a news conference Wednesday, **President Trump inveighed against the nuclear agreement with Iran, declaring it "one of the worst deals ever made."** *New York Times February 17, 2017*
>
> **he has called the deal "terrible," "a disgrace," "stupid" and "catastrophic,"** and said his No. 1 priority as president would be to dismantle it. *New York Times February 17, 2017*
>
> "**It didn't bring calm, it didn't bring peace, and it never will**." Trump said. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

In his announcement, Mr. Trump recited familiar arguments against the deal: that **it does not address the threat of Iran's ballistic missiles or its malign behavior in the region,** and that the expiration dates for the sunset clauses open the door to an Iranian nuclear bomb down the road. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

C. Topos of threat or danger

The argumentative strategy of threat employed by NYT in trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP falls in many threatening issues to both 'Us' and 'Them'. First, it was argued that trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP is a threat to US and its allies (Us) because it would leave the world less safe and embolden the hardliners in Iran to stand against US. Moreover, it would encourage the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to commit more terrorist attacks in the Middle East and against Israel.

Categorically speaking, the most important line of argument contributing to the construction of threat in New York Times is its explicit or co-textual reference to Iran as 'sponsor of terrorism', 'Iranian retaliation', 'fueling an arms race', 'nuclear-armed' and 'nuclear breakout'. The following excerpts cover all these argumentative issues:

> The Trump administration could crank the pressure beyond the breaking point. For example, it could reimpose sanctions lifted by the nuclear deal under a non-nuclear rationale, which Tehran would interpret as a violation of the accord. Or it could designate t**he Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization.** *New York Times February 17, 2017*

> The Bush and Obama administrations named **Iran a state sponsor of terrorism** and put sanctions on individual **Revolutionary Guard commanders** and two dozen Iranian firms to which the guard corps is connected.*New York Times February 17, 2017*

> **Mr. Trump move could embolden hard-line forces in Iran**, **raising the threat of Iranian retaliation against Israel or the United States**, **fueling an arms race** in the Middle East and **fanning sectarian conflicts** from Syria to Yemen. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

> It also drew a rare public rebuke by Mr. Obama, who said **Mr. Trump's withdrawal would leave the world less safe**, confronting it with "**a losing choice between a nuclear-armed Iran or another war in the Middle East.**" *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Even if Iran was in compliance, he said, it could "**still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a short period of time.**" In fact, under the deal, the limits on Iran's uranium enrichment and stockpiles of nuclear fuel mean that Iran would not be on the verge of a nuclear breakout until 2030.*New York Times May 8, 2018*

For President Trump and two of the allies he values most — Israel and Saudi Arabia — the problem of the Iranian nuclear accord was not, primarily, about nuclear weapons. **It was that the deal legitimized and normalized Iran's clerical government**, **reopening it to the world economy with oil revenue that financed its adventures in Syria and Iraq, its missile program and its support of terrorist groups.** *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Months before it became clear that Mr. Trump had a decent shot at being elected, **the Iranian military increased support for President Bashar al-Assad in Syria**; **it expanded its influence in Iraq and accelerated its support for terrorist groups**. And **it doubled down on deploying cyberattacks against targets in the West and in Saudi Arabia,** embracing a weapon that was not covered by the nuclear accord. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

"**This will most likely lead to an outcome that is much worse not only for the U.S., but for Israel**," Mr. Allison said, because the current agreement rolled Iran's nuclear program back a decade "and imposed on Iran the most intrusive inspection regime ever negotiated." *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Mr. Trump and his Middle East allies are betting they can cut Iran's economic lifeline and thus "break the regime," as one senior European official described the effort. **In theory, America's withdrawal could free Iran to produce as much nuclear material as it wants** — as it was doing five years ago, when the world feared that it was headed toward a bomb. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Even if its restrictions on nuclear weapons were tightened and extended, "**the agreement by itself does not solve the problem of Iran**," Mr. Jubeir said. "**Iran must be held accountable.**" *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Jeremy Shapiro, research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations and a State Department official during the Obama administration, said"If the deal opened an avenue for better relations between the United States and Iran, **that would be a disaster for the Saudis**," he added "They need to ensure a motivation for American pressure against Iran that will last even after this administration." *New York Times May 8, 2018*

On the other hand, it was argued that Trump's order to pull US out of the deal is a threat to Iran (Them) because it would close all sorts of negotiations of its nuclear file and return the sanctions on the country and close it to the world economy. The excerpts below explain this:

> As a result, **the United States will reinstate all the sanctions it had waived** as part of the nuclear accord, and **it will impose additional economic penalties** that are now being drawn up by the Treasury Department. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Another argumentation of threat is Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps. They are the strong front of Iran against foreign threat. The excerpt below explains any attack or challenge to RGC is a threat to withdraw Iran out of the nuclear deal and prompt the Guards to attack US's interests in the Gulf region:

> **A direct challenge** to the Revolutionary Guards Corps would likely cause its commanders **to press for Iran's withdrawal from the nuclear deal**. It would undermine the re-election prospects of the accord's main advocate, President Hassan Rouhani, who seeks to moderate Iran's international behavior. It could also **prompt the guards corps to unleash Shiite militias against United States forces in Iraq** — just when our shared, if uncoordinated, objective of defeating the Islamic State there is within reach — **or to go after American ships in the Gulf or shut down the Straits of Hormuz**, through which 25 percent of the world's oil flows. *New York Times February 17, 2017*

The argumentation of threat and danger employed in NYT between 2017 and 2018, during Trump's ruling the US, follow the general structure of "we are right because they are a threat" with various intensity. This topos is constructed through different argumentative themes, such as 'their threat of nuclear materials', 'their threat IRGC', 'Iran's nuclear deal is a threat to Israel and Saudi'. All these themes have legitimized the United States (Us) to break the nuclear accord and return sanction on Iran (Them).

Additionally, having a thorough reading to the discourse of NYT during the era of Trump, one can notice that most articles written on the paper almost attended to the issue of threat and danger of Iran nuclear program. This topos reinforces and affirms the legitimacy of the Self and the delegitimacy of the Other.

D. Topos of history

The historical argumentation in trump's period concerning Iran nuclear deal focuses on the challenges of the Iranians to develop their nuclear program though the American's threat.

Historically speaking, the dispute over Iran nuclear program reached to the point US's threat to militarily attack Iran in many occasions, therefore, Iran either stop temporarily its program or slow it down. The topos of history used by NYT in many articles is for the purpose to refer to the bad practices, evilness, terrorist attacks and Iran's enmity to Israel that. Thus, the United States has constantly produced an evil image of Iran based on the topos of history. Examples of this are below:

> **And Iran's own nuclear history suggests** the country's leaders have always been cautious in the face of credible American threats, which is one reason they shelved much of their nuclear program in 2003 after the U.S. invaded Iraq. *New York Times May 1, 2018*

> "**When the Iranians fear American power, they either back down or they stall**," says Mark Dubowitz, an expert on Iran sanctions at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "**When they don't fear American power, they push forward**. With Trump, the question is: Are they going to feel American power, or American mush?" *New York Times May 1, 2018*

E. Topos of responsibility

The argumentation of responsibility used in NYT falls into two categories: first the responsibility of United States and its allies is to preserve the nuclear deal and try to modify it. When president Trump came in 2018, he first pull US out of the JCPOA and then he showed commitment to the deal. This has been argued by the fact that US want to continue its commitment to JCPOA, on one hand. On the other hand, US's withdrawal form JCPOA is in favour of Israel. The withdrawal would block Iran's pathway towards a nuclear bomb which is a direct threat to Israel. All the excerpts below explain all these arguments:

> So it was striking last week when senior administration officials told the European Union's foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, **that President Trump was committed to fully carrying out the accord.**

> He rejected the suggestion that the United States could not be trusted to keep its agreements when political winds change. "**Any nation reserves the right to correct a past mistake**," Mr. Bolton said. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Emmanuel Macron of France said:

"Together, **we emphasize our continuing commitment to the J.C.P.O.A.** This agreement remains important for our shared security." They added, "**We urge the U.S. to ensure that the structures of the J.C.P.O.A. can remain intact, and to avoid taking action** which obstructs its full implementation by all other parties to the deal. **After engaging with the U.S. administration in a thorough manner over the past months, we call on the U.S. to do everything possible to preserve the gains for nuclear nonproliferation** brought about by the J.C.P.O.A., by allowing for a continued enforcement of its main elements. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pressed Mr. Trump to abandon an arrangement that the Israeli leader has always detested. But Mr. Netanyahu's own military and intelligence advisers say Israel is far safer with an Iran whose pathway to a bomb is blocked, rather than one that is once again pursuing the ultimate weapon. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

"**The individuals who shoulder responsibility for Israel's survival and security have been crystal clear**," Graham Allison, a Harvard professor who has spent his career examining cases of nuclear proliferation. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

"**This will most likely lead to an outcome that is much worse not only for the U.S., but for Israel**,'' Mr. Allison said, because the current agreement rolled Iran's nuclear program back a decade "and imposed on Iran the most intrusive inspection regime ever negotiated." *New York Times May 8, 2018*

But Mr. Netanyahu holds Israel's bullhorn, and **he used it last week to persuade Mr. Trump to pull the plug on the Iran deal**. By releasing Iranian documents, stolen from Tehran in January, Mr. Netanyahu proved what Western intelligence agencies long knew: A decade ago or even longer, the Iranians were working hard to design a nuclear warhead. *New York Times May 8, 2018*

Many articles emphasized the role and responsibility of the United States to stop Iran's nuclear deal. The expressions like 'The individuals who shoulder responsibility', 'we emphasize our continuing commitment to the J.C.P.O.A' and 'President Trump was committed to fully carrying out the accord' predicate the United States as strong country and it bears responsibility. Hence, the topos of responsibility was served as a tool for the positive self-construction of the United States. The discourse of NYT has heavily depended on this topos to argue against the deal and support Trump's order.

4.7.5. Recontextualisation of the news

New York Times bases its recontextualisation on provoking and reviving old news about the topic by bring up the issue of US-Soviet union relation. The deal struck between these nations has been compared with the Iran nuclear deal. The paper is interested in recontextualizing the content of its analysis of the Iran deal topic to suit its arguments (topos of history). This operationalization is so important to NYT as to legitimize its news discourse towards Iran nuclear deal in particular. The excerpt below shows this:

> **Would Mr. Bush argue that a succession of United States presidents should not have negotiated arms <u>deals with the Soviet Union</u> because they did not lead to full,** unilateral disarmament and a renunciation of communism? I hope not. *New York times, July 14, 2015*

One of the aspects of recontextualisation here also is embodied in invoking the topic of US-China relation during 1972. The New York Times compares this issue with the current issue of Iran deal in terms of diplomacy which played a crucial role in striking the deal. This old issue has been revived and recontextualized by the paper in order to give full legitimacy to the West or the United States (Us) against its counterpart Iran (Them).

> These and similar statements have become fodder, among some observers, for a heroic narrative that **Mr. Obama has achieved a rapprochement with Iran comparable to <u>Richard M. Nixon's breakthrough visit to China in 1972</u>**. Indeed, in another interview with Mr. Friedman, on Tuesday, **Mr. Obama repeatedly invoked <u>President Nixon's historic diplomacy with China</u>** and promoted the idea that Iran "will be and should be regional tight controls, financial sanctions and the ban on oil sales will be lifted, allowing Iran much-needed access to frozen funds and Western investment. *New York times, July 15, 2015*

One of the topics which brought up by NYT is the agreements set up with the old Soviet Union to limit its ballistic missile. This topic has also referred to as an example of recontextualisation, in other words, one of the ways of recontextualisation used by NYT is to bring an old issue with the same data and procedures as Iran nuclear issue and put it in a new context. The statements below can show this:

> **The best analogy for the deal with Iran is the arms control agreements of the Cold War. <u>The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) limited Soviet</u>**

modernization of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and granted the United States an unprecedented degree of access to a closed society. *New York times, July 15, 2015*

Like the earlier agreements with the Soviet Union, the deal reached with Iran on Tuesday substantially reduces the potential nuclear threat from an adversary and provides access to a relatively closed society. But Iran's program will not be completely abolished, as many wished. *New York times, July 15, 2015*

As a recapitulation, the opinion discourse of NYT has barely covered all sides and aspects of Iran nuclear deal from 2015 to 2020. It thoroughly examined the positive Self-representation of US and its allies and negative Other-representation of Iran. All the references and predications and arguments have also legitimized the Self discourses and actions, on one hand, and on the other hand, they have delegitimized the Other practices and discourses. NYT also depended much on some texts on referring to old stories dealt with as US-China and US-Soviet Union before as an example to show the reader that Iran nuclear issue drops in the same context. This strategy (recontetualization) aims at providing enough arguments for the Self (United States and its allies) to stand against the Other (Iran) and to legitimize its discourse.

4.8. Textual analysis of Washington Post

4.8.1. Introduction

This second part of the analysis investigates the representation of different social actors (Iranians and American and their allies) and their actions and practices in Washington Post selected articles. To uncover the discursive strategies employed by the newspaper to represent the social actors and their discourses, I conducted a detailed analysis by drawing on Wodak's referential, predicational and argumentative (topoi) strategies.

The first phase of analysis begins with representation of the Self/Other and the deal during the period of Iran nuclear deal 2015. Here I examine how US and its allies, Iran and Iran deal are referred. I also examined how US and its allies and Iran are predicated. Last, I investigate the topos used by the newspaper to argue for or against the Iran nuclear deal. Finally, I bring

these findings together to demonstrate the ways these social actors build their discourse to construct an account of Iran nuclear deal. The second phase takes the same steps but it is about the representation of the Self/Other and the deal during Trump's order to pull US out of the nuclear deal 2015. The accounts of this analysis will be brought together to draw the final conclusion about the kind of discourse about Iran during Trump presidency.

4.8.2. Discourse topics analysis

The analysis of discourse topics of this study are exclusively related to Iran nuclear issue that took place during the period stretching between 2015 and 2020. The study focuses on two major historic events that would provide enough and various data to the research analysis and help realize the objectives of the study. These events were fully reported and analyzed in Washington Post's different section: Iran nuclear deal signed on July 14th, 2015, and Trump's order to pull US out of the JCOAP in May 8th, 2018.

4.8.3. Representation of Self/Other and Iran deal 2015 in Washington Post during Obama's second term.

First, the analysis of discourse topics of Washington Post newspaper mainly focuses on the opinions and analysis of Iran nuclear deal that was struck between Iran and P5 on 14th July, 2015. The analysis mainly focuses on how the discursive strategies of the newspaper represent the self/other of the deal and the actors involved (participants) in the deal. These participants are the P5 group including the United States which represent the notion "*Us*" and Iran leaders who represent the "*Other*". The first discourse topics to be analyzed are those which come after the day of the deal 14th July, 2015, and last till 2017. The table below shows the number of articles found in Washington Post about Iran nuclear deal between 2015 and 2017.

Washington Post	Iran's Nuclear Deal 2015	Number of articles
Total Numbers of Articles to be analyzed	All retrieved from the New Washington Post	4
Number of Articles after July 14, 2015	Washington Post	4
Number of Articles in 2017	Washington Post	0

Table.15: Number of Articles Found in the Washington Postfor Iran's Nuclear Deal 2015

The figure.21 below also shows the topics discourse discussed regarding the nuclear deal in the period between 2015 in Washington Post.

The WP discourse topics on Iran nuclear deal during 2015 till 2017

Topic1 Iran historic deal

Topic2 US and its allies concern of the deal

Topic 3 Iran is untrusty and remains a threat

Topic 4 international inspectors' access to Iran's nuclear sites

Topic 5 Iran deal as flawed and bad deal

Figure.21: The WP discourse topics about Iran and Iran deal 2015

4.8.3.1. Referential strategy: Self (US and its allies)

Tables below show the number of occurrence of the deal actors, US and its allies and the Iranian leaders, and the deal itself in Washington Post newspapers. The United States was the first social actor in the corpus in terms of saliency of its presence. It was the most recurrent social actor in the Washington Post (16 times), where Iran had its least saliency (7 times)

Self (West) actors	US actors	EU actors
Number of occurrences	16	7

Table.16: Presence of the US and its allies in Washington Post

According to the number of occurrence in table, the United States is the first major social actor attended to in Washington Post's discourse. From reading the articles about Iran's deal, there are three distinct official types of representing the Americans: Obama and his administration (referred as Obama, president Obama, Obama and his administration, Mr. President, He, I, the white house), America as a nation (referred as US and We) and American critics of the deal (Israel's prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Republicans, the WP's critics). The EU represents also the self. It occurs many times and it is represented by either the name 'Americans' allies' or by geographical countries like France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia or some European critics of the deal.

Throughout the whole analysed articles, it seems that the Washington Post refers to the Self by focusing on "Mr. Obama", "Obama administration", "white house", "Congress" and "American officials", or it uses the pronoun "I" which expressed in quotations. In the following article entitled 'Historic deal reached with Iran to limit nuclear program' (article written by carol Morello and Karen DeYoung on July 14, 2015, world section), the author uses official names (Obama, president Obama) and some evaluative ones (American diplomacy, the West, the IAEA):

The United States and other **world powers** reached a historic agreement with Iran here Tuesday, aimed at preventing Islamic republic from building a nuclear weapon….*Washington post July 14, 2015*

President Obama, after announcing the agreement in Washington, quickly turned to what may be the more arduous task of selling the deal to skeptical lawmakers and **U.S allies in the Middle East.** *Washington post July 14, 2015*

"This deal demonstrates that **American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change**," Obama told a nation that awoke Tuesday morning to news of the accord. *Washington post July 14, 2015*

In Vienna news briefings and Washington conference calls, **senior administration officials** joined the president in hailing the agreement. ….. **Officials** suggested that the deal might also help build momentum inside Iran…*Washington post July 14, 2015*

Obama also called leaders in the Middle East, officials said. Reaction from **U.S. allies** ranged from concern among the Sunni monarchies of the Persian gulf that listing sanctions would increase Shiite Iran's efforts to expand its power. *Washington post July 14, 2015*

There is another group of references to the Self which comprise quasi-ideological blocs, they are 'the West', and references which denote unity and power such as 'the European union' and 'US's negotiating partners':

Rouhani also suggested that Iran's relations with the world, particularly **the West**, would change. *Washington post July 14, 2015*

Early Tuesday, when they knew they had a deal, Iranian foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif sat on last time with Kerry and **U.S. negotiating partners** from Britain, France, Germany, Russia, china and **the European union**. *Washington Post July 15, 2015*

Other referential names that represent a wider scope and they are common in the American press in general and WP in particular, for example:

If the **international community** suspects that Iran is cheating, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can request access to any suspicious location. Much has been made about a possible 24-day delay before inspectors could gain access to suspected undeclared nuclear sites. To be clear, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours' notice under the Additional Protocol of the Nonproliferation Treaty. *Washington post July 22, 2015*

The IAEA said it signed an agreement Tuesday morning with Iran that allows **international inspectors** to resolve all such outstanding questions. *Washington post July 14, 2015*

In another article written by Karen DeYoung and Carol Morello on July 15, 2015 entitled 'The path to a final Iran nuclear deal: long days and short tempers', the Washington Post makes use of different evaluative names and in many occasion to refer to the Self, on one hand, and on another hand, it is for distinguishing the Self (US, European countries, international agency IAEA) from the Other (Iran)

> By the end of the first week, as foreign ministers came and went from U.S. negotiating partner countries-known collectively as the **P5+1**-they had agreed that economic and banking sanctions would not be lifted until the **international atomic energy agency(IAEA)** had verified that Iran's declared nuclear sites were being used only for the civilian purposes.*Washington Post July 15, 2015*

> "We have nothing to hide" a senior Iranian negotiator told **Western reporters.***Washington Post July 15, 2015*

> A secure video conference between **president Obama** and the **U.S. team** had been set for Wednesday night, July 8, in Vienna. The **U.S. delegation** huddled around a screen in the screen tent that had had been set up inside a Coburg hotel room.*Washington Post July 15, 2015*

The WP discourse has varied its reference to the Self and accounted them very important social actors and contributors of the Iran nuclear deal period. Official, neutral and evaluative names have been bestowed to the self as well as positive representation has characterized the United States and its allies. What is more, the WP set up the Self as the initiator and maker of the deal, and at the same time, it has underestimated the role of Iran in establishing the deal.

4.8.3.2. Referential strategy: Other (Iran)

Other actors	Iranians actors
Number of occurrences	4

Table.17: Presence of Iran in Washington Post

The construction of the Other (Iran) in Washington Post newspaper through the referential strategy professionally depend on describing Iran with negative presentation. This approach aims at de-legitimization of the Other along with associating it with isolation. The referential themes employed in the paper can be classified into two main groups: the first one constitutes

official names such as Iran. The second group is for evaluative references such as a nuclear-armed Iran. The excerpts below include all these references to Iran:

> When President Obama took office, he faced **an Iran that had mastered the nuclear fuel cycle**. *Washington post July 22, 2015*
> .

A main key reference to de-legitimize Iran and its nuclear actions is the reference to the issue of 'nuclear arms' and 'nuclear threat'. This reference is widely used in the American press whenever the Iran nuclear issue is tackled. Washington post employed specific negative presentation of the Other with reference to all Iran past and present threatening nuclear actions. The excerpts below explain this:

> **A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to our allies in the Middle East**, as well as to the United States and the international community. By taking **this threat off the table,** this deal makes it far less complicated to address the many other problems that we have with **Iran's regional actions**. *Washington post July 22, 2015*

4.8.3.3. Referential strategy: Iran nuclear deal

newspaper	Washington Post
Number of occurrences	**11**

Table.18: Presence of the deal in Washington Post

Many articles which tackled by WP regarding the Iran nuclear deal have shown a positive sign and welcomed the deal as an initiative to resolve Iran nuclear file with the West. The Washington Post's referential strategy is explicit in positively describing the deal and in semantically constructing different adjectives and names such as 'durable', 'viable', 'resolution', 'accord'. Almost the excerpts below vary its references:

> **The deal reached in Vienna this month is not only the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon**, it is the only **durable and viable option** for achieving this goal. **This comprehensive diplomatic resolution has the unified support of the world's leading powers**. It extends the time Iran would need to

develop a nuclear weapon, provides strong verification measures that give us ample time to respond if Iran chooses that path, and takes none of our options off the table. *Washington post July 22, 2015*

Specifically, **the deal blocks each of Iran's possible pathways to producing fissile material for a nuclear weapon:** the highly enriched uranium and the plutonium production pathways, as well as the covert pathway. **This deal is based on verification, not trust**. *Washington post July 22, 2015*

This accord does not change that baseline. In fact, **the deal enhances it by creating a new mechanism** to ensure that the IAEA gets the required access and sets a firm time limit to resolve access issues within 24 days. *Washington post July 22, 2015*

"**this deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction**. We should seize it,….**this important opportunity** to make a humanitarian gesture" Obama said.*Washington Post July 15, 2015*

House Speaker john A.Boehner (R-Ohio) said Tuesday that Obama had "abandoned" initial goals to strip Iran of its nuclear capability. "if, in fact, it's as **bad a deal** as I think it is at this moment, we'll do everything that we can to stop it," Boehner told reporter. *Washington Post July 15, 2015*

Decision theory examines how people can become preoccupied with the road not taken after choices are finalized. Many observers have wondered **no deal would have been better than** *this deal*.*Washington Post December 5, 2015*

Even more important, however, is ensuring that Iran complies with longer-term requirement, such as adopting and implementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) Additional Protocol (A.P). The A.P. is **a voluntary agreement** the IAEA establishes with individual countries that allows the IAEA to confirm that the country is using nuclear material for peaceful purposes only. *Washington Post December 5, 2015*

However, the references to the deal used by WP displayed in the statements above seem with less importance and positivity in opposite to NYT newspaper. The deal has been categorized with adjectives and verbs that reduce the value of it, such as 'voluntary', 'better than this deal', 'as bad a deal as I think', 'this accord does not change that baseline'. This can be concluded that WP authors give much bias to Trump policy and strategy, and it inclines to serve his agenda.

Describing the Self and Other could be explicit in WP during Obama's second term of presidency. The paper focused on an armed and threatening Iran with its nuclear activities. However, the United States and its allies always displayed with positive references. This has given rise to the legitimation of the Self's discourse against the Other's discourse.

4.8.3.4. Predicational strategy: Self (US and its allies)

The strategy of WP in reporting predictions and attributions to the Self is professional in terms of language (discourse) and journalistic style. Pragmatically speaking, it could be inferred from the excerpts below that the position of the Self (US and its allies) as the opposing party to Iran is legitimised through a set of negative predicational themes for the Other. A large body of what can be considered positive Self representation and legitimation in WP denotes the Self's power and right against Iran's nuclear program. Thus, it can be concluded that the Washington Post rhetoric is founded on the Self's legitimation and positive representation of the Self against the Other de-legitimation negative representation.

The discourse of WP in the excerpts below represents the self (positively) as the group which is 'able to sanction Iran', 'to curb Iran's nuclear ambition', 'to keep the deal in place'

> **The Obama administration had been able to win broad international support for crippling sanctions** precisely because it convinced Russia and China, two major Iranian partners, that the pressure was designed **to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions** and force the government into negotiations." *Washington Post October 14, 2017*
>
> **Trump is right** that Iran twice exceeded the deal's limits on heavy water. *Washington Post October 14, 2017*
>
> Similarly, Federica mogherini, the E.U. foreign policy chief, said no one country could terminate the deal. "this deal is not a bilateral agreement," said she. "**the international community, and the European union with it, has clearly indicated that the deal is, and will, continue to be in place**" *Washington Post October 14, 2017*

4.8.3.5. Predicational strategy: Other (Iran)

The predicational themes which represent the Other in WP are substantial and varied from one theme to the other. Yet, all the themes which elaborate Iran nuclear issue here show negative point of view about the Iranian regime. Most of the predicational categories which are brought up in WP are explicitly related to Iran's regime and its officials.

One of the most common predicational themes, which is also analysed in Washington Post's referential strategy, is the theme of 'an Iran still produce nuclear weapons and enrich uranium'. This reflects the nature of the Other (Iran) which is negatively reported as non-

peaceful regime engaged in non-peaceful nuclear activities. An article in Washington post's

OP-ED entitled '**John Kerry and Ernest Moniz: The case for the nuclear deal with Iran'**

reported this theme as follow:

> When President Obama took office, he faced **an Iran that had mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, had constructed a covert uranium enrichment facility inside a mountain, was on its way to installing nearly 20,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment, was developing advanced centrifuges and was building a heavy-water reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium.** If Iran wanted to develop a nuclear weapon, it was already well down that road and the international community had little insight into its program. Against this backdrop the president vowed never to let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

> Without this deal, **Iran could double its capacity to enrich uranium in a short time**. With it, it must reduce that capacity immediately and sharply. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

> Without this deal, **Iran could continue to rapidly develop advanced centrifuges**. With it, its program will be significantly constrained. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

> Without this deal, **Iran could expand its existing stockpile of enriched uranium**. With it, that stockpile will be reduced by 98 percent, and it will be capped at that level for 15 years. Iran will also be required to get rid of its 20 percent enriched uranium, which is most of the way to bomb material. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

> Without this deal, **Iran could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium each year for one to two nuclear weapons**. With it, Iran will not produce any weapons-grade plutonium. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

> Without this deal, **Iran could take the steps necessary to produce a nuclear weapon.** With it, Iran is prohibited from pursuing any of these steps. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

Another theme which is also common and often tackled is 'Iran is a threat'. Due to its

continuing nuclear activities, Iran is considered as a threatening regime to the US and its

allies, including the Middle East countries. So, the construction of the Other as a threat in WP

is based on negative predicational representation.

> We recognize that **Iran remains a threat to stability in the Middle East**. That danger is precisely why this deal is so necessary and why we fought so hard for the multilateral arms embargo to remain in place for five years and the embargo on ballistic missiles for eight. U.S. sanctions related to terrorism, human rights and missiles will also continue. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

> **A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to our allies in the Middle East**, as well as to the United States and the international community. By taking this threat off the table, this deal makes it far less complicated to address the many other problems that we have with Iran's regional actions. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

Closely related and contributing to this negative attribution and characterization is the theme of 'Iran break out the deal'. This theme emerges from the fact that Iran does not fully bear responsibility and seriously adhere to the deal's terms. This theme constructs the Other in actions such as: 'Iran fails to meet its responsibilities', 'Iran tries to break out the deal altogether'.

> **If Iran fails to meet its responsibilities**, sanctions will snap back into place, and no country can stop that from happening. **If Iran tries to break out of the deal altogether,** the world will have a longer time period — a year compared with two months — to respond before it could produce a bomb. We also will have the moral authority that comes from exhausting all diplomatic options. *Washington Post on July 22, 2015*

One central theme that WP has concentrated in is Iran's nuclear activities. This theme has been treated well with details and displayed Iran with a dangerous nuclear program. this latter has been categorized in many sub-topics such as '**nuclear fuel cycle', 'uranium enrichment facility', 'heavy-water reactor', 'weapons-grade plutonium' and 'advanced centrifuges'.** This predicational strategy is part of the WP discourse, and the purpose behind it is to delegitimize the Other actions and discourses.

4.8.3.6. Argumentative strategy (topos)

A. Topos of advantage and usefulness

The application of the argumentative strategy of advantage is professional, journalistic and it covered so enough of the usefulness of the deal. The Washington Post paper addressed the advantage of the deal in three ways: the deal is useful to Us, the deal is useful to Them and the deal is useful to both Us and Them. The following extracts are an example of the way employed by the newspaper to display the advantage to Us (US and its allies):

This deal demonstrates that **American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change**,” Obama told a nation that awoke Tuesday morning to news of the accord. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

He said it would ensure that **Iran had no possibility to achieve a rapid nuclear weapons “breakout” for at least the next decade**. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

This comprehensive diplomatic resolution **has the unified support of the world's leading powers.** It extends the time **Iran would need to develop a nuclear weapon, provides strong verification measures** that give us ample time to respond if Iran chooses that path, and takes none of our options off the table. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

The deal blocks each of Iran's possible pathways to producing fissile material for a nuclear weapon: the highly enriched uranium and the plutonium production pathways, as well as the covert pathway. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

The second subcategory is the advantage to Them. This is mainly expressed by the objectives behind this deal, lifting the economic sanctions and the world's recognition of Iran's nuclear program for civilian use and build strong ties with the west is among them. The WP focuses on the quotes said by Rouhani which include both pronouns 'We'. This latter is one of the main parts of the dichotomy Us/Them, and it plays a major role in opposing the Other. The extracts below include this concept:

Officials suggested that **the deal might also help build momentum inside Iran to move away from radicalism and toward greater ties with the west**. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

In Tehran, a live broadcast of Obama's white house remarks was interrupted for an address by President Hassan Rouhani, who said that “**all our objectives” had been realized in the planned lifting of sanctions and in what he said was the world's recognition of Iran's nuclear program for civilian use.** *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

The extracts below also are employed by the paper in order to show the usefulness of the deal to both Us and Them.

Rouhani also suggested that Iran's relations with the world, particularly with the west, would change. “**if this deal is implemented correctly**,” he said, “**we can gradually eliminate distrust**” *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

The final deal provided ammunition for both sides in the upcoming political debates. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

> "**this deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction**. We should seize it," Obama said. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

The dichotomy of 'Us' vs 'Them' seems milder in WP in this period (2015 till 2016). This is because both Iran and the west show rapprochement via the nuclear deal. The politics of the American presidency in 2015 has influenced the American press in terms of the discourse addressed and the ideology interpreted.

B. Topos of disadvantage and uselessness

The application of the argument of disadvantage in WP newspaper is less remarkable since the deal was supposed to bring more advantage to US and its allies. Yet, the paper shifted focus to a point of conflict between Iran and US which is 'sanction relief'. The United States of America claimed that the deal would give Iran an advantage of sanctions relief and, therefore, Iran could develop nuclear weapons in the future, and this is considered as a disadvantage to US because it enables Iran to develop its nuclear capability. It is expressed below:

> Beyond dissatisfaction with any deal allowing Iran to keep some components of its nuclear program, critics said that **time limits of between 10 to 25 years on many of the restrictions effectively gave Iran a sanctions-free rein to develop nuclear weapons in the future.** *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

> "there are nits to be picked," Perkovich said, "but most of the critics are not actually interested in details. **They don't want any deal with the Islamic republic that allows it to have any nuclear capability or to obtain any sanctions relief**." *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

C. Topos of threat or danger

The Washington post is characterized by its straightforward way of expressing the threat and danger of Iran nuclear file. This topos is substantiated and constructed through different argumentative themes. First, 'Iran is a threat to the stability of the Middle East'. This is argued by the country history in waging wars and spreading terrorist attacks in a number of countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Second, 'Iran is a threat to US and its allies in the

Middle East' because of its nuke activities and support to terrorism in the region. Therefore,

the deal is so necessary to limit Iran's nuclear capacity. It is expressed in the excerpts below:

> We recognize that **Iran remains a threat to stability in the Middle East**. **That danger is precisely why this deal is so necessary** and why we fought so hard for the multilateral arms embargo to remain in place for five years and the embargo on ballistic missiles for eight. U.S. sanctions related to terrorism, human rights and missiles will also continue. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

> **A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to our allies in the Middle East**, as well as to the United States and the international community. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

> Obama also called leaders in the Middle East, officials said. Reactions from US allies ranged from concern among the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf that **lifting sanctions would increase Shiite Iran's efforts to expand its powers**, to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu's assessment that **Iran would not only get a nuclear weapons out of the agreement, but also a "cash bonanza" to continue support for terrorism once sanctions are gone.** *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

D.Topos of reality

Reality does not change. The fact is that Iran is a nuclear country; it does not stop its industry

of nuclear materials. Kerry, US Secretary of state, said that keeping pressure on Iran is

unrealistic and there is no getting away from the diplomatic solution. Thus, the nuclear deal is

a way to give IAEA access to Iran's nuclear factories and prevent it from having nuclear

weapons. All these are expressed in the excerpts below.

> Secretary of state John F. Kerry, who spearheaded the talks with Iranian foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, said **the talks to keep pressuring Iran, rather than seeking a diplomatic solution, were unrealistic**. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

> **This accord does not change that baseline**. **In fact, the deal enhances it by creating a new mechanism to ensure that the IAEA gets the required access** and sets a firm time limit to resolve access issues within 24 days. This mechanism provides an important tool for ensuring that Iran could not delay indefinitely. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

> The deal reached in Vienna this month is not only the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon, **it is the only durable and viable option for achieving this goal**. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

President Obama has said clearly that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. Neither sanctions nor military action can guarantee that outcome. **The solution is the comprehensive diplomatic deal reached in Vienna.** *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

E. Topos of history

The historical argumentation applied in 2015-2016 period targeted the United States of America and Iran efforts to set up a historical rapprochement via the nuclear deal. Yet, the Washington post also gave review to all Iran past nuclear activities and the economic sanctions put on it by the West. Moreover, the paper gave part to Obama's policy towards Iran and it considered it as an achievement compared with the previous US presidents' policies.

> Pessimists and detractors point to the fact that **Iran has once already chosen to abandon the Additional Protocol (A.P.) in 2005**, after **Iran was branded a member of the "axis-of-evil"** and relations with the West, and US in particular, soured. To date, Iranian leaders have said that they will implement the protocol, but only time will tell. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

> "I welcome scrutiny of the details of this agreement," Obama said. But he warned that he would veto any legislation that tried to prevent its implementation. "**We do not have to accept an inevitable spiral into conflict. And we certainly shouldn't seek it.**" he said in a response to republican charges of appeasement. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

> **Iran has long insisted that it does not seek an atomic arsenal and wants the capability to produce nuclear fuel** to power reactors for energy and medical application. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

G. Topos of Burdening

Argumentation of burdening assumes that one has burdens he has to bear them; otherwise he assumes the negative results. Both Iran and the west have burdens and undertakings to perform. Iran, out of the nuclear deal, has to get rid of its dangerous nuclear activities and adhere to the deal. For the west, US particularly, should keep an eye on Iran activities and make sure Iran start to remove the core of its heavy-water reactor at Arak, this can be read from the excerpts below:

Iran must also, with international assistance, remove the core of its heavy-water reactor at Arak, capable of producing spent fuel that can yield plutonium. "with international partnership, **it will be redesigned and rebuilt**," a senior administration official said, and converted into a reactor "**to produce zero weapons grade plutonium in normal use**" *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

Only five of the eight members need to agree, effectively ensuring that Iran, Russia and China cannot prevail if they vote together. **Iran then has three days to implement the decision. If it does not, "then we can begin snap-back" of sanctions**, an administration official said. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

When President Obama took office, h**e faced an Iran that had mastered the nuclear fuel cycle**, had constructed a covert uranium enrichment facility inside a mountain, was on its way to installing nearly 20,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment, was developing advanced centrifuges and was building a heavy-water reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

H. Topos of responsibility

The arguments for responsibility are employed in almost articles of Washington post concerning Iran-US conflict. The argument for responsibility stands for one has to assume responsibility of his actions; otherwise he may well face serious repercautions. In the case of Iran nuclear issue, the Washington Post focuses on Iran's responsibility to adhere to the nuclear deal's protocols. It is conditional if Iran meets its responsibility and adhere to additional protocol of the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran will benefits from sanctions relief. The Washington Post represents the Other (Iran) as the one who is responsible for the success and failure of the deal.

If Iran fails to meet its responsibilities, sanctions will snap back into place, and no country can stop that from happening. **If Iran tries to break out of the deal altogether, the world will have a longer time period** — a year compared with two months — **to respond before it could produce a bomb**. We also will have the moral authority that comes from exhausting all diplomatic options. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

For the United States to back away from this deal would be a historic mistake. We would be isolated from our partners, face an unraveling sanctions regime and give Iran the unconstrained ability to push ahead with its nuclear program. *Washington post on July 22, 2015*

<u>**Iran will also immediately adhere to the Additional Protocol**</u> of the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows IAEA inspectors to demand access to any site in the country, including military facilities. *Washington post on July 14, 2015*

In recap to the argumentative strategy, the WP employs and focuses on topos of threat, responsibility, reality and less on advantage. These topos are substantiated and constructed through different themes such as 'Iran will also immediately adhere to the Additional Protocol', 'Iran must also, with international assistance, remove the core of its heavy-water reactor at Arak', 'Iran was branded a member of the "axis-of-evil"', 'the talks to keep pressuring Iran, rather than seeking a diplomatic solution, were unrealistic', 'Iran remains a threat to stability in the Middle East' and 'this deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction'. WP attempts to create such a balance between praising the deal and displaying Iran as untrusty and unpredictable. The paper seemed reserved about its discourse towards Iran in this period.

4.8.4. Representation of Self/Other and the nuclear deal in Trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP

Washington Post	Trump's order to pull US out of the nuclear deal	2017-2020
Total Numbers of Articles Analyzed	All retrieved from the New Washington Post	10
Number of Articles in 2017	Washington Post	8
Number of Articles in 2020	Washington Post	1
Number of Articles in 2020	Washington Post	1

Table.19: Number of articles found in WP about trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP

4.8.4.1. Discourse topics analysis

The analysis of the discourse topics of Washington Post in Trump's era exclusively focuses on trump's order to pull US out of the nuclear deal and his accusation Iran country of terrorism and spreading instability in the Middle East in particular. Several articles have been written about the trump's order to pull US out of the deal. These articles have their claims on more than five general themes. These themes are revealed by many topics in Washington Post newspaper, framing the issue in different ways. Table below presents the topics:

The WP discourse topics on Trump's order to pull US out of JCOAP

Topic1 Trump decision to pull US out of the deal

Topic2 sanctions are reinstated

Topic 3 US's Allies express regret and concern about this withdrawal

Topic 4 Iran is a sponsor of terrorism in the world according to Trump

Topic 5 Iran deal is defective and flawed

Figure.22: The WP discourse topics about Trump's order to pull US from JCOAP

Consequently, Iran and its nuclear deal are frequently featured in the politics section and opinion-editorial section where different views and analysis are bestowed to the issue. Minor

topics are also discussed and analysed representing the Other (Iran) with negative traits and attributions such as Iran's anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli stance.

4.8.4.2. General description of Trump's order to pull US out of the deal in WP

Many articles discussed the issue of Trump's order to pull US out of the deal. All of them focus on the reason why Trump is no longer committed to JCOAP and the consequences of the withdrawal. One of the articles entitled '**Trump pulls United States out of Iran nuclear deal, calling the pact 'an embarrassment'(article by Anne Gearane and Karen De Young on May 8, 2018 at 5:30 p.m., Washington Post**)displays with details trump's arguments behind his decision, discussing and analyzing also the results upon both US and Iran. Another article entitled '**Trump's dangerous folly on the Iran deal (article by Editorial Board on October 5, 2017, the Post's view. Opinion)** describes Trump's withdrawal as a result of Obama's flawed decision. These articles and others will be analyzed to see how now Iran, US and the deal are represented.

4.8.4.3. Referential strategy: Self (US and its allies)

Self (West) actors	US actors	EU actors
Number of occurrences	11	6

Table.20: Presence of the Self in Washington Post

The discursive referential strategy used by Washington Post focuses on displaying and describing the Self with positive attributions. The articles collected for this study frequently refer to the self by using official names such as 'Trump', 'US', 'president Trump', and makes references to specific countries' names, e.g. Britain, France and Germany. The Washington Post also makes evaluative references to the Self, such as 'White House national security adviser john Bolton said', 'Europeans', 'GOP leaders'. Much interestingly, the paper does refer to the self by explicit names mentioned before and it avoids using vague pronouns 'We'

and 'Us', at the same time, Washington Post depends on the dichotomy Us/Them by distinguishing between the Other (Iran) and the Self (US and its allies). The references used by WP to refer to the self are explicit and unambiguous proper names such as 'Theresa May', 'Emmanuel Macron', 'Angela Merkel'. The excerpts below are examples of the referential strategy employed by WP:

> **President Trump on Tuesday said he is pulling the United States** out of the international nuclear deal with Iran, announcing that economic sanctions against Tehran will be reinstated….*Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> **Trump's decision, announced at the White House, makes good on a campaign pledge** to undo an accord…*Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> The move amounts to Trump's most significant foreign policy decision to date. While he cast the **U.S. action as essential for national security** and a warning to Iran and any other nuclear aspirant that "**the United States** no longer makes empty threats," it could also increase tensions with key **U.S. allies** that heavily lobbied the administration in recent weeks not to abandon the pact and see it as key to keeping peace in the region. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> After Trump's announcement, **the leaders of Britain, France and Germany** issued a joint statement expressing "regret and concern" and pledging their "continuing commitment" to terms of the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).*Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> "This resolution remains the binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute about the Iranian nuclear programme," **British Prime Minister Theresa May, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel** said in their statement. "We urge all sides to remain committed to its full implementation and to act in a spirit of responsibility." *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> **The United States will reimpose all sanctions** and could add new ones, **U.S. officials** said. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> Discussions with **allies** about new negotiations would begin Wednesday, **White House national security adviser john Bolton said**. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> A memorandum signed by **Trump** at the conclusion of his statement means that "no new contracts" with Iran will be permitted, Bolton said. Although the **United States** cannot prevent the **Europeans** or **others** from having financial relationships with Iran, nearly all global transactions at some point pass through dollar exchanges and U.S. banks, arrangements that are now prohibited. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> Other **GOP leaders** cheered the move, saying it was needed to push U.S. allies and Iran to strike a more restrictive bargain. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

"President Trump is right to abandon the Obama administration's bad deal," Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) said in a statement, adding that **Congress** must have a role in any new agreement. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

Almost the articles of Washington post make reference to Trump as the withdrawal decision-maker. They also describe his actions by referring to his claims, decisions and announcement. Among the linguistic references to trump's decision are verbs like 'abandon', 'reimpose', 'pledge to undo the accord' and 'pull'. Moreover, the other evaluative references are the core of its referential strategy. It described them and their action with verbs like 'cheered', cannot prevent'

4.8.4.4. Referential strategy: Other (Iran)

Other actors	Iranians actors
Number of occurrences	12

Table.21: Presence of Iran in Washington Post

It can be argued that WP's discourse about Iran nuclear deal is neutral as far as referential choices are concerned. Articles which discuss Iran nuclear deal during trump's presidency 2018 predominantly use official names and references denoting Iran and its political system. The WP's first and predominant choice is official references as 'Iran', 'Iranian Officials', 'President Rouhani', 'Iranian regime'

> That was a plea to **Iran not to take steps that would break the**, something **Iranian officials** have said at times they would do if Trump followed through on his frequent threats to yank the United States out of the agreement. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> "In response to US persistent violations & unlawful withdrawal from the nuclear deal, as instructed by **President Rouhani**, I'll spearhead a diplomatic effort to examine whether remaining JCPOA participants can ensure its full benefits for Iran," Iranian Foreign Minister **Mohammad Javad Zarif** tweeted. "Outcome will determine our response." *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> Trump said **Iran** had lied throughout negotiations for the international deal, and he cited secret Iranian documents revealed last week by Israel that showed the **Iranian**

regime had concealed a nuclear weapons program in the 1990s. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

Trump in his speeches about Iran always describe the Iranian regime as threatening to American people. He depends on this strategy of **'pure racism'** in his discourse in order to represent Iran's regime with negative traits and de-legitimize its actions. In one of his speeches, he describes the Iranian regime with **'blackmail', 'threatening', 'sponsor of terror'** and a regime which chants 'Death to America'

> "America will not be held hostage to nuclear blackmail. We will not allow American cities to be threatened with destruction, and we will not allow **a regime that chants 'Death to America'** to gain access to the most deadly weapons on Earth," Trump said. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> **The chant was a fixture of pro-government rallies** in Iran for decades, but despite its use during a major anti-Trump rally last year, it has largely fallen out of favor as a propaganda tool. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

> "In just a short period of time, **the world's leading state sponsor of terror** will be on the cusp of acquiring the world's most dangerous weapons." *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

Other than describing Iran with the accustomed and prominent references (threatening, sponsor of terrorism, etc.), the Washington post went further than this and attributed Iran and its regime with a radical and negative references. Cotton, the republican representative, and Trump called Iran a "corrupt dictatorship" accusing it also of harming US interests in the Middle East, and that was in two articles, the first was written by Anne Gearan entitled: "He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise" on October 11, 2017, and the second was by Amber Phillips entitled: it's up to congress to keep or kill the Iran nuclear deal. Here is how lawmaker could do either on October 11, 2017), and this was before the coming of Trump to US presidency and during his electoral campaign:

> Cotton laid out that approach in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations this month, in which **he accused Iran of harming U.S. interests in the Middle East and scheming to preserve its ability to eventually produce a bomb**. *Washington Post on October 11, 2017*

> President Trump criticized the Iran nuclear deal and called the Iranian government a **"corrupt dictatorship"** while addressing the U.N. on Sept. 19. (Reuters)*Washington Post on October 11, 2017*

A very interesting topic brought up by Washington Post is reporting that regimes in Beijine and Tehran are autocratic. The paper considers Iran and Beijine are the same in terms of their enmity to the West. There are also occasional evaluative references to Iran in which WP describes it "hypocritic", "countering US imperialism" and "Islamophobia". All this has been tackled in an article written by by Ishaan Tharoor entitled: "trump's two main foreign foes plan a major pact" published on July 14, 2020, two years after Trump inaugurated as US president:

> **The autocratic regimes in Beijing and Tehran** are feeling the heat from Washington. The former is locked in bitter, damaging trade war with the United States; the latter has seen its country's economy mauled by sanctions reimposed by the Trump administration after it broke from the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers. But the tariffs and sanctions have yet to yield President Trump the acquiescence from both parties he seeks. And recent developments suggest these two putative American adversaries may be finding greater common cause. *Washington Post on July 14, 2020*

> Some analysts abroad saw **hypocrisy in Tehran's courtship** of Beijing. "An Iranian regime whose revolutionary identity is premised **on countering U.S. imperialism and Islamophobia is about to ratify its total economic and strategic dependency on a Chinese government** that keeps over 1 million Muslims in re-education camps," reported Karim Sadjadpour a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *Washington Post on July 14, 2020*

It can be summarized from the WP discourse towards Iran that the paper has targeted to use the referential strategy to describe Iran with negative names. Furthermore, the paper has come up with radical and racist references like 'hypocrisy', 'autocracy' and 'corrupt dictatorship'. This can be explained by the influence of the ideological dichotomy of Us/Them embedded in WP's discourse and the stereotypical principle adopted by the paper, too.

4.8.4.5. Referential strategy: Iran nuclear deal

newspaper	Washington Post
Number of occurrences	**10**

Table.22: Presence of the nuclear deal in Washington Post

Before Trump was elected as US president and during his race to the white house in 2017, he made Iran nuclear deal as a priority on his agenda, criticizing it as an embarrassment and lacks many things, he considered it is no longer in his country's national security interest. This was despite the fact many of his advisers and republican leaders and some key US allies said it is a valuable tool to stop Iran having a nuclear bomb. What is remarkable is that the Washington Post shifted its discourse from Obama's legacy and made the newly elected president's decision its central topic, and that started from the onset of 2017 and lasted till 2020. Here are some excerpts reporting the president Trump decision of withdrawal:

> So White House national security adviser H.R. McMaster and other senior advisers came up with a plan — one aimed at accommodating **Trump's loathing of the Iran deal as "an embarrassment"** without killing it outright.
>
> **The Iran agreement, brokered by President Barack Obama, was never designed to do many of the things Trump criticizes it for lacking**. Many of his own advisers — and many Republican leaders and key U.S. allies — see it as **a valuable tool in stopping an Iranian nuclear bomb**.
>
> Trump could assert that **the deal is no longer in the U.S. national security interest**. *Washington Post on October 5, 2017*

However, the Iran's nuclear deal during Trump's period of presidency has been attributed many and different references, almost of them are negative. Considering this fact, the Washington Post uses more evaluative referential descriptions, including some general and neutral references. It is remarkable that these references are negative and non-peaceful unlike what Washington post described during Obama period of presidency.

> Trump's decision, announced at the White House, makes good on a campaign pledge to undo an accord he has criticized as **weak, poorly negotiated and "insane."** *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*
>
> "**The Iran deal is defective at its core**. If we do nothing, we know exactly what will happen," *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*
>
> "**The Iran Deal is a deeply flawed agreement**. . . . However, without proof that Iran is in violation of the agreement, it is a mistake to fully withdraw from this deal," Rep. Michael R. Turner (R-Ohio), a senior member of the House Armed Services and Intelligence committees, said in a statement. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*
>
> **The accord the Obama administration fashioned in 2015 is flawed**. *Washington Post on October 5, 2017*

Additionally, the WP discourse regarding the nuclear deal is clear and explicit, this can be explained by what the paper reported about what Trump described the deal as a 'pact' and 'fiction'. The representation of the deal by this implies the view that the ideological discourse carried by the WP serves the Self's interests.

> President Trump on Tuesday said he is pulling the United States out of the international nuclear deal with Iran, announcing that economic sanctions against Tehran will be reinstated and declaring that **the 2015 pact was rooted in "fiction."** *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

At the same time, and in order to legitimize the Self's actions and de-legitimize the Other's nuclear activities, WP brought up Obama's foreign policy towards Iran and considered the deal as an achievement and the best way to stop Iran's nuclear threat, and this came in the same article.

> Obama considered the agreement a signature **foreign policy accomplishment, calling it the best way** to head off the near-term threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and **a potential opening** toward better relations with Tehran after more than three decades of enmity. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*
>
> Obama on Tuesday lamented Trump's decision and sought to counter his criticism that **the accord** had done little to check Iran's nuclear ambitions.
> "The reality is clear. **The JCPOA is working** — that is a view shared by our European allies, independent experts, and the current U.S. Secretary of Defense," Obama said in a statement. "**The JCPOA is in America's interest — it has significantly rolled back Iran's nuclear program**." *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

4.8.4.6. Predicational strategy: Self (US and its allies)

One of the attended predicational themes in Washington post, during Trump's race towards the white house, is predications which draw on positive self representation as the side which is cooperative, worried about the future of the deal, with good intentions, helpful and attentive of how to revisit the deal. This is particularly observed in the comments and declarations of officials involved in shaping the deal

> "McMaster realized **we just cannot come back here next time with a binary option — certify or decertify**," an exercise Congress requires every 90 days, said a person familiar with the July discussion. "**He put his team to work on a range of other options, including a decertification option that would involve Congress**" and would not immediately break the deal. (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

> The deliberations show the extent to which **Trump's national security team in recent months has been occupied with navigating the future of the Iran nuclear deal**, which Trump repeatedly vowed to throw out as a "disaster" during the campaign. (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

> "**We are on a tightrope. We don't know what will happen**," said one Western diplomat worried that Trump's action will undermine the international agreement. (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

> "**To get us on the right foot on the Iran strategy, we do need to use this certification decision,** this moment, to launch a real effort to plug the holes and the weaknesses in the JCPOA," the aide said. (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

Another article attended to the theme of putting more restrictions on Iran's nuclear plan and further than that tearing up the deal and sanctioning Iran again. This predicational theme is always existing and repeated by officials opposing the deal from the start (Republicans and Trump's subordinates). It displays the Self as willing, serious.

> Congress could send a message to the rest of the world that **it wants to change the deal**. It could do this by voting on a resolution that says the United States wants to extend restrictions on Iran's nuclear plan indefinitely instead of ending it in a decade. **Or it could require Iran to stop testing ballistic missiles if it wants to keep the**

deal. (article by Amber Phillips entitled: it's up to congress to keep or kill the Iran nuclear deal. Here is how lawmaker could do either. WP on October 11, 2017)

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), one of the Iran deal's most vocal opponents, has called this option "**coercive diplomacy**." If it doesn't work, he wants Congress to revisit tearing up the deal by imposing sanctions.
"**The world needs to know we're serious**, we're willing to walk away, and **we're willing to reimpose sanctions**," he told the Council on Foreign Relations last week. (article by Amber Phillips entitled: it's up to congress to keep or kill the Iran nuclear deal. Here is how lawmaker could do either. WP on October 11, 2017)

In predicational terms, the Washington post's discourse regarding Iran nuclear deal during Trump presidency now is clear and seems to present the Self as rightful and has legitimate decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal. Thus, the paper's predicational themes are different and many, and they explained the reasons of the Self's legitimate acts. Here are some excerpts taken from different articles between 2018 and 2019:

President Trump on Tuesday said **he is pulling the United States out of the international nuclear deal** with Iran, announcing that **economic sanctions against Tehran will be reinstated** and declaring that the 2015 pact was rooted in "fiction." *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

Trump's decision, announced at the White House, makes good on a campaign pledge to **undo an accord he has criticized weak.** *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

They tried to convince **Trump that his concerns about "flaws" in the accord** could be addressed without violating its terms or ending it altogether. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

"**President Trump is right to abandon the Obama administration's bad deal**," Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) said in a statement, adding that Congress must have a role in any new agreement. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

The paper does also include a number of predications which are the countries opposing Trump's decision. These predications are critical of the Self, and they portray the self as the one who can determine the future of Iran nuclear deal.

After Trump's announcement, **the leaders of Britain, France and Germany issued a joint statement expressing "regret and concern" and pledging their "continuing commitment" to terms of the agreement**, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

"**We urge all sides to remain committed to its full implementation and to act in a spirit of responsibility**." British Prime Minister Theresa May, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in their statement. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

United States cannot prevent the Europeans or others from having financial relationships with Iran, nearly all global transactions at some point pass through dollar exchanges and U.S. banks, arrangements that are now prohibited. *Washington Post on May 8, 2018*

Officials and lawmakers are nearly unanimous in their prediction that, if the United States and European partners are unable to agree on changes to the Iran nuclear deal**, trump will make good on his promise to scuttle U.S. participation in the deal.** Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said so Sunday. (article by Josh Rogin on march 20, 2018, Opinion: what happens the day after trump pulls out of the Iran deal)

A very critical predicational theme which represents the republicans' voice and discourse is their objection and stance towards Iran nuclear deal. The republicans' discourse seems sharp, decisive and carries enmity to Iran. The Washington post has spared a large part of its paper, especially the opinion and editorial sections, to talk about this. What is remarkable also in Washington post discourse in the opinion section is its construction of the dichotomy Us/Them, in other words, there is a global positive predicational themes concerning the Self, and negative predicational themes concerning the Other. Here we read:

Still, **Republican leaders say they are confident that they can craft a legislative response to the president's decision** that can address deficiencies in the deal and avoid turning the issue into a political litmus test for the GOP.(article by Josh Rogin on march 20, 2018, Opinion: what happens the day after trump pulls out of the Iran deal)

Some Republicans have also been urging the president to take a critical public stance against the deal — without blowing it up. (article by Josh Rogin on march 20, 2018, Opinion: what happens the day after trump pulls out of the Iran deal)

Rep. Adam B. Schiff (D-Calif.) said a decertification would undermine global confidence in the deal and in U.S. commitments generally. (article by Josh Rogin on march 20, 2018, Opinion: what happens the day after trump pulls out of the Iran deal)

"**What we have to figure out is how to actually accomplish what we were well on our way to do before Barack Obama gave them a patient pathway to a nuclear bomb,**" Gardner said, referring to what he and other Republicans see as the deal's failure to prevent Iran from developing weapons down the road. (article by Josh Rogin

on march 20, 2018, Opinion: what happens the day after trump pulls out of the Iran deal)

4.8.4.7. Predicational strategy: Other (Iran)

Unlike the predicational strategy for representing the self, the predicational content for constructing and de-legitimising the Other is substantial and elaborated within several themes. Most of these predicational categories focus on either Iran's nuke activities, Iran's as a sponsor of terrorism, Iran's threat to US and its allies or Iran as an untrusty regime.

One of the common predicational themes is the theme denoting Iran as an untrusty regime continuing its nuclear program activities. So the Other here is reported as liar, untrusty and violator of the deal exceeding the limits of 130 metric tons of heavy water.

> Trump said **Iran had lied throughout negotiations** for the international deal, and he cited secret Iranian documents revealed last week by Israel that showed **the Iranian regime had concealed a nuclear weapons program in the 1990s.***Washington Post on May 8, 2018*
>
> "**the deal allows Iran to continue developing certain elements of its nuclear program and, importantly, in just a few years**, as key restrictions disappear, Iran can sprint towards a rapid nuclear weapons breakout" *Washington Post October 14, 2017by Glenn Kessler*
>
> "**the Iranian regime has committed multiple violations of the agreement**. For example, on two separate occasions, **they have exceeded the limits of 130 metric tons of heavy water.** Until recently, **the Iranian regime has also failed to meet our expectations in its operation of advanced centrifuges**" *Washington Post October 14, 2017 by Glenn Kessler*

Another theme, which also very common in the American press, is Iran as a sponsor of terrorism. This predicational theme has been dealt with in most American newspapers in order to display the Other (Iran) with a negative representation. The Washington Post varied its description of the theme; sometimes it straightforwardly describes Iran as a terrorist nation, and sometimes regime supplying an d supporting al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas.

> "**The regime harboured high level terrorists in the wake of the 9/11 attacks**, including Osama bin Laden's son." *Washington Post October 14, 2017 by Glenn Kessler*

> "**the regime remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism**, and provides assistance to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist networks" *Washington Post October 14, 2017 by Glenn Kessler*
>
> JCPOA "also gave **the regime an immediate financial boost and over 100 billion dollar its government could use to fund terrorism**. The regime also received a massif cash settlement of 1.7 billion dollar from the united states, a large portion of which was physically loaded onto an airplane and flown into Iran" *Washington Post October 14, 2017 by Glenn Kessler*

Another theme contributing and confirming the negative representation of the Other is Iran's relation with north Korea. This latter has been classified by US government as one of the regimes keeps enmity and form a threat to the United States of America. This theme constructs the Other (Iran) in action of reinforcing its nuclear capacity and having a strong ally.

> "there are also many people believe that **Iran is dealing with north Korea**. I am going to instruct our intelligence agencies to do a thorough analysis and report back their findings beyond what they have already reviewed" *Washington Post October 14, 2017*

To recap all the strategies used by WP to describe the Self and Other as well as Iran deal, it used explicit references and discussed the most influencing predicational themes. The paper has elaborated the theme of Iran as a threat and terrorist regime in order to reinforce the legitimate discourse addressed to confirm its irrevocable principle toward the Orient.

4.8.4.8. Argumentative strategy (topos)

A.Topos of advantage and usefulness

Argument for advantage and usefulness was applied most in the pro-deal and one year after the deal articles (2015-2016). However, by the coming of Trump and his administration, the American press started to report and write articles portraying the opinion and views of "anti-dealers". Yet, US allies, Britain, France and Germany with American Democrats, made endeavours to keep the deal alive and continuing, arguing that the deal cannot be redone and keeps US credibility with the rest of the world, above all, it stops Iran's nuclear threat. In the

excerpts below, the authors tried explain the attitudes of the US allies towards the deal which is positive.

> Britain, France and Germany, along with the European Union's foreign policy chief, have argued to Congress and the Trump administration that **the deal cannot be redone**. Iran has said the same. (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

> "**The nuclear deal was a crucial agreement that neutralized its nuclear threat**," British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said Tuesday, following a telephone call with Tillerson. "**The U.K. supports the deal and stresses the importance of all parties continuing to uphold their commitments**." (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

> Democrats. They largely want to keep the deal intact, in part because they think tearing it up with sanctions would undermine U.S. credibility with the rest of the world. "Leaving the [deal] at this point, absent concrete facts and material determinations, would isolate us from our allies and partners," Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (Md.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement.**(article by Amber Phillips entitled: it's up to congress to keep or kill the Iran nuclear deal. Here is how lawmaker could do either. WP on October 11, 2017)**

As mentioned before, the arguments for the deal and its benefits, said US allies, are reasonable. Furthermore, they add more arguments in terms of the consequences and positive benefits of the deal. The same author, Amber Phillips, in an article entitled 'it's up to congress to keep or kill the Iran nuclear deal. Here is how lawmaker could do either', lists some of the benefits for both parties, Iran and the West.

> The agreement signed under President Barack Obama was intended **to close off the potential for Iran to quickly build a nuclear bomb** by curbing nuclear activities the United States and other partners considered most troubling. **It allowed some uranium enrichment to continue for what Iran claims is peaceful medical research and energy; the country says it has never sought nuclear weapons**. In exchange, **world powers lifted crippling U.S. and international economic sanctions.**

Though the firm decision taken by Trump to withdraw out of the 2015 nuclear deal, the international inspectors with US allies still trying to convince Trump administration think again of the withdrawal, arguing that flaws of the deal can be addressed and Iran is abiding by

the terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement. Moreover, the deal can increase the distance

between Iran and development of its nuclear power

> They tried to convince Trump that his concerns about **"flaws" in the accord could be addressed without violating its terms or ending it altogether.**_Washington Post May 8, 2018_

> According to international inspectors and the U.S. intelligence community, **Iran has largely abided by the termsof the 2015 nuclear deal**, which greatly reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium and placed strict limits on its nuclear activities. **If the regime continues complying, it could be a decade or more before Iran could again threaten to become a nuclear power**._Washington Post August 20, 2017_

B. Topos of disadvantage and uselessness

The topos of disadvantages and uselessness of the deal was used, in fact, in pro-deal and anti-

deal articles from 2015 till current days. Yet, the high percentage of rejection of the deal was

in Trump's era starting from 2017 till his presidency was finished. The arguments used

against the deal in this period were used to denote the disastrous outcomes of the deal and its

weaknesses. In the excerpts below, the Washington Post reported trump attitudes and decision

of the accord and the bad consequences of the withdrawal.

> **The principal weakness of the nuclear accord is its temporary nature**. Most of its provisions will expire in eight to 13 years, leaving Iran free to stockpile an unlimited quantity of nuclear materials. _Washington Post August 20, 2017_

> **Mr. Trump could assert that the deal is no longer in the U.S. national security interest.**_Washington Post October 5, 2017_

> President Trump on Tuesday said he is pulling the United States out of the international nuclear deal with Iran,……… **declaring that the 2015 pact was rooted in "fiction."**_Washington Post May 8, 2018_

> **Trump's declaration puts a variety of companies in difficult positions**. Though the French oil giant Total had hoped the contract it signed would be excluded from the newly reimposed sanctions that seemed unlikely Tuesday._Washington Post May 8, 2018_

> The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal also **boosts the outlook for crude-oil prices.** _Washington Post May 8, 2018_

C. Topos of threat or danger

The argumentative strategy used by Washington post is similar to the New York Times one. The general trend followed by WP during Trump's period depends on characterization of the Other as a "threat and danger" and on the de-legitimation of the Other. The paper follows the general structure of "what we do is right because they are a threat". As seen in the referential and predicational strategies where the Other was negatively represented, the Washington Post draws on topos of threat in most of its articles. This topos of threat of the Other is constructed through different themes, such as "Iran is the most destructive country", "Iran is like the Islamic state terrorist group", "Iran had not lived up to its end of the nuclear bargain", "The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East", and others were mentioned in referential and predicational themes before.

> The solution is a compromise that retains the agreement but also puts Iran and U.S. allies on notice that Trump is willing to walk away. Meanwhile, Trump is likely to make the case that as the **Islamic State terrorist group** is weakened,**Iran is reasserting itself as the most destructive influence in the Middle East** and using the nuclear deal as cover to do so. (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

> By July, the president's frustration was evident. He made it clear that **he felt strong-armed and that the July certification would be his last**, several people familiar with the discussion said. (article by Anne Gearan entitled: He threw a fit: Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aids to scramble for a compromise. WP on October 11, 2017)

> Welcoming military leaders to a White House dinner Thursday night, Trump said **Iran had not lived up to its end of the nuclear bargain.**

> "**The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East**," he said. "That is why we must put an end to Iran's continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement."

The Washington Post's discourse was sometimes explicit in showing the threat of Iran and its nuclear program. This was expressed by certain discursive strategies either in Trump's speeches or some Washington Post's analysts in Op-ed section. What is remarkable also is that WP rarely includes the voice of the Other, for example, Iran's counter arguments, claims,

justifications, etc. this could mean a radical view and ignorance of the paper to Iran as a nation.

> **Iran might respond to decertification by resuming uranium enrichment,** even if Mr. Trump did not reimpose U.S. sanctions. *Washington Post August 20, 2017*

> "In just a short period of time, **the world's leading state sponsor of terror** will be on the cusp of acquiring **the world's most dangerous weapons**."*Washington Post May 8, 2018*

> Yet perversely, Mr. Trump is matching his passivity towards Iran's regional meddling with **an apparent determination to torpedo the nuclear pact**. *Washington Post August 20, 2017*

One of the themes that was tackled for several times in WP is "decertification of the deal". Trump decided to decertify the nuclear deal signed with Iran in July 14th, 2015, because, according to Trump, the deal was not in the national interest of the United States. We can read also from Trump decision that certifying the deal is a threat to national security and interest of the United States, and would permit Iran to resume its nuclear enrichment and nuclear program.

> Mr. Trump nevertheless is said to be leaning toward **"decertifying" Iran** under legislation Congress passes. *Washington Post October 5, 2017*

> President Trump is expected to announce next week that **he will "decertify" the international nuclear deal with Iran**, saying it is not in the national interest of the United States and kicking the issue to a reluctant Congress, people briefed on the White House strategy said Thursday.

D. Topos of reality

Throughout the period under study, what has been repeatedly insisted on and tackled as a matter of fact is Trump's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and Iran as untrusty regime continuing its production of nuclear bomb and uranium enrichment.

> But Iran is unlikely to agree to such modifications-at least not without major new concessions from the United States. **If the Islamic regime continues to comply with the existing deal, the implicit U.S. threat**- that it will follow decertification with withdrawal- **will look hollow**; in the absence of proven Iranian violation, Washington will have no European support. **In any case, nothing prevents the Trump administration from enlisting U.S. allies in a new negotiating effort without the show of decertification**.*Washington Post October 5, 2017*

> Even **if Europeans political leaders** are unpersuaded, he said, European businesses, vulnerable to U.S. sanctions if they continue dealing with Iran, may be. And **if that** does not work, Cotton said, "let there be no doubt about this point: **if forced to take action, the United States has the ability to totally destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure**. And **if they** choose to rebuild it, **we would destroy** it again, until they get the picture. *Washington Post October 5, 2017*

E. Topos of Burdening

I included this topos of burdening in this study because the Iran nuclear file is a burden on both the Self (US and its allies) and the Other (Iran). This topos stands for the idea that "each one has burdens to carry till the problem is solved". Therefore, the Washington post expresses this on the tongue of both parties. The United States and its allies have the burdens to control and minimize the threat and danger of Iran's nuclear program, and sanctions relief, too. That requires money, efforts and time. The excerpts below carry this idea.

> Such comments infuriate the Europeans. "I would remind our American friends that **when we started to impose sanctions, the United States did not have any trade with Iran… and we carried the burden**" of financial losses, Gerard Araud, France's ambassador to the United States, said last week at the Atlantic Council. *Washington Post October 5, 2017*

> It follows that **the challenge for a national U.S. administration** would be not how to get out of the deal now, **but how to extend its restrictions into the future**. U.S. partners would likely be ready to cooperate in a strategy aimed at that goal, and **they ought to be pressed to do more to stop Iran's non-nuclear behaviour**. *Washington Post August 20, 2017*

> **The issue of sanctions relief "is more complex than the nuclear issue, in part because Trump took steps explicitly aimed at making this process more difficult**," Henry Rome, a senior Iran analyst at Eurasia Group in Washington, wrote in a briefing Friday. (article by loveday Morris, Michael Birnbaum and Karim Fahim entitled: US official and other signatories to Iran nuclear deal to meet in Vienna next week. WP on April 2, 2021)

F. Topos of responsibility

This topos of responsibility is much employed by Washington Post in several of its articles because it expresses the idea that "each side has to assume the responsibility of his actions, otherwise things fail". The Washington Post exploits this topos in order to show the positive representation of the Self in particular, US and its allies' commitment to the deal, their

strategy in imposing sanctions to stop Iran's nuclear danger. This has been expressed by many

noun phrases, verbs and expression, such as continuing commitment, to remain committed, to

act in a spirit of responsibility, under pressure to show that it has a strategy, laboring.

> "The Iran deal is defective at its core. **If we do nothing, we know exactly what will happen**," Trump said. *Washington Post May 8, 2018*

> the leaders of Britain, France and Germany issued a joint statement expressing "regret and concern" and **pledging their "continuing commitment" to terms of the agreement.***Washington Post May 8, 2018*

> "We urge all sides **to remain committed to its full implementation** and **to act in a spirit of responsibility."***Washington Post May 8, 2018*

> Trump immediately faced questions about whether he has a plan for dealing with Iran beyond scrapping the accord, and **the administration will now be under pressure to show that it has a strategy for the Middle East beyond undoing what was put in place under President Barack Obama.***Washington Post May 8, 2018*

> **Previous efforts to negotiate a U.S. return to the deal** have been confounded by arguments over whether Tehran or Washington should take the first step. (article by loveday Morris, Michael Birnbaum and Karim Fahim entitled: US official and other signatories to Iran nuclear deal to meet in Vienna next week. WP on April 2, 2021)

> **The two sides are also laboring against the legacy of the Trump administration's blitz to reimpose sanctions and add many new ones**. (article by loveday Morris, Michael Birnbaum and Karim Fahim entitled: US official and other signatories to Iran nuclear deal to meet in Vienna next week. WP on April 2, 2021)

All in all, arguments used by the paper to delegitimize Iran and Iran nuclear deal are different

and drop in one essential idea that Iran is a threat and the United States has to take

responsibility to withdraw immediately from the deal and reimpose sanctions on it. The

argumentative strategy which heavily relies on topos of threat, responsibility and usefulness

could be described as professional and journalistic. This strategy will certainly have bearings

on the American readers and could help the American foreign policy.

4.8.5. Recontextualisation of the news

Recontextualisation is one of the important aspects of language employed by Washington

Post. Recontextualisation functions as to bring some characterizations and attributions of the

'Other' from other sources (International media and officials) and put them into new context.

In the case of Iran deal, the paper always refers to the past US-Iran relation and digs deep to find its reality to suit its arguments against the Other (Iran). This can be achieved through some operations such as rephrasing, making changes to the headlines, selecting and summarizing.

As an example of recontextualisation deemed highly important by Washington Post to legitimize its discourse against Iran is that it draws some old stories about Iran nuclear issue and revive them in the context of Iran nuclear deal. Washington post focused on the 'danger of Iran nuclear weapons program' and 'Iran as a threat', and the verb 'remains' implies here that the threat has been existing since long. The excerpts below show that:

> Trump said Iran had lied throughout negotiations for the international deal, and he cited secret Iranian documents revealed last week by Israel that showed **the Iranian regime had concealed a nuclear weapons program in the 1990s.** Washington Post May 8, 2018

> We recognize that **Iran remains a threat to stability in the Middle East**. That danger is precisely why this deal is so necessary and why we fought so hard for the multilateral arms embargo to remain in place for five years and the embargo on ballistic missiles for eight. U.S. sanctions related to terrorism, human rights and missiles will also continue. Washington Post May 8, 2018

Also, Washington Post picks up some reactions of international officials from "Reuters" news and Bloomberg news, and it brings them into its analysis of the issue. This is to add some value and legitimacy of its news. Washington Post, Reuters and Bloomberg news, as Western media, work with the idea that they are for the Iran deal and in support of the Us against Them. The paper depends on such sources to recontextualize the issue because Reuters and Bloomberg have got wide readers and confidential news. Therefore, they considerably helped the paper to legitimize its topoi discussed before. The excerpts below explained this:

> **The foreign ministers of Germany, France and Britain** Jan. 11 voiced their blanket support for the Iran nuclear deal. (Reuters) Washington Post, October 11, 2017

> President Trump criticized the Iran nuclear deal and called the Iranian government a "corrupt dictatorship" while addressing the U.N. on Sept. 19. **(Reuters)** Washington Post, October 11, 2017

"The world needs to know we're serious, we're willing to walk away, and we're willing to reimpose sanctions," he told the Council on Foreign Relations last week. Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) on Capitol Hill in September. (Aaron P. Bernstein/**Reuters**) Washington Post, October 11, 2017

Yes. Before Congress considers any legislative options, it probably will hold hearings. And Republicans could put together hearings that showcase experts who think Iran isn't holding up its end of the bargain. Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) holds a hearing in May. (Andrew Harrer/**Bloomberg News**). Washington Post, October 11, 2017

To recap, the analysis has fully traced articles that represent the Self and Other and legitimize and delegitimize their discourse. What is remarkable is that the representation of Iran and the nuclear deal has been given more negative references and predications. The Washington Post has treated the Iran deal and its decision-makers with binary options. The paper has shown a more radical and stereotyping view to the issue of Iran nuclear deal. From the day the deal signed till trump's decision to pull his country from the JCPOA, WP serves the issue with negativity (compared with NYT). This can tell a lot about the discursive strategies adopted by the paper and the theories that shaped its discourse. The final conclusion of this research will certainly bring all these findings together and answer the research question of the study. Chapter one and three will certainly help to draw the final conclusion and provide a theoretical platform to the implications of the analysis chapter.

Discussion of the findings

This thesis has examined American press discourse concerning two historical stages in Iran-US relation, Iran nuclear deal 2015 and Trump's order to pull US out of the JCPOA. In this period, stretching from 2015 till 2020, the American media intensified their coverage and analysis of Iran and its nuclear issue. The Iran nuclear deal signed on July 14th, 2015, has led to a division among American elites whether this deal would stop Iran's nuclear threat in the Middle East and the world or allow Iran to continue its nuclear program. All of a sudden and unexpectedly, US exit from JCPOA on May 8th, 2018, has broken all efforts done by Obama and his administration with US allies (P5), and returned all parties again to the table of negotiations. Therefore, American media, especially newspapers' opinions/editorials and analysis sections, were the leading platforms for such vigorous debates and thorough analysis.

In this thesis, I divided my analysis into sections according to two contradictory events in terms of decision-making. I tried to investigate various accounts of the nuclear deal and US exit from the deal presented by two leading newspapers in the United States of America, New York Times and Washington Post, with different political critics. With this, I developed four research questions and I attempted to answer them in the analytical chapter. Overall, my work on this discussion and analytical chapter focused on identifying the discursive and rhetorical strategies employed by the newspapers' authors to construct their opinion discourses. Additionally, I tried to examine the political stances of each newspaper through their linguistic patterns used to analyse Trump's order to pull US out the JCPOA. Also, my focus was to examine the interrelationship between discourse and society, i.e. I wanted to examine in which way discourses influence society and verse versa.

To achieve these objectives, I employed one of the potential critical discourse analysis approaches which is Discourse Historical Approach (Wodak, 2001) and recontextualisation as an element of analysis. I depended on DHA in my analysis because DHA provides an

insightful analysis that deciphers the complex link between power relations, discursive construction of identities, and discourse. Moreover, DHA suits this study because of its emphasis on the broader historical context that shapes threat perceptions and discourses of the United States and Iran vis-a-vis each other both synchronically and diachronically. Above all, the interdisciplinarity of DHA allowed me to analyse the selected opinions/editorials and analysis articles of both newspapers as and, therefore, to answer the research questions of this thesis.

In this study, DHA operationalizes its discourse analysis in three steps: the first identifies the general discourse topics, the second investigates the discursive strategies used to legitimize discourses under analysis, and the third examines the relevant context in which discourses are embedded. The data investigated are all from the newspapers' opinion/editorials and analysis section which enables this research to answer questions about the Self/Other negative and positive representation, argumentation of legitimization and de-legitimization of discourse, and the function of discourse in shaping the social structure.

The first question concerned the representation of both the Self (US and its allies) and the Other (Iran) and the construction of their social realities in the periods after the nuclear deal and after US exit from the JCPOA. The main question that poses itself here is: is the representation of the Other (Iran) still the same, or how was the Other (Iran) represented in both periods, taking into account the historical background before the rapprochement period. What inspired me to dig deep into this particular question regarding the dispute on Iran nuclear deal was the fact that elites in the American press, journalists, analysts, American officials and experts, differed significantly in their opinion. Thus, this enabled me to trace their discursive strategies and rhetoric to construct the reality of the Self/Other representation. Therefore, Wodak's referential, predicational and argumentation strategies were applied to examine actors and their action representations in the newspapers (NYT and WP) articles, as

well as recontextualisation to trace the legitimacy and delegetimacy of discourse. The outcome of the analysis made in chapter four revealed that there were differences and similarities among newspapers in the way they represent the social actors and their actions. Let's first give results of the analysis account of each newspaper discourse about Iran deal from 2015 till 2020.

The New York Times

The New York Times' discourse about Iran nuclear deal (2015-2020) is naturally influenced by first Obama policy and US allies towards Iran. This policy reduced tension between the West and Iran and allowed Iran to resume its economic trade with the rest of the world. Many themes were though tackled by the paper during the period of the nuclear deal (2015-2017) and framed Iran with negative representation, such as "Iran is a terrorist nuclear superpower", "outlaw regime", "Iranians are radicals", "untrusty regime", "unpredictable and uncertain regime". The New York Times' coverage showed that the American republicans were totally against this agreement and they referred to it as "historic mistake". Additionally, Republicans, on the tongue of their representatives like Senator Bob Corker, could not trust Iran "we're driving at this based solely on our own instinct". Also the senator Lindsey Graham, in an op-ed article, considered the nuclear agreement with Iran is a "gross misunderstanding of Iran" and Iranians are radicals and untrusted, he said "Mr. Kerry argument that the deal would empower Iranian moderates is gross misunderstanding of Iran". However, most Democrats attributed the deal with positive expressions such as "better deal", "this agreement is remarkably specific", "this accord was vastly preferable", "a new chapter". All these positive representation of the deal were discussed in Op-Ed article of NYT.

The New York Times tends to make explicit references to the Self (US and its allies) and the Other (Iran), and it avoids making references to complicated ideological groups. It avoids also using pronouns (we, they) in reference to the Self and Other unless they exist in quotes

from speeches of political actors (Obama, Democrats or Republicans). The dominant reference to the Self in NYT articles (especially two weeks after striking the nuclear deal on July 14th, 2015) is 'Mr. Obama' or 'President Obama', although there are mentions of proper names of countries and political figures such as Germany, Britain, France, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Netanyahu, as well as some other evaluative references to the Self as 'the world', 'International Atomic Energy Agency', 'the white house'.

Regarding the Other (Iran) mention, the New York Times generally makes official/neutral references such as 'Iran', 'Iranians'. There are also some occasional references to the Other as 'the Islamic revolutionary guard corps', 'Shiite forces'. There is also a reference that exists all the time in all American media, this reference expresses the 'rigidity' of some Iranian officials and the opposition in Iran, they are called 'Iranian hard-liners'. Moreover, the New York Times sometimes resorts to more loaded references when there is a need to express the enmity of Iran to America and Israel as 'Anti-American' and 'Anti-Semitic'.

The New York Times' discourse on Iran nuclear deal 2015 makes a good account of legitimation of the Self. This clearly appears in the predicational themes tackled by the paper which can arguably be classified as examples of positive presentation of the Self. These predicational themes generally express the idea that the Self is 'active', 'determined', and among these positive representation of the Self is the following expressions: 'we were able to unify', 'the world agreed with us', 'our willingness', 'we can in fact resolve some of the differences', 'I'm prepared to…'. However, the New York Times' predicational strategy in the construction and de-legitimization of the Other is crucial. Almost predicational themes represent Iran with negative attributions and traits. They generally describe Iran and its regime as 'untrusty', 'violate the deal', 'sponsor of terrorism', 'Anti-America', 'Anti-Israel', etc.

The New York Times' discourse during rapprochement period that had its first accord on July 14th, 2015 (Iran nuclear deal) seems to demonize Iran's social actors (politicians, leaders) and their actions and glorify the Americans actors and their actions. These strategies included ideological and vague references such as Hardliner, terrorist for Iranian officials; the application of the ideological dichotomy Us/Them which means that Americans and their allies (France, Germany, Britain, Russia, China, Israel, Saudi Arabia) are active in stopping the Iran's threat and peaceful in disarming Iran. Iranians are terrorists, violent, non-peaceful and immoral. Applying this dichotomy of Us/Them by NYT helps to legitimize the Self and de-legitimize the Other.

In terms of argumentation, the NYT could emphasize three major argumentations for the Iran nuclear deal: argumentation of usefulness, argumentation of history and argumentation of reality and pragmatism. The use topos of usefulness and advantage by NYT was particularly embodied in reporting what Obama and his supporters of the Democrats said about the deal. For example, in his interview with Friedman, Obama expressed hope and positive representation of the deal "the deal reached with Iran on Tuesday substantially reduces the potential nuclear threat", "it increases the distance between Iran and a bomb", "it makes the middle East less dangerous". So the NYT's argumentation strategy is so explicit in describing the deal to help represent the deal positively to its readers. The topos of reality and pragmatism was embodied in the fact that the Obama administration was in front of the reality to minimize Iran's nuclear threat. Therefore, NYT reported that there was no better deal than this, despite its faults, and the paper also reported what was said by Obama is a sort of pragmatism "and so this whole system that we built is not based on trust, it is based on verifiable mechanism". Last, if we refer to the topos of history, the NYT uses it whenever there is a report or an article about Iran. There were prospects and attempts to settle down conflicts between US and Iran in the past without resorting to the military force during

Obama's first term of presidency. Hence, the NYT emphasizes the role of the discursive construction of the past on present situations when claiming validity for certain policies.

After all, I can say that NYT's representation and legitimization of Iran nuclear deal is to a certain extent positive. Yet, Iran was portrayed in almost the NYT selected articles as an enemy, untrusty and a terrorist country in the eye of the West, and the US in particular. However, there was a certain mitigation strategy used by NYT in displaying Iran stepping up efforts to protect the deal and allowing the international inspector to verify their nuclear buildings. Moreover, the ideological dichotomy of Us vs Them was observable but it was a little milder. This is because both countries were engaged in setting up a historical nuclear deal which would get them closer.

On the other hand, reporting about Iran and Iran nuclear deal during Trump period seems different. The NYT discourse in this period was influenced by the anti-Iranian sentiments and hatred of the ex-President Trump towards Iran. Therefore, NYT referred to Iran as "the biggest problem we face in our region", "Iran could never be trusted", "Iran does not have the economic strength to confront the United States". Also, NYT referred to Iran nuclear deal as "flawed", "disastrous", "terrible", "the worst deal", "disgrace", "defective", "a road to a confrontation", "disaster", "horrible one-sided deal". However, NYT depiction of the Self was positive in its predicational strategy. the self (Trump) was referred as "right", "patient", "the success of Trump's policy", "reopens negotiations with Iran", "fulfilled his promise". Thus, the use of the dichotomy Us vs Themis remarkably explicit, and the opinions discourse of the NYT authors and analysts is influenced by the ideology of the Self. So the NYT's discourse follows a consolidated ideological dichotomization.

The NYT's discourse about Iran and Iran nuclear deal during trump's presidency says a lot about the legitimation of the Self. This seems in the paper's predicational themes brought up every time which can be arguably classified as examples of positive presentation of the Self

(especially in Op-Ed articles and politicians' views). These themes include the principles that "we are prepared to dissolve this flawed deal", "we are determined to stop Iran's threat" and "we are aware what Iran intends behind this deal". However, the paper's predicational strategy in the construction and de-legitimisation of the Other (Iran) is substantial. Some these themes are related to the non-adherence of Iran to the nuclear deal 2015, and Iran lies on IA. The other themes also include "Iran is still proceeding its uranium enrichment" and "Iran does not stop the building of its nuclear program". In terms of argumentation, the NYT's overall frame tends to represent the Other as a 'threat and danger' and to de-legitimize it. This topos is substantiated and constructed through different argumentative themes, such as 'their threat of terrorism', 'their threat of nuclear program', 'their threat of supporting militia in Yemen and Syria to destabilize the region' and 'their threat of anti-Semitism'.

Washington Post

The Washington post's discourse about Iran and Iran nuclear deal during Obama presidency is highly influenced by Obama initiative to set up a nuclear deal with Iran. Much of what Obama said about Iran and its nuclear deal was reflected on the paper representation of the Self and the Other. The WP refers to Iran with official names such as 'Iran' and some evaluative references such as 'regional power' and 'A nuclear-armed Iran'. To legitimize the nuclear deal, the paper generally refer attributed the deal with positive reference such as 'durable and viable option', 'the best way', 'important opportunity' and 'a better deal'. However, the Washington Post's discourse regarding the Self is well constructed and presented. The paper does focus on the positive actions the United States and its allies have done before and now in order to maintain peace in the world. This was expressed by the positive references attributed to the Self, such as 'The United States and other world powers reached a historic agreement with Iran' and 'American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change'.

Moreover, many predicational themes were tackled by WP during this period and framed Iran with negative attributions. Most of the predicational categories which are brought up in WP are explicitly related to Iran's regime and its officials. These themes include 'a non-peaceful regime', 'a country still producing nuclear weapons and enriching uranium', 'Iran remains a threat' and 'Iran fail to meet its responsibility'. Though the paper described the deal as a positive step towards stabilizing the relationship between Iran and the west, but it de-legitimized the Other and its action. WP strategy of de-legitimation of the Other was processed by referring to the past bad actions and practices of Iran, which is the same actions and practices in present.

The dichotomy Us vs Them was emphasized by the positive Self-presentation and the negative Other-presentation. The paper does not show it explicitly by such pronouns like Ours, theirs; but it is, pragmatically speaking, understood the discursive construction of the self and other, in other words, the self is referred as the doer of the action, and the other is the receiver of the action. WP also seems to have a tendency that the Self (US and its allies) is the one who has power and exercise it on the Other in order to stop Iran's nuclear threat.

The discourse of Washington Post concerning the case of Trump's order to pull US out of brought up all kinds negative and radical references to Iran. This latter was attributed radical names such as 'corrupt dictatorship', 'autocratic regime', 'hypocrite' and 'harming U.S. interests in the Middle East'. The construction and de-legitimization of the Other through references to Iran nuclear deal as a defective and an insane deal are systematically pursued by the paper, for example, the deal was described as 'weak', 'poorly negotiated', 'rooted in fiction', 'flawed' and 'bad'. Moreover, the predicational strategy used by WP to describe Iran focused on different themes which represented the Other negatively, 'such as Iran had lied throughout negotiations', 'the Iranian regime has committed multiple violations of the agreement', 'the regime remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism' and 'the deal

allows Iran to continue developing certain elements of its nuclear program'. All these actions could de-legitimize the Other's actions.

In terms of argumentation, the Washington Post focused much on three topos and less on the others. The three topos that can legitimize the Self (Trump in particular) action of withdrawing from the deal and de-legitimize the Other (Iran nuclear deal) are topos of disadvantage and uselessness, the topos of threat and topos of responsibility. The topos of uselessness used by WP to argue that the nuclear deal is defective, weak and tough sanction must be reimposed on Iran. Also, based on the topos of threat, the deal permitted Iran to double its uranium enrichment and do not stop its nuclear program. Thus, the nuclear deal 2015 did not meet the US interests, and Iran poses a fundamental threat to US and its allies. Such predicational themes about the victimization of Iran strengthened the negative Other-presentation, and it gave Trump an argument to pull US out of the JCPOA. Among the predicational themes in WP that undermine Iran and strengthened the topos of threat are those claimed by Trump and the Republicans that Iran is still committed to develop its nuclear activities and Iran is a sponsor of terrorism. These discourses depicting Iran as an enemy that arouses fear have been strengthened with the appeal to the topos of responsibility that has emphasized the duty of the United States to ensure the security of its citizens and its allies by containing Iran through measures such as the withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

The topos of responsibility has served as a tool for the positive self-construction of the United States and its allies. By emphasizing the negative outcomes of the deal, the topos of responsibility has also functioned as an instrument to indicate what needs to be done to stop Iran's nuclear program entirely. Depicting the United States as a responsible state that continuously promotes world peace and as a world leader that has a responsibility to prevent Iran from undermining regional stability, sponsoring terrorism, and acquiring nuclear weapons, Washington Post emphasized the urgent actions to be taken to contain Iran.

General Conclusion

This thesis has attended to a gross issue that seems everlasting between two nations, different in culture and political system, the United States and its allies and Iran. The study of this topic has principally targeted the nuclear accord which was struck between them in 2015 to settle down the conflict that has lasted for many years. This nuclear accord has somehow neared US and Iran to each other and overcome the barriers and economic sanctions put on Iran. However, US and its allies wanted to protect their presence and interests in the gulf region by making sure that Iran suspend its nuclear weapon program as the nuclear deal stated. Unfortunately, things turned around and worked against Obama administration and Rouhani one, too. President Trump suspended the deal and pulled US out of the deal. Therefore, this sequence of happenings and events has provided media with topics and themes which are the core concern of this research.

This research has tackled this case study to analyse the discursive practice of the American press and their opinions, commentaries and rhetoric. The goals behind this are diverse. First, it is for the purpose to see how the newspapers employed discourse to legitimize the self's actions and de-legitimize the Other's action. Second, it is aiming at looking how power governs discourse and how discourse is linguistically and socially ordered to bestow legitimacy to the Self. The most and foremost purpose is that this research attempts to find more linguistic mechanism, methods, concepts and pragmatic assumptions that can explain clearly the interplay between discourse and social structure and disclose ideologies in discourse, in other words, I want to examine how the discourse of the newspapers was shaped by its socio-political context.

To achieve these objectives, the thesis is structured in four chapters. The first chapter explained the theories and concepts this research is based on. The term discourse, which is the core of the research, has been defined from different perspectives and angles, as well as its

relationships with other concepts such as power, ideology, legitimacy and identity. The chapter also has fully covered Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA), its roots, methods and discursive strategies. The chapter has provided the research with a theoretical foundation which significantly helped in gathering accurate data for the analysis according to the objective and focus of the study. The second chapter, in turn, has dealt with the type of discourse dealt with for analysis. Political discourse has been defined and given its characteristics and framework of functioning. The chapter also attended to media discourse and its analysis. Much importantly, the discourse historical approach (DHA) is considered one the effective and accurate approaches that has been always resorted to for analysis of political discourse and media discourse as well. The chapter has also traced the socio-political history and discourses which dominated Iran since the Islamic Revolution 1979. That would give a good image of the kind of the country that the west (US and its allies) are confronting. The value of this chapter is to read some of the concepts and ideas about political discourse and the way how it is analysed.

The third chapter is considered a theoretical foundation for this study, too. It has attended to diverse conceptual theories of media that helped much in explaining the research problem, such as bias, stereotyping, orientalism and representation. Moreover, the chapter has given a short sketch about Iran nuclear deal 2015 and its portrayal in different international media and US's withdrawal from this deal in 2018. This chapter and the others have significantly built a clear ground to the textual analysis chapter. This latter has covered almost of the issues that are addressed by this study by analysing the selected discourses and themes of New York Times and Washington Post.

In this thesis, I endeavoured to investigate various accounts of the nuclear deal between 2015 and 2020. In this period, a lot of topics and themes have emerged especially Trump's decision to pull his country from the nuclear accord. This has provoked the American press,

New York Times and Washington post in particular, to write more and show its political stances towards Iran and the nuclear deal. Accordingly, I developed four research questions and I elaborated them in the analytical chapter and answered in the finding discussion and conclusion.

Based on the DHA analytical tools, the research questions of this thesis have been received a thorough investigation and analysis. Concerning the first question, I noticed that both newspapers, the New York Times and Washington Post, have similarities and difference in constructing the image of the Self and Other. The most point of similarity is that both have the same perceptions of Iran. They have referred to the Other's social actors and their actions with the same degree of characterization. The newspapers always resort to the past (history) nuclear activities of Iran, and they use interdiscursivity and recontextualisation as tools to relate the past with the present and legitimize their claims. Therefore, Iran has been portrayed as a threat, defiant, sponsor of terrorism and a liar in both newspapers. However, the main point of divergence is embodied in the fact that both newspapers differ in their discursive strategies in representing the Self and Other, and this due to their authors' personal ideologies and affiliations, newspapers' political stances, readers' values. Washington post seems more radical and uses many negative and radical references to the Other (Iran) and Iran nuclear deal. Most of the articles of WP condemned the deal, regardless of its little positive representation of the deal here and there. Yet, NYT's articles focused on the benefit of the deal and its outcomes on Iran and the US. This would confirm the first hypothesis that Iran is still regarded as an opposing and enemy to the west, though Iran was referred in many times as country which can be a good friend and ally to the US. From this, I can read some of the ideologies of the newspapers toward Iran, and this leads me to answer the second research question about the ideological stance of the newspapers towards Iran.

The ideological stance of WP and NYT towards Iran and Iran nuclear deal is evident. Both are radical and extremist especially towards Iran as a regime. This is because of their harsh criticism to the Other, and their orientalist representations of their discourse. Such representations of the Other have a long history in their discourse on Iran. Both newspapers' discourse depend on the ideological dichotomy Us vs Them in treating Iran. Such depiction reinforces both Said's (1978) notion of Orientalism and Hall's system of representation of the Other. Both concepts are applicable by the newspapers, and they were addressed by means of language. The construction of Iran as a threat, terrorist and defiant, and the Iran nuclear deal as defective, weak and flawed can be seen as part of the western Orientalist tradition. This latter helps the American media to define the Self against the Other and legitimize the dominance of the West over the East.

The last research question deals with the interconnectedness between discourse and society (how can the newspapers' opinion discourse influence to shape the American national identity?). This question deals with the context of how discourse is produced and consumed. All the opinion and editorials discourses produced by both newspapers seek to influence their readers and convince them of the bad and evil side of the Iran nuclear deal. The papers carried out specific actions, and all their representational, interactional and argumentative features were means for conducting those actions. These referential, predicational and argumentative strategies worked out to shape the discourse of the newspapers in order to represent the social actors and their practices in a way that can touch the readers' feelings. Authors' discourses during Obama period draw the attention to the fact that the deal with Iran would stabilize the situation, and they do not focus much on Iran's evilness and bad practices. However, authors' discourses during Trump focused much on Iran as a terrorist and threatening country. They depicted an alarming situation with Iran, and there should be drastic measures to be taken immediately. Furthermore, the ideology that both newspapers carry is for the national interest

and security. They write credibly and responsibly and speak authoritatively as Edward Said reported in his book 'covering Islam' (p.92). In Iran issue context, their ideological discourses helped to emotionalize the American readers by their government, and New York Times and Washington Post daily publications of political articles have influenced the American domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, the traditions of the American newspapers in depicting Iran are embodied in their orientalist mindset. This latter were present in all the newspapers discourses from micro levels of actors and actions of representation to macro levels of argumentation. This helped the West to define the Self against the bad and evil Other. Therefore, it also helped to spread its power and hegemony and legitimize their discourse and actions over the East. Additionally, what reinforces the ideological dichotomy which is embedded in the newspapers' discourses is Hall's system of representation and binary opposition. The discourse of both newspapers bears this kind of representation which emphasizes the difference between the Self (good, savior, civilized) and the Other (aggressive, bad, dangerous). This difference helped to construct meaning and social identity. Thus, opinions discourse are bearers of these ideological concepts and they significantly contributed to the construction of system of knowledge and belief, and, therefore, they contributed to the construction of social identities.

As an overall remark from this research and a personal contribution, if we compare it with the previous researches which were done before 2015, the shift in the American decision about Iran nuclear deal has prompted many discourses to emerge. Media discourse, in particular, carries many discursive practices. It is the hinge in which these practices such as ideology, power, legitimacy and identity interact and influence each other. Power is not only expressed by the linguistic construction of text; it is also expressed by persons' control of social occasions. That is seen in the newspapers discourse of their authors. Hence, ideologies which were manifested in the American press authors discourse (New York Times and

Washington Post) such as Us/them dichotomy, inclusion and exclusion, binary opposition and orientalism have established and maintained power, hegemony and exploitation. Therefore, the discourse of NYT and WP concerning Iran deal during this period has served to legitimise relations of organized power. This interaction between these discursive practices, power, ideology and legitimacy, has inculcated in ways of being identities. This arouses the idea that media news plays a vital role in terms of their pervasive and widespread discourse that people from all backgrounds are exposed to. Now, it can be concluded that discourse can be again defined as a set of ideological representations embedded in the text to represent the world, and discourse is bearer of human actions and is a mental act that can be interpreted in one's reaction.

Again, it is worthy to emphasize and reconfirm the pivotal role of CDA in the domain of media. We know that CDA is not only interested in deconstructing linguistic expression; it endeavours to analyse and explain social phenomenon. CDA targets social meaning or language in action. The language of the press presented in New York Times and Washington post was put in action by context, recontextualization and interdiscursivity. These linguistic elements reinforced the legitimacy of the American discourse against Iran, and proved their vital role in analysing political discourse. Overall, I want to emphasize the crucial importance and effectiveness of the discourse historical approach (DHA) in this research, because it can help to provide methods and techniques to analyse topics such as Self/Other representation and the relationship between language (discourse) and society. It is multidisciplinary approach; it enables discourse analysts to select different methods according to the objectives of the study and their research questions. Much interestingly, for this kind of topics which is socio-political and socio-cognitive and its renewal discourses, the possibility of integrating van Dijk's cognitive analysis will be primarily needed and used to explain the production and reproduction of prejudice, disputes and stereotypes. Here I want to draw the attention to the

point that each discourse needs a particular analytical model proper to its genre and characteristics, and this examined topic is characterised by its sensitive socio-political context. This will be for future projects as the topic of Iran nuclear power is growing complex with its emerging issues coming to the surface every day. I mean here the possibility of synergizing van Dijk cognitive approach with Wodak DHA for more accurate analysis.

It is important to recognize the role of media in shaping policies as New York Times and Washington post do. Media are mirrors reflecting elites' agenda and ideas. They are considered one of the authorities that all government around the world depend on to spread their hegemony and power over their people. Therefore, media work for the national interest and security as NYT and WP do. First, their tone and critic toward the deal during Obama's second term seemed less intense and severe, in which they considered the deal as positive and good for the national and allies' security, and they endorsed the Obama's administration discourses. Second, their critic of the deal was harsh as they considered it as a mistake and flawed during Trump's presidency 2018. These opposing frames of the deal between 'yes and no for the deal' have been dealt with great professionalism and responsibility and exported with different discursive strategies to the American people.

I want to draw the attention to the relationship between media and elites. Media are in service of elites, they convey their message to public. Having a deep look at the structure of the news produced by NYT and WP, we can infer that media production of discourse is not arbitrary; they use and emphasize indexing, interaction, modality, metaphors and binary conceptualization. This is explicit in the language of the American press which is the channels of the American elites to feed their public with the desired news. What is more, I want to emphasize also on some media theories used in the newspapers texts which have a great impact on the American public. The discourse has been structured by using Bakhtin's notions of voicing (1986), Goffman's concept of framing (1981), Bell's work on narrative structure

and style (1998), and Tamen's positioning of the media as agonists and instigators of polarized public debate (1998), they all have led to valuable insights into discourse structure, function, and effect - and have characterized the very significant role the media play in the shaping of public.

The bottom line is that the conflict between Iran and the west over Iran nuclear issue has been taking a great deal of space in the international media. The emerging themes and topics are varied, and this thesis has only dealt with critical discourse viewpoints of the American press journalists. These latter have provided many discourses which are pivotal point of critic and analysis. The attitude set by the American press towards Iran nuclear deal has been proved unchanged, and it was expressed by different stereotypes and orientalist minds (untrusty, threatening, terrorist, etc.). This representation of Iran has long on history in American discourse on Iran, and this reinforces the binary opposition between the Americans and Iranians. The critic over this topic is still going on, we may confront in the future with other cases that can enrich the field of discourse studies with new concepts and empirical studies. This topic has not been only dealt with in the press; it is being now tackled in televisions, radios, and social media. These types of media can be great source of more data to analyse and understand this issue, and this could inspire discourse critics to combine approaches (social semiotics with DHA) to analyse its data.

As a final word, I hope this CDA study on Iran nuclear deal benefited those in the field of teaching discourse and pragmatics and those who are carrying projects on critical discourse analysis, and provide researchers with good impetus to strengthen their researches.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 23: Summary of the referential strategy in NYT and WP for Self and Other representation

Discursive strategy	Objectives	Categories
Referential/Nomination	Discursive construction Legitimation of Self (Us)	Pronouns: **We, Our, Us** References to the country: **US** References to people**: American People,US government,Congress, The white house, Republicans, Obama, Trump, etc.** References to US allies and other: **EU, Russia, China, Israel**
Referential/Nomination	Discursive construction Delegitimation of Other	Pronouns**: They, Them, Their** Reference to the country**: Iran, Islamic Republic of Iran** Reference to people: **Iranians,** Reference to ideological names**: Hardliners, IRGC,**

Appendix 2

Table 24: Summary of the referential strategy in NYT and WP for Iran nuclear deal

Discursive strategy	Objectives	Categories
Referential/Nomination	Discursive construction of Iran nuclear deal	Official and specific references: Iran deal, pact Iran nuclear deal, agreement, accord, defective, valuable better deal, void, null, disaster, embarrassment historic mistake, worse, disgrace, fiction, flawed catastrophic, stupid, dangerous, insane, weak, potential, best way, poorly negotiated

Appendix 3

Table 25: Summary of the Predicational strategy in NYT and WP for Self and Other representation

Discursive strategy	Objectives	Categories
Predicational strategy What characteristics and qualities and features are attributed to social actors	Discursive construction and legitimation of **Self**	Pronouns: **WE** -we are willing to walk away - we are willing to reimpose sanctions -we urge all sides to remain committed to its full implementation. -we have to figure out how to actually accomplish what we were all on our way. -united states cannot prevent the Europeans or Other from having financial relationship with Iran -Republicans leaders say they are confident that they can craft a legislative response to the president's decision
Predicational strategy What characteristics and qualities and features are attributed to social actors	Discursive construction and delegitimation of **Other**	Pronoun: **They** -Iran had lied throughout negotiation -the Iranian regime had concealed a nuclear weapons program in the 1990s -the Iranian regime has committed multiple violations of the agreement -the regime remains the world's leading state of terrorism -Iran is permanently enjoined from building a Nuclear weapons. -the regime harboured high level terrorists In the wake of the of 9/11 attacks.

Appendix 4

New York Times articles

ARTICLE 1

Republicans Race to Condemn the Iran Deal
BY ANDREW ROSENTHAL JULY 14, 2015
https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/.../republicans-race-to-condemn-the-iran-deal/
The Republican presidential candidates fell all over themselves today trying to see who could condemn the nuclear deal with Iran the most quickly and in the most cataclysmic terms. It made no difference whether they actually knew anything about the deal, about Iran, about nuclear arms, or about foreign policy in general. They had their attacks ready, just as they have had and will have to anything President Obama does or wants.
Gov. Scott Walker of Wisconsin, who reportedly has been getting briefings on foreign affairs because he's the governor of a Midwestern state with no actual experience in the area, announced: "The deal allows Tehran to dismantle U.S. and international sanctions without dismantling its illicit nuclear infrastructure — giving Iran's nuclear weapons capability an American stamp of approval."
Actually, no. It requires Iran to dismantle a great deal of its "illicit nuclear infrastructure" before sanctions start to be lifted, would restore them and impose more if Iran cheats, and keeps in place many sanctions based on Iran's human rights record and its support for terrorist organizations.
"Shame on the Obama administration for agreeing to a deal that empowers an evil Iranian regime to carry out its threat to 'wipe Israel off the map' and bring 'death to America,'" said Mike Huckabee, the former Arkansas governor.
Mr. Huckabee, like the rest of the G.O.P. field, offers not a clue as to how he would prevent Iran from doing those things, which don't actually require a nuclear weapon, which the United States and Israel have, by the way.
"Based on what we know thus far, I believe that this deal undermines our national security," said Marco Rubio, the Florida senator. Mr. Rubio said the United States should ratchet up sanctions until Iran agrees to completely dismantle its nuclear program. It's long been clear that won't happen, and it could never be verified in any case without a deal like the one Mr. Obama and other world leaders signed.
"A comprehensive agreement should require Iran to verifiably abandon – not simply delay – its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability," said Jeb Bush, former governor of Florida. Well, yes, that would have been comprehensive. Again, it was never going to happen.
Would Mr. Bush argue that a succession of United States presidents should not have negotiated arms deals with the Soviet Union because they did not lead to full, unilateral disarmament and a renunciation of communism? I hope not.
The same applies to a comment by Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey, who said: "The deal threatens Israel, it threatens the United States, and it turns 70 years of nuclear policy on its head." It does not do those things. 285

power" — precisely the kind of thinking that drives away potential supporters of a more limited approach. This is unfortunate, because the Iran deal is a solid achievement in terms of nuclear arms control — not a geopolitical watershed.

The accord simply offers sanctions relief in exchange for extensive limits on Iran's ability to enrich uranium, which is the hard part of building a nuclear weapon. By limiting the equipment that can be used for this purpose, it will be far more difficult for Iran to transform its civilian nuclear program into a weapons program. In exchange, and underOne of my favorite lines of attack was the one voiced by (among others) Rick Perry, the former governor of Texas and former spectacular failure in the Republican primary process. "President Obama's decision to sign a nuclear deal with Iran is one of the most destructive foreign policy decisions in my lifetime," he said.

Seriously?

How about the Bay of Pigs; Vietnam; the secret bombing of Cambodia; the invasion of Cambodia; the C.I.A. plot to overthrow and perhaps murder the president of Chile, ushering in decades of military dictatorship and the slaughter of countless Chileans; Iran-Contra; the failure to take prompt action against the Balkan genocide; the decision to retreat from the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and invade Iraq based on propaganda and disinformation; and the botched invasion of Iraq, which laid the groundwork for regional warfare and the formation of the Islamic State terrorist group?

Going back just a few years before Mr. Perry was born in 1950, there was the decision to carve up Europe with Stalin, creating the Soviet bloc, sparking a nuclear arms race and leaving entire nations in bondage to the Kremlin for a half century.

Meanwhile, over in the land of reality TV, Donald Trump predicted that the Iranians would cheat. Perhaps they will, but this assessment comes from the man who reportedly told some Hollywood conservatives last Friday that the United States should have invaded Mexico instead of Iraq.

ARTICLE 2

How Obama Should Sell the Iran Deal
By JAMES P. RUBIN JULY 15, 2015
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/.../how-obama-should-sell-the-iran-deal.html

LONDON — IN the long run-up to Tuesday's nuclear agreement with Iran, the Obama administration repeatedly suggested that the accord was part of a larger strategic shift in Washington's approach to Iran. Past experience with arms control debates during the Cold War demonstrates that this is a big mistake that could jeopardize hard-won security gains.

The administration should now seek to justify the deal exclusively on narrow national security grounds.

Although President Obama and his advisers have recently begun to change their tune, they have repeatedly, over the past few years, characterized the nuclear talks as part of a more comprehensive administration strategy to establish "a new equilibrium" between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The unfortunate consequence of these and other exaggerated claims was the alienation of moderate Republicans and friendly Arab leaders, many of whom supported steps to reduce the risk from Iran's nuclear program but opposed any attempt to improve relations with the Iranian government.

As recently as April, when the framework for Tuesday's deal was announced, Mr. Obama was emphasizing the idea that as the United States reduces its presence in the Middle East, better relations with Iran could help establish a new balance of power there. In an extensive interview with The New York Times's Thomas L. Friedman at the time, Mr. Obama envisioned a nuclear accord and sanctions relief changing Iran's overall approach,

and "then what's possible is you start seeing an equilibrium in the region, and Sunni and Shia, Saudi and Iran" would begin to consider reducing their tensions.

These and similar statements have become fodder, among some observers, for a heroic narrative that Mr. Obama has achieved a rapprochement with Iran comparable to Richard M. Nixon's breakthrough visit to China in 1972. Indeed, in another interview with Mr. Friedman, on Tuesday, Mr. Obama repeatedly invoked President Nixon's historic diplomacy with China and promoted the idea that Iran "will be and should be a regional tight controls, financial sanctions and the ban on oil sales will be lifted, allowing Iran much-needed access to frozen funds and Western investment.

The accord's benefits far outweigh its costs. While the agreement will not prevent a determined Iran from building a nuclear weapon, it will make doing so much harder, and the extensive verification and inspection procedures will make it much easier to discover any such attempt. The easing of sanctions, and the ease with which they can be reimposed, provides a powerful incentive for Iran not to take that risk.

In addition to worrying allies abroad, the other problem with linking the nuclear accord to improved American-Iranian relations is the fact that ties may not get better, especially if Iran's regional policies — like providing life support to Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria and supporting terrorist organizations — become more aggressive.

No one knows if the nuclear agreement will be followed by a more moderate Iranian approach to Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. I suspect it won't be, because the Revolutionary Guards remain at the core of the Supreme Leader's coalition and they, not the moderate foreign minister, are the crucial advocates of an aggressive stance in the region. It's far better to explain how the accord advances American national interests, whether or not Iran changes its regional policies.

The best analogy for the deal with Iran is the arms control agreements of the Cold War. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) limited Soviet modernization of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and granted the United States an unprecedented degree of access to a closed society.

SALT I and SALT II drew strong opposition in Congress when the agreements were seen as part of a broader improvement in American-Soviet relations. In fact, SALT II was never ratified, partly because the Senate debate was hijacked by other foreign policy problems, including the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and its deployment of troops in Angola and Cuba.

The fact that American military and intelligence agencies supported SALT II was forgotten in the larger political firestorm. Only because President Ronald Reagan decided to continue American compliance with the treaty's main numerical limits was the steady increase in Moscow's overall number of missiles and launchers halted.

Like the earlier agreements with the Soviet Union, the deal reached with Iran on Tuesday substantially reduces the potential nuclear threat from an adversary and provides access to a relatively closed society. But Iran's program will not be completely abolished, as many wished.

To maximize congressional and international support, Mr. Obama must now focus on the national security benefits of this accord and avoid any new suggestions that the deal was intended as part of a grand strategy for the region.

American-Iranian relations may one day improve when Tehran's destabilizing policies in the region change.

The White House can hope that will happen but should not expect it. Whether it occurs is irrelevant to the wisdom of Tuesday's arms control agreement.

James P. Rubin was the assistant secretary of state for public affairs from 1997 to 2000, under President Bill Clinton.

ARTICLE 3

A Good Deal for Israel
By CHUCK FREILICH JULY 19, 2015
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/opinion/a-good-deal-for-israel.html
The prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, responded to the Iran deal as expected: It is bad, endangers Israel, he argued; we are against it and will be the only

American ally not only to oppose it, but to go down gloriously, fighting a battle in Congress that we are destined to lose.

Mr. Netanyahu often warns that Iran is like Nazi Germany in 1938, fooling naïve appeasers even as it plans a cataclysm for Jews. But only those who never see merit in any proposal and never initiate their own could respond as the Israeli leader has.

Not that the agreement is without faults. President Obama negotiated from a position of weakness and conveyed a message that failure to obtain a deal was not an option. He misguidedly took the military option off the table long ago and made it clear that a return to sanctions would be a poor outcome.

Indeed, Iran will be allowed to retain its nuclear infrastructure instead of dismantling it, and most parts of the agreement are limited to 10 to 15 years, instead of being permanent. It remains to be seen what inspections Iran will actually allow, and the dispute resolution mechanism is cumbersome.

The agreement also does not address Iran's destructive regional role, including its support for terrorism. In fact, the added revenue it will receive as a result of the relaxation of sanctions may enable more aggressive action.

So, yes, we could have gotten a better deal. Israel wanted something different (as did the United States), but this is the agreement that was reached — and despite its faults, it is not a bad one. Crucially, it will contribute to Israel's security.

For at least the next decade, Israel will not have to live under the threat of a nuclear Iran and will not face the danger of annihilation. For Israel, that is a major achievement. It will enable Israel to divert precious resources to more immediate threats, like Hezbollah's more than 130,000 rockets, Hamas and the Islamic State, and no less important, to pressing domestic needs.

No agreement is ironclad, but the inspections provisions provide a high degree of confidence that Iran will not be able to renew the nuclear program without its being detected. A regime that has staked so much on this agreement will be reluctant to incur the costs.

It was Israel that decided years ago to give priority to the nuclear issue, as an existential threat, over all other Iranian transgressions, and concluded that if we can just resolve the nuclear threat, that would be good enough. Malign as Iran's other actions are — its regional role, support for terrorism and more — they can be dealt with at a later date; the overriding priority is the nuclear threat.

Iran aided the U.S. in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and, at the same time, Tehran, and its cat's paw, Hezbollah, have propped up the Syrian regime while it has perpetrated a genocide against its own people, mostly Syrian Sunnis. We need to confront Iran's regional behavior when it contradicts our interests, but align with it when it comports with our interests. We want to balance the autocratic Sunnis and Shiites, not promote either. Neither share our values.

Finally, when it comes to the Middle East broadly, we need to contain, amplify and innovate: Contain the most aggressive forces there, amplify any leaders or people building decency there, and innovate on energy like crazy to keep prices low, reduce oil money to bad actors and reduce our exposure to a region that is going to be in turmoil for a long, long, long time.

ARTICLE 4

The Door to Iran Opens
Roger Cohen JULY 16, 2015
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/.../roger-cohen-the-door-to-iran-opens.html
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel calls it a "historic mistake" that permits Iran "a sure path to nuclear weapons." A minister in his government, unable to resist outrageous hyperbole, calls it "one of the darkest days in world history." Jeb Bush, doing the tired Chamberlain-Obama number, dismisses it as "appeasement."

So what do the critics, from Republican presidential hopefuls to the Israeli government, seek in place of the deal with Iran that verifiably blocks Tehran's path to a nuclear weapon for at least the next 10 to 15 years? Presumably, they want what would have happened if negotiations had collapsed. That would be renewed war talk as an unconstrained Iran installs sophisticated centrifuges, its stockpile of enriched uranium grows, Russia and China abandon the sanctions regime, moderates in Iran like Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif are sidelined, and a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic draws closer.

To favor such peril, when a constructive alternative exists that engages one of the most highly educated societies in the Middle East, amounts to foolishness dressed up as machismo.

The Iran nuclear deal is not perfect, nor was it ever intended to address the long list of American-Iranian grievances, which will persist. It must be judged on what it set out to do — stop Iran going nuclear — not on whether Iran has a likeable regime (it does not) or does bad things (it does). President Obama did not set out to change Iran but he has created a framework that, over a decade, might.

If implemented, the agreement constitutes the most remarkable American diplomatic achievement since the Dayton Accords put an end to the Bosnian war two decades ago. It increases the distance between Iran and a bomb as it reduces the distance between Iran and the world. It makes the Middle East less dangerous by forestalling proliferation. In a cacophonous age of short-termism, it offers a lesson of stubborn leadership in pursuit of a long-term goal.

For many years, before Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry embarked on their diplomacy, Iran had been increasing its operating centrifuges and the size and enrichment level of its uranium stockpile. Now, the number of centrifuges is to be slashed by two-thirds to 5,060; the stockpile is to be all but eliminated; enrichment levels are capped at 3.7 percent, a long way from bomb grade; the potential route to weapons-grade plutonium at Arak is disabled; international inspection is redoubled and, in Obama's words, will extend "where necessary," "when necessary." In return, Iran gets the phased elimination

of most sanctions, the end to its pariah status, and a windfall that will alleviate its economic crisis.

By portraying the issue in absolute terms, Mr. Netanyahu obfuscated the fact that the agreement is not the end of the story, merely another stage in a decades-long struggle to prevent Iran from going nuclear. Both Israel and the United States wanted a knockout blow; what we got was a punt.

The nuclear issue has not been resolved, but postponed for at least 10 years. When the agreement expires, or in the event of a violation, the international community may have to resume its efforts. Iran has not given up its long-term nuclear aspirations.

The agreement's detractors have been long on invective, short on suggestions. A collapse of the talks would have freed Iran to go forward and left America struggling to maintain a sanctions regime weakened by international disunity. Israel would have remained isolated, left only with the military option. These are hardly desirable outcomes.

Israel may, at some point, still have to go the military route, but it is abundantly clear that no one in Jerusalem has been avid to do so. Had Mr. Netanyahu wanted to launch an attack, he had many chances. But for very good reasons, not the least of which was American opposition, he did not.

An attack probably could not have achieved more than a few years' postponement of Iran's program, whereas the agreement will do so for at least 10 to 15 years. After the deal expires, it's conceivable that Iran will prefer to avoid becoming an international pariah again.

Over decades, Israel has built a unique alliance with the United States. This partnership has provided Israel with extensive aid, turned the Israel Defense Forces into one of the world's most advanced militaries and safeguarded Israel's interests in hostile international forums. Without America, the I.D.F. would be an empty shell, and Israel would be isolated and sanctioned.

Part of being a junior ally is knowing when to say, "Enough, we have made our case, time to be a team player." Nothing is more important for Israel's security than the vitality of its relationship with the United States — which Israel will still need in order to deal with Iran in the future.

Chuck Freilich, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, is a senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center and the author of "Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy."

Avoid a black-and-white view of the Middle East. The idea that Iran is everywhere our enemy and the Sunni Arabs our allies is a mistake. Saudi Arabia's leadership has been a steadfast U.S. ally in the Cold War; many Saudis are pro-American. But the Saudi leadership's ruling bargain is toxic: It says to the Saudi people that the al-Saud tribe gets to rule and in return the Saudi Wahhabi religious establishment gets billions of dollars to transform the face of Sunni Islam from an open and modernizing faith to a puritanical, anti-women, anti-Shiite, anti-pluralistic one. The Saudis have lost control of this puritanical-Salafist transformation of Islam, and it has mutated into the ideology that inspired the 9/11 hijackers — 15 of 19 of whom were Saudis — and the Islamic State.

Iran, at 36 years from its theocratic revolution, is a repressive but pragmatic power under an aging leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose conduct in the talks saw his anti-American instincts counterbalanced by understanding of a reform imperative. Iran is finely poised between a tough old guard forged in revolution and its aspirational, Westward-looking youth. A decade is a long time in societies in transition.

It is far better to have deep American-Iranian differences — over Hezbollah, over Syria, over regional Shiite irredentism, over Iran's vile anti-Israel outbursts — addressed through dialogue rather than have Iran do its worst as pariah.

This accord has the merit of condemning the United States and Tehran to a relationship — however hostile — over the next 15 years. The Middle East, several of its states irremediably fractured, needs a new security framework. This will take years. But to imagine it could ever be fashioned without Iran's involvement is fantasy. Meanwhile, the West and Iran have a common enemy: the medieval slaughterers of Islamic State. Whether concerted action will result from a shared objective is unclear, but the possibility is there.

Many possibilities have been opened by this accord. They include the doomsayers' vision of a dissembling, newly solvent Iran at work to subversive, anti-American ends. Strict verification is imperative.

But Congress should think twice before the feel-good, reckless adoption of a resolution condemning a deal that advances American interests. Obama would veto it, and almost certainly has the votes to resist an override, but this would be a regrettable way for the nation to assume such a ground-shifting agreement.

The president is right to invoke the bold accords of past presidents — both Republicans — with hostile regimes in Beijing and Moscow. Neither was risk-free. Both proved transformative — not only of bilateral relations but the entire world.

Israel, too, should ask the hard questions rather than dismiss a deal that puts Iran much further from a bomb, empowers Iranian reformists, locks in American-Iranian dialogue and will be leveraged by Netanyahu to secure more advanced American weapons systems.

The darkest days in history for the Jewish people were of an altogether different order. They should never be trivialized.

And this is "one of the darkest days in world history"? No, it is a moment for guarded hope.

ARTICLE 5

The Iran Deal Is a Lie

By Bret Stephens
Opinion Columnist

- May 1, 2018

    - "The sanctions lifting will only occur as Iran takes the steps agreed, including addressing possible military dimensions."
    - That was State Department spokesman John Kirby in June 2015, <u>speaking just as</u> negotiations for the Iran nuclear deal were wrapping up. But Tehran did not "take the steps agreed." The deal was founded on a lie.
    - Two lies, actually. The first was Iran's declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency, prior to the implementation of the deal, of the full extent of its past nuclear work. This was essential, both as a test of Tehran's sincerity and as a benchmark for understanding just how close it was to being able to assemble and deliver a nuclear warhead.
    - The second lie was the Obama administration's promise that it was serious about getting answers from Tehran. In a moment of candor, then-Secretary of State John Kerry admitted "we are not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what they did at one point in time or another" — but then he promised Congress that Iran would provide the accounting.

That was when the White House still feared that Congress might block the deal. When it failed to do so, thanks to a Democratic filibuster, the administration contented itself with a make-believe process in which Iran pretended to make a full declaration and the rest of the world pretended to believe it.

"Iran's answers and explanations for many of the I.A.E.A.'s concerns were, at best, partial, but over all, obfuscating and stonewalling," David Albright and his colleagues at the nonpartisan Institute for Science and International Security <u>wrote in December 2015</u>. "Needed access to sites was either denied or tightly controlled as to preclude adequate inspections."

So much, then, for all the palaver about the deal providing an unprecedented level of transparency for monitoring Iranian compliance.So much, also, for the notion that Iran has honored its end of the bargain. It didn't. This should render the agreement null and void.

That's the significance of Benjamin Netanyahu's show and tell on Monday of what appears to be a gigantic cache of pilfered Iranian documents detailing Tehran's nuclear work. The deal's defenders have dismissed the Israeli prime minister's presentation as a bunch of old news — just further proof that Iran once had a robust covert program to build a bomb. They also insist Iran has complied with the terms of the agreement since it came into force in January 2016.

Yet it's difficult to imagine that the I.A.E.A. can now square Iran's 2015 declaration with what the Israelis have uncovered. Iran's mendacity is no longer the informed supposition of proliferation experts such as Mr. Albright. It is — assuming the documents are authentic, as the U.S. has confirmed — a matter of fact that the I.A.E.A. chose to ignore when it gave Iran a free pass under political pressure to move to implement the deal. If the agency cares for its own credibility as a nuclear watchdog, it should decide that Iran's past declaration was false and that Iran's retention of the documents obtained by Israel, with all the nuclear know-how they contain, put it in likely breach of the agreement.

As for Iran's current compliance, of course it's complying. The deal gave Iran the best of all worlds. It weakened U.N. restrictions on its right to develop, test and field ballistic missiles — a critical component for a nuclear weapons capability that the Iranians haven't fully mastered. It lifted restrictions on Iran's oil exports and eased other sanctions, pumping billions of dollars into a previously moribund economy. And it allows Iran to produce all the nuclear fuel it wants come the end of the next decade.

Yes, Iran is permanently enjoined from building a nuclear weapon, even after the limitations on uranium enrichment expire. But why believe this regime will be faithful to the deal at its end when it was faithless to it at its beginning?

Netanyahu's revelations were plainly timed to influence Donald Trump's decision, expected later this month, on whether to stay in the Iran deal. Trump is under pressure from the French, British and Germans to stay in it, on the view that, if nothing else, the agreement has kept Iran from racing toward a bomb.

But the deal now in place allows Iran to amble toward a bomb, even as it uses the financial benefits of the agreement to fund (in the face of domestic upheaval and at a steep cost to its own economy) its militancy in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and especially in Syria. And Iran's own nuclear history suggests the country's leaders have always been cautious in the face of credible American threats, which is one reason they shelved much of their nuclear program in 2003 after the U.S. invaded Iraq.

"When the Iranians fear American power, they either back down or they stall," says Mark Dubowitz, an expert on Iran sanctions at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "When they don't fear American power, they push forward. With Trump, the question is: Are they going to feel American power, or American mush?"

I opposed the Iran deal, but immediately after it came into effect, I believed that we should honor it scrupulously and enforce it unsparingly. Monday's news is that Iran didn't honor its end of the bargain and neither need the United States now. Punitive sanctions combined with a credible threat of military force should follow.

ARTICLE 6

Opinion
Why the Iran Nuclear Deal Must Stand

By Antony J. Blinken

- Feb. 17, 2017

- WASHINGTON — Standing next to Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, at a news conference Wednesday, President Trump inveighed against the nuclear agreement with Iran, declaring it "one of the worst deals ever made." On this matter, Mr. Trump has been consistent — he has called the deal "terrible," "a disgrace," "stupid" and "catastrophic," and said his No. 1 priority as president would be to dismantle it.

- So it was striking last week when senior administration officials told the European Union's foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, that President Trump was committed to fully carrying out the accord. The administration officials told the press the same thing in tamping down a fiery statement about Iran from Michael T. Flynn, when he was still Mr. Trump's national security adviser.

- Maybe President Trump's bluster masks a growing recognition within the administration that the deal is a good one for America's security and that of our allies. It reaffirms and strengthens Iran's commitment, under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to never acquire a nuclear weapon. It imposes powerful constraints on Iran's ability to quickly amass a stockpile of fissile material for a bomb. It includes an inspections regime perhaps more rigorous than any other. And it pays for all of that with Iran's own money.

- According to Adam Szubin, who until recently was the Treasury Department's sanctions supervisor, Iran has regained access to about $50 billion in frozen funds (not $150 billion, as critics allege), far less than Iran requires for more than $500 billion in unmet economic needs — like government salaries, pensions, debts and infrastructure investment — and to support its currency.

- But any apparent retreat by the administration may be temporary and tactical — not a strategic rethink. While Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson are said to counsel sticking with the deal, senior White House advisers continue to talk it down around Washington. These advisers do recognize that a frontal assault — through unilateral American withdrawal — would divide us from our European, Russian and Chinese negotiating partners, isolating the United States rather than Iran. Instead, they envisage the deal's demise by other means.

- One approach is to demand a "better deal." President Trump's broadsides help lay the predicate for a renegotiation. This might be focused on greater access to military sites or on the agreement's "sunset provisions," through which some constraints on Iran's nuclear program will be phased out over time. Or it could center on Iran's testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, which is not covered by the agreement and remains subject to sanction under a United Nations Security Council resolution — and for which Mr. Flynn put Iran "on notice."

- Given the effort that went into reaching the agreement and its complexity, it is highly unlikely the other signatories would support a renegotiation. Unless, that is, the administration offered "more for more" — for example, greater economic benefits to Iran in return for additional constraints on its nuclear program. It is equally implausible that the Trump administration would be willing to "give" Iran anything. The main purpose of demanding a renegotiation would be to generate a slow-motion breakdown while muddying the waters so that Washington could avoid blame.

- Another approach is to increase pressure on Iran in non-nuclear areas, resulting in a crisis that would give hard-line opponents of the deal in Tehran cause to pull the plug — and let Washington off the hook. There is no shortage of objectionable

Iranian behavior. In addition to the ballistic missile tests, the government provides lethal aid to Houthi rebels in Yemen, harasses shipping in the Persian Gulf, sustains the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, backs Hezbollah and Hamas, supports violent Shiite militias in Iraq and represses its own people.

- The Obama administration was clear that the nuclear deal did not give Iran a pass for its nefarious activities. It maintained a long litany of non-nuclear domestic and international sanctions, continued to enforce them and beefed up military and intelligence cooperation with our Gulf allies. But President Obama also concluded that these same nefarious activities would be far more dangerous and difficult to confront if they were carried out under an Iranian nuclear umbrella. He was careful to calibrate additional pressure, in order to keep our international partners with us and prevent the nuclear deal from derailing.

- The Trump administration could crank the pressure beyond the breaking point. For example, it could reimpose sanctions lifted by the nuclear deal under a non-nuclear rationale, which Tehran would interpret as a violation of the accord. Or it could designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization — a move reported to be under active consideration.

- The Revolutionary Guard Corps is the official protector of Iran's revolution, with 100,000 troops divided into air, naval and ground divisions. It plays a large role in Iran's economy. Its international paramilitary arm, the Quds Force, is Tehran's main vehicle for supporting Shiite proxy forces. The Bush and Obama administrations named Iran a state sponsor of terrorism and put sanctions on individual Revolutionary Guard commanders and two dozen Iranian firms to which the guard corps is connected. But they stopped short of designating the guards corps itself a terrorist organization because the potential blowback outweighed the benefits.

- A direct challenge to the Revolutionary Guards Corps would likely cause its commanders to press for Iran's withdrawal from the nuclear deal. It would undermine the re-election prospects of the accord's main advocate, President Hassan Rouhani, who seeks to moderate Iran's international behavior. It could also prompt the guards corps to unleash Shiite militias against United States forces in Iraq — just when our shared, if uncoordinated, objective of defeating the Islamic State there is within reach — or to go after American ships in the Gulf or shut down the Straits of Hormuz, through which 25 percent of the world's oil flows.

- Any of these actions could escalate into a full conflict, especially in the absence of the effective crisis management channel established by John Kerry when he was secretary of state and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif. In that event, losing the nuclear deal might be the least of our concerns.

- Antony J. Blinken, a deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration, is a contributing opinion writer.

ARTICLE 7

Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned

President Trump said pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal sends a message that "the United States no longer makes empty threats."CreditCredit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Mark Landler

- May 8, 2018

WASHINGTON — President Trump declared on Tuesday that he was withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, unraveling the signature foreign policy achievement of his predecessor Barack Obama, isolating the United States from its Western allies and sowing uncertainty before a risky nuclear negotiation with North Korea.

The decision, while long anticipated and widely telegraphed, leaves the 2015 agreement reached by seven countries after more than two years of grueling negotiations in tatters. The United States will now reimpose the stringent sanctions it imposed on Iran before the deal and is considering new penalties.

Iran said it will remain in the deal, which tightly restricted its nuclear ambitions for a decade or more in return for ending the sanctions that had crippled its economy.

So did France, Germany and Britain, raising the prospect of a trans-Atlantic clash as European companies face the return of American sanctions for doing business with Iran. China and Russia, also signatories to the deal, are likely to join Iran in accusing the United States of violating the accord.

> Mr. Trump's move could embolden hard-line forces in Iran, raising the threat of Iranian retaliation against Israel or the United States, fueling an arms race in the Middle East and fanning sectarian conflicts from Syria to Yemen.

The president, however, framed his decision as the fulfillment of a bedrock campaign promise and as the act of a dealmaker dissolving a fatally flawed agreement. He predicted his tough line with Iran would strengthen his hand as he prepared to meet North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, to begin negotiating the surrender of his nuclear arsenal.

"This was a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made," a grim-faced Mr. Trump said in an 11-minute address from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House. "It didn't bring calm, it didn't bring peace, and it never will."

[Read the full transcript of President Trump's remarks.]

Mr. Trump's announcement drew a chorus of opposition from European leaders, several of whom lobbied him feverishly not to pull out of the agreement and searched for fixes to it that would satisfy him.

It also drew a rare public rebuke by Mr. Obama, who said Mr. Trump's withdrawal would leave the world less safe, confronting it with "a losing choice between a nuclear-armed Iran or another war in the Middle East."

The response from Iran itself, however, was muted. President Hassan Rouhani declared that the Iranians intended to abide by the terms of the deal, and he criticized Mr. Trump for his history of not honoring international treaties. Mr. Trump won strong backing from Saudi Arabia and Israel, whose leader, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, hailed him for a "historic move" and "courageous leadership."

Three times previously, the president's aides had persuaded him not to dismantle the Iran deal. But Mr. Trump made clear that his patience had worn thin, and with a new, more hawkish cohort of advisers — led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the national security adviser, John R. Bolton — the president faced less internal resistance than earlier in his administration.

While Mr. Trump had long scorned the Iran deal, threatening repeatedly to rip it up during the 2016 presidential race, his impulse to act now was reinforced by what he views as the success of his policy toward North Korea. He has told aides and foreign leaders that his policy of maximum pressure had forced Mr. Kim to the bargaining table, and that a similar policy of overwhelming pressure would enable the United States to extract a better deal from Iran.

As Mr. Trump abandoned one diplomatic project, he accelerated another — announcing that Mr. Pompeo was flying to Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, to continue discussions with Mr. Kim about the upcoming summit meeting. He expressed hope that three Americans who are detained in the North would be released soon.

"The message to North Korea," Mr. Bolton told reporters, "is the president wants a real deal."

He rejected the suggestion that the United States could not be trusted to keep its agreements when political winds change. "Any nation reserves the right to correct a past mistake," Mr. Bolton said, citing President George W. Bush's decision to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 2001.

The Trump administration, he said, would continue to work with Europeans to pressure the Iranians. He dismissed those who said the United States was on a path to war with Iran, though he did not present any new diplomatic initiatives. Another senior administration official acknowledged that there was no Plan B.

Months of intense negotiations with the Europeans to keep the accord in place collapsed over Mr. Trump's insistence that the limits placed by the agreement on Iran's nuclear fuel production were inadequate. Under the provisions of the deal, those limits, or "sunset clauses," were to expire in 2030 — 15 years after the deal was signed.

As a result, the United States will reinstate all the sanctions it had waived as part of the nuclear accord, and it will impose additional economic penalties that are now being drawn up by the Treasury Department.

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin declined on Tuesday to specify what additional sanctions the United States might impose, but he expressed confidence that they would still be powerful even if other American allies did not follow suit.

"We do not want to let Iran use the U.S. financial markets and financial system and transact in dollars until they agree that not only will they not have a nuclear weapon now, but we've put in provisions that they will never have one," Mr. Mnuchin said.

In his announcement, Mr. Trump recited familiar arguments against the deal: that it does not address the threat of Iran's ballistic missiles or its malign behavior in the region, and that the expiration dates for the sunset clauses open the door to an Iranian nuclear bomb down the road.

Even if Iran was in compliance, he said, it could "still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a short period of time." In fact, under the deal, the limits on Iran's uranium enrichment and stockpiles of nuclear fuel mean that Iran would not be on the verge of a nuclear breakout until 2030.

Still, Mr. Trump said, the United States and its allies could not stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon "under the decaying and rotten structure of the current agreement."

"The Iran deal is defective at its core," he concluded.

Mr. Trump's announcement capped a frantic four-day period in which American and European diplomats made a last-ditch effort to bridge their differences and preserve the agreement.

That effort began Friday, when Mr. Pompeo called his counterparts in Europe to tell them that Mr. Trump was planning to withdraw from the deal, but that he was trying to win a two-week reprieve for the United States and Europe to continue negotiating. Mr. Pompeo, people familiar with the talks said, suggested that he favored a so-called soft withdrawal, in which Mr. Trump would pull out of the deal but hold off on reimposing some of the sanctions.

The next day, the State Department's chief negotiator, Brian H. Hook, consulted with European diplomats to try to break a deadlock over the sunset provision, under which the restrictions on Iran's ability to produce nuclear fuel for civilian use expire after 15 years.

The Europeans had already agreed to a significant compromise: to reimpose sanctions if there were a determination that the Iranians were within 12 months of producing a nuclear weapon. But officials said that still did not satisfy Mr. Trump, and the Europeans were not willing to go any further.

By Monday, the White House began informing allies that Mr. Trump was going to withdraw from the deal and reimpose sanctions on oil and impose new sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran.

Under the financial sanctions, European companies will have 90 to 180 days to wind down their operations in Iran, or they will run afoul of the American banking system. The sanctions on oil will require European and Asian countries to reduce their imports from Iran.

Mr. Mnuchin insisted that the restrictions would not drive up oil prices because other suppliers would pick up the slack. "My expectation is not that oil prices go higher," he said. "To a certain extent, some of this was already in the market on oil prices."

Mr. Trump's decision will test his already frayed relationship with European leaders. President Emmanuel Macron of France, whom the president welcomed with a state dinner two weeks ago, learned of his decision in a phone call with Mr. Trump on Tuesday morning. Later, he said in a post on Twitter that the European allies "regret" his decision.

"The international regime against nuclear proliferation is at stake," he added.

In a joint statement, Mr. Macron, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain noted pointedly that the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing the nuclear deal remained the "binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute." That raises the possibility that the United States will be found to be in violation in the Security Council.

Few people were more stung by Mr. Trump's decision than those who worked for Mr. Obama. Though he has moved methodically to dismantle his predecessor's legacy, his reversal of the Iran deal was particularly painful, given the five years of effort that went into imposing sanctions, and the more than two-year-long negotiation led by Secretary of State John Kerry that yielded the accord.

"No rhetoric is required," Mr. Kerry said in a statement. "The facts speak for themselves. Instead of building on unprecedented nonproliferation verification measures, this decision risks throwing them away and dragging the world back to the brink we faced a few years ago."

ARTICLE 8

NEWS ANALYSIS

Behind Trump's Termination of Iran Deal Is a Risky Bet

By David E. Sanger and David D. Kirkpatrick

- May 8, 2018
Leer en español

WASHINGTON — For President Trump and two of the allies he values most — Israel and Saudi Arabia — the problem of the Iranian nuclear accord was not, primarily, about nuclear weapons. It was that the deal legitimized and normalized Iran's clerical government, reopening it to the world economy with oil revenue that financed its adventures in Syria and Iraq, its missile program and its support of terrorist groups.

Now, by announcing on Tuesday that he is exiting the nuclear deal and will reimpose economic sanctions on Iran and companies around the world that do business with the country, Mr. Trump is engaged in a grand, highly risky experiment.

[*Read a full transcript of President Trump's remarks.*]

Mr. Trump and his Middle East allies are betting they can cut Iran's economic lifeline and thus "break the regime," as one senior European official described the effort. In theory, America's withdrawal could free Iran to produce as much nuclear material as it wants — as it was doing five years ago, when the world feared that it was headed toward a bomb.

But Mr. Trump's team dismisses that risk: Iran does not have the economic strength to confront the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia. And Iran knows that any move to produce a weapon would only provide Israel and the United States with a rationale for taking military action.

It is a brutally realpolitik approach that America's allies in Europe have warned is a historic mistake, one that could lead to confrontation, and perhaps to war.

And it is a clear example of Middle East brinkmanship that runs counter to what President Barack Obama intended when the nuclear deal was struck in July 2015.

Mr. Obama's gamble in that deal — the signature foreign policy accord of his eight years in office — was straightforward. He regarded Iran as potentially a more natural ally of the United States than many of its Sunni-dominant neighbors, with a young, educated Western-oriented population that is tired of being ruled by an aging theocracy.

By taking the prospect of nuclear weapons off the table, the Obama administration had argued, the United States and Iran could chip away at three decades of hostility and work on common projects, starting with the defeat of the Islamic State.

It did not turn out that way. While the deal succeeded in getting 97 percent of Iran's nuclear material out of the country, Iran's conservatives and its military recoiled at the idea of cooperating on any projects with the West.

Months before it became clear that Mr. Trump had a decent shot at being elected, the Iranian military increased support for President Bashar al-Assad in Syria; it expanded its influence in Iraq and accelerated its support for terrorist groups. And it doubled down on deploying cyberattacks against targets in the West and in Saudi Arabia, embracing a weapon that was not covered by the nuclear accord.

Then came Mr. Trump, with his declaration that the deal was a "disaster" and his vow to dismantle it. That is exactly what he has now done, but at a huge cost.

Moments after he delivered his statement — in which he made it sound as if Iran was cheating on the accord, even though his intelligence chiefs have testified otherwise — Mr. Trump received a stinging rebuke from Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain, President Emmanuel Macron of France and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany.

The three leaders, America's closest European allies, essentially rejected his logic. They noted that the United Nations Security Council resolution that embraced the Iran deal in 2016 "remains the binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute about the Iranian nuclear program."

That was polite diplomatic language for the stark conclusion that it is the United States — not Iran — that first violated the accord.

[*Read our coverage of Mr. Trump's decision and his announcement.*]

And now, suddenly, the world may well be headed back to where it was in 2012: on a road to uncertain confrontation, with "very little evidence of a Plan B," as Boris Johnson, the British foreign minister, said on a visit to Washington.

> Exiting the deal, with or without a plan, is fine with the Saudis. They see the accord as a dangerous distraction from the real problem of confronting Iran around the region — a problem that Saudi Arabia believes will be solved only by leadership change in Iran.

The Saudis have an ally in John R. Bolton, the president's new national security adviser, who had made clear before taking office that he shared their view. Mr. Obama's deal, Mr. Bolton said on Tuesday afternoon, featured "an utterly inadequate treatment of the military dimension of Iran's aspirations."

The Saudi case against Iran has been bolstered in recent months by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has repeatedly referred to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as "the new Hitler."

"Many countries around the world and in Europe did not realize how dangerous Hitler was until what happened, happened," Prince Mohammed said in a recent interview with the CBS News program "60 Minutes." "I don't want to see the same events happening in the Middle East."

In a speech in March at the Brookings Institution, Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, asserted that Iran was "the biggest problem we face in our region." He blamed Iran for interfering in neighboring countries, backing allied armed groups in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere, and supplying Yemeni rebels with ballistic missiles they fired at his country.

Even if its restrictions on nuclear weapons were tightened and extended, "the agreement by itself does not solve the problem of Iran," Mr. Jubeir said. "Iran must be held accountable."

Jeremy Shapiro, research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations and a State Department official during the Obama administration, argued that the nuclear deal's opposition from Saudi Arabia, Israel and other regional players was primarily about its effects on American politics and policy.

"They believe they are in this existential conflict with the Iranian regime, and nuclear weapons are a small part of that conflict" — but the one that most influences public opinion in the United States, Mr. Shapiro said.

"If the deal opened an avenue for better relations between the United States and Iran, that would be a disaster for the Saudis," he said. "They need to ensure a motivation for American pressure against Iran that will last even after this administration."

Israel is a more complicated case.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pressed Mr. Trump to abandon an arrangement that the Israeli leader has always detested. But Mr. Netanyahu's own military and intelligence advisers say Israel is far safer with an Iran whose pathway to a bomb is blocked, rather than one that is once again pursuing the ultimate weapon.

"The individuals who shoulder responsibility for Israel's survival and security have been crystal clear," Graham Allison, a Harvard professor who has spent his career examining cases of nuclear proliferation.

"This will most likely lead to an outcome that is much worse not only for the U.S., but for Israel,'' Mr. Allison said, because the current agreement rolled Iran's nuclear program back a decade "and imposed on Iran the most intrusive inspection regime ever negotiated."

But Mr. Netanyahu holds Israel's bullhorn, and he used it last week to persuade Mr. Trump to pull the plug on the Iran deal. By releasing Iranian documents, stolen from Tehran in January, Mr. Netanyahu proved what Western intelligence agencies long knew: A decade ago or even longer, the Iranians were working hard to design a nuclear warhead.

To Mr. Netanyahu, this was proof that Iran could never be trusted and that it had reached the nuclear deal under false pretenses by pretending it never had a weapons program. To Mr. Trump and his allies, the Israeli discovery said less about Iranian nuclear capability than it did about Iranian perfidy.

Given evidence that Iran was preserving its bomb designs as a hedge for the future, the discovery suggested it has not given up its ambitions. As Dennis Ross, a former Middle East negotiator, put it, someone needed to address the Israeli discovery "lest they give the Iranians the ability to pick up quickly where they left off on weaponizing."

Still, at the core of Mr. Trump's announcement on Tuesday is a conviction that Mr. Obama made a critical mistake in agreeing to a deal that contains an expiration date. Mr. Trump's argument is that Iran can never be allowed to accumulate enough material to assemble a bomb.

So when the Europeans said that would require reopening the negotiations, Mr. Trump balked, and decided instead to scrap the entire deal.

It was a classic Trumpian move, akin to the days when he would knock down New York buildings to make way for visions of grander, more glorious edifices. But in this case, it

is about upsetting a global power balance and weakening a government that Mr. Trump has argued, since he began campaigning, must go.

Correction: May 8, 2018

An earlier version of a caption with this article misstated the day on which it was taken. It was Tuesday, not Wednesday.

David E. Sanger reported from Washington, and David D. Kirkpatrick from London.

ARTICLE 9

Opinion

Trump Needs a Tutorial on How International Agreements Work

The administration is arguing that it is still a party to the Iran deal that it left with great fanfare in 2018.

By The Editorial Board
The editorial board is a group of opinion journalists whose views are informed by expertise, research, debate and certain longstanding underlined values. It is separate from the newsroom.

- Sept. 20, 2020
  - Two years ago, the Trump administration withdrew from an international agreement that had lifted most sanctions on Iran in exchange for strict limits on Iran's nuclear program. President Trump called the accord, which had been painstakingly negotiated by the Obama administration and America's closest European allies, the "worst deal ever." He has been trying to kill it ever since. He reimposed economic sanctions and threatened secondary sanctions on European allies that do any business with Iran. The repudiation was so head-spinning that other countries now wonder if American international commitments can be trusted to last beyond the next election.
  - In a stunning display of gall, the Trump administration is now arguing that the United States is still part of the Iran deal after all. That's because it wants to use a provision in the deal to "snap back" global sanctions on Iran to prevent the expiration of an arms embargo. Only a party to the agreement can trigger a resumption of global sanctions. A State Department legal opinion argues that, even though the United States withdrew from the accord and has been acting in opposition to the substance of the agreement since 2018, it nonetheless remains a participant because a descriptive section of the U.N. Security Council Resolution that followed the accord lists the names of the countries that struck the deal, including the United States. That argument does not hold water.
  - "It's a matter of simple logic that if you are a participating state, you have to be participating," said Larry Johnson, former assistant secretary general for legal affairs at the United Nations.
  - Even Iran hawks, like John Bolton, find this argument so disingenuous as to be counterproductive. "It's too cute by half to say we're in the nuclear deal for purposes we want but not for those we don't," Mr. Bolton wrote in The Wall Street Journal.

- Preventing the sale of sophisticated weaponry to Iran is a laudable goal, given the military support that Iran provides to various violent nonstate actors in its region. But for nearly two decades, world powers have agreed to focus on the bigger prize: preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Snapback sanctions could put the final nail in the coffin of an agreement that does just that, at least until 2030.

- Moreover, the United States left the agreement in 2018. No amount of legalistic contortions can change that simple fact. The United States has no standing to invoke a cherry-picked provision that serves its own agenda while it makes a mockery of the rest of the agreement. That's not how international agreements work. The Trump administration's behavior erodes the integrity of every international accord going forward.

- That's why there is so little support on the 15-member Security Council for the U.S. position. In a related vote in August, only the Dominican Republic stood with the United States. Nonetheless, U.S. diplomats are pushing ahead. They contend that global sanctions snapped back after a 30-day notification period, which ended Saturday night. President Trump is expected to address the General Assembly virtually on Tuesday and declare his intention to enforce Security Council sanctions on Iran.

- U.N. officials now find themselves in a diplomatic twilight zone, stuck between the Trump administration's view of reality and that of the world where nearly everyone else resides. "In essence, we will be living in two alternative universes," said Richard Gowan, the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group, an organization that seeks to prevent deadly conflicts.

- It is not clear what will happen next. Global sanctions normally require a committee to monitor them. But a committee won't be set up unless the Security Council makes an official decision to do so. The United States will almost certainly pursue its own low-key measures, like sanctioning Russian or Chinese companies that sell arms to Iran. A bigger worry is that the United States could begin to interdict ships carrying goods to or from Iran, which could potentially lead to a military confrontation in the run-up to the American election in November.

- The tragedy of the Trump administration's approach is that it has alienated European allies who share the common goal of curbing Iran's most worrisome behavior. The United States once stood shoulder to shoulder with not only France, Germany and Britain, but also with Russia and China — to isolate Iran. Now, it is the United States that is isolated.

- The bigger question is whether the American efforts to invoke snapback will kill the nuclear deal, which the other parties have been trying desperately to keep alive. Iran had been widely seen as keeping its commitments under the deal until the U.S. exit. Afterward, it increased its production of fissile material, as a calibrated response to the American withdrawal.

- Now, the agreement is in tatters. If Mr. Trump is re-elected, the chances of reviving the accord are slim to none. Iran could walk away from the nuclear deal altogether and resume its previous levels of production of fissile material, which it claims will be used as fuel for a peaceful nuclear reactor. This will set Iran back on a collision course with the United States and Israel.

- The deal could still get back on track. Iran's actions are not irreversible. The fissile material it has produced could still be secured and sent out of the country. There's also a chance that behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts might lead to

- informal agreements to refrain from significant arms sales to Iran that would inflame the situation. The arms embargo does not actually expire until October, so there is still time for diplomacy to work.
- But the Trump administration has squandered the unity that the international community once had on Iran. It has also squandered the chance to fix the flaws in the Obama-era agreement by failing to pair its dramatic exit with meaningful diplomatic overtures that might have made renegotiation possible. At the time, American diplomats bragged to their European counterparts that the Iranians would soon be brought to their knees, and come begging to reopen talks. That hasn't happened.
- The Iranian people are undoubtedly suffering from the U.S. sanctions, all the more so during the pandemic, which has left them short of medicines. But the regime has not come begging for a deal with Mr. Trump. In fact, the Trump administration's policies have made fools of the moderates in Iran, who argued that the United States could be trusted to keep its end of the bargain. The Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has publicly called the deal a "mistake." Nevertheless, Mr. Trump has portrayed himself repeatedly as capable of quickly achieving a deal with Iran. "Don't wait until after U.S. Election to make the Big deal," he tweeted at Iranian leaders in June. "I'm going to win. You'll make a better deal now!"
- Like so much of Mr. Trump's gamesmanship, there's no Plan B behind the bluster. Today, Iran is closer to having enough fissile material to build a nuclear bomb than it was when he took office.

ARTICLE 10

Trump Pushes to Revisit Iran Nuclear Deal, and Asks Allies to Help

President Trump met with President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority on Wednesday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Peter Baker and Rick Gladstone

- Sept. 20, 2017

President Trump is seeking to revisit the nuclear agreement with Iran to toughen its provisions rather than scrap it right away as he has threatened, enlisting allies to pressure Tehran to return to the negotiating table, administration officials said Wednesday.

Mr. Trump, who denounced the agreement in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly this week as an "embarrassment to the United States," wants to expand on it by extending its time frame and imposing new limits on Iran's development of ballistic missiles. Although European officials strongly back the current deal, some signaled openness to negotiating a separate follow-up agreement.

The maneuvering suggested a possible path forward for Mr. Trump short of abandoning the accord, but it remains uncertain whether he can reach consensus with the European allies, much less with Russia and China, the deal's other patrons. Iran on Wednesday ruled out revisiting the agreement as President Hassan Rouhani declared it a "closed issue" and warned that if the United States pulled out, Iran might resume uranium enrichment.

"We see today the Americans are seeking an excuse to break this agreement," Mr. Rouhani said at a news conference after his own speech to the General Assembly. For that reason, he said, negotiating with "an American government that tramples on a legal agreement would be a waste of time."

The accord, reached in 2015, required Iran to curb its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. Under United States law, Mr. Trump has until Oct. 15 to certify whether Iran is complying and the deal remains vital to America's national security. While he has done so twice since taking office, he has signaled that he will refuse to do so again.

That by itself would not abrogate the deal, but would give Congress 60 days to reimpose sanctions on Iran, an action that would mean an end to the agreement, at least for the United States. Mr. Trump may see decertification, or the threat of it, as leverage to press Iran and the other powers to restart talks. He could offer to certify for another 90 days if other parties agreed to explore new negotiations.

On Wednesday, the president teased reporters who asked him whether he had decided what to do. "I have decided," he said, repeating the phrase three times. Pressed by reporters, he added: "I'll let you know. I'll let you know."

Mr. Trump remained coy later when he met with Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain and declined to tell her his decision either. "Prime Minister May asked him if he would share it with her and he said no," Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said.

Mr. Tillerson met in the evening with counterparts from the other countries that brokered the deal — Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China — as well as Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. It was the first time Mr. Tillerson had been in the same room with Mr. Zarif since taking office and he described the session as businesslike.

"It was a good opportunity to meet, shake hands," he told reporters. "The tone was very matter of fact. There was no yelling. We didn't throw shoes at one another."

Mr. Tillerson acknowledged that international inspectors have found that Iran "is in technical compliance with the agreement, and no one around the table took exception to that." But he argued that Iran was violating the larger aspirations of the deal by engaging in destabilizing activities not directly covered by it, like supporting terrorist groups.

He also conceded that prospects of persuading the other powers, much less Iran, to revisit the deal were daunting, even as he said he remained optimistic. When negotiating as chief executive of Exxon Mobil, Mr. Tillerson said he had learned that "it always gets the darkest before you might have a breakthrough."

No breakthrough was apparent on Wednesday evening. Federica Mogherini, the foreign minister for the European Union who led the 90-minute meeting, rejected scrapping or renegotiating the agreement. "The international community cannot afford dismantling an agreement that is working and delivering," she told reporters outside the Security Council chamber.

"This is an agreement that prevented a nuclear program and potentially prevented military intervention. Let's not forget that," she added. "There is no need to renegotiate parts of the agreement, because the agreement is working."

Mr. Tillerson outlined the Trump administration approach in a television interview on Tuesday. "The president really wants to redo that deal," he told Fox News. "We do need the support, I think, of our allies, the European allies and others, to make the case as well to Iran that this deal really has to be revisited."

Two provisions he focused on involve the expiration of the agreement and its failure to stop Iran from developing ballistic missiles. Under the deal, some provisions expire, or "sunset," after as few as 10 years while others are in force longer and some are permanent. And although United Nations provisions seek to limit ballistic missile technology, the nuclear agreement does not prohibit Iran from developing such weapons.

"If we're going to stick with the Iran deal, there has to be changes made to it," Mr. Tillerson said. "The sunset provision simply is not a sensible way forward. It's just simply, as I say, kicking the can down the road again for someone in the future to have to deal with."

President Emmanuel Macron of France opened the door to rethinking its terms on Wednesday, two days after meeting with Mr. Trump. Speaking to reporters at the United Nations, Mr. Macron said France favored keeping the agreement "because it's a good one," but would support adding "two to three other pillars," or provisions. He cited ballistic missiles and the deal's expiration dates.

Mr. Macron also said he favored "an open discussion with Iran about the current situation in the region." But he added, "I think it would be a mistake just to abandon the nuclear agreement without that."

The French position would be to leave the current agreement in place but negotiate a supplemental deal to address concerns, according to a European official. Such an approach could potentially satisfy Israel, whose prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu,

also met with Mr. Trump this week and later told the United Nations that the deal should be amended or rescinded. "Change it or cancel it," he said. "Fix it or nix it."

Speaking to the General Assembly, Mr. Rouhani on Wednesday praised the deal as a "model," arguing that the Middle East was safer for it. "It will be a great pity if this agreement were to be destroyed by rogue newcomers to the world of politics," he said. "The world will have lost a great opportunity."

The Iranian president sought to flip the script on the Trump administration's contention that Iran destabilizes the Middle East. He said American taxpayers should ask why billions of dollars spent in the region had not advanced peace, and "only brought war, misery, poverty" and the "rise of extremism to the region."

"The ignorant, absurd and hateful rhetoric, filled with ridiculously baseless allegations, that was uttered before this august body yesterday," Mr. Rouhani said, referring to Mr. Trump's speech was "unfit to be heard at the United Nations, which was established to promote peace and respect between nations."

At a later news conference, Mr. Rouhani demanded an apology from Mr. Trump and said the nuclear agreement could not be amended, reopened or renegotiated. Given the Trump administration's open hostility, he said he saw no reason for dialogue. "It is not realistic," he said. Should the agreement unravel, he said one option "may be to start enrichment" of uranium.

If negotiations were to reopen in some form, the challenge for Mr. Trump would be how to persuade Iran to make further concessions. The sanctions that forced Iran to the table under Mr. Obama have been lifted, so Mr. Trump would have less leverage. And it is not clear what, if anything, he would be willing to offer to strike a deal.

"If there are concerns that the administration has, they certainly can suggest an additional negotiation leaving the deal intact and implemented," Wendy R. Sherman, who negotiated the accord for Mr. Obama, said in an interview. "But that would also require the United States government to be ready to put something on the table. If the administration is looking for more, they will also have to give more."

Representative Ed Royce, the California Republican who is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, made a similar point. Once sanctions were lifted, he noted, Iran recovered funds that had been frozen in the West, eliminating that leverage. "They now have this money," Mr. Royce [said on CNN](#) on Tuesday. "And so in a way, the toothpaste is out of the tube."

He suggested it would be better to make the agreement work rather than pull out altogether. "I think we should enforce the hell out of the agreement," he said, "and thereby force compliance on the part of Iran."

ARTICLE 11

Trump Withdrew From the Iran Deal. Here's How Republicans, Democrats and the World Reacted.

President Trump in the Diplomatic Room of the White House on Tuesday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By The New York Times
May 8, 2018

World leader and lawmakers from both sides of the aisle were quick to weigh in on Tuesdayafter President Trump announced his plan to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear accord.

The following is a roundup of some of the reaction.

For more coverage of Mr. Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Iran deal, read our main story or the full transcript of Mr. Trump's announcement.

World Leaders

Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Emmanuel Macron of France

"It is with regret and concern that we, the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, take note of President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States of America from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Together, we emphasize our continuing commitment to the J.C.P.O.A. This agreement remains important for our shared security."

They added, "We urge the U.S. to ensure that the structures of the J.C.P.O.A. can remain intact, and to avoid taking action which obstructs its full implementation by all other parties to the deal. After engaging with the U.S. administration in a thorough manner over the past months, we call on the U.S. to do everything possible to preserve the gains for nuclear nonproliferation brought about by the J.C.P.O.A., by allowing for a continued enforcement of its main elements.

We encourage Iran to show restraint in response to the decision by the U.S.; Iran must continue to meet its own obligations under the deal, cooperating fully and in a timely manner with IAEA inspection requirements. The IAEA must be able to continue to carry out its long-term verification and monitoring program without restriction or hindrance. In turn, Iran should continue to receive the sanctions relief it is entitled to whilst it remains in compliance with the terms of the deal."

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel
Prime Minister Charles Michel of Belgium
Federica Mogherini, the high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy

"The European Union regrets today's statement by the president of the United States on the nuclear deal with Iran [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, J.C.P.O.A.]. Should the U.S. reconsider this position, we would welcome it. The United States remain our closest partner and friend, and we will continue to work together on many other issues. As we have always said, the nuclear deal is not a bilateral agreement and it is not in the hands of any single country to terminate it unilaterally."

She added, "I am particularly worried by the announcement of new sanctions. I will consult with all our partners in the coming hours and days to assess their implications. The European Union is determined to act in accordance with its security interests and to protect its economic investments.

The nuclear deal with Iran is the culmination of 12 years of diplomacy. It belongs to the entire international community. It has been working and it is delivering on its goal, which is guaranteeing that Iran doesn't develop nuclear weapons. The European Union is determined to preserve it. We expect the rest of the international community to continue to do its part to guarantee that it continues to be fully implemented, for the sake of our own collective security."

Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States

Republicans

Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky and the majority leader, said the Iran deal was a "deeply flawed agreement."Credit...Tom Brenner/The New York Times

Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the majority leader

"The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action represented a deeply flawed agreement, which President Trump has determined is not in the national security interests of the United States. Iran's malign behavior across the broader Middle East — support to proxies such as Shia militias within Iraq, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and militias inside of Syria, use of cyberattacks, support for terrorism and pursuit of an advanced ballistic missile program — must all be addressed in a wider regional effort.

Our European partners now have an opportunity to come back to the table with Secretary Pompeo and negotiate the best terms to create either a better agreement, or a maximum-pressure campaign against Iran.I share the objective and commitment made by the president that Iran should never be able to acquire or develop a nuclear weapon."

Speaker Paul D. Ryan of Wisconsin

"From the beginning, the Obama-era Iran deal was deeply flawed. Iran's hostile actions since its signing have only reaffirmed that it remains dedicated to sowing instability in the region. The president's announcement today is a strong statement that we can and must do better.

I have always believe the best course of action is to fix the deficiencies in the agreement. It is unfortunate that we could not reach an understanding with our European partners on a way to do that, but I am grateful to them for working with the United States toward that goal.

The president is right to insist that we hold Iran accountable both today and for the long-term. There will now be an implementation period for applying sanctions on Iran. During that time, it is my hope that the United States will continue to work with our allies to achieve consensus on addressing a range of destabilizing Iranian behavior — both nuclear and non-nuclear."

Representative Mac Thornberry of Texas, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee

"I have no doubt that the J.C.P.O.A. was flawed and that for years Iran has been deceptive about its nuclear and other programs. My preference would have been to give our European allies a few more months to strengthen the deal, but now that the president has decided that the United States will withdraw, we must have two critical priorities. One is to further enhance our own military capabilities. The other is to strengthen our alliances. A strong, international effort is required to curtail Iran's aggressive behavior in a number of areas."

Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee

"I'm glad that President Trump decided today to withdraw from the flawed Iran nuclear deal and impose crippling economic and financial sanctions against the Iranian regime. This agreement was so bad that bipartisan majorities in both chambers of Congress voted against it after the last administration refused to submit it as a legally binding treaty under the Constitution."

He added, "After Israel's recent revelations of Iran's secret archive of nuclear weaponization plans, the American people deserve better than a bad deal that paves the Iranian terror regime's path to nuclear weapons. And the Iranian people deserve better as they continue to suffer under the regime's criminal corruption, economic mismanagement, and systemwide human rights abuses."

Democrats

President Barack Obama in August 2015 at American University, where he spoke about the Iran deal.Credit...Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

Former President Barack Obama

"There are few issues more important to the security of the United States than the potential spread of nuclear weapons, or the potential for even more destructive war in the Middle East. That's why the United States negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.) in the first place.

The reality is clear. The J.C.P.O.A. is working — that is a view shared by our European allies, independent experts and the current U.S. secretary of defense. The J.C.P.O.A. is in America's interest — it has significantly rolled back Iran's nuclear program. And the J.C.P.O.A. is a model for what diplomacy can accomplish — its inspections and verification regime is precisely what the United States should be working to put in place with North Korea. Indeed, at a time when we are all rooting for diplomacy with North Korea to succeed, walking away from the J.C.P.O.A. risks losing a deal that accomplishes — with Iran — the very outcome that we are pursuing with the North Koreans.

That is why today's announcement is so misguided. Walking away from the J.C.P.O.A. turns our back on America's closest allies, and an agreement that our country's leading diplomats, scientists and intelligence professionals negotiated. In a democracy, there will always be changes in policies and priorities from one administration to the next. But the consistent flouting of agreements that our country is a party to risks eroding America's credibility, and puts us at odds with the world's major powers."

Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Senator Mark R. Warner of Virginia, the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee

"The president's refusal to waive certain sanctions on Iran sets in motion the dismantling of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which has successfully prevented Iran from developing nuclear weapons. While the J.C.P.O.A. was far from perfect, by signing the agreement, Iran gave up 98 percent of its uranium stockpile, dismantled 2/3 of its centrifuges, rendered its heavy water nuclear reactor unusable and agreed to unprecedented inspections that provide critical insight into, and early warning about, any attempts by Iran to accelerate its nuclear program. Trump administration leaders, all parties to the agreement, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is charged with its verification, have agreed that Iran has complied with its terms.

Simply withdrawing the United States from the J.C.P.O.A. will not benefit the American people and U.S. national security: It will only succeed in driving a wedge between us and our allies, whose help we need to enforce any future sanctions regime against Iran, and will effectively green light Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Withdrawing from this agreement makes the United States, and the world, less secure."

Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the House Democratic **leader**

"The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a great diplomatic achievement. Experts and our allies all agree that this landmark agreement has been successful in preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and even senior Trump Administration officials have confirmed that Iran has remained in compliance with the agreement. Yet, the president has chosen to utterly ignore that reality."

She added, "This rash decision isolates America, not Iran. Our allies will hold up their end of the agreement, but our government will lose its international credibility and the power of our voice at the table. The president's decision to abdicate American leadership during a critical moment in our effort to advance a denuclearization agreement with North Korea is particularly senseless, disturbing and dangerous.

Democrats have no illusions about the Iranian regime. We remain strongly committed to stopping the advancement of Iran's ballistic missile program, its egregious human rights abuses, and its support of terrorism and other nefarious activities in the region."

ARTICLE 12

NEWS ANALYSIS

Instead of Isolating Iran, U.S. Finds Itself on the Outside Over Nuclear Deal

Allies and adversaries alike have refused to recognize the Trump administration's demand for sanctions, potentially weakening American authority worldwide.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for the restoration of sanctions against Iran during a trip to the United Nations headquarters in New York on Thursday.Credit...Pool photo by Mike Segar

By Lara Jakes and David E. Sanger

The Shift in the American Press Discourse over Iran Nuclear Deal 2015

Published Aug. 20, 2020Updated April 6, 2021

WASHINGTON — A diplomatic standoff over restoring international sanctions against Iran may be the most vivid example yet of how the United States has largely isolated itself from the world order — instead of isolating Tehran, as the Trump administration intended.

At nearly every step President Trump has taken in his dogged pursuit to demolish a 2015 accord limiting Iran's nuclear program, he has run into opposition, including from America's strongest allies in Europe.

On Thursday, the opposition turned into open defiance.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo traveled to New York to personally demand that the United Nations Security Council "snap back" the sanctions on Iran for violating some terms of the nuclear deal. The act was born of frustration: His closest allies had rejected an American effort to recast the terms of the deal by extending an arms embargo against Iran that begins to expire in October. Only the Dominican Republic voted with the United States.

Mr. Pompeo, sounding incredulous, again accused Iran of fomenting terrorism, destabilizing the Middle East and trying to hide its nuclear and weapons programs from international inspectors. But he directed some of his harshest words toward diplomats from Britain, France and Germany, who he said "chose to side with ayatollahs."

"It's not a matter for anger or frustration," Mr. Pompeo said. "We'll follow the rules of the U.N. Security Council, and that will lead to the sanctions being reimposed."

Never mind that Iran's major violations were in response to Mr. Trump's decision to exit the nuclear agreement. And set aside the legal contortion that underpins America's insistence that it is still a "participant" in the international accord, with the authority to restore the economic penalties, despite Mr. Trump declaring in 2018 that he was "terminating United States participation."

The bigger issue is that even if Mr. Pompeo succeeds, he may be reimposing sanctions that no U.S. allies are willing to enforce. And that could not only weaken American authority worldwide, it may also show adversaries how to sidestep the United Nations in future global disputes.

"We call on all U.N.S.C. members to refrain from any action that would only deepen divisions in the Security Council or that would have serious adverse consequences on its work," diplomats from Britain, France and Germany wrote in a joint statement issued moments after Mr. Pompeo spoke.

They maintained that since the United States left the nuclear agreement, it has no right to act under its provisions. "We cannot therefore support this action," the European diplomats wrote.

The rejection last week by the Security Council of the arms embargo issue has already been wrapped up in election-year politics: Mr. Pompeo was quick to note that the nuclear agreement had been reached by the "Obama-Kerry-Biden" triumvirate.

Former Secretary of State John F. Kerry and the Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif were the key negotiators on the Iran nuclear deal that was reached in 2015.Credit...Pool photo by Brendan Smialowski

But in making his point, Mr. Pompeo further fractured the group of nations that negotiated the original accord with Tehran.

They included two major adversaries, China and Russia, who worked on an unusual common cause with the United States to keep Iran from gathering the materials needed to make a bomb until at least 2030. Now the agreement is frayed, and Iran is luring Moscow and Beijing from the coalition, in part by looking to buy their guns, tanks and planes.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Pompeo will do whatever is necessary to keep Iran from once again going on the arms market. To the administration's critics, it is an indefensible form of the president's America First foreign policy.

"They are pushing our allies to balance against us, along with our adversaries," said Jon B. Alterman, a geostrategy and security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "It's unthinkable to me why you would intentionally lose a fight like this, at the U.N."

Mr. Pompeo is instead preparing to declare victory.

Wielding a veto threat to dissuade defectors, he has demanded that U.N. sanctions be restored on Iran's energy, military and financial industries. They had served as the leverage that originally forced Tehran into negotiations and were lifted when the nuclear deal was struck in 2015.

Then Mr. Trump withdrew from the accord, in part because it did nothing to halt Tehran's ballistic missile programs or support of terrorist groups. The United States

quickly reimposed its own sanctions on Iran, notably on its oil exports, gutting its economy.

Iran abided by the terms of the agreement for another 14 months. Then, under pressure at home as its economy suffered and frustrated that the deal was unraveling, Tehran began to violate it.

Britain, France and Germany have largely been left to hold the accord together, creating festering diplomatic resentments and fueling perceptions of the United States as an unreliable partner. The countries cite a different legal technicality in the nuclear deal to prevent Mr. Trump from forcing through the international sanctions.

In January, after Iran began compiling and enriching nuclear fuel beyond the limits of the agreement, European officials formally accused Tehran of violating the deal. That set off a dispute mechanism that is part of the 2015 accord. A Security Council diplomat said it must be resolved before international sanctions were restored.

Negotiations between Europe and Iran continue without a deadline for completion. European diplomats are widely believed to be delaying until after the U.S. presidential election in November with the hope that a new American policy toward Iran would stop the march to sanctions, and perhaps conflict, if Mr. Trump loses.

Mr. Pompeo isn't waiting. He says the agreement allows the United States to act, regardless of whether it has declared it is leaving the accord.

Yet Wendy R. Sherman, the chief American negotiator during the Obama administration, said the United States "does not have standing" to restore the sanctions and was unlikely to convince European diplomats that it did.

"I believe they will try anyway," Ms. Sherman said of the Trump administration during an appearance at the Atlantic Council on Wednesday.

President Trump declared two years ago that the United States would leave the Iran nuclear agreement.Credit...Anna Moneymaker for The New York Times

She said the United States could undercut its own authority, especially if it defied other world powers, including allies, that refused to enforce the sanctions. "And that's a problem of tremendous significance," Ms. Sherman said.

In a six-page notification submitted on Thursday to Dian Triansyah Djani of Indonesia, the Security Council president, the Trump administration said the sanctions would be reimposed against Iran after 30 days. Officials said the sanctions could be blocked only by a Security Council resolution, which the United States has the power to veto.

The nuclear agreement with Iran was envisaged as a diplomatic and security measure that would curb Tehran's nuclear threat across the Middle East and thaw decades of tensions with the West.

But it immediately inflamed Iran's archenemies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia, who worried about appeasing a country that the United States had designated in 1984 as a state sponsor of terrorism. Refusing the sanctions would undermine security and reward Iran's "malicious aspirations," Israel's ambassador to the U.N., Gilad Erdan, wrote on Twitter on Thursday.

The dispute has created an unlikely alliance between Iran and Europe — one that Tehran has seized upon to turn the American isolation campaign back on itself.

"The U.S. shouldn't try its luck. The result will be another humiliation," said Iran's deputy U.N. ambassador, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, according to official Iranian news media.

Back in Iran, officials unveiled new ballistic missiles named after military officials who were killed in an American drone strike in Baghdad on Jan. 3: Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the Quds Forces commander, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a leader of a Shiite militia in Iraq that is backed by Tehran.

At the United Nations, Mr. Pompeo downplayed the specter of a confrontation with allies. Other diplomats compared the standoff to a frosty system of parallel universes, in which the United States insists the sanctions are back in place, and the rest of the world refuses to acknowledge them. That could set off years of legal disputes in courts around the world as companies and people who do business with Iran challenge the economic penalties.

But it will not stop the Trump administration from claiming that it has done all it can to upend the nuclear accord with Iran.

"We have to keep the pressure on them," Nikki Haley, the Trump administration's first ambassador to the U.N., told the group United Against Nuclear Iran in a forum this week. "And we can overcome what's happening at the U.N."

Michael Schwirtz and Farnaz Fassihi contributed reporting from New York.

ARTICLE 13

An Iran Nuclear Deal That Reduces the Chance of War

By The Editorial Board

- July 14, 2015

Secretary of State John Kerry on Tuesday.Credit...Leonhard Foeger/Reuters

The final deal with Iran announced by the United States and other major world powers does what no amount of political posturing and vague threats of military action had managed to do before. It puts strong, verifiable limits on Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapon for at least the next 10 to 15 years and is potentially one of the most consequential accords in recent diplomatic history, with the ability not just to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but also to reshape Middle East politics.

The deal, the product of 20 arduous months of negotiations, would obviously have provided more cause for celebration if Iran had agreed to completely dismantle all of its nuclear facilities. But the chances of that happening were effectively zero, and even if all of Iran's nuclear-related buildings and installations were destroyed, no one can erase the knowledge Iranian scientists have acquired after working on nuclear projects for decades.

As described by Mr. Obama and other officials, the deal seems sound and clearly in the interest of the United States, the other nations that drafted it and the state of Israel. In return for a phased lifting of international economic sanctions, Iran will reduce by 98 percent its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which can be processed further into bomb-grade fuel, and reduce the number of operating centrifuges used to enrich that fuel by two-thirds, to 5,060. These limits mean that if Iran ever decides to violate the agreement and make a dash for a nuclear bomb, it will take a year to produce the weapons-grade fuel needed for a single bomb, compared with a couple of months now.

Many of the various restrictions in the agreement will be in force for 10 to 25 years. Some, notably Iran's agreement to constant and technologically advanced monitoring by

the International Atomic Energy Agency, will last indefinitely, as will its commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to never produce a nuclear weapon. Inspectors will have access to suspicious sites "where necessary, when necessary," President Obama said, and if Iran cheats, that will be detected early enough to respond, including by quickly reimposing sanctions or taking military action.

The deal nearly faltered on a demand by Iran and Russia that United Nations bans on the purchase and sale of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles be lifted immediately. But in the end, the accord requires that the conventional weapons ban remain in place for five years and the missile ban for eight years — assuming Iran abides by its commitments.

It is deeply unsettling that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel derisively dismissed the deal immediately as a "historic mistake." He, Republicans in Congress and most candidates for the Republican presidential nomination have opposed negotiations with Iran from the outset yet offered no credible alternative to a negotiated settlement. The Republican presidential hopefuls repeated that formula today — condemnation of the deal with no credible alternative to offer.

That said, no one should have any illusions about Iran, which considers Israel a sworn enemy; often condemns the United States; supports Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations; and aspires to greater influence in the region. Once sanctions are lifted, it stands to gain access to billions of dollars from accounts in international banks that have been frozen and from new oil exports and other business deals.

American officials say that Iran will get that money over time, and that its immediate priority will be to deal with pressing domestic needs. More important, many American sanctions will remain in place even after the deal is implemented, including those relating to Iran's support for terrorism and its human rights violations. The United States has to be extremely vigilant in monitoring how Iran uses those new funds and in enforcing those sanctions.

Agreeing on the nuclear deal is just the first step. Congress gets to review and vote on it. Powerful forces, like Mr. Netanyahu, have vowed to defeat it, and Mr. Obama may have to make good on his vow to veto any resolution of disapproval. It would be irresponsible to squander this chance to rein in Iran's nuclear program.

Appendix 5

 Washington Post Articles

ARTICLE 1

Trump pulls United States out of Iran nuclear deal, calling the pact 'an embarrassment'

By

Anne Gearan and
Karen DeYoung

May 8, 2018 at 5:30 p.m. EDT

President Trump on Tuesday said he is pulling the United States out of the international nuclear deal with Iran, announcing that economic sanctions against Tehran will be reinstated and declaring that the 2015 pact was rooted in "fiction."

Trump's <u>decision</u>, announced at the White House, makes good on a campaign pledge to undo an accord he has <u>criticized as weak</u>, poorly negotiated and "insane."

"The Iran deal is defective at its core. If we do nothing, we know exactly what will happen," <u>Trump said in remarks at the White House</u>. "In just a short period of time, the world's leading state sponsor of terror will be on the cusp of acquiring the world's most dangerous weapons."

The move amounts to Trump's most significant foreign policy decision to date. While he cast the U.S. action as essential for national security and a warning to Iran and any other nuclear aspirant that "the United States no longer makes empty threats," it could also <u>increase tensions with key U.S. allies</u> that heavily lobbied the administration in recent weeks not to abandon the pact and see it as key to keeping peace in the region. They tried to convince Trump that his concerns about "flaws" in the accord could be addressed without violating its terms or ending it altogether.

<u>How killing the nuclear deal could make it easier for Iran to pursue the bomb in secret</u>
After Trump's announcement, the leaders of Britain, France and Germany issued a joint statement expressing "regret and concern" and pledging their "continuing commitment" to terms of the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

"This resolution remains the binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute about the Iranian nuclear programme," British Prime Minister Theresa May, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in their statement. "We urge all sides to remain committed to its full implementation and to act in a spirit of responsibility."

That was <u>a plea to Iran not to take steps that would break the deal</u>, something Iranian officials have said at times they would do if Trump followed through on his frequent threats to yank the United States out of the agreement.

While the U.S. exit does not render the rest of the deal moot, it is not clear whether there is enough incentive on the part of Iran to sustain the agreement. Relief from U.S. banking sanctions was a main reason for Tehran to come to the table.

"In response to US persistent violations & unlawful withdrawal from the nuclear deal, as instructed by President Rouhani, I'll spearhead a diplomatic effort to examine whether remaining JCPOA participants can ensure its full benefits for Iran," Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted. "Outcome will determine our response."

The United States will reimpose all sanctions and could add new ones, U.S. officials said. Discussions with allies about new negotiations would begin Wednesday, White House national security adviser <u>John Bolton said</u>.

Bolton, filling in some of the blanks in Trump's remarks, said that all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions lifted as part of the agreement are now back in effect. "We're out of the deal. Right now. We're out of the deal," he said.

A memorandum signed by Trump at the conclusion of his statement means that "no new contracts" with Iran will be permitted, Bolton said. Although the United States cannot prevent the Europeans or others from having financial relationships with Iran, nearly all global transactions at some point pass through dollar exchanges and U.S. banks, arrangements that are now prohibited.

Existing contracts, Bolton said, will be subject to "wind-down provisions" of 90 days to six months, after which they will be required to "phase out." Regulations giving specific time frames, he said, will be announced by the Treasury Department.

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the administration was revoking licenses for Boeing and Airbus, which were among the biggest deals since the nuclear accord. Boeing had planned to sell IranAir about 80 aircraft worth about $17 billion; Airbus had agreed to sell 100 aircraft worth about $19 billion.

"The Boeing and Airbus licenses will be revoked," Mnuchin said. "The existing licenses will be revoked."

He argued that sanctions are what previously brought Iran to the negotiating table.

"These are very, very strong sanctions — they worked last time," Mnuchin told reporters. "Our objective is to, again, eliminate transactions and eliminate access to their oil industry."

Trump's declaration puts a variety of companies in difficult positions. Though the French oil giant Total had hoped the contract it signed would be excluded from the newly reimposed sanctions, that seemed unlikely Tuesday.

The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal also boosts the outlook for crude-oil prices. Before the deal, the Obama administration squeezed traders and refiners to not buy Iranian oil, wringing a series of 20 percent cuts in purchases until more than 1 million barrels a day of Iran's exports had been taken off world markets. Fear of a similar mechanism has been one factor bolstering oil prices in recent weeks, though prices sagged Tuesday. The price of West Texas Intermediate crude fell about 1.4 percent, slipping to $69.74 a barrel.

Trump immediately faced questions about whether he has a plan for dealing with Iran beyond scrapping the accord, and the administration will now be under pressure to show that it has a strategy for the Middle East beyond undoing what was put in place under President Barack Obama.

"I don't see a path," said Senate Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), stressing that even if Trump had promised during the campaign to rip up and replace the Iran deal, "they don't have a real plan here."

Obama considered the agreement a signature foreign policy accomplishment, calling it the best way to head off the near-term threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and a potential opening toward better relations with Tehran after more than three decades of enmity.

Obama on Tuesday lamented Trump's decision and sought to counter his criticism that the accord had done little to check Iran's nuclear ambitions.

"The reality is clear. The JCPOA is working — that is a view shared by our European allies, independent experts, and the current U.S. Secretary of Defense," Obama said in a statement. "The JCPOA is in America's interest — it has significantly rolled back Iran's nuclear program."

Trump said Iran had lied throughout negotiations for the international deal, and he cited secret Iranian documents <u>revealed last week by Israel</u> that showed the Iranian regime had concealed a nuclear weapons program in the 1990s.

"America will not be held hostage to nuclear blackmail. We will not allow American cities to be threatened with destruction, and we will not allow a regime that chants 'Death to America' to gain access to the most deadly weapons on Earth," Trump said.

The chant was a fixture of pro-government rallies in Iran for decades, but despite its use during a major anti-Trump rally last year, it has largely fallen out of favor as a propaganda tool.

Trump invoked the current <u>diplomatic efforts with North Korea</u> and the possibility of a compact to rid the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons as emblematic of how he is conducting major international negotiations, saying any deal he cut would be airtight.

The reaction to the president's decision did not split neatly along party lines. While some GOP leaders applauded his decision, heralding it as an opportunity to strike a new and better arrangement, several other senior Republicans — including those who voted against the Iran deal — said the decision to withdraw was "foolhardy" and "a mistake."

"The Iran Deal is a deeply flawed agreement. . . . However, without proof that Iran is in violation of the agreement, it is a mistake to fully withdraw from this deal," Rep. Michael R. Turner (R-Ohio), a senior member of the House Armed Services and Intelligence committees, said in a statement.

Even House Speaker Paul D. Ryan (R-Wis.) said in a statement that it was "unfortunate" that the United States could not come up with a way of fixing the Iran deal instead of withdrawing, and he thanked the European parties to the pact for trying to work with Washington "toward that goal." He expressed hope that they might be able to find a new way of addressing Iranian aggression before new sanctions are implemented.

Other GOP leaders cheered the move, saying it was needed to push U.S. allies and Iran to strike a more restrictive bargain.

"President Trump is right to abandon the Obama administration's bad deal," Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) said in a statement, adding that Congress must have a role in any new agreement.

Democratic leaders excoriated the president for a "rash" and shortsighted decision that they argued will compromise security in the Middle East and around the world.

"The President's decision to abdicate American leadership during a critical moment in our effort to advance a denuclearization agreement with North Korea is particularly senseless, disturbing and dangerous," House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said in a statement.

Josh Dawsey, Seung Min Kim, Damian Paletta, Philip Rucker, John Hudson, Karoun Demirjian and Steven Mufson contributed to this report.

ARTICLE 2

The Case for the Nuclear Deal with Iran

Op-Ed
John Kerry Secretary of StateSecretary of Energy Ernest Monizn The Washington Post

July 22, 2015

When President Obama took office, he faced an Iran that had mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, had constructed a covert uranium enrichment facility inside a mountain, was on its way to installing nearly 20,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment, was developing advanced centrifuges and was building a heavy-water reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium. If Iran wanted to develop a nuclear weapon, it was already well down that road and the international community had little insight into its program. Against this backdrop the president vowed never to let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon.

The deal reached in Vienna this month is not only the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon, it is the only durable and viable option for achieving this goal. This comprehensive diplomatic resolution has the unified support of the world's leading powers. It extends the time Iran would need to develop a nuclear weapon, provides strong verification measures that give us ample time to respond if Iran chooses that path, and takes none of our options off the table.

Specifically, the deal blocks each of Iran's possible pathways to producing fissile material for a nuclear weapon: the highly enriched uranium and the plutonium production pathways, as well as the covert pathway. This deal is based on verification, not trust. Before obtaining significant relief from economic sanctions, Iran must roll back its enrichment, its research-and-development and its stockpile of enriched uranium. To preclude cheating, international inspectors will have unprecedented access to Iran's declared nuclear facilities, any other sites of concern and its entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium production to centrifuge manufacturing and operation.

If Iran fails to meet its responsibilities, sanctions will snap back into place, and no country can stop that from happening. If Iran tries to break out of the deal altogether, the world will have a longer time period — a year compared with two months — to respond before it could produce a bomb. We also will have the moral authority that comes from exhausting all diplomatic options.

Is this a good deal for the United States and for global security? Consider the facts.

Without this deal, Iran could double its capacity to enrich uranium in a short time. With it, it must reduce that capacity immediately and sharply.

Without this deal, Iran could continue to rapidly develop advanced centrifuges. With it, its program will be significantly constrained.

Without this deal, Iran could expand its existing stockpile of enriched uranium. With it, that stockpile will be reduced by 98 percent, and it will be capped at that level for 15 years. Iran will also be required to get rid of its 20 percent enriched uranium, which is most of the way to bomb material.

Without this deal, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium each year for one to two nuclear weapons. With it, Iran will not produce any weapons-grade plutonium.

Without this deal, Iran could take the steps necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. With it, Iran is prohibited from pursuing any of these steps.

If the international community suspects that Iran is cheating, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can request access to any suspicious location. Much has been made about a possible 24-day delay before inspectors could gain access to suspected undeclared nuclear sites. To be clear, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours' notice under the Additional Protocol of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which Iran will implement under this deal. This accord does not change that baseline. In fact, the deal enhances it by creating a new mechanism to ensure that the IAEA gets the required access and sets a firm time limit to resolve access issues within 24 days. This mechanism provides an important tool for ensuring that Iran could not delay indefinitely.

Most important, environmental sampling can detect microscopic traces of nuclear activities even after attempts to remove evidence. Iran's own history provides a good example. In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran, and negotiations dragged on as Iran tried to remove evidence. But even after six months, tests revealed nuclear activity despite Iran's attempt to cover it up.

The plan approved in Vienna does not expire — it is indefinite. Some provisions will be in place for 10 years, others for 15, and still others for 20 or 25. But the transparency requirements and Iran's most fundamental obligation — to preserve the peaceful nature of its nuclear program — are permanent.

Meanwhile, economic sanctions will remain intact until Tehran has met its key commitments, which include removing the core of its reactor at Arak, disconnecting and locking away some 13,000 centrifuges and shipping most of its enriched uranium out of the country.

For the United States to back away from this deal would be a historic mistake. We would be isolated from our partners, face an unraveling sanctions regime and give Iran the unconstrained ability to push ahead with its nuclear program.

We recognize that Iran remains a threat to stability in the Middle East. That danger is precisely why this deal is so necessary and why we fought so hard for the multilateral arms embargo to remain in place for five years and the embargo on ballistic missiles for eight. U.S. sanctions related to terrorism, human rights and missiles will also continue.

A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to our allies in the Middle East, as well as to the United States and the international community. By taking this threat off the table, this deal makes it far less complicated to address the many other problems that we have with Iran's regional actions.

President Obama has said clearly that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. Neither sanctions nor military action can guarantee that outcome. The solution is the comprehensive diplomatic deal reached in Vienna.

ARTICLE 3

Politics

Trump warns he will withdraw U.S. from Iran nuclear deal if fixes not made

President Trump "still strongly believes this was one of the worst deals of all time," White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said Thursday. (Mark Wilson/Getty Images)

By

Carol Morello

 and

Anne Gearan

January 12, 2018

President Trump on Friday kept alive the Iran nuclear deal he detests by waiving sanctions for the third time, but he said he will not grant another reprieve unless the agreement is amended to permanently block a potential pathway for Iran to build nuclear weapons.

In conjunction with the waivers, the Treasury Department placed sanctions on 14 people and entities for alleged offenses unrelated to Iran's nuclear industry. The new measures concern human rights abuses and censorship in Iran and the arming of groups throughout the region.

Trump's decision avoided placing the United States in violation of the commitments it made in the landmark 2015 deal. But he affirmed his willingness to withdraw from it in a few months unless changes are made.

"Despite my strong inclination, I have not yet withdrawn the United States from the Iran nuclear deal," Trump said in a statement. "Instead, I have outlined two possible paths forward: either fix the deal's disastrous flaws, or the United States will withdraw."

Critics of the deal deemed the president's decision "an opportunity to do better," as Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called it.

But supporters expressed skepticism that the deal will survive in its current form. Trita Parsi, head of the National Iranian American Council, called it a "temporary stay of execution."

"In a nutshell, he's saying, 'Kill the deal with me, or we'll kill it alone,' " said Robert Malley, who worked on the National Security Council under President Barack Obama.

The foreign ministers of Germany, France and Britain Jan. 11 voiced their blanket support for the Iran nuclear deal. (Reuters)

Trump blamed Iran for a litany of alleged malign activities, including support for terrorist groups and the "murderous regime" of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and torture, mass arrests and oppression at home.

Trump said his strategy for confronting Iran through sanctions and support for Iranian political freedom "stands in stark contrast to the policy and actions of the previous administration."

"President Obama failed to act as the Iranian people took to the streets in 2009. He turned a blind eye as Iran built and tested dangerous missiles and exported terror. He curried favor with the Iranian regime in order to push through the disastrously flawed Iran nuclear deal," he said.

'He threw a fit': Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aides to scramble for a compromise

Iranian officials warned that a U.S. withdrawal from the deal would spell its doom.

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Twitter that "Trump's policy & today's announcement amount to desperate attempts to undermine a solid multilateral agreement."

"JCPOA is not renegotiable," he said, using an abbreviation for the deal's formal name, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. "Rather than repeating tired rhetoric, US must bring itself into full compliance — just like Iran."

As a signatory to the international Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has committed to not building nuclear weapons, even after the restrictions on its program lapse, and it is entitled to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Trump listed his conditions for legislation that would address future U.S. participation and called on European allies "to join with the United States in fixing significant flaws in the deal, countering Iranian aggression, and supporting the Iranian people."

"If other nations fail to act during this time, I will terminate our deal with Iran," warned Trump, who will revisit the decision in 120 days.

Officials said the administration will discuss the changes it is seeking with Europeans but will not talk directly with Iran.

Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (Md.), the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called Trump's statement an "ultimatum" and said the president is "making negotiations with Europe more difficult by the way he's laying out the conditions."

All parties to the accord would have to agree to any changes. That is highly unlikely. The Europeans, who consider the deal a great success contributing to their security, have said that Iran's non-nuclear behavior must be addressed separately.

The changes Trump has demanded include timely inspections of all sites requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency, reflecting a concern that Iran could be conducting nuclear research clandestinely at military sites.

Trump also wants to terminate the phased expiration dates of various limitations placed on Iran's nuclear program. Sometimes called "sunset provisions," many of them lapse 10 to 15 years in the future. Trump wants them to continue indefinitely so that the United States can rapidly resume sanctions if Iran is ever found to be cheating.

Rep. Eliot L. Engel (N.Y.), the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the demands are unattainable.

"The Trump administration's policy announced today sets impossible standards that would ultimately isolate the United States rather than isolating the regime in Tehran," he said.

"Like it or not, we need to uphold our end of the bargain so that we can hold Iran to its obligations and crack down on the regime's other destabilizing activities."

Some of the new sanctions announced by the Treasury Department are a response to crackdowns on anti-government protests and blocking access to social media sites.

The entities sanctioned include Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace and its subsidiary, the National Cyberspace Center, which police the Internet, restricting access to websites that challenge the regime.

The sanctions with the most political repercussions are against the administrative head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Amoli Larijani. A hard-line cleric appointed by Iran's supreme

leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Larijani is a highly influential member of Iran's most powerful political family. His older brother, Ali Larijani, is the speaker of Iran's parliament.

Iran's judicial system is notoriously repressive, and the country remains one of the world's leading executioners. According to the European Union, which placed its own sanctions on the judiciary chief in 2012, Sadegh Larijani has "personally signed off on numerous death penalty sentences."

"Naming and shaming Sadegh Larijani is one small way the U.S. can bring its human rights policy and coercive economic strategy against Iran into greater alignment," said Behnam Ben Taleblu, Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington.

Other sanctions target companies accused of conducting prohibited transactions with Iranian entities. Malaysia-based Green Wave Telecommunications was named for providing U.S. technology to Iranian companies.

The Treasury Department also listed several Chinese individuals and companies for breaking similar rules to provide materials to Iran that could be used in navigation and weapons systems. Two Iranian companies that build and maintain the nation's military helicopters also are on the list.

"The designations today politically go to the top of the regime and send a very strong message that the United States is not going to tolerate their continued abuses, continued violations of the rights of their citizens," said an administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity under rules for briefing reporters.

Erin Cunningham and Bijan Sabbagh in Istanbul and Karoun Demirjian in Washington contributed to this report.

ARTICLE 4

'He threw a fit': Trump's anger over Iran deal forced aides to scramble for a compromise

By **Anne Gearan**

October 11, 2017

President Trump was livid. Why, he asked his advisers in mid-July, should he go along with what he considered the failed Obama-era policy toward Iran and prop up an international nuclear deal he saw as disastrous?

He was incensed by the arguments of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and others that the landmark 2015 deal, while flawed, offered stability and other benefits. He did not want to certify to Congress that the agreement remained in the vital U.S. national security interest and that Iran was meeting its obligations. He did not think either was true.

"He threw a fit," said one person familiar with the meeting. ". . . He was furious. Really furious. It's clear he felt jammed."

So White House national security adviser H.R. McMaster and other senior advisers came up with a plan — one aimed at accommodating Trump's loathing of the Iran deal as "an embarrassment" without killing it outright.

To get Trump, in other words, to compromise.

"McMaster realized we just cannot come back here next time with a binary option — certify or decertify," an exercise Congress requires every 90 days, said a person familiar with the July discussion. "He put his team to work on a range of other options, including a decertification option that would involve Congress" and would not immediately break the deal.

That effort — described by seven people familiar with the debate, most of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the confidential discussions — led to a revamping of the U.S. approach to Iran and the nuclear pact Trump is set to announce this week and which congressional leaders were briefed about Wednesday. Under the expected announcement, Trump will declare the deal is not in the U.S. national interest while stopping short of recommending renewed nuclear sanctions.

The deliberations show the extent to which Trump's national security team in recent months has been occupied with navigating the future of the Iran nuclear deal, which Trump repeatedly vowed to throw out as a "disaster" during the campaign. The sometimes angry internal debate also provides another illustration of the way in which Trump's gut impulses and desire for dramatic action have often collided with the subtlety of international diplomacy.

[Trump plans to declare that Iran nuclear deal is not in the national interest]
The Iran agreement, brokered by President Barack Obama, was never designed to do many of the things Trump criticizes it for lacking. Many of his own advisers — and many Republican leaders and key U.S. allies — see it as a valuable tool in stopping an Iranian nuclear bomb.

The solution is a compromise that retains the agreement but also puts Iran and U.S. allies on notice that Trump is willing to walk away. Meanwhile, Trump is likely to make the case that as the Islamic State terrorist group is weakened, Iran is reasserting itself as the most destructive influence in the Middle East and using the nuclear deal as cover to do so.

"He doesn't want to certify the Iran deal for more domestic reasons than international ones," said Vali Nasr, dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "He doesn't want to certify that any piece of the Obama strategy is working."

Trump is expected to announce new conditions for U.S. participation in the agreement among the U.S., Iran, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China and punt the issue to Congress. He may also announce new sanctions or penalties on Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard Corps.

"You can do both," Trump said Wednesday when asked about certifying or rejecting the deal.

He said he would announce his plan "very shortly," adding in an interview with Fox News, "It's a horrible, horrible embarrassment to our country, and we did it out of weakness, when actually we had great strength."

"We are on a tightrope. We don't know what will happen," said one Western diplomat worried that Trump's action will undermine the international agreement.

As a practical matter, Trump's expected move will place the onus on Congress to decide what to do next. Working with Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), a leading congressional hawk on Iran, the White House would refrain from recommending that Congress reimpose nuclear sanctions that were suspended under the deal.

That would buy time for new legislation codifying Trump's conditions for remaining in the deal formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a Republican congressional aide said. It would also increase U.S. leverage with European allies who don't want to renegotiate the deal, said the aide, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because Trump has not yet announced his plan.

[It's up to Congress to keep or kill the Iran nuclear deal. Here's how lawmakers could do either.]

"To get us on the right foot on the Iran strategy, we do need to use this certification decision, this moment, to launch a real effort to plug the holes and the weaknesses in the JCPOA," the aide said.

"We need to send the message that the president does not feel constrained by the JCPOA and does not feel beholden to it" while seeking an extension of the deal's restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities and other modifications.

Cotton laid out that approach in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations this month, in which he accused Iran of harming U.S. interests in the Middle East and scheming to preserve its ability to eventually produce a bomb.

The speaker and the setting were clear signals that the Iran hard-liner would block for Trump in two ways. By holding off on new sanctions that would bust the deal, Cotton helps Trump rebuff the claim of sabotage from Democrats and other parties to the agreement. And because of his history of advocating tough measures against Iran, he may help protect the White House from criticism by conservatives who want to do away with the deal.

"It would give a few months' or years' lead time to give time to get U.S. allies on board with the same restrictions — a unified front that will put lots of pressure on the Iranians" to reopen the deal, the aide said.

Britain, France and Germany, along with the European Union's foreign policy chief, have argued to Congress and the Trump administration that the deal cannot be redone. Iran has said the same.

The pivotal moment in the administration's Iran debate came July 17, when the president balked when presented with the recommendation of his national security advisers that he should submit the July congressional certification. He argued with aides, forcing a postponement of a planned announcement and a rewriting of White House talking points.

The decision was clumsily announced that evening, hours before a legal deadline, along with a declaration Trump planned to toughen expectations and enforcement.

The administration announced new sanctions on Iran over its ballistic missile program the following day. But only sanctions related to the country's disputed nuclear program are covered by the 2015 deal. Iran claims that it has never sought a nuclear weapon and that its nuclear research and development is intended for medicine and energy.

The first certification of Trump's presidency came in April, when Trump was also reluctant but agreed on the grounds the administration was just beginning a review of its Iran strategy and would wait for major decisions, the people familiar with the debate said.

By July, the president's frustration was evident. He made it clear that he felt strong-armed and that the July certification would be his last, several people familiar with the discussion said.

Trump took the internal confrontation public in an interview with the Wall Street Journal in which he said he regretted the decision. The experience also further soured Trump on Tillerson, who he complained consistently came forward with only "totally conventional" approaches to foreign policy problems, people familiar with Trump's thinking have said.

[A 'pressure cooker': Trump's frustration and fury rupture alliances, threaten agenda]

It would fall to Tillerson and the State Department to try to negotiate new terms for the Iran deal, and ally after ally has bent his ear with arguments that the deal should be preserved as it is.

"The nuclear deal was a crucial agreement that neutralized its nuclear threat," British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said Tuesday, following a telephone call with Tillerson. "The U.K. supports the deal and stresses the importance of all parties continuing to uphold their commitments."

Tillerson joined all of Trump's other top national security advisers in recommending last month that Trump decertify the deal as part of a strategy some refer to as "decertify, pressure and fix."

As Trump officials briefed lawmakers Wednesday, two Obama administration architects of the deal, former secretary of state John F. Kerry and former energy secretary Ernest Moniz, were also on Capitol Hill arguing in defense of the original agreement.

Congress may now do away with the requirement that the president recommit to the deal every 90 days, something that skeptical lawmakers of both parties mandated when Obama negotiated the agreement.

Karoun Demirjian and Philip Rucker contributed to this report.

ARTICLE 5

Analysis

It's up to Congress to keep or kill the Iran nuclear deal. Here's how lawmakers could do either.

President Trump criticized the Iran nuclear deal and called the Iranian government a "corrupt dictatorship" while addressing the U.N. on Sept. 19. (Reuters)

By

Amber Phillips

Reporter, The Fix

October 11, 2017

This week, President Trump is expected to announce that he doesn't think Iran is complying with a global 2015 nuclear deal — and that he'll leave the fate of the pact in Congress's hands.

From there, lawmakers will have 60 days to act on a range of options. They can tear up the United States' involvement in the deal, or try to get Europe and the United Nations on board with making changes, or do nothing at all.

Here are the four main options available to them, listed in order of most to least damaging to the deal itself. It's not clear which option Congress will choose.

1. Impose sanctions on Iran: Either new or old ones. This would be the most aggressive thing Congress could do. It would effectively end the United States' involvement in the deal and potentially end the global deal itself, as the whole reason for Iran to come to the negotiating table is to be able to do business with countries that had closed it off. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has warned that Iran could end its side of the deal "within hours" if Congress imposes new sanctions.

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Who's advocating this: Hardly anyone.Yet.

Is it likely? No. Trump has called the Iran deal "one of the worst deals I've ever seen," but if he wanted to tear it up, he would have either decertified it earlier this year when he had the opportunity or tried to issue new sanctions. He hasn't done either, and the The Washington Post's Anne Gearan and Karoun Demirjian report that he doesn't plan to recommend that Congress tear up the deal by imposing sanctions either.

Even some of the Iran deal's most vocal opponents want to try No. 2 first.

2. Try to get other countries to renegotiate the deal: Congress could send a message to the rest of the world that it wants to change the deal. It could do this by voting on a resolution that says the United States wants to extend restrictions on Iran's nuclear plan indefinitely instead of ending it in a decade. Or it could require Iran to stop testing ballistic missiles if it wants to keep the deal. (This summer, Congress passed a bill that sanctions Iran for testing ballistic missiles.) Supporters of this proposal argue that under the current deal, Iran's path to a nuclear bomb is just delayed.

Advertisement

Who's advocating this: Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), one of the Iran deal's most vocal opponents, has called this option "coercive diplomacy." If it doesn't work, he wants Congress to revisit tearing up the deal by imposing sanctions.

"The world needs to know we're serious, we're willing to walk away, and we're willing to reimpose sanctions," he told the Council on Foreign Relations last week.
Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) on Capitol Hill in September. (Aaron P. Bernstein/Reuters)

Is it likely? Cotton is optimistic, but at least one international expert isn't. The European Union and the United Nations have said the deal is working, so why would they join the United States to renegotiate it, said Anthony Cordesman, a military strategy consultant with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Who on Earth is going to be persuaded? What are you going to do? Threaten to beat them to death in the alley if they don't join us?"

Some of Trump's top advisers, including Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, think Iran is cooperating, too.
Defense Secretary James Mattis was asked whether it was in the U.S. national interest to stay in the Iran nuclear deal. After pausing, he answered yes. (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services)

How to argue about the Iran deal
3. Hold hearings that tsk tsk Iran: Consider this a subtler way for Congress to urge the international community to renegotiate the deal. The aim would be to press Iran to get in line and world powers to force Iran into a tougher deal. "Hearings are weapons," Cordesman said.
Who's advocating this: Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, isn't ruling it out. "I think that we may well have some legislative opportunities coming up soon relative to Iran," he told reporters last week.
Is it likely? Yes. Before Congress considers any legislative options, it probably will hold hearings. And Republicans could put together hearings that showcase experts who think Iran isn't holding up its end of the bargain.

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) holds a hearing in May. (Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg News)

4. Do nothing: Trump decertifying the deal would be mostly symbolic. It would signal to the international community that he doesn't think the deal is in the national security interests of the United States. But it would not actually pull the United States out of the deal. That's up to Congress. Congress could fail to act, and the deal would stay in place.

Who's advocating this: Democrats. They largely want to keep the deal intact, in part because they think tearing it up with sanctions would undermine U.S. credibility with the rest of the world. "Leaving the [deal] at this point, absent concrete facts and material determinations, would isolate us from our allies and partners," Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (Md.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement.
Is it likely? Yes. Republicans control a majority in both chambers, but in the Senate, Democrats could filibuster any legislation changing the Iran deal.

ARTICLE 6

Politics

Trump plans to declare that Iran nuclear deal is not in the national interest

CORRECTION

An earlier version of this article misidentified the state of Sen. Dan Sullivan. He represents Alaska. This version has been corrected.

By **Anne Gearan** and

Karoun Demirjian

October 5, 2017

President Trump is expected to announce next week that he will "decertify" the international nuclear deal with Iran, saying it is not in the national interest of the United States and kicking the issue to a reluctant Congress, people briefed on the White House strategy said Thursday.

The move would mark the first step in a process that could eventually result in the resumption of U.S. sanctions against Iran, potentially derailing a deal limiting Iran's nuclear activities reached in 2015 with the United States and five other nations.

But Trump would hold off on recommending that Congress reimpose sanctions, which would constitute a clearer break from the pact, according to four people familiar with aspects of the president's thinking.

The decision would amount to a middle ground of sorts between Trump, who has long wanted to withdraw from the agreement completely, and many congressional leaders and senior diplomatic, military and national security advisers, who say the deal is worth preserving with changes if possible.

This week, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed qualified support for the deal during congressional testimony. And Mattis suggested he did not believe taking the step to decertify would scuttle the agreement.

Trump is expected to deliver a speech, tentatively scheduled for Oct. 12, laying out a larger strategy for confronting the nation he blames for terrorism and instability throughout the Middle East.

Officials cautioned that plans could still change, and the White House would not confirm plans for a speech or its contents. Trump faces an Oct. 15 deadline to report to Congress on whether Iran is complying with the agreement and whether he judges the deal to be in the U.S. national security interest.

"The administration looks forward to sharing details of our Iran strategy at the appropriate time," said Michael Anton, spokesman for the White House National Security Council.

The fate of the nuclear pact is only one consideration in that larger strategy, U.S. officials said, although given Trump's focus on the deal as an "embarrassment," it is the most high-profile element.

The agreement signed under President Barack Obama was intended to close off the potential for Iran to quickly build a nuclear bomb by curbing nuclear activities the United States and other partners considered most troubling. It allowed some uranium enrichment to continue for what Iran claims is peaceful medical research and energy; the country says it has never sought nuclear weapons. In exchange, world powers lifted crippling U.S. and international economic sanctions.

At issue now is the fate of U.S. sanctions lifted by Obama and, by extension, whether the United States will move to break the deal. That could open an international breach with European partners who have warned they will not follow suit.

Outreach for a "transatlantic understanding" about reopening or supplementing the deal is likely to be part of Trump's announcement, according to one Iran analyst who has discussed the strategy with administration officials. Several other people familiar with a nine-month review of U.S. military, diplomatic, economic and intelligence policy toward Iran spoke on the condition of anonymity because aspects of the policy are not yet set, and Trump has not announced his decision.

Trump said last month that he had decided what to do on Iran but that he would not divulge the decision at that time.

Welcoming military leaders to a White House dinner Thursday night, Trump said Iran had not lived up to its end of the nuclear bargain.

"The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East," he said. "That is why we must put an end to Iran's continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement."

The president's senior national security advisers agreed within the past several weeks to recommend that Trump "decertify" the agreement at the Oct. 15 deadline, two of those people said.

The administration has begun discussing possible legislation to "strengthen" the agreement, congressional aides and others said — a "fix it or nix it" approach suggested by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Sen. Tom Cotton (Ark.), a leading Republican hawk on Iran.

But the prospects of such an approach are highly uncertain, and many supporters of the deal consider it a dodge.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said last month that he will not reopen the agreement for negotiation. Separately, representatives of Iran, China and Russia told Secretary of State Rex Tillerson the same thing during a meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly session last month, two senior diplomats familiar with that meeting said.

[U.S., Iran accuse one another of undermining nuclear deal]
Cotton appeared to preview the main elements of the administration's plan this week, although he said he does not know exactly what Trump plans to do. The two met Thursday at the White House.

In a speech Tuesday at the Council on Foreign Relations, Cotton said Trump should "decline to certify the deal and begin the work of strengthening it."

He said decertification should be based on a finding that the deal is not in the U.S. "vital national security interest," citing "the long catalogue of the regime's crimes and perfidy against the United States, as well as the deal's inherent weakness."

But Cotton said he would not push for the immediate reimposition of sanctions, as some conservative lawmakers and outside lobbying groups are doing.

He laid out proposals for Congress to pass new stipulations for U.S. participation in the deal, including elimination of the "sunset clauses" under which restrictions on some Iranian nuclear activities expire after several years, tougher inspections requirements and new curbs on Iran's ballistic and cruise missile programs.

Cotton claimed that a unified statement from Congress would help Trump forge a new agreement among European and other allies and strengthen his hand for renegotiation.

"The world needs to know we're serious, we're willing to walk away, and we're willing to reimpose sanctions — and a lot more than that," Cotton said. "And they'll know that when the president declines to certify the deal, and not before."

In the Senate, plans have been underway for months to respond to a presidential decertification.

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has been Capitol Hill's point person on discussions with the White House. Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) also have been made aware of plans being discussed with the White House and State Department.

McConnell is not eager to take on the issue at a time when the Senate calendar is full and midterm elections are only a year off, according to congressional aides and a Western diplomat who has met with him.

"He's not excited about getting the 'Old Maid,' " said the diplomat, referring to the card game where the player left holding a certain card is the loser.

Still, Republican leaders say they are confident that they can craft a legislative response to the president's decision that can address deficiencies in the deal and avoid turning the issue into a political litmus test for the GOP.

Some Republicans have also been urging the president to take a critical public stance against the deal — without blowing it up.

"The president should come out and say, 'Hey, we're going to enforce this, and right now I think these different provisions are being violated,' " Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) said last week, adding that Trump should tell Iran it has a limited window to fix problems. "If they don't, do what [then-Secretary of State] John Kerry and Barack Obama said they were going to do, which is snap back sanctions."

Rep. Adam B. Schiff (D-Calif.) said a decertification would undermine global confidence in the deal and in U.S. commitments generally.

"If the president fails to certify the deal while saying Iran is complying with it, it's a destructive political gesture," Schiff said.

[Text of Iran nuclear deal]

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said that beginning a process that could result in the United States withdrawing from the Iran deal would go against "advice from his own national security team and our closest allies."

"Unilaterally abandoning this agreement will make the world less safe," she said in a statement.

A half-dozen Democrats who went to the White House on Wednesday evening to meet with national security adviser H.R. McMaster came away with the impression that he agreed with Mattis and Dunford.

The group who visited with McMaster to discuss Iran included Cardin and Sens. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), Christopher A. Coons (D-Del.), Joe Manchin III (D-W.Va.), Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.) and Angus King (I-Maine), according to a person familiar with the meeting.

Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.) called the nuclear deal "very, very flawed" but not completely ineffective — a common view among Republicans and a potential starting point for negotiations with Democrats.

"What we have to figure out is how to actually accomplish what we were well on our way to do before Barack Obama gave them a patient pathway to a nuclear bomb," Gardner said, referring to what he and other Republicans see as the deal's failure to prevent Iran from developing weapons down the road.

Those concerns are one of the main areas that Republicans are planning to address in their legislative response to the president's decision, according to a person familiar with plans being hammered out between the White House, State Department and Capitol Hill.

Abby Phillip and Ed O'Keefe contributed to this report.

ARTICLE 7

The Post's View

Opinion

Trump needs to find a diplomatic exit from the Middle East hole he dug for himself

Opinion by Editorial Board
Jan. 2, 2020 at 10:21 p.m. GMT+1

A RETREAT by Iranian-backed militia forces from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on Wednesday defused, at least for the time being, an escalating conflict between the United States and Iran. Yet thanks to the inept and confused actions of the Trump administration, Tehran has won a tactical victory, and it retains the initiative.
Up until last week, Iran was under severe pressure in Iraq from popular demonstrations demanding an end to its influence over the Iraqi government, including through the

militias it sponsors. By firing rockets at an Iraqi base on Dec. 27 and killing an American contractor, the Kataib Hezbollah militia changed the subject. The subsequent U.S. airstrikes in both Syria and Iraq on Sunday touched off universal outrage in Iraq and provided pro-Iran militants with a pretext to storm the embassy compound.

Having done little to stop the initial assault, the wobbly Iraqi government induced the militia members to withdraw only after promising a new debate in parliament over whether to order U.S. forces out of the country. Even if legislators reject the proposition, as they have before, Iran has already succeeded in easing the pressure on its own presence in the country. And it can renew hostilities against the 5,000 Iraq-based American troops at any time, knowing that President Trump — as he reiterated Tuesday — has no interest in a new Middle East war.

AD

Mr. Trump got himself into this mess by withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, despite U.N. certifications of Iranian compliance, and launching a massive sanctions campaign that has badly damaged the Iranian economy. He did so in spite of widespread predictions that Iran would respond by resuming its nuclear activity and by launching attacks across the Middle East against the United States and its allies.

Mr. Trump is understandably reluctant to respond to the attacks; escalating into a war with Iran would be a catastrophic blunder. But that has left him without effective means to answer or deter Tehran's provocations, other than by applying still more sanctions. Meanwhile, the pressure campaign has brought about neither the Iranian capitulation on nuclear matters that Mr. Trump said he was seeking nor the regime collapse his more hawkish advisers hoped for.

Having overlooked previous rocket attacks, the administration had little choice but to respond when the Dec. 27 strike killed an American and injured others. However, had it limited its response to Syria, where there are ample Iranian targets, it might have avoided the damaging backlash in Iraq. U.S. forces at the Baghdad embassy and in the nearby region have now been reinforced. But the best way to respond to Iranian aggression in Iraq is to encourage political reforms that will limit Iranian influence and that, at least until this week, had considerable public support.

More broadly, Mr. Trump ought to resolve the contradiction between his attempt to crush the Iranian regime and his distaste for further conflict in the region. If he really "want[s] to have peace," as he said Tuesday, he ought to be seeking a diplomatic exit from the Middle Eastern hole he has dug for himself.

ARTICLE 8

Historic deal reached with Iran to limit Nuclear Program

ARTICLE 9

Trump may be planning to make a very bad decision on the Iran deal

ARTICLE 10

Trump's generals thwart him on the Iran deal

ARTICLE 11

Trump's dangerous folly on the Iran deal

ARTICLE 12

Trump's decision on Iran nuclear deal could cause major breach with allies in Europe

ARTICLE 13

Europe helped draft the Iran nuclear deal. Now leaders are trying to save it.

ARTICLE 14

Fact-checking President Trump's speech on the Iran deal