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**A Discourse-Stylistic analysis of Harold Pinter's *Victoria Station*:
Simpson's Three Ss Model as a Sample**

**Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of Magister Degree in
Literary Stylistics and Discourse Analysis**

By

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Abstract

The general purpose of the present work is to demonstrate the way in which discourse analysis can be useful in the stylistic analysis of dramatic texts mainly that of Harold Pinter's absurdist texts. This work aims at isolating the linguistic patterns that typify Pinter's writings and explain the way he fashions language to create absurdist themes and motifs. The work is an application of Paul Simpson's model to Pinter's play *Victoria Station* to demonstrate the way this method of analysis, which draws on other areas of linguistics mainly pragmatics and discourse analysis, can account for the absurd nature of Pinter's dialogue. This model explores three different aspects of language use: structure, strategy and setting. The work, then, seeks to analyse how and why Pinter's characters in *Victoria Station* employ certain linguistic patterns at specific contexts to generate particular dramatic effects. Moreover, this work illustrates that the violation of the conversational rules is the source of absurdity. It shows that what critics call inefficient interactions in Pinter's plays is actually the way Pinter fashions language to generate particular dramatic effects whereby he builds particular language patterns to convey messages about his characters and his plays as well. Further, this work engages in up-to-date reading of Camus's philosophy of the absurd as articulated by Michael.Y. Bennett to demonstrate that Pinter's *Victoria Station* not only means on a more general level but it is also not so about the meaninglessness of life as it is about how to make life meaningful.

الملخص

باللغة العربية

يحاول البحث إظهار أهمية تحليل الخطاب في تحليل النصوص المسرحية مركزًا صاحبه على نموذج الكاتب المسرحي العبثي هارولد بنتر؛ ذلك أنّ جلّ كتابات هارولد قد امتازت بالجانب اللغوي الذي كان يعكس في الغالب كل ما له علاقة بالعبث. غير أنّ البحث حاول أن يعتمد على بيان نموذج بول سيمبسون المطبّق أساسا على مسرحية هارولد بنتر فيكتوريا ستايشن، بحكم أنّه يتماشى مع طبيعة الحقول اللغوية لاسيّما البراغماتية وتحليل الخطاب.

ولتحسيد معالم تحليل الخطاب في إطاره الأسلوبي الذي امتازت به كتابات هارولد بنتر اعتمدنا على نموذج سيمبسون في تحليل النصوص وفق ثلاثة إجراءات وهي: السياق والاستراتيجية وأخيرا البنية اللغوية؛ هذه الإجراءات الثلاث كانت سببا في إظهار كيف ولماذا استخدم هارولد بنتر الأساليب اللغوية في سياقات محدّدة من أجل بثّ إثارة معينة لدى المتلقي.

مثل هذا النوع من الأساليب اللغوية التي امتاز بها هارولد بنتر حاولت أن تعكس لنا أمرا آخر يتعلق بطبيعة وخصوصية الاستعمال؛ إذ الغالب في الخطاب العبثي لهارولد كان يمثل خروجًا وانتهاكا لقواعد التخاطب المتفق عليها عن طريق ما يسمى في مجال الأسلوبية بالانزياح أو الخروج عن المألوف. من هذا المنطلق كل ما قيل في شأن أسلوب هارولد من وصفه بعدم التواصل في جلّ حواراته، هو في الأصل يعكس رسائل وحقائق معينة اعتمدها هارولد قصدا وتعمدا للفت انتباه القارئ أو المتلقي إلى ما احتوته الشخصيات داخل المسرحية من جهة، وإلى الإطار العام حول المسرحية في حدّ ذاتها.

باللغة الفرنسية:

Le but général du travail présent est de démontrer la façon dont l'analyse du discours peut être utile dans l'analyse stylistique des textes du théâtre du genre absurde principalement ceux d'Harold Pinter. Ce travail vise à isoler les caractères linguistiques qui caractérisent les textes de Pinter et à expliquer la manière dont il façonne la langue pour créer des thèmes absurdes. Le travail est une application du modèle de Paul Simpson à la pièce Victoria Station de Pinter pour démontrer comment cette méthode d'analyse, qui est basée sur plusieurs domaines de linguistique notamment la pragmatique et l'analyse du discours, peut dévoiler la nature absurde du dialogue de Pinter. Ce modèle explore trois aspects différents d'utilisation de langue : structure, stratégie et contexte. Le travail, alors, cherche à analyser comment et pourquoi les personnages de Pinter dans Victoria Station emploient certains caractères linguistiques dans des contextes spécifiques pour produire des effets dramatiques particuliers. De plus, ce travail a pour but d'illustrer que la violation des règles conversationnelles est la source d'absurdité et de montrer ce que les critiques appellent interaction inefficace ou échec de communication dans les dialogues de Pinter est en fait délibérément conçu de cette manière par le dramaturge par lequel il construit des caractères linguistiques particuliers pour transmettre des messages sur ses personnages et ainsi que de ses pièces.

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Dedication

To my husband.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my supervisor Dr. B.A. Neddar for encouraging my research. His constant support and advice have been priceless. My sincere thanks go also to the board of examiners for the time and effort they dedicated for reviewing my work and providing their professional guidance.

General Introduction:

Harold Pinter's works are universally acknowledged to belong to the theatre of the absurd, a major characteristic of which is its distrust of language as a means of communication. His plays depict the characters as being unable to communicate, producing dialogues which seem to be complete gibberish as they are imbued with repetitions, non-sequiturs, pauses and silences. However, though notoriously seen by many critics as "failure of communication", his dialogues seem to communicate many aspects about the human existence. The characters of Pinter's plays impart the idea of isolation, frustration, uncertainty and human need for security, to name but a few, through language use.

A discourse-stylistic analysis of Pinter's plays can account for the fact that the dialogues Pinter produces are not in fact nonsensical or inane. Simpson's 3Ss model can offer fruitful insights on the way Pinter builds particular language patterns to convey messages about the characters and his plays as well.

Having conducted an analysis of some instances from Pinter's '*Victoria station*' applying Simpson's model as part of my studies, I have become interested in the way this model accounts, from a linguistic perspective, for the absurd nature of his dialogues. I was intrigued by the way Simpson's model reveals how Pinter's interactions, though known for their communicative breakdowns, can still mean on a more general communicative level. Motivated by Simpson's claims (1998) that his model is not yet fully explored as studies on drama dialogues over the years have focused on only one or the other dimensions of his model, I decided to explore the whole play. So, I will try to give insights into the way Pinter exploits the language in *Victoria Station* to convey certain meanings and imply important ideas about human condition.

An exploration of the interactions present in Pinter's *Victoria Station* has drawn my attention to the way Pinter constructs his dialogues so as to impart absurdist themes. An analysis of the structure of the verbal interactions and an assessment of the strategies used by the characters of the play has illuminated me on the similarities that exist between Pinter's dramatic dialogues and ordinary conversations. This has heightened my interest on the possibility of conducting a discourse-stylistic analysis on the whole play by Pinter which is rich with linguistic behaviours and verbal interactions that need thorough scrutiny.

So, my work aims at isolating the linguistic patterns that typify Pinter's writings and explain the way he fashions language to create absurdist themes and motifs. By drawing on Paul Simpson's model of analysis which focuses on applications of studies in discourse analysis, I intend to demonstrate the way in which discourse analysis can be useful in the stylistic analysis of Pinter's absurdist texts and how an analysis of his dialogues can offer fruitful insights into aspects of naturally occurring conversation.

Given such a focus, my dissertation falls under what is known as the stylistics of drama which is itself part of the discipline of literary stylistics: the use of theories in linguistics to study the language of drama.

The present work is greatly based on my own subjective responses to the play under scrutiny. However, in keeping with the general orientation of the analysis, it is also based on transparent and replicable methods of investigation.

To conduct my research, I will analyse *Victoria Station* applying Paul Simpson's model which draws on discourse analytical methods that are viable and accessible to stylistics. Simpson's model comprises three main principles: Structure, Strategy and Setting.

Structure accounts for the linear progression of discourse as a sequence of exchanges. Structural analysis covers types of exchanges, moves, conversational turns, etc. Strategy foregrounds the tactical nature of discourse. It deals with the choices people make when they speak. An analysis of discourse strategy sheds lights on Grice's Cooperative Principle (1975), Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (1986) and Brown and Levinson's Politeness Phenomena (1976; 1987). The third dimension which is Setting, is both a significant determinant of discourse structure and an important influence on discourse strategy. It deals with the non-linguistic context which envelops a piece of communication including the physical environment and the assumptions people bring into discourse. Descriptions of Setting make known the motivations behind the linguistic strategy and the structure used by the characters.

The late 70's and early 80's witnessed an interest in literature as discourse, that is, as a form of language use. Analyses of literary texts have become increasingly based upon theories of language which are pragmatically oriented. This new orientation, which relies heavily on discourse analysis, developed a particular interest in the dynamics of drama

dialogue. Many early works in discourse stylistics, thus, have come to be associated with the study of play talk. (Quigley 1975)(Burton1980), (Short1981), (Simpson 1989).

Drama interactions have drawn scholars' attention because they are complex in terms of their communicative structure whereby one level of discourse is embedded in another: the discourse world of the play and the discourse situation of the world outside the play (Short1981). It would seem to follow that an analysis of the interactions between the characters gives insights about the characters and the play itself as well. Dialogues present in the Drama of the Absurd and in Harold Pinter's plays, in particular, have offered a floor where rich comparisons can be drawn on the discourse world inside and outside the play. (Simpson 2004)

Though stressing the significance of language in Pinter's plays and those of the Theatre of the Absurd, studies have failed, according to Simpson (1998), to account for the absurd nature of dialogues, but most importantly they have been unable to explain the way they convey meanings on a larger level. For these reasons, Simpson developed a model of analysis in which he draws on other areas of linguistics, mainly pragmatics and discourse analysis. While he asserts that his approach is in no way canonical or definitive, he finds it reasonably affective as it explores three different aspects of language use: Structure, Strategy and Setting. Simpson's model, then, seeks to analyse how and why speakers employ certain linguistic patterns at specific contexts to convey their messages.

By applying Simpson's model on Pinter's play *Victoria Station*, I intend to show how a discourse-based stylistic analysis can account for the absurd nature of the dialogues. I will illustrate that the violation of the conversational rules is the source of absurdity and demonstrate that what critics call inefficient interactions in Pinter's plays actually reveal the way Pinter fashions language to generate particular dramatic effects.

In my work, I will not be arguing whether the dialogues in *Victoria Station* conform to the absurd tradition. I will rather argue that the primary way in which the themes of the theatre of the absurd manifest are through language use.

While critics view the absurdity of the plays in the theatre of the absurd in terms of action (Esslin 1960), I would maintain that Pinter's absurdity does not lie essentially in action, but in the way language is used. Most importantly, I will demonstrate that, contrary to

Esslin's assertion that language in absurd drama is subordinate to poetic images and visual stage effects and may be "disregarded altogether" (ibid), Pinter's plays elevate language to a central position.

The idea of the failure of communication has been portrayed and perceived as a crucial marker of the absurd drama ever since Esslin's book *The Theatre of the Absurd* was published in 1961. My work endeavours to prove that Pinter's plays do not fail to communicate; the implications, I will contend, are different. Far from being "failure of communication", his plays communicate even the unspeakable thoughts and feelings of the characters.

The fact that the theatre of the absurd is characterised by unstable characterisations and breakdowns in discourse, has led critics to complain that it has "no message" to offer (Hinchliffe 1996). As to Pinter, says Evans (as cited in Cahn 2011, p. 9), "none of his plays ...engage us in any issue, moral or otherwise". Added to these are notions of gloom and pessimism which are so often associated with Pinter's drama. For this, I would like to show that Pinter's plays can be read in a new light through a re-examination and re-application of Camus's philosophy.

I will be engaging with Camus's concept of the absurd because it was to it that Esslin turned to explain the tenets of the theatre of the absurd. The plays mentioned in his book were understood in terms of Camus's ideas and existential philosophies focusing on the meaninglessness of life. Reading the play *Victoria Station* in an up-to-date understanding of Camus as articulated by Michael. Y. Bennett (2012), I will argue that Pinter's play is not so much about the meaninglessness of life as about how to make life meaningful.

As far as the organisation of my work is concerned, the first chapter will focus on the theoretical frame-work adopted in the analysis of the play. There will be a description of Simpson's model where different discourse theories are going to be displayed and explained. The second chapter will be devoted to Pinter's drama. For Pinter's works belong to the Theatre of the Absurd, an overview of this dramatic tradition will be given. Moreover, this chapter will emphasise the characteristics of Pinter's writings in terms of language use. An application of Simpson's model on *Victoria Station* will be the focal concern of the third chapter. This chapter will include two parts each of which will be devoted to an analysis of

one of levels of discourse organisation. My dissertation will conclude with a discussion of the findings where my hypotheses put forward will be either confirmed or refuted.

Chapter I: Drama and Discourse Analysis

Introduction:

Compared to poetry and fiction, drama has in general received little attention from stylisticians. Part of the problem lies in the fact that one important characteristic of drama is its focus on verbal interaction. Dramatic talk was largely considered as a debased level of analysis and therefore was neglected because of certain assumptions that were based on the premise that talk is random and not orderly, hence, not worth studying. It is only with the advent of more appropriate tools from linguistics that stylistics of drama was made possible. Developments within areas of linguistics such as discourse analysis, conversation analysis and pragmatics have provided stylisticians with methods to analyse the meanings generated in drama. Prior to the 1980s, which witnessed a development in stylistics, the techniques that were used in the stylistic analysis of drama could not account for the full range of effects created by dramatic texts.

The paucity of studies in this field may also be as a result of the complex nature of dramatic dialogue because inherent to drama is another silent but important participant besides the participants of the play: the audience. This grants drama dialogue its most salient characteristic which is its embedded nature of discourse. For this reason, critics such as Burton (1980) and Short (1981) contend that to study drama properly, one should focus on the level of discourse.

Analysts who turned their attention to studying drama as discourse have gone well beyond the level of the sentence. Their treatments of dramatic language diverged from the many of analyses that were traditionally offered and which tended to be heavily dependent on the identification of lexical items such as idioms, clichés, jargons and slangs. That is not to say however that an investigation into the language of a particular text cannot include an analysis of lexical items.

Analysts can go further and apply methods, perspectives and findings from linguistic investigation of ordinary talk such as discourse analysis, conversation analysis and pragmatics. Burton (1980), for example, has focused on the discourse structure of dramatic dialogue. Short (1989) has drawn eclectically from pragmatics and discourse analysis to illuminate character traits and has demonstrated the significance of infelicitous speech acts in creating absurdist themes in Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*. Leech (1992) has used politeness theory to shed light on the social dynamics of characters.

Simpson (1997), though admitting that stylisticians interested in drama are wide-ranging with respect to the categories of analysis adopted to studying drama dialogue, claims that these studies have focused on only one or the other planes of the model he proposes and which comprises two main dimensions: structure and strategy of discourse. To these, he adds setting, another dimension which greatly affects both structure and strategy.

This chapter provides details about Simpson's revised discourse model known as the three Ss model. It comprises a section which presents an overview of the general principles of discourse organisation. Burton's (1980) model for analysing drama, on which Simpson (1997) based his model, will be introduced before the following section which is dedicated to a break-down of the three elements composing the model: structure, strategy and setting. This section will be followed by an explanation of the way an analysis of discourse is conducted employing Simpson's methodological orientations of analysis.

Before moving to a consideration of Simpson's model and the many frameworks which will be used to analyse Pinter's drama, namely: Grice's Cooperative Principle, Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory and Brown and Levinson's Politeness Phenomena, some preliminary remarks are necessary to clarify the relation between conversational speech and represented speech in drama dialogue.

I-1- Dialogue in Drama

Ordinary communicative events involve an addresser who sends a message to an addressee. This constitutes the basic form of communication as illustrated below:



Figure I.1-1: The structure of dialogue in ordinary conversation

However, there are situations which deviate from this basic form such as a diary where the addresser and addressee maybe the same. In a lecture, the addresser is one while the addressees maybe numerous. The addresser and addressee maybe physically and temporally separated such as in a recorded political broadcast.

While it shares the same basic format, drama, says Short (1989, p. 149), has a structure whereby one discourse is embedded in another. Its '*discourse architecture*' so

termed by Short, is made up of two levels: The sort of higher level consists of a playwright who addresses an audience. Embedded within this level, is the second level which consists of characters addressing each other within the dramatic text. The discourse between characters is arranged to be *'overheard'* on purpose (ibid). Thus, dialogues in plays are structured in a way whereby messages between characters in the discourse context of the play become part of what the playwright *'tells'* the audience. (Simpson, 2004, p. 34). The discourse structure of the play can be represented diagrammatically as bellow:




Figure I.1.2: the structure of dialogue in plays from Short (1989, p.149)

This dual communicative structure suggests that the discourse situation of the play is much more complex than what is encountered in naturally occurring conversation. Mandala (2007, p. 04) posits that while play dialogue may resemble what we think of as talk, it differs from it in a number of crucial aspects. Abercrombie (as cited in Mandala, 2007), for instance, claims that play-talk presents *'spoken prose'* which is “far more different from conversation than is usually realised”. It is a speech that “has had a specific pressure put on it”, adds Stayan (as cited in Mandala, 2007, p. 04).

As far as Pinter’s dialogue is concerned, Esslin (1970, p. 194) notes that it does far more than simply reflecting ordinary talk. It is, as postulated by Herman (1995, p. 06), not presented for mimetic value, but crafted for a purpose. Because the discourse at the level of characters is meant to be *'overheard'*, then dialogue in drama, Kennedy (as cited in Mandala, 2007, p. 4) asserts, has to be realistic-sounding to be convincing but carefully designed to effectively convey the playwright’s purpose.

In line with this, Herman (1995, p. 6) propounds that whether dramatic dialogues mirrors real conversations or not is not a point of reference between the forms. It is rather a question of '*mechanics*', that is, how principles of everyday speech are exploited and manipulated by playwrights in the construction of their plays. She says: "...the rules underlying the orderly and meaningful exchanges of speech in everyday context are the resource that dramatists use to construct dialogue in plays" (ibid).

Following the same idea, Mandala (2007, p. xii) claims that dialogues in drama work with respect to pragmatic and discursal norms postulated for ordinary conversation. Simpson (1997, p. 164) assumes that for their understanding, thus, drama dialogues can be "subject to the same analytic procedures as naturally occurring conversation". In other words, the interpretation of drama dialogues requires the same rules that govern everyday interactions.

Mandala (2007, p. 9) argues that to study how the language of drama relates to or deviates from ordinary talk norms, one has to resort to methods from linguistics. Burton (1980, p. 07) claims that to consider play talk linguistically, one needs a relevant set of linguistic materials and the only possible linguistic level to use as a basis to describe drama dialogue is discourse.

Drama texts have received little attention in comparison to poetry and fiction. If the stylistic study of drama is rare, Mandala (2007) notes, the stylistic study of drama as discourse is even rarer. The consideration of drama dialogue as discourse has been routinely neglected because conversational speech for many centuries has been regarded as a debased and unstable form of language and drama dialogue, thus, with all its affinities with ordinary talk in being "speech exchange systems", dramatic talk was liable to be dismissed. ", says Herman (1995, p. 4),

The dearth of appropriate linguistic materials to deal with spoken discourse made critics recourse to inappropriate analytic tools to study drama dialogue which are hence based on intuitions and assumptions (Mandala,2007, p. 12). One of the assumptions about ordinary talk that frequently undermines discussions of its representation in drama is that talk is unable to express complex emotions.

Herman (1995, p. 04)) cites Nicoll (1968) who holds the view that talk is not up to the task of “communicating our passions intimately”. The representation of ordinary talk in drama was undervalued because of another assumption which sees talk as random. Esslin (1968, p. 265), for instance, describes what Pinter manages to capture as absurd through the reproduction of real conversation a “rambling irrelevancy”. Nicoll (1968) is similarly dismissive of ordinary talk as she claims that for drama to be truly expressive, the language used must be carefully designed. Unlike Esslin (1968) and Nicoll (1968), Mandala (2007, p. 10) views ordinary talk as patterned. She confirms that talk does not ‘*just ramble*’; a thing that is now widely accepted by linguists and demonstrated by works in conversation and discourse analysis.

Traditional stylistic analysis with its focus on lexis, phonology and syntax had failed to cope with the meanings which are produced by dramatic texts as stated by Short (1981, p. 180). Quigley (1975, p. 29) notes that Pinter’s critics such as Esslin (1970), Nelson (1967) and Brown (1967) appealing to metaphor and analogy failed to account for the commonplace and mundane in Pinter’s language. The stylistic study of drama was made fully possible with the advent of more appropriate tools from areas such as discourse analysis and conversation analysis to deal with face-to-face interactions. Subsequent developments in linguistics have equipped styliticians not only with the tools to analyse the meanings generated by drama but also undermined those unexamined assumptions about ordinary talk. Playwrights like Pinter, Herman (1995, p. 4) notes, “have revealed the force and power of conversational resources when they are used with dramatic skill”.

I-2-Dialogue and discourse:

A substantial body of linguistic literature brought to light the rule-governed aspect of interactions contrary to habitual expectations .Burton (1980, p. 86) affirms that though complicated, conversations are “orderly and rule-governed”. Simpson (1997, p. 131) agrees with Burton and he further claims that spoken discourse has an underlying structure despite the fact that it seems at first glance unorganised, “peppered with dysfluencies, non-sequitres, false-starts and hesitations”.

In fact studies in conversation and discourse analysis have repeatedly shown that in conversation, which is a largely unplanned activity, interactants though are not bound with a fixed order of speaking-turns, they manage turns in an orderly fashion (Sacks, Schegloff and

Jefferson 1974). In this respect, Mandala (2007, p. 10) also remarks that in conversations there are understood procedures for introducing new topics, in that, participants cannot say anything they want to. Once an initiatory move is made, there are only a limited number of expected expectations and what occurs will be interpreted on the basis of those expectations (Sinclair, 1992, p. 83).

Interactants actually have expectations about what should take place in conversation in the sense that questions are expected to have answers; requests anticipate reactions while comments or statements prospect acknowledgments. And all those speech activities, Simpson (Sinclair, *ibid*) adds, are expected to be delivered with a degree of politeness. Since users of language have expectations about what constitutes well-formed conversations, the occurrence of something else will be perceived as unusual and this will prompt interlocutors to search for implied meanings.

Burton (1980, p. 107) states that “speakers have a very fine sense of the structures of coherent and orderly conversations”. These conversational structures, she says, are underlying patterns that all speakers share as part of their linguistic and cultural knowledge (*ibid*). It is this knowledge for the normal production of speech, explains Short (1981, p. 185), “which allows us to deduce contextual information when that production is apparently normal and which also allows us to perceive deviant speech acts production and interpret it”.

In everyday conversation, Burton (1980, p. 88) says, people try to ascribe interpretations to speakers’ behaviour when the conversational patterns they use are at odd with their expectations. She continues, if someone dashes off from a coffee-break chat without even saying goodbye, his/her colleagues are likely to think that s/he is in a bad mood, they may question if they have done something to offend him/her or assume s/he must have just remembered something urgent. When faced with talk in play, the audience have the tendency to make similar observations, Burton asserts. She also (1982, p. 86) explains that drama dialogues in that they are in some way an exploitation of ‘overheard’ conversation are also “orderly, highly patterned, and available for interesting systematic description in terms of linguistic analysis”.

Simpson (as cited in Culpeper et al. 1998, p. 41) admits that despite the fact that ordinary speech and drama discourse are not the same, they are nevertheless, *‘parallel modes*

of communication' and hence "expectations about well-formedness in everyday speech form the benchmark against which aberrant and incongruous discourse can be measured" .

Therefore, adopting frameworks of ordinary talk in the analysis of drama, dialogue that is represented as 'normal' can be distinguished from that is represented as 'odd' (Mandala 2007, p. 19) .In fact, as a linguistic approach to drama, Short (1981) believes in the usefulness of discourse analysis in the stylistic analysis of drama. Culpeper et al (1998, p. 3) assert that "to explain the dynamics of drama properly, we need much help from areas of linguistics- notably pragmatics and discourse analysis". This is because discourse analysis can account for what people intuitively perceive as well-formed, orderly and coherent conversational structures as well as what we think of as deviant and ill-formed structures. Simpson (as cited in Culpeper et al. 1998, p. 37) posits that "...there exists among discourse analysts a broad measure of agreement about what constitutes well-formed, canonical discourse, and this means that, by imputation, there exists a method for explaining relatively ill-formed, non-canonical discourse".

By appealing to approaches from discourse analysis in the study of drama, it is also possible to account for the various effects that are aimed at by playwrights (Mandala, 2007, p. 22) and there will be a systematic basis to pinpoint the conversational patterns that are mimetic and those that deviate from the norm (Short, 1989, p. 145; Carter, 1982, p. 5). Short (1981, p. 185) illustrates with an exchange taken from *Waiting for Godot* between Vladimir and Estragon who at the end of the play agree on leaving but none of them does:

Vladimir: Well, shall we go?

Estragon: Yes, let's go.

They do not move

Mandala (2007, p. 86) points out that dialogues in play are written in a way that the audience will go looking for an explanation. In the case of the above example, the fact that Vladimir and Estragon agree to go but do not is what prompts readers to search for an interpretation of their behaviour.

Once the world of the play is established, the audience expect to see and hear things consistent with the more usual conventions of shared knowledge. When the assumptions

shared by characters in play clash with our own assumptions we try to look for a plausible interpretation. This clash, Short (as cited in Mandala 2007, p. 89) explains, constitute “one of a number of accumulated messages which the playwright is giving us about the world in which his/her characters live”.

Because of the embedded nature of dramatic discourse, when characters speak to each other, the playwright speaks to the audience. Being aware that incongruity is what attracts his/her audience, the playwright exploits features of talk in a way so as to focus the audience’s attention to aspects of the characters in drama that he/she wishes him/her to notice (Burton 1980, p. 89)

After having shed light on the relation between conversational speech and dramatic speech and the way people interpret speech in naturally occurring conversation and drama on the basis of their shared knowledge about the coherent and orderly underlying structures of conversation, I now turn to the way discourse analysis accounts for these structures.

It is worth beginning at this juncture with an overview of the two axes of language: the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axes. These axes permeate the entire language patterning and are at the basis of the many conceptual models of discourse which will be displayed later in this chapter.

I-3-Language organisation:

Patterns of language have been traditionally studied in terms of the concept of ‘choice’ and ‘chain’. These two concepts are represented diagrammatically as two intersecting axes as illustrated bellow:






Figure I.3. Chain and choice axes.

The syntagmatic axis is the axis of chain which represents the linear combinations of linguistic signs. A syntagmatic investigation into language demonstrates how words are combined and what sort of structural relationships links them. The paradigmatic axis on the other hand, which is the axis of choice, offers an explanation of people's selection of words according to their appropriateness to the context along the axis of chain (Simpson, 1997, p. 134). The syntagmatic axis represents the structural frame on the basis of which selection possibilities occur along the paradigmatic axis. Similarly, the paradigmatic axis offers choices from a pool of options that are available to speakers for each slot along the syntagmatic axis (ibid, p. 77).

In order to illustrate how the axes function, Simpson (1997) puts forward the following example and leaves readers to fill in the blank.

My sunburnt

Users of language, says Simpson (1997), are able to predict on the basis of the syntagmatic combination of 'my' and 'sunburnt' the nature of the lexical item that is missing and can, therefore, select amongst the possible alternatives on the paradigmatic axis. The structural frame of this example requires a noun which denotes a part of the body that can be exposed to the sun. Though available, the selection is restricted to the following set of lexical entries: my sunburnt face- arms- nose – legs. It would seem to follow that the item 'sunburnt' requires the type of lexeme with which it usually combines. The term '*collocation*' is used to indicate these types of lexical combinations. Collocations refers to the grammatical combination of lexical items, while any word from the same pool of lexical items and whose

selection is constrained by the structural form established in the syntagmatic axis is called 'collocate'.

Because the process of selection is confined to the structural set up in the syntagmatic axis, collocates, confirms Simpson (1997, p. 87), are easy to predict. The way lexical items are chained along the syntagmatic axis brings about strong predictions about the kind of items that will come after. This is well-evidenced in the following examples:

-These are addled.

-Throw out that rancid.....

- Here comes a bay-coloured.....

One is likely to think of 'eggs', 'butter/bacon' or any other food which is no longer fresh and 'horse' as suitable collocates for addled, rancid and bay-coloured respectively.

Our predictions about suitable collocates are nevertheless not always met. The ninth line of the first sonnet of Sir Philip Sidney's poem *Asrophil and Stella* (1582) presents an instance of what happens when words do not occur in familiar combinations or are incompatible with our assumptions:

Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sunburnt brain.

In this example, 'sunburnt' was not followed by any of the suitable collocates that were suggested for the word 'sunburnt'. 'Sunburnt' and 'brain' here, represent what is known as '*collocational clash*'. This type of semantic mis-match, propounds Simpson (1997), underlies metaphors, tropes and figures of speech with which poetry particularly abounds. Having said that, collocational clashes do not figure only in creative forms of language. They are, Simpson (1997) contends, a commonplace in everyday discourse. To illustrate this, Simpson (1997) developed a stylistic exercise which he called 'shunting'. This exercise according to him sheds light on many aspects of language patterns. The 'shunting' exercise consists of devising some syntactic combinations containing two elements each: a+b as mentioned below:

Stone mason

sad dream

shredding machine

Tangerine pipes	purple roses	sick joke
Killing fields	soft rain	unhygienic cafe

Then, the B element of each pair was shunted at random around the set. Here are some of the new pairings generated by this shunt:

Stone roses	sad cafe	soft machine
Purple rain	killing joke	tangerine dream

Though clearly inconsistent with our expectations, they do exist in English as either names of popular rock and pop groups like ‘stone roses’ and ‘tangerine dream’ or names of albums or song titles such as ‘purple rain’ by Prince. Striking as these names may seem, they were used by artists to make them memorable. Resorting to collocational clashes turn to be one of the favourite stylistic strategies adopted by many artists.

After having introduced the axes of syntagmatic and paradigmatic to account for the workings of collocation, the dissertation will explain how these intersecting axes can account for the way conversations work at much higher level of linguistic organisation which is discourse

I-4-Discourse organisation:

Discourse refers to the highest level of linguistic organisation and the analysis of which concerns itself with “organisation of language above the sentence or above the clause” (Stubbs, 1983, p. 1). Discourse analysis studies larger linguistic units such as conversational exchanges or written texts. It investigates the way speakers use language in social contexts and therefore one of its focal interests is to account for the structure of conversation and how interactions are connected to serve speakers’ communicative purposes (Brown and Yule, 1983, p. 1)

In discourse analysis, Simpson (1997, p. 132) says, there are three basic principles for conversational coherence: 1- that users of language have intuitions about interactive well-formedness, 2- that they are expected to cooperate in interaction and 3-that what they say has some degree of relevance. These principles, Simpson says (ibid) are noticeable especially when what we encounter as discourse is at odd with our expectations.

Combinations in discourse function in similar fashion to grammatical combination, in that, the principle of collocation applies, as confirmed by Simpson (ibid) to the category of exchange in discourse. An exchange is broadly defined as a combination of conversational contributions produced by different speakers on the same topic. Exchanges, adds Simpson (ibid) are generally two-part consisting of two structural components as in:

A: Hi! How's it going?

B: Oh! Not so bad, and yourself?

A: Right now, have the bowels been working OK,

B: Mmm...yeah...

A: What now do you think should be our reaction to yesterday's mortar attack in Sarajevo?

B: Well I'm someone who's said that _unless we take firm action then these problems will escalate. I mean, the best thing you can say_and there aren't many good things you can say_is that it is a crisis that came before Europe was ready.

A: Come on now, eat up your crunchy nut cornflakes.

B: No want it! No want it!

Simpson (1997, p. 132)

Simpson (1997, p. 133) argues that despite the fact that the above exchanges are decontextualised, one is still able to infer their probable sources. One can make predictions about the status, identity and power of the participants engaged in the dialogues. In the first

exchange one can deduce that it is an informal opening to a conversation. The second is typical to a doctor-patient encounter. The third one is part of a political interview while the fourth can be viewed as a domestic encounter between an adult and a toddler. One can notice that there is nothing extraordinary about the three exchanges. However by simulating the shunting exercise previously applied to collocation, that is, by replacing B's utterance in each exchange by another, the following rather strange exchanges are produced:

A: Hi! How's it going?

B: No want it! No want it!

A: Right now, have the bowels been working OK?

B: Oh! Not so bad, and yourself?

A: What now do you think should be our reaction?

B: Mmm...yeah...

A: Come on now, eat up your crunchy nut cornflakes.

B: Well I'm someone who's said that _unless we take firm action then these problems will escalate. I mean, the best thing you can say_ and there aren't many good things you can say_ is that it is a crisis that came before Europe was ready.

Simpson (1997, p. 133)

The juxtaposition of the first set of exchanges with the second illustrates that hearers make use of their intuitions so as to tell whether the exchanges are consistent or at odd with what they know about the structure of dialogues. This highlights our taken for granted

assumptions about coherence and well-formedness in discourse. These assumptions are the sum of the implicit knowledge that native speakers access when they speak or interpret speech (Herman, 1995, p. 5). This implicit knowledge is what Hymes (1967/1972) calls '*communicative competence*' when he argued that Chomsky's linguistic competence did not sufficiently account for all that speakers appear to know about their own language (without knowing they know). (Mandala, 2007, p. 34)

Hymes suggests that when people speak, they choose language forms that are appropriate to a particular context, thus, they take into account a range of variables such as the context of the participants, the purpose of the utterance and the topic of talk (1972, p. 65). The concept of communicative competence, Mandala (2007, p. 35) notes, has been reworked a number of times and now encompasses knowledge of discourse structure, that is, knowledge of how acts are patterned and distributed in speech and what socio-cultural factors motivate these patterning and distributions.

As far as drama dialogues are concerned, Mandala (2007, p. 35) states that these patterns and distributions are presented and exploited when playwrights represent talk in play dialogue. Playwrights, then, draw subconsciously on their communicative competence when they write dialogues, and it is to this competence that the audience return in order to tell if the simulated dialogues in drama are congruous or incongruous with their knowledge about language use and in the light of which they interpret drama. (Mandala, 2007, p. 35).

Before explaining how dramatic dialogues are interpreted by applying models of discourse analysis namely the ones composing Simpson's 3Ss model, Simpson (1997) sees that it is necessary to begin with an account of why people find the exchanges such as above strange at the level of discourse. To this end, he introduces the concepts of structure and strategy which are no more than the axis of syntagmatic and the axis of paradigmatic when mapped on to discourse.

I-5-Simpson's three Ss model:

Simpson (1997) suggests a model for the analysis of dialogue which comprises two principle methodological orientations. The first of these involves a focus on the way spoken discourse is structured. The second orientation involves the study of discourse in terms of strategy. Structure and strategy are studied in the light of the contextual setting of an interaction which is an important determinant of discourse structure and a significant influence on discourse strategy.

I.5.1 Structure:

The structural axis accounts for the linear progression of discourse as a sequence of exchanges. It sheds light on the way discourse units are combined to form exchanges. According to Simpson (1997) there are three types of discourse exchanges arranged along the syntagmatic axis. These exchanges often take the form of familiar pairings such as questions and answers or statements and acknowledgments. There are however some exchanges which may contain non verbal behaviours such as a request- reaction exchange which is another type of discourse where the second part of it is not a verbal utterance. This takes place when a speaker makes a request and the hearer reacts to it with no need to respond verbally. Here are the three principle types of discourse exchange, questioning, stating and requesting illustrated with examples:

A: what's the time? B: three o'clock. (Question- answer)

A: that was a great goal B: yeah, you bet. (Statement- acknowledgment)

A: open the window. B: (opens the window) (request- reaction)

I.5.2 Strategy:

While the syntagmatic axis represents the way discourse is structured, the paradigmatic axis foregrounds the strategic nature of discourse. It would seem to follow that the emphasis will be laid on the way speakers "use different interactive tactics at specific points during a sequence of talk" Simpson in (Culpeper et al, 1998, p.37). This axis represents a selection from a pool of available options. If we consider the third exchange cited above, the

request as directive made by speaker A is clear and forthright. It may nevertheless be interpreted as rude or inappropriate in other contexts. Simpson (1997) propounds that there are less direct options which still can get the hearer to perform the same action. The following examples illustrate the other strategies which can be used by speakers ranging from direct to indirect.




Figure I.5.2.: the strategy axis

Though structurally all the three strategies are the same, in that they consist of a request and a reaction, they are different in terms of strategy. The first contribution in each exchange has its degree of directness with the most direct form used in the first exchange where an unmitigated directive is employed to the less direct form in the second exchange where the stratagem '*could you*' is used which softens the directive. The third exchange is an oblique hint which makes it the least direct form. All the three strategies are arranged along the paradigmatic axis and thus it forms, as stated by Simpson, "a strategic continuum ranging from direct to indirect along which different types of utterances can be plotted" (1997, p. 135).

Also, fundamental to discourse analysis is the grammatical mood as an examination of which helps us to systematically measure the directness and indirectness of an utterance.

For instance, ‘goodness me, it’s hot in here’ was categorised as indirect for it exhibits no semantic link between its grammatical mood and its function as a request.

In discourse analysis the imperative, the interrogative and the declarative which constitute the main moods in English need to be attentively taken into consideration. This is because these types of moods describe the form of the sentence and not the function of the utterance in context.

It is noteworthy mentioning that these three principle moods are generally associated with a certain discourse function. That is, an interrogative is the form usually used to ask questions; a declarative is the form commonly employed to make statements, and an imperative is the form used for orders or commands. Nevertheless, Simpson (1997, p. 139) asserts that there is no one-to-one relation between the form of utterances and their function. An imperative, for instance, is not employed to give only orders. Similarly an interrogative can be used to convey other functions rather than simply asking questions. A declarative can carry a number of discursal possibilities as well. As illustrated in the table below, a grammatical mood can have many discursal functions and that these functions depend on the context of the utterance.

utterance	Form	function
Have a drink	Imperative	Offer
Have a nice day		Ritualistic parting
Will you have a drink? Could you pass the salt?	Interrogative	Offer
		Polite request
Goodness me it's hot in here	Declarative	Request

A declarative, adds Simpson (1997, p. 142), can have many functions depending on the intonation with which it was uttered. If the declarative 'you have had enough cake' was uttered with a rising tone in a context of dinner party, it can function as either an offer or a request for information. If uttered with a falling tone by a mother addressing her kid, it functions as a command to stop eating cakes. However, Simpson (1997, p. 142) notes, sometimes we don't need a mood in order for things to be done in language. A construction like 'the door, please' is moodless but its function as request would be clear in many contexts.

The 'lack of fit' so termed by Simpson (*ibid*) between form and function provides a tool so as to map utterances against the strategy axis. The more apparent the form-function asymmetry is, the less direct the utterance will be and vice versa. In other words, the strategy which draws on the mood type that is standardly related to a particular discourse function is the most direct one. 'Open the window' is clearly a direct request for it employs an imperative. In 'could you open the window?' an interrogative is used to make a request and thus placed in the medial position on the strategy continuum as a less direct utterance. The most indirect strategy takes place when there is an absence of semantic link between the form of the utterance and its ostensible purpose. 'Goodness me, it's hot in here' is by far the most indirect utterance as it uses the declarative form where there is no actual mention of the service requested.

An explanation for why speakers choose from the indirect continuum will be revealed in the section which deals with Simpson's model for analysing dramatic texts strategically. However, there is, to begin with, an important factor that is the contextual setting which influences speakers' choices to go directly or indirectly.

I.5.3 Setting:

Speakers are generally aware of the kind of strategy to use in which context. The first strategy 'open the window', for instance, is more appropriate when used with friends and social equals in an informal context. There may be an interactive peril, however, if the aforementioned strategy is used in formal situations with an interlocutor who is socially superior. The communicative strategies that speakers choose are thus context-sensitive. Simpson (1997) considers setting as the crucial third dimension in discourse analysis for it

functions as a key strategy-framing device. To him, the setting of an interaction is “both a significant determinant of discourse and an important influence on discourse strategy” (1997, p. 135).

Setting, according to Simpson, is the non-linguistic context in which a piece of communication takes place. This is to say that setting encompasses the physical environment of an interaction and extends to the speaker’s assumptions and worldviews that they bring to discourse. Setting is also susceptible to change as interaction progresses. When new discourse context is brought about, patterns of interaction will be profoundly affected.

The way discourse setting motivates linguistic strategy is succinctly illustrated by the following example provided by Simpson (1997, p. 136) to show the importance of setting as a third dimension in discourse.

A: er...you have to go to head office...please.

B: (nods and rises to go)

Despite the fact that there have been no context clues provided, from a structural point of view, one can still guess it is the type of request-reaction exchange. Strategically speaking, the speaker uses two particles ‘er’ and ‘please’ with the hesitation employed around them. These particles function as softeners that mitigate the force of the request. The use of ‘have to’ instead of ‘must’ is another strategy which makes the requirement get across as a general rule and not as a subjective decree.

All these strategies combined in this exchange make it fall under the indirect form on the strategy continuum. Nevertheless, it is only with a description of the discourse setting of the exchange that the whole picture begins to unfold. This exchange, Simpson (1997, p. 137) tells us, took place in a travel agent’s shop where speaker A is a young black manageress who addresses a white-middle-aged male. The latter is dealing with customers while sitting behind a desk. The woman, though according to institutionally sanctioned employment practices is relegated more power, is being cautious in designing her speech in the sense that she chooses a less direct form reducing thus the command-like status of her utterance. Her risk-free strategy, Simpson (ibid) suggests, may also be motivated by the fact that she is infringing upon the ‘territory’ he occupies as he sits in comfort behind his desk. Beside power and status

the strategy of this exchange might be affected by other social variables such as gender, age and ethnicity.

Any piece of discourse, Simpson (1997, p. 138) contends, can be viewed in terms of the three Ss. He depicts the importance of setting as the third dimension in the following figure where he conceptualises it as a circle that embraces the other two dimensions of discourse: structure and strategy.




Figure I.5.3: Simpson's three Ss model

After having offered a general overview of the three components of Simpson's model, the next section will focus on the way these elements are applied in the analysis of discourse.

I-6-Simpson Three Ss Model for the Analysis of Discourse

The first subsection will focus on discourse structure whereby Deirdre Burton's (1980) model of analysis on which Simpson (1997) has based his three Ss model will be presented in details. The second subsection will be devoted to discourse strategy whereby the models of Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle, Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (1986) and Brown and Levinson's (1978 ;1987) Politeness Phenomena will be explored.

Setting, the third dimension, will be integrated where appropriate with those discourse models in which it plays a key role.

I.6.1- Analysis of discourse structure:

It has been stated earlier that Simpson (1997) developed his model out of Burton's pioneering work on the study of discourse structure of play-talk. Simpson (1997) makes particular use of the descriptive categories proposed by Burton (1980) whose model in turn is a modification of the model propounded by Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) which was based on teacher-pupil interactions in classrooms. Sinclair and Coulthard's aim was to isolate the exchange patterns that typified classroom discourse. They identified a three-part exchange structure commonly found in teaching situations such as the following:

Teacher: What's the capital of France?

Pupil: Paris.

Teacher: Yes, Paris. That's right.

This type of exchange comprises three main parts: an initiation by the teacher who asks a question to which the pupil gives a response. The teacher, then, gives feedback on the pupil's answer. Typical of this very specific situation, this three part type exchange is hardly common in everyday conversation. Otherwise, Simpson (1997, p.144) asserts, an exchange like the following would be nothing out of the ordinary in naturally occurring conversations:

A: What's the time?

B: Three o'clock.

A: Yes, three o'clock. That's right.

To account for other types of interaction in different contexts, Burton (1980) sought to modify the classroom model to make it workable with all sorts of talk. Interestingly, Simpson (*ibid*) says, she applied her revised model on drama dialogue as an illustration. Burton's framework follows the Birmingham doctrine that is of Sinclair and Coulthard's model whereby the units of discourse were seen to be related in terms of ranks or levels. Each unit is made up of one or more of the units below it. Interactions comprise transactions which

are made up of exchanges which in turn consist of moves, while moves are realised by the smallest discourse unit, acts. The following figure demonstrates the way discourse units are structured in a hierarchical scale:




Figure I.6.1: the structure of discourse units

Burton (1980, p. 107) confirms that this scale accounts for all kinds of interactions, in the sense that “...all utterances should eventually be sorted according to all three aspects of the description: exchanges, moves and acts”. However Burton (ibid) focuses particularly on the move as interactive unit. Thus in Simpson’s model, emphasis will be given to interactions on the level of moves as well because according to her they are the minimal interactive units while larger units are “not likely to yield much when dealing with drama texts” (Burton 1980, p. 146). Pouring in the same vessel, Simpson (1997, p. 145) suggests that moves are the central issue in any description because moves are often concomitant with speaker’s turn in conversation and mark the point of transition at which subsequent speakers respond and react.

It has been stated earlier that Sinclair and Coulthard’s work has been extended beyond classroom discourse to casual conversation by Burton (1980) (Eggins and Slade 2005, p. 44). Burton found that the initiatory-response-feedback moves are typical of classroom discourse and identified as a result seven moves instead to describe casual conversations. Of these moves, Simpson (1997) considers the three main moves which serve his three Ss model which are: opening, supporting and challenging moves.

Opening moves are topic-carrying items that “have no anaphoric reference to the immediately preceding utterance” (Burton 1980, p. 148). Speakers have the choice to realise one of the four different kinds of primary opening moves defined according to the type of response they prospect; a requestive move expects non-verbal response, and allows the

addressee to choose between compliance and non-compliance. A directive while also expects a non verbal response, it is realised with the assumption that the addressee will comply. An elicitation prospects a verbal response and usually calls for answers. An informative prospects verbal responses too, but expects only a minimal acknowledgment or supportive comments (Mandala 2007, p. 29). When this *'discourse framework'*, in Burton's words, is maintained by the preceding initiatory move, a supportive move is said to take place. (1980, p. 104).

Supportive moves, Burton (ibid) states, thus, "facilitate the topic presented in a prior utterance". For example, in the following question-answer exchange,

A: John! Have you got the time?

B: Four o'clock.

A's utterance is an elicitation which constitutes an opening move. B's utterance is a reply and because this move maintains the framework set up by A's opening move, it is a supporting move. As far as acts are concerned, A's opening move comprises two acts: the main act of question preceded by the act of summons 'John'. B's supporting move consists of one single act which is an answer. Moves can actually contain even more than two acts; in the exchange of request-reaction type that took place in a travel agent's shop cited above, the manageress's move comprises three discourse acts: the first is the most central one to the coherence of the exchange as it is the content-bearing act which is the request act 'you have to go to the head office'. Preceded by this is the second act 'er' which is a marker that indicates that a more important act is about to come. The third act which is the prompt 'please' is used to make sure that the requestive function of the utterance is understood.

The table below is a breakdown of the exchanges cited above to illustrate the structural analysis of discourse following the Birmingham framework:

Opening move	Act	Supporting move	act
-----------------	-----	--------------------	-----

A: John! Have got the time?	summons question	B : Four o'clock	Answer
A: Er... You have to go to the head office... Please.	Marker Request Propmt	B : (nods and rises to go)	reaction

While supporting moves maintain the framework of discourse established in the opening move, challenging moves are those which break it, in the sense that, they do not fulfil the expectations set up by the preceding initiation. In other words, a challenging move is made when the appropriate second part of an exchange is withheld or an alternative move with new discourse framework is offered (Burton 1980, p. 104)

The table below is a breakdown of an example that was put forth by Simpson (1997, p. 147) to demonstrate how a breach in communication can be generated by a challenging move.

Opening move	act	Supporting move	act	Challenging move	act
A: What's the code to Los	question			B: are you	question

Angeles?				hungry?	
				A: what?	question
				B : what ?	question

Where a response would have maintained speaker A's opening move as an elicitation, another question was offered instead and this created a breach in the discourse framework.

Now that an application of Burton's model to the structural analysis of discourse has been introduced, Simpson contends (1997) that though important, structure is not the only element. A structural model, Simpson notes (1997, p. 147), tends to describe the surface of discourse rather than revealing the strategies behind that surface. While structural analysis concerns itself with explaining how units of discourse are structured, an analysis of discourse strategy seeks to explain why they are structured as such in that it investigates the interactive tactics used by speakers. An analysis of discourse strategy as articulated by Simpson (1997) in his model will be the concern of the following section.

1.6.2 The analysis of discourse strategy

1.6.2.1 Grice's cooperative principle

In an article entitled *'Logic and Conversation'* in 1975, the language philosopher H. Paul Grice developed an account of how hearers get to infer the meanings that are generated and understood during the course of ordinary conversation without being directly derivable from the surface structure of the utterance. (Grice, 1975, p. 45). In other words, his aim was to explain how it is that interlocutors work out meaning when this meaning is not part of what is explicitly expressed by the words uttered. In the following example discussed with clarity by Herman (1995:175-6),

A: What time is it?

B: Well, the postman's been,

A is able to infer from B's reply that it is after 8:00. By what reasoning process was A able to come to this conclusion? And why did B's reply work? Though B's reply is not the expected answer to A's question, Herman (ibid)) explains, A begins interpreting B's response on the assumption that it is actually addressing his/her question. Speaker A, thus, assumes that there is some relationship between the time and the postman. A would suppose that B chooses a common point of reference with A that is the arrival of the postman at about eight o'clock instead of saying exactly what time it is because s/he either does not know time or has reasons for not telling the time, but still wants to answer A's question as helpfully as possible.

Mandala (2007, p. 22) points out that exchanges such as that between A and B above are in fact part and parcel of ordinary talk. Grice (1975) argues that there must be a kind of tacit understanding between interlocutors to cooperate in a meaningful way in order for such exchanges to work. He assumes that what enables people to derive the implied meanings is the underlying assumption that as users of language we have communicative purposes and these purposes are more likely to be fulfilled if we cooperate. Grice (1975, p. 54) articulates this insight as follows:

Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically to some degree at least, cooperative effort, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.

The assumption about the general rules that govern conversation termed '*the cooperative principle*' (CP) is formulated in Grice's (1975:45) words as,

... a rough general principle which participants will be expected to observe: make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

From the CP he derives a series of maxims:

Quantity Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of the exchange)

Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

Quality	Do not say what you believe to be false
	Do not say that for you which you lack evidence.
Relation	Be relevant
Manner	Avoid obscurity of expression
	Avoid ambiguity
	Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
	Be orderly

(Grice, 1975, p. 45-6)

As Thomas (1995, p. 62) has noted, Grice's use of the imperative in outlining the CP was not to indicate an ideal view of communication. Rather, he was suggesting that users of language generally proceed under the assumption that both they themselves and everyone else operate with these principles, that "talkers will in general ...proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe" (Grice, 1975, p. 47-8). What Grice was trying to do then is to describe how communication happens and not how it should happen. (Allan, 2009, p. 168).

Grice's CP accounts for how hearers like A in the following exchange are able to interpret utterances such as B's

A: So how was your meeting?

B: Well,....

A could infer that 'the meeting was not successful' without being directly 'spelt out' by B. While B is clearly not abiding by the maxims of quantity and manner in that s/he blatantly and obviously remains vague and says too little, the assumption that B is behaving cooperatively, and therefore is being unambiguous and informative, prompts A to draw on other resources beyond the utterance and search for an interpretation that makes sense in this given context. It would seem to follow that the indirect meanings or non-literal meanings that are inferred from interactions are generated by '*deliberate departures*' from these maxims, Simpson (1997, p. 148) claims.

Grice (1975) in (Culpeper et al, 1998, p. 57) notes that users of language often transgress the expectation that these maxims would be followed and intentionally fail to observe them for particular interactional reasons: speakers deliberately fail to observe a maxim as a means of encouraging others to look for a meaning which is different from, or in addition to the expressed meaning. The meanings that are generated by this process are what Grice (1975) refers to as '*implicatures*'. Implicatures are those indirect, non-said meanings whose inferencing is encouraged by speaker's blatant, intentional non-observance of a maxim or maxims. (Culpeper et al,ibid).

When failing to observe a maxim is designed to be noticed by hearers and is fashioned to generate a conversational implicature, a '*flout*' of a maxim is said to take place (Grice, 1975, p. 49). A flout, asserts Bousfield (2008, p. 22), is one possible mechanism by which speakers convey meanings indirectly. Implicatures are, thus, as stated by Simpson (1997, p.149) characterised with the type of utterances which is situated in the indirect end of the strategy continuum.

The following examples illustrate how implicatures are generated by flouting one of the four maxims:

a) Flouting the quality maxim

The speaker flouting the maxim of quality chooses to say something that is manifestly untrue in the context. Thomas (1997, p. 55) illustrates this with an example involving a paramedic and a drunken man on Christmas Eve. The man vomits on the paramedic while assisting him. The paramedic exclaims: 'great! That's made my Christmas!'. The paramedic's utterance is unlikely to be a true reflection of his state of mind in the given circumstance. The implicature that can be derived is that in fact he means the opposite of what he actually asserts.

Cutting (2002, p. 37) counts other possible ways of flouting the maxim of quality such by exaggerating as hyperbole in 'I could eat a horse'. Metaphors are also another common flout of the quality maxim as in 'my house is a refrigerator in January'. Cutting (2002) cites irony and banter as two other ways of flouting the maxim of quality. 'If you only knew how I love being woken up at 4 am by a fire alarm' is an irony where the speaker here, explains Cutting (ibid), expresses a positive sentiment and implies a negative one. Unlike

irony, banter expresses a negative sentiment to imply a positive one as in ‘you’re nasty, mean and stingy, how can you only give me one kiss’

b) *Flouting the quantity maxim*

In flouting the maxim of quantity, speakers deliberately give too little or too much information. In the exchange below, Cutting (2002) explains the way uninformativeness can generate implicatures:

A: well, how do I look?

B: your shoes are nice.

While A’s question is about the whole appearance, B’s response is underinformative in that it addresses only part of it. A, thus, could infer that whatever s/he is wearing does not look nice except for his/her shoes.

c) *Flouting relation*

When speakers flout the maxim of relation, they expect hearers will do the inferencing by making meaningful connections between their utterance and the previous one. Flouts of relation, Simpson (1997, p. 150) notes, often take the form of non-sequiturs or disconnected remarks as in the following exchange which Simpson tells us took place between him and a colleague while they had been talking about administrative matters:

Simpson: So should we do the transitivity stuff on day one?

Colleague: Mary’s just come into the room with a big plate of supper and switched on the telly.

What Simpson could infer from his colleague’s irrelevant response is that it was a signal to stop the conversation.

d) *Flouting manner* :

Speakers who are said to flout the maxim of manner, produce utterances that are blatantly obscure in the context. Cutting (2002, p.37) notes that the maxim of manner is often

exploited to exclude a third party. Simpson (1997, p. 151) illustrates with an exchange that took place between adults at the presence of a toddler

A: can you give him his B.O.T.T ‘cos I’m going for a C.I.G.

The speaker here is ambiguous for an explicit mention of both bottle and cigarette, explains Simpson is disguised in front of toddlers.

Besides flouting, Grice (1975) suggested a number of other ways that communicators could fail to observe maxims such as violating a maxim, opting out a maxim, etc. However, of central importance in the present analysis is the difference between flouting which is deliberately failing to observe a maxim in order to generate an implicature and violating which is unostentatiously failing to adhere to a maxim generally with the purpose of misleading the interlocutor. (Grice, 1975, p. 49).

Simpson contends that no matter how uninformative, irrelevant, vague and false utterances may seem, hearers try to do the inferencing work and hence derive implicatures on the assumption that what speakers are saying is “strategically motivated and not just aberrant or purposeless bits of discourse” (1997, p. 150).

Simpson (1997) includes in his model another important extension to Grice’s theory. This model which expands Grice’s maxim of relation cannot be overlooked because without which, though not the main analytic tool in his model of analysing drama texts, the three Ss model would not be properly informative as he asserts.

1.6.2.2 Relevance theory

Building on the central insights of Grice’s contribution to inferential communication, Sperber and Wilson (1986) developed a theory which seeks to explain how hearers infer speakers’ meaning by dint of certain cognitive processes in which relevance plays a key role.

Relevance theory, as it has come to be known, provides an inferential account of communication whereby the interpretation of speaker’s intended message is not decoded as it has been traditionally suggested by the code model of communication but inferred on the basis of the evidence provided by communicators of their intended message (Sperber and Wilson, 1994, p. 86).

According to code model, communication proceeds in terms of encoding and decoding information. On this account, speakers encode their intended meaning into a signal which is the phonetic or graphic representation of an utterance. Hearer, by the decoding process they recover the message using an identical copy of the code. The code model proposes, as Sperber and Wilson (1986) in (Bataller, 2002, p. 13) note, that the retrieval of the intended message is unproblematic and complete in that the hearer gets an exact reproduction of the thoughts the speaker intended to convey once the decoding process is completed.

Sperber and Wilson contend that such reproduction is rarely achieved partly because understanding an utterance involves other aspects beyond the semantic meaning of the sentence uttered (Bataller: *ibid*). They believe that “there is a gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the thoughts communicated by utterances”.(Sperber and Wilson, 1994, p.87) cited in (Bataller: *ibid*). Speakers intended messages are not always replicable in the hearer by the decoding process, as Sperber and Wilson note (1986), because as in: ‘their friendship blossomed’, there exists an indeterminacy so as to spot the exact interpretation. The meaning that was intended to be conveyed in this example can be described in a number of ways:

That their friendship grew naturally.

That it grew into something beautiful.

That like a flower it was destined to fade.

Sperber and Wilson (1986) state that the code model provides an inadequate account of communication because, they argue, communication is possible without the use of a code as in:

Peter: Did you enjoy your skiing holiday?

Mary: (displays her leg in plaster)

Though there is not a code which states that displaying one’s leg in plaster means that one’s skiing holiday did not live up to expectations, Peter can still infer from Mary’s action that her skiing holiday has not gone according to plan.

Sperber and Wilson suggest (1994) that some alternative to the code model is needed to account for such an example. What Peter needs to understand Mary is not a code but only his knowledge of the world and his general reasoning abilities. According to inferential communication, speakers provide evidence of their intention to convey a certain meaning which will be retrieved by hearers on the basis of the evidence provided. Communication is successful, they assert, when the communicator is able to make his /her intention recognizable by the hearer (Sperber and Wilson, 1994, p. 89). In the example above Mary provides evidence that she broke her leg on holiday and as a result Peter could infer that her holiday did not live up to expectations.

Within an inferential framework Sperber and Wilson (1986) view communication as an act of showing (Simpson 1997, p. 152). They describe communication in terms of two interrelated components: ostention which is the speaker's act of making manifest a certain set of assumptions or hypotheses that contain his/her intention through language; and inferencing which is the decoding process as affected by the hearer to recover the speaker's intended meaning. These two elements comprise what is referred to as *ostensive-inferential communication*. (ibid).

Important to relevance theory is the concept of intention and the way it is viewed with an ostensive inferential communicative framework. Ostensive-inferential communication advances the idea, on which both Grice and Sperber and Wilson agree, that an essential feature of communication is the expression and recognition of intention. (Nigegodcew 2007, p. 12). According to ostensive-inferential communication speakers have two intentions: the *informative intention* which is the intention to inform a hearer of something; and *the communicative intention* which is the intention to inform the hearer of one's informative intention (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, p. 61).

Understanding in communication is achieved when the communicative intention is fulfilled, that is, when the hearer recognises the informative intention. It would seem to follow that the speaker produces an act of ostention or an ostensive stimulus which contains clues about his/her communicative and informative intentions. Hearer drawing on the clues infers the speaker's informative intention.

Ostensive-inferential communication exploits an ostensive stimulus which is "designed to attract an audience's attention and focus it on the communicator's

meaning”(Freeman and Smith, 2013, p. 276). An ostensive stimulus then is required to meet two criteria; it must attract hearer’s attention to trigger a process of decoding; and it must be focused on the speaker’s attention. Speakers by producing the ostensive stimulus request hearers’ attention, implying that their utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing. Thus, an ostensive stimulus guarantees hearers’ expectation of relevance. (Feng, 2010, p.173)

Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory shares Grice’s vision about communication to account for utterance interpretation. Sperber and Wilson agree with Grice on the fact that utterances create expectation of relevance. However, their theory departs from Grice’s insight in that they do not view relevance as a maxim in Grice’s sense. In their account utterances raise expectation of relevance not because speakers are expected to obey the relation maxim. It is not a norm that communicators choose whether to adhere to or not as suggested by Grice (Zufferey, 2010, p. 19). They rather believe that the expectation of relevance has its sources in universal human cognition mechanisms. Sperber and Wilson(1986) maintain that relevance is a generalisation about communicative behaviour because the pursuit of relevance is a fundamental feature of human cognition that communicators may exploit when they talk.

Instead of Grice’s cooperative principle and its maxims, Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest that they can be replaced by a principle of relevance because the expectation of relevance is precise enough to guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning (Burke, 2014, p. 370).

In order to explain how human mind proceeds when attempting to select a plausible interpretation of an ostensive stimulus, Sperber and Wilson (1986) ground their work in a general view about cognition which is based on the premise that human cognition is relevance-oriented. In plain words, human beings tend to focus their attention on what seems to be the most relevant information available to them. As far as communication is concerned, every utterance begins with a request for the hearer’s attention and thus creates an expectation of relevance. Hearer in interpreting chooses the interpretation which best satisfies his/her expectation of relevance. Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. 178) claim that “the correct interpretation of an ostensive stimulus is the best accessible interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance”. Utterance interpretation, in their account is governed by the following principles of relevance:

Cognitive principle of relevance: Sperber and Wilson (1986, p.26) argue that “human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance”. While processing, hearers tend to pay attention to the most relevant stimuli and construct the most relevant contextual representations of these stimuli and process them and select a context that maximise their relevance. In this respect, they state that “contexts are not fixed in advance but are chosen partly in function of the proposition being processed (1986, p. 252)

Communicative principle of relevance: Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. 158) propound that every act of ostention “communicates the presumption of its optimal relevance”. In other words, hearers work out meanings on the assumption that their interlocutors’ utterances are ‘*optimally relevant*’ (1986, p. 270)

An utterance is optimally relevant only if: a) it is relevant enough to be worth the hearer processing effort, b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences i.e., social, aesthetic, moral, stylistic preferences. A speaker then aiming at optimal relevance fashions his/her utterance in a way that encourages the hearer to assume that it is relevant enough to be worth interpreting.

An ostensive stimulus achieves optimal relevance when it interacts with and modifies hearer’s assumption about the world. The newly presented stimulus interacts with a context of existing assumptions to derive what Sperber and Wilson term ‘*cognitive effects*’ also known as ‘*contextual effects*’.

A contextual effect is a modification in the hearer’s representation of the world resulting from the interaction between an ostensive stimulus and a context of existing assumptions. There exists three ways whereby this interaction takes place to derive contextual effects. The most important type of cognitive effect is achieved by processing an ostensive stimulus in a context is a contextual implication. That is, ostensive stimulus combines with the context to yield implications. The second type of cognitive effect is derived when the newly presented information strengthens existing assumptions and the third interaction involves the contradiction of an existing assumption which ultimately leads to its elimination.

According to Sperber and Wilson an utterance is relevant when it guarantees the derivation of at least a cognitive effect, and hence the greater the effects, the greater the relevance. Accessing to a context while processing an utterance to derive effects require some

mental effort and the smaller the effort, the greater the relevance. Sperber and Wilson believe that hearers follow a least effort principle in inferencing and stops as soon as their expectation of relevance is satisfied (Simpson 1997, p. 153).

The aim of the interaction is to achieve the greatest contextual effects as economically as possible. Speakers aiming at maximum relevance must make sure that their utterances put their interlocutors to no justifiable processing effort because any extra effort detracts from relevance. When an utterance achieves cognitive effects with the least effort, it is said to carry strong relevance. When recovering the contextual effects requires more processing effort the utterance is said to exhibit weak relevance.

In order to illustrate, according to relevance theory, the process hearers follow to infer speakers' intended meaning, Simpson (1997) tells us of an incident about an eighty year old man who was suspect of driving while drunken but the case against him was finally dropped for the lack of sufficient evidence. In the court the arresting officer explains that he had not breathalysed the suspect on the basis of what was said to him by the old man. The old man said 'if an eighty year old man had pleurisy of the chest would you make him blow into a breathalyser?' and this what eventually lead to his acquittal.

What follow are the processes which made the officer decide not to take a breath sample and finally lead the case to be dropped against the old man:

1-The man by saying the utterance above, he makes an ostensive stimulus.

2-The officer recognises the man's communicative intention but most importantly he fails to recognise his informative intention which was to deceive the officer.

3-The officer attempts to seek relevance on the basis of the assumptions and hypotheses present in the utterance.

4-The officer takes into account while processing the utterance other assumptions available to him (e.g. the age of the man, shortness of breath cause by pleurisy, etc.) and connects them with the assumptions raised by the man's ostensive stimulus.

In cost benefit term, the officer accesses the most relevant inference for him in this context and draws no further inferences because the contextual effect he derived was a

satisfactory, one according to him, namely that the old man has pleurisy. This contextual effect was relevant enough to the officer because it strengthens the other assumptions he brought while processing the utterance. This contextual effect made him decide not to breathalyse the old man which led finally to his acquittal.

Though relevance theory has been particularly influential as it provides an important cognitive perspective on the way people interpret other's utterances, it has been criticised for neglecting the social and personal aspects of verbal interaction. (Simpson, 1997, p. 154). For Grice's cooperative principle and Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory are primarily philosophical and cognitive in orientation, Simpson (1997) suggests that his model needs a framework that pays attention to the social dimensions of interaction which strongly influence the way people design their language. He, therefore, includes in his model Brown and Levinson's theory about politeness which, he claims, is social and anthropological in nature.

I.6.2.3 Politeness phenomena

Brown and Levinson's politeness theory revolves around the concept of '*face*', a concept that was originally put forth by the sociologist Erving Goffman (1967) as he examined the way individuals use linguistic resources to present a public image to others to which he gave the label face. (Holman and Thorpe, 2003, p. 57). Face, defined as "individual's self-esteem" (Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. 2), is a characteristic attributed "to all competent members of society", as they claim. (ibid, p. 61)

Brown and Levinson stress on the fact that face consists of wants and assume that members of a given society are concerned about their face, the self image they present to others and that they recognise others have similar wants. They suggest that face consists of two fundamental socio-psychological wants which they claim are universal and are basic desires for any individual in any interaction (Simpson, 1997, p. 156). The want that one's existence to be acknowledged, one's interests to be approved of and one's desire to be liked by others is what Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 62) call '*positive face*'. The other want which is one's wish that one's actions be unimpeded by others' (ibid) , that is , one's desire to have autonomy of action without being coerced, ordered or forced into things is what Brown and Levinson call '*negative face*'. In their view, negative face and positive face can be "lost, maintained or enhanced and must be constantly attended in interaction" (1987, p. 61). In this respect, they claim that any human interaction comprises communicative acts whose content

threatens the face of the speaker and/or the hearer (Simpson 1997, p. 156). They suggest that certain acts inherently threaten the face needs of one or both interlocutors. Those acts which “by their nature run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or the speaker” (Brown and Levinson cited in Lakoff and Ide, 2005, p. 132) are known as ‘*face threatening acts*’ (FTAs). They call positive FTAs all acts that target the positive face in that they involve actions that entail others are not desirable. Criticism, for instance, typically threatens positive face. Requests and orders typically threaten negative face and are considered as negative FTAs in that they involve impositions that impinge upon people’s own will to act (Vangelisti, 2009, 56) .


Simpson (1997, p. 156) believes that doing FTAs is an integral part of language use and that even relatively mundane interactions contain communicative acts which may threaten the speaker’s and/or hearer’s face. Nevertheless, it is the interest of all interlocutors to minimise face threats. Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 61) says that “in general, people cooperate (and assume each other’s cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction” because maintaining each other’s face is not only a basic need of every member of society but it is also seen as fundamental to uphold social cohesion. Politeness, then, which is showing consideration to other’s face by trying to mitigate any possible FTA is “basic to the production of social order and a precondition of human cooperation” (Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. xiii).

Speakers and hearers, by being polite, employ certain linguistic strategies to avoid or mitigate face loss. In selecting an appropriate strategy or strategies (Marquez-Reiter, 2000, p. 13), speakers need to take into consideration the degree of face threat of the communicative act s/he is about to make. The weight of an FTA can be assessed according to three social variables (A.Locher, 2004, p. 66):

- 1- The social distance of speaker and hearer.
- 2- Relative power of speaker and hearer.
- 3- The ranking of the imposition in a particular cultural context.

In this respect, Culpeper (2002, p. 83) states that Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory is a framework which “brings together face (an emotionally sensitised concept about the self) and sociological variables such as power, and social distance) and relates them to motivated linguistic strategies”. Therefore, according to the seriousness of the FTA, speakers

choose from a set of five possible strategies as postulated by Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 87) which will make them decide either to avoid it entirely or at least soften it. The strategies which are available to the speaker to redress FTAs are presented in the diagram below ranging from the least polite to the most polite strategy.



Greater

Figure I.6.2.3 Possible Strategies for Realising FTAs (Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. 66)

The first strategy which is to go on-record, baldly, without redressive action clearly involves the greatest amount of face threat. It is employed when there is a minimal risk of damaging the addressee's face. There is no need for redressive actions in situations where the interlocutors are either on intimate terms or because the context requires the act to be performed in the most direct, concise and unambiguous manner. When interactants go on-record with redressive actions and choose the second strategy which aims at enhancing and maintaining the addressee's positive face, they are said to be doing positive politeness. Those who go on-record and choose the third strategy, they use redressive actions to avoid the transgression of the addressee's freedom of action are said to be doing negative politeness. Speakers choose the fourth strategy when the risk of loss of face is great. In this case, the speaker drops a hint whose interpretation is left to the addressee. The fifth strategy which is to avoid committing the FTA is obviously the least face threatening strategy. People choose to say nothing when the risk involved is too great.

In order to illustrate what strategies people choose to perform FTAs, it is important to return to the strategy axis presented in figure I.5.1 which provided the different strategies speakers use to get someone to open a window. The form 'goodness me it's hot in here' was categorised as indirect along the strategic continuum for there is no semantic link between the utterance and what is requested and the grammatical mood employed is not consistent with its function. Following Brown and Levinson's politeness theory, this strategy can be classified as off-record. On the surface, the speaker is making a comment about how hot it is, only indirectly the utterance carries the function of request. The speaker drops a hint in that he avoids any explicit mention of the service requested.

The form 'open the window' on the contrary, which was categorised as maximally direct is clearly on-record in Brown and Levinson's terms. This strategy is performed baldly without redress in that it contains no softeners or mitigating elements that may minimise face loss.

It should be clear at this juncture that transition from direct to indirect strategies marks a concomitant shift in politeness which goes from impolite to polite (Simpson 1997, p. 157). It would seem to follow, Simpson (ibid) explains, that directness has a principle pay-off which is clarity and conciseness. However, it carries a big amount of risk in damaging other's face. Indirectness on the other hand, whose principle pay-off is politeness, stands less chance to be understood. Because the function of the utterance is oblique, interlocutors may use it as a 'get out' (Simpson, 1997, p. 158) by pretending not to have understood the request function.

Politeness, stresses Culpeper (2002, p. 83) is about "the strategic manipulation of language". To be polite thus requires linguistic features to mitigate the threat to face. Simpson (1997:158) cites a number of strategies that can be used for doing negative politeness such as:

Using indirectness which is a strategy based on the mismatch between the grammatical mood and discourse function as in: 'could you open the window' which is an on-record redressive FTA that maintains the interlocutor's negative face.

Using hedges which consists of employing some particles whose aim is to soften the impact of an FTA such as: 'er', 'sort of...', 'would...', 'could ...', etc.

Being pessimistic involves minimising one's chance of one's FTA to be succeeded as in 'I don't suppose you give us a lift'. By displaying concern to negative face, speakers may also *apologise, impersonalise* an FTA and state it as a general rule and acknowledging the debt as in 'I'll be eternally grateful...'

To display one's approval of other's personality, hence, do positive politeness, Simpson (1997, p. 161) suggests some linguistic behaviours which can attend positive face such as:

Complementing the hearer which involves saying good things about him/her. *Using in-group markers* which aims at closing down the social distance and involves words like: 'mate', 'dear', 'guys' and 'pal'.

The frameworks constituting Simpson's three Ss model that have been mentioned above represent the explicit linguistic knowledge of conversation. Being aware of these approaches allow us to consciously think of the implicit linguistic knowledge users of language access when they speak or interpret language. So, interactants can have a perfectly

successful communication without the explicit knowledge of the structure of dialogue, the cooperative principle and its maxims, relevance theory or politeness phenomena.

With regard to drama dialogue, playwrights draw subconsciously on their communicative competence, the implicit knowledge they possess about language, to write dialogues (Mandala, 2007, p. 35). Spencer (2002, p. 198) too, believes that the process of crafting dialogue in drama is crucial, but largely subconscious. As far as Pinter is concerned, Nelson (1967, p. 52) notes that he employs “a controlled but essentially intuitive approach” to writing plays, drawing on the playwright’s own remark as he says:

I merely write and characters create themselves. I don’t arbitrarily impose characterisation upon someone, and say you’re going to be like this to prove a point that I’m going to make. The stage opens, the curtain goes up and characters move along with it

(Pinter with Hallam Tennyson, BBC General Overseas Service 7 August 1960, as cited in Nelson, 1967, p. 153-4)

However, Spencer (2002, p. 196) states that:

[playwrights] may be very well not be aware of [their] word choice as [they] write, but [they] are making choices nevertheless. The degree to which [they or their] subconscious makes them cohesively or clearly ... will be the degree they are perceived by the audience as lifelike.

Thus, the words playwrights choose, and the order in which they are delivered will determine what the readers think about the play.

It is clear that for the playwright to write effective dialogue, s/he does not need explicit linguistic knowledge of conversation, nor do readers need such knowledge to be affected by this dialogue. They are unlike analysts whose work is best done with conscious knowledge of how language functions in talk. A demonstration of how explicit knowledge of conversation is applied to analyse Pinter’s drama will be the subject of the third chapter.

That the tools to analyse dialogue in Pinter plays have been displayed in the first chapter, it is time now, in the second chapter, to shed light on some characteristics of Pinter's drama in terms of characteristics and language use.

CHAPTER II: Pinter's Drama

Introduction:

This chapter explores the critical term most often employed to interpret and explain Pinter's work- the absurd. It will focus on the thematic and stylistic characteristics of the theatre of the absurd and consider a variety of ways that critics have investigated Pinter's language beginning with Martin Esslin (1970) and Austin Quigely (1975) and moving toward more recent linguistic approaches including the use of discourse analysis and pragmatics.

II-1 Definition and background

The theatre of the absurd is a term coined by the Hungarian critic Martin Esslin in 1961 in his landmark book of the same name to refer to the works of a number of dramatists, mostly written in 1950s and 1960s. In the first edition, Esslin presented the four playwrights Samuel Beckett, Arthur Adamov, Eugene Ionesco and Jean Genet as the defining figures of this theatrical convention. In subsequent editions he added a fifth playwright, Harold Pinter. These writers were not part of a conscious or deliberate movement but, who according to Esslin, expressed in their own way, a view of life that they all shared: a sense of universe that is hostile, irrational, and devoid of any meaning, and that man's existence in it is hopeless, helpless, futile and in one word absurd. Esslin explains that he regards the term theatre of the absurd as "a device to make certain fundamental traits which seem to be present in the works of a number of dramatists accessible to discussion by tracing the features they have in common" (Esslin, 1961, p. 12). The "element of absurd" is what Esslin sees as the common denominator that characterises these plays.

Esslin insists that it is neither the original definition of the word absurd which means "out of harmony" in a musical context nor is it its use in everyday sense of "ridiculous" which form the basis of the theatre of the absurd (Esslin, 1961, p .18). For the definition of absurd, he turns to Ionesco who, in an essay he wrote about Franz Kafka, defined absurd as " that which is devoid of purpose...cut off from his religious, metaphysical and transcendental roots, man is lost, all his actions become senseless, absurd, useless" (as cited in Esslin 1961).

The absurdity of the human condition, but mainly the sense of "metaphysical anguish" that it accompanies it, is "broadly speaking, the theme of the plays" of the theatre of the absurd. The plays of Beckett, Adamove and the other writers discussed in his book,

according to Esslin, mirror and reflect the preoccupations, anxieties, the emotions and thinking of many of their contemporaries in the western world.

Esslin describes the theatre of the absurd as a post-war phenomenon. He explains that “the convention of the absurd springs from a feeling of deep disillusionment, the draining away of the sense of meaning and purpose in life, which has been characteristic of countries like France and Britain in the years after the Second World War” (Esslin as cited in Bernard Dukore). To comment on the feelings of the times, Esslin turns to Albert Camus and his ideas of the absurd creating, thus, a framework to categorise the plays in his book. Esslin (1961, p. 16) refers to Camus's *The Myth of Sisyphus* as Camus's attempt to “diagnose the human situation in a world of shattered beliefs”. Esslin (ibid, p. 15) states that “by 1942, Camus was calmly putting the question why, since life had lost all meaning man should not seek escape in suicide”.

Gavins (2013, p .1) states that while the literary absurd has sustained critical interest for over a half century, it is still highly nebulous. Gavins explains that the body of scholarly work which examined the phenomenon since the middle of the twentieth century “has failed to agree on the temporal, generic or stylistic parameters which define the concept” (ibid). However, what critics do agree upon is that the literary absurd, hence the theatre of the absurd, is an expression of human beings' inability to find inherent meaning in their existence.

The origins of this viewpoint are diverse and can be seen to be drawn from a wide range of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy as well as ideas expressed in literary works (Cornwell, 2006, p. 2). The sense of the senselessness of life which Esslin regards as the subject matter of the theatre of the absurd can be found not only in the works of Camus but also in the works of contemporary dramatists such as Jean Giraudoux, Jean Anouilh, Armand Salacrou and Jean Paul Sartre.

According to Esslin, Sartre and Camus, whom he identifies as belonging to an earlier tradition of “existentialist theatre” (1961, p. 25), can be seen to be expressing the same metaphysical anguish as Beckett, Pinter and the rest of the dramatists mentioned in the book, only in “the form of highly lucid and logically constructed reasoning” (ibid, p.24) where this “new content” is presented in the “old convention” (ibid, p. 21). Esslin (1980, p. 24) continues to describe Camus's writings as exhibiting “the elegantly rationalistic and

discursive style of an eighteenth century moralist”, while Sartre’s plays are based on the old convention in terms of characterisation which states that “human being has a core of immutable unchanging essence” (ibid).

The theatre of the absurd is characterised by its deliberate violation of theatrical conventions which had previously defined the literary canon. Esslin (1961, p. 24) says that the theatre of the absurd “strives to express its senselessness of the human condition and the inadequacy of the rational approach by the open abandonment of rational devices of discursive thought”. The theatre of the absurd is often described as “anti-theatre”, Esslin (1960, p. 3) writes, as it displays certain features which go counter to accepted standards of stage conventions such as the lack of plot structure, unclear characterisation, irrational happenings and dialogues which seem nonsensical.

Though the theatre of the absurd seems at first sight revolutionary, says Esslin (1960, p. 7), it is “a very ancient and a very rich tradition nourished from many sources”. He states Alfred Jarry as the first precursor the theatre of the absurd whose *Ubu Roi* (1896) displayed a departure from established forms of theatre. The protagonist Ubu which Jarry presents as a fat, cowardly and brutal figure is a foil to the traditional hero archetype. The grotesqueness of Ubu’s character is a breach of prevailing naturalistic conventions.

Besides Jarry, Cornwell (2006, p. 47) cites Antonin Artaud and Guillaume Appollinaire as two other major figures whose writings also anticipated the advent of absurdist aesthetics as they both advocated the rejection of realism in theatre. Appollinaire encouraged the playwrights to break from ossified theatrical convention for them to be able to write creatively and imaginatively. Artaud’s ambition was to give priority to non-verbal expression such as light, masks, music and gestures. He, explains Cornwell (2006, p. 54), wanted to abandon the priority of the written text for he had “a deep contempt for the word”.

Before I tackle what impacts their dramatic creations had on the theatre of the absurd, I would like to elaborate on its philosophical underpinning. However, I will not be focussing on the philosophical orientation as implied by Esslin’s usage of the term absurd. I will rely on Camus’s concept of the word as revisited by Michael Y. Bennett (2012) to argue that Pinter’s play *Victoria Station* is not only meaningful but it is also about how to make life meaningful.

II-2 Philosophical orientation

In this section I will be engaging with Camus's sense of absurdity as viewed by Bennett (2012) for Camus is the philosopher that Esslin selected to create a framework to classify the plays in his book and Camus's quote from the *Myth of Sisyphus* (1942) introduced in the book, according to Esslin, is pivotal in the understanding of the theatre of the absurd.

The plays in Esslin's book were examined in the light of Camus's ideas and existential philosophies, emphasising the meaninglessness of the world. According to Esslin, absurd plays highlight the senselessness of life and portrays man's predicament which arises from his position in a hostile and absurd universe. Esslin (1961, p. 24) remarks that

It is not merely the subject matter that defines what is here called the theatre of the absurd. A similar sense of senselessness of life, and the inevitable devaluation of ideals, purity and purpose, is also the theme of much of the work of dramatists like Giraudoux, Anouilh, Salacrou, Sartre and Camus himself

Bennett (2012) contends that Esslin broadly conflates Camus with Sartre and existentialism and that his book "aided the continued old assumption of Camus's view of absurdity" (ibid, p. 53). Bennett explains that the reason why Camus is frequently categorised as an existentialist is because experiences of anguish and despair- the feeling of existential crisis which Camus wrote about in the *Myth of Sisyphus*, are the main topics of the philosophical school of existentialism.

In his article, Bennett (2013) studies the meaning of existential crisis by examining the ideas expressed in Sartre's nihilistic existentialism (existentialism proper) and Camus's philosophy which rather, he argues, revolted against it.

Though Bennett (2012, p . 57) admits that it is true what Esslin says in his introduction: that Camus poses the question, why not commit suicide?, He emphasises that Camus rather " explicitly argues why one *should not* commit suicide". He believes that the question which preoccupies Camus is what is one to do given that the world is absurd. Camus, in this way, is focusing on the consequences and our resulting actions of our absurd condition. It is not about absurdity, Bennett argues, but about making life meaningful given the absurdity of our lives. Bennett states: "How do I make life meaningful in a world that is absurd, where

my desires are contradicted by the realities of the world? is the central question that Camus asks us to ponder” (2012, p. 59).

Camus in the *Myth of Sisyphus* concluded that human existence is absurd. Life, according to him, might not have any inherent meaning, however, this stems not from the world but it is “born out of the confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world” (1942, p. 28). It is the contradiction between man’s desires and what the world offers him which generates the sense of absurdity. Nevertheless, given the absurdity of this situation, it is up to individuals, through their defiance, revolt and contemplation to make life meaningful.

In his essay, Camus queries whether the idea that life is meaningless necessarily implies that life is not worth living. He says: “does its absurdity require one to escape it through hope or suicide...does the absurd dictate death” (1942, p. 8)

Some individuals tend to what Camus calls ‘philosophical suicide’ in the attempt to flee from the unsettling awareness of the absurdity of life. They escape through faith and hope despite no evidence. These believe that beyond this earthy existence exists transcendental truth, meaning or god. Others commit physical suicide upon the realisation that life is meaningless. According to Camus, those who chose to commit suicide fail to grasp that to be aware of the absurd without opting for death represents an accomplishment. Suicide is “the wrong answer for Camus because suicide is giving up. One should not ignore it”, Bennett states, “but should confront it head on” (2012, p. 57)

Camus remarks that existential philosophers generally try to evade this confrontation with the absurd. These philosophers, according to him, veer away from logic when it is in conscious, rational revolt that life has value. The values are not “given”, says Sir Herbert Read in (ibid, p. 58), “that is the illusionistic trick played by religion or by philosophy. They have to be deduced from the conditions of living”. It is then that “man can decide to accept such a universe and draw from it his strength, his refusal to hope, and the unyielding evidence of a life without consolation” (Camus, 1942, p. 44). In so doing, contends Bennett, man possesses the freedom and the power of defiance.

To explain his philosophy, Camus invokes the Greek myth of Sisyphus from which he gets the title of his entire essay. Sisyphus having angered the Gods was condemned to

continually roll a rock up a hill, only to watch it roll back down again under the force of its own weight. This is an absurd punishment in that his desire to roll the rock up to the top is contradicted by the reality of the situations as it always returns to the bottom. In contemplating his torment, in “keeping the absurd alive” Sisyphus comes to understand that “his fate belongs to him” and that he is “the master of his days”. As Camus concludes, the struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy. This is because he has “contemplated his torments” and has reasoned that the rock and his continual defiance of the gods is his purpose in life, says Bennett (2012, p. 59)

According to Bennett (2012) existentialism differs from Camus’s philosophy, in that, it works against reason while Camus couched his philosophy with reason. Bennett explain that “Camus, like existentialists, may argue that life has no inherent meaning, but unlike the existentialists, life is not made meaningful through experience/ actions that affirm and define existence (the central tenet of existentialism where existence precedes essence but “through the use of reason” (2012, p. 59)

In *Victoria Station*, the controller’s and the driver’s desires are contradicted with the reality of their lives; the controller stuck in a freezing office and the driver probably unhappy in his marriage and fed up with his job.

Upon the realisation of the absurdity of their lives, they first commit “physical suicide”, to take Camus’s words. The controller finds meaning of life in religion when he refers to his God-given job and resorts to hope as he indulges in a dream to go on holidays in Barbados. The driver on the other hand, dreams of love and companionship.

In contemplating their torments, the characters of *Victoria Station* decide to reason and take actions. It is in revolt that they find meaning. The controller leaves the office and joins the driver. He says “listen, I’ve been thinking, I’ve decided that what I’d like to do now is to come down there and shake you by the hand straightaway. I’m going to shut this little office and I’m going to jump into my old car and I’m going pop in down to see you, to shake you by the hand, all right?”

The driver, who has already abandoned his position as a driver at the very beginning of the play when he disobeys the controller’s orders, now is willing to marry the woman of his dreams since he found true love.

Controller: so you have found true love at last, eh, 274?

Driver: yes, I've found true love at last.

Controller: so you're happy man then, are you?

Driver: I am very happy. I've never found such happiness.

II-3 Characteristics of the theatre of the absurd:

The first English performance of Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* in 1955 was Britain's first taste of what to become known as absurd drama. Estragon's statement, "Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it's awful" is perhaps what best describes the plays of the theatre of the absurd (Cross, 2000, p. 30).

Absurdist plays often feature empty or minimalist sets, bizarre dialogues or monologues, and seemingly meaningless plots with many unresolved questions. Indeed in *Waiting for Godot*, Beckett leaves the biggest question—who is Godot—unanswered. In this play, Beckett gives an account of two tramps waiting for a character whom they do not know nor are they sure he would come to meet them. Godot, in that, is an illusion to which the two tramps resort to keep on living in a non-sensical world with the hope that one day life would be better.

The playwrights associated to the theatre of the absurd wanted to express human's state of confusion, isolation, and utter despair. For those to whom the world has lost its central explanation and meaning "it is no longer possible to accept art form still based on the continuation of standards and concepts that have lost their validity" (Esslin, 1961, p.11) Therefore, they experimented with a new form of writing that would suit the conscious of those times, and which would exclude the traditional devices of the drama such as meaningful dialogues, logical plot development and intelligible characters who fail to communicate with each other or find meaning in their existences. Esslin (1961) suggests that the fact that the audience fail to identify with any of its characters makes absurd drama essentially a comic theatre, even though its subject matter is grotesque and violent. The recognition that life is absurd, hopeless and without any meaning is another source of comedy in the theatre of the absurd. Esslin explains that "these bitter truths will have a liberating effect: if we realise the

basic absurdity of most of our objectives we are freed from being obsessed with them and this release expresses itself in laughter” (1960, p. 13)

The theatre of the absurd is not concerned with conveying information or presenting the destinies or the adventures of the characters. It renounced arguing about the absurdity of human condition, “it merely presents it in being- that is, in terms of concrete stage images” (Esslin 1961, p. 29).

Esslin uses Ionesco’s *The Chairs* to demonstrate this concept, suggesting that the poetics of the play does not rest in the “banal words” spoken, but in the fact that they are said to “an ever-growing number of empty chairs” (Esslin 1961, p. 30).

It is in this striving to communicate these images that we can find a key to the devaluation and disintegration of language in the theatre of the absurd. According to Esslin, it subordinates logic, discursive thought and language to visual imagery. Language when used emerges as devalued, disintegrated, nonsensical and ultimately ‘fails to communicate’

Therefore, the plays of the absurd “tend towards a radical devaluation of language, toward a poetry that is to emerge from the concrete and objectified images of the stage itself. The element of language still plays an important part in this conception, but what happens transcends, and often contradicts, the words spoken by the characters” (Esslin 1961, p. 27)

Dialogues in the theatre of the absurd becomes “divorced from the real happenings in the play and is even put into direct contradiction with the action” (Esslin 1961, p. 27) as in the encounter between Vladimir and Estragon in *Waiting for Godot*

Vladimir: Well, shall we go?

Estragon: Yes, let’s go.

They do not move

This is why Esslin believes that in the theatre of the absurd “the real content of the play lies in the action. Language maybe disregarded altogether “(1960, p. 12). This resulted in communication being depicted in a state of breakdown which is one the major themes of the theatre of the absurd beside man’s alienation and his precarious condition in the world.

II- 4 Pinter and the absurd

Pinter’s theatre is certainly one of the most bizarre and unique to have emerged in the English language, remarks Bernard Dukore (1962, p. 43). Pinter is considered to be the most influential playwright of the twentieth century. Belington (1996) observes of the writer “ you cannot possibly sum up Harold Pinter in a nutshell: he is too complex, too elusive, too contradictory” (Billington, 1996 as cited Tone 2014, p. 156).

The language of Pinter’s plays has certainly been a puzzle for his critics for the last four decades or so. His early critics were literally puzzled because of the use of the seemingly inconsequential, repetitive and meaningless language by the characters in his plays. An extract from the review of the Manchester Guardian summed up the overwhelmingly negative response to The Birthday Party: “What all this means, only Mr Pinter knows” (as cited in Silverstein, 1993, p. 13).

Harold Pinter’s plays have been attacked most of the time especially because his characters speak in a language which seems to be irrelevant and because his enigmatic use of silences and pauses. All these characteristics that feature the language used in his plays lead his critics to believe that since Pinter is an exponent of the theatre of the absurd, he wants to show a breakdown of communication through language among human beings that is why he deliberately reduced the language in his plays to the stature of meaningless encounters. Silences and pauses among the dialogue seem to confirm this belief. Thus, the label of the theatre of “non communicability” continues to be associated with Pinter criticism (Kumar 2000, 135).

His plays refuse conventional narrative closure and fail to adhere to the norms of theatrical action and defy the normative structure and styles of socially realistic plays of the 1950s. A variety of other characteristics of Pinter’s plays, most notable the long and awkward silences or pauses, the creation of feelings of menace, unpredictable and illogical actions or events and the often threatening sinister subtext lurking beneath everyday conversation.

His plays are characterised by small plot structures, long dialogues, sometimes with comic twits and minimum members of characters who,

“behave in a believable manner but they are shrouded in a twilight of mystery. We are never precisely sure who they are, why they are there, or what they have come to do. Their motives and background are vague and unknown... his characters are recognizable human beings who seem to behave according to valid psychological and sociological motives, and yet there is something bizarre about their very reality. They seem to be real people, for their speech, their concerns, their behavioural pattern, and their rhythms of daily living have a ring of truth to them. But it is the details of living and the individual sections of dialogues which have this ring of truth, not the overall pattern itself” (Bernard Dukore 1962, p 44)

As Pinter’s obscure and difficult work finally finds critical acceptance, yet another means of classification is coined and we witnessed the birth of a new term

Pinteresque was coined in the early 1960s to describe the characteristics of the style of Harold Pinter whose work became highly influential after the production of his first full-length play *The Birthday Party* in 1958. His early subject matter was characterised by undefined menace below the surface of banal reality, and his style by his use of pauses, silences and an elusive subtext. Whilst many people have taken his language to be characterised by meaninglessness, non-sequiturs and comic breakdowns in communication, which is probably the most common usage of Pinteresque. (Harrison 1998, p. 196)

The critical reception of Pinter’s work has often, initially at least been unappreciative, questioning and even hostile. Reactions most famously to *The Birthday Party* saw the play as an incomprehensible attempt to ape that other obscure playwright Samuel Beckett’s *Waiting for Godot* in 1953. However it is due to this comparison with Beckett that Pinter was eventually to be accepted by the critics as was he adopted by Esslin as a leading practitioner of the theatre of the absurd, included in his seminal book and given more prominence in the third edition of his book *The Theatre of the Absurd* as a key dramatist. This classification of Pinter as absurdist remains, however, highly contentious; critics still debate whether or not his plays adhere to the definitions set out by Esslin

Zarhy-levo (2001 as cited in Wyllie and Rees 2016, p. 30) suggests that the early rejection of Pinter, and the critical mauling he received when his early works were first performed, was mainly due to the reviewer’s “inability to associate, or to identify its dramatic work with established models (2001, p. 22). Esslin strove to correct this, and his inclusion of Pinter in the third edition of the book reflects his growing reputation as a playwright and to adopt him fully into the theatre of the absurd, contributing to Pinter’s reputation as “ a major absurdist” (Zarhy-levo as cited in Wyllie and Rees 2016, p. 32)

Pinter was given his own label “Pintereque” which categorises him beyond a simple connection to Beckett or absurdism. It marked a new way for critics and reviewers to explore and explain Pinter’s works. (Wyllie and Rees 2016, p. 33)

Zarhy-levo traces the evolving nature of the term Pinteresque, suggesting that it emerges from Pinterism through Pintation and Pinctular to finally reach painteresque. Coining the word was an attempt to account for the particular “strangeness” or puzzling nature of Pinter’s work. Nevertheless, however useful this term might be for critics, it was rejected by Pinter himself who referred to it as “oh this dread word...it’s highly regrettable (Balty, 2005 as cited in Wyllie and Rees 2016, p. 36).

In many ways, its creation seems to account for the ambiguity surrounding Pinter’s classification as absurd, because it helps critics and audiences understand ways in which his work is both absurd and something unique in its own right. On the one hand it encapsulates many of the characteristics of Esslin’s absurd such as the disconnect between language and action, as well as the unexpected or unconventional narrative action. In this, Pinteresque is a continuation of the critical opinion that termed his work as “puzzling”. However the creation of menace or threat is not classically absurdist and does seem to refer to a more particular trait in Pinter’s work specifically. In this way, the term helps establish Pinter as a playwright in his own right away from the school of absurdism but it also helps account for the absurd elements in his work.

II.5 Pinter’s Critical Evolution.

Pinter has intrigued critics for decades and a remarkably variety of critical responses to his plays testify to the richness of his dramatic output and his stature as a great playwright. Characterised by complexity, his plays defy easy explanation and according to Free “puzzle audiences and critics”, and, “in spite of a growing body of criticism, there are perhaps more unanswered questions about Pinter than about any other major contemporary playwright” (1969, p.1)

Surveying Pinter criticism, Behera (1998) identifies three broad approaches taken by Pinter scholars “the socio-psychological approach with its focus on the problem of failure of communication, the symbolic approach with the focus on the ideas that are inherent in the play, and the theatrical approach with its concern with the stage effects”.

Despite these major attempts to classify and categorise his works, some critics such as Austin Quigley realised that traditional critical tools are inadequate for understanding Pinter. Quigley was the first critic to draw attention to the fact that Pinter's plays demand a

different approach. Rejecting the traditionally accepted socio-psychological and symbolic-allegorical approaches, Quigley (1975), in *The Pinter Problem*, invokes language philosophy of Wittgenstein to analyse Pinter's plays. He exposes the limitations inherent in such approaches which assume that the primary functions of language in referential. Positing an interrelational function of language, Quigley argues that Pinter's characters use language to primarily negotiate relationships with each other. He persuades us to:

Look at Pinter's language from exactly the same point of view that we should adopt in approaching all language use; we must begin with Wittgenstein's suggestion that we: look at the sentence as an instrument, and its sense as its employment" (1975, p. 46)

Quigley (1975) noted that it was Pinter's "peculiar use of language that presented a "major stumbling block for criticism of his work". In comparison to many of Pinter's critics, says Mandala (2007), Quigley was by far the most linguistic in orientation. He calls for "demonstrably accurate analytic statements" (1975, p. 29). He takes issue with many of Pinter's pioneering critics, such as Esslin (1970), Taylor (1961, 1971), Nelson (191967) and Brown (1967), on the ground that they recognise the need to account for Pinter's use of language but fail to do so. Deeply dissatisfied with existing critical work, Quigley gave himself the task of accounting for Pinter's language. Drawing on Halliday (1970), who was interested in relating language structure to language function, he proposed the interrelational function of language to cope analytically with his primary observation regarding Pinter's dialogue: it is not, essentially, about the transfer of information, but about what the verbal interactions of the characters indicate about the relationship between them. (Quigley, 1975, pp. 49-53). In his chapter 'The Language Problem', he cites some of the key papers and collections of essays in stylistics available when he was writing such as Halliday (1971), Chatman (1971) and Freeman (1970). While Quigley reads linguists and critics interested in language in pursuit of his goal, he also notices that he is limited by what is available to him.

For Quigley language and language in Pinter was not about referring to things and concepts, but about constructing (or destroying) relationships between people. In essence what he needed in order to fulfil his thesis on language in Pinter was pragmatics, a discipline within linguistics that seeks to account not for what language means but for what speakers mean in the many situations in which they find themselves. In 1975, however, there were not many sources Quigley could consult to expand his theory, as pragmatics had not been defined itself as a discipline and its major textbooks only began to appear in the early 1980s.

Quigley turned instead to what might be called the 'proto-pragmatists' (Levinson, 1983, p. Xii), scholars such as Wittgenstein (1969), Austin (1962, 1975) and Firth (1964, 1966) who are more interested in what speakers do with language rather than the structure of the language itself. These authors contribute key ideas to Quigley's work, and from Firth in particular comes the essential notion that "You are not free to say just what you like...the moment a conversation is started, whatever is said is a determining condition for what in any reasonable expectation follow (Firth 1964, p. 94).

This relationships between an utterance and what follows it, including silence, as Quigley (1975, p. 55) also realised, is a key concept in study of talk, but actual and represented. While Quigley may have not had access to what discourse analysts and conversational analysts will call preference organisation or prospection, he is quick to grasp, the significance of Firth's statement in relation to understanding Pinter's dialogue (Mandala 2007). 'There's a strong social pressure available in language to promote the responses one wishes to receive', notes Quigley (1975, p. 51), but such expectations are, of course never met. Rather, "the tension in much Pinter's dialogue derives from that refusal to produce the expected response" (ibid).

Quigley recognises that the relationship between successive utterances in talk is closely bound up with how speakers negotiate relationships with each other. Drawing once again on Firth, he observes that

No matter how one is addressed there is an implicit demand for a particular response. To respond within that range is to accept the relationship on the terms of the first speaker; to reply outside that range is to qualify or reject the common ground of the relationship as envisaged by the first speaker (Quigley, 1975, p 55).

For Quigley, an analysis how Pinter's dialogue is sequenced will reveal how these sequences communicate changes in the relationships of the characters. It is this 'sequence-oriented interpretations that separates analysis from re-telling the plot (Quigley, 1975, p. 75)

While Quigley sketches out a reasonable theory, says Mandala (2007), his sources fail him when it comes to applying that theory to the text. She argues that Quigley was vague on the details of sequencing in the dialogue.

While Quigley is considered the first with linguistic orientation in analysing Pinter's works, Esslin too had interests in understanding the language in Pinter's plays. Towards this end he devoted a chapter, *Language and Silence*, to examining 'some of Pinter's favourite linguistic and stylistic devices' (1970, p. 199). Without a comprehensive model of conversational interaction on which to base his analyses, Mandala (2007) says, Esslin had to depend on intuition and assumption. In some cases, this takes him reasonably far. For example, he accounts for the pauses and silences, noting that "only if the audience knows the possible alternative answers to a question can the absence of a reply acquire meaning and dramatic impact" (1970, p. 222). With this statement he shows an intuitive understanding of what conversational analysts call preference organisation and attributable silences. Esslin posits that "pauses and silences are...often the climaxes of Pinter's plays, the still centres of the storm, the nuclei of tension..." (1970, p. 220). While such metaphor loading gives Esslin's writings a certain verve, it does little to show how Pinter has exploited the phenomenon of silence in talk. (Quigley 1975)

That Esslin's work will remain as a landmark contribution in the study of Pinter's plays is beyond doubt. However, he ultimately fails in his central purpose of demonstrating how "each word of a Pinter play is essential to the total structure and decisively contributes to the overall effect aimed at" (1970, p. 219). Without a 'fully articulated' (Burton, 1980, p. 194) theory of conversational interaction, it is difficult to him to define the 'total structure'. In addition he is limited to the unit of the word in his discussion of the 'overall effect aimed at', when what he needs is the speaking turn, the speech act or the discourse move discussed in the first chapter. While Esslin's insights into the nature of talk were in many ways incisive, they did little to help him with a systematic analysis of language and silence and Pinter's dialogue.

Dierdre Burton advances Quigley's own investigation by pursuing a sociolinguistic discourse analysis of Pinter. However, she differs strikingly from most other previous Pinter criticism in that she gives her interpretations less priority than the analysis itself, Merritt (1995) notes. Burton's 'descriptive apparatus' (1980, p. 109) for analysing discourse in Pinter's plays does advance Quigley's quest for such a path to improve understanding Pinter's

language. As Burton and others move beyond Quigley's work on Pinter's language games they are modifying it with newer language games, putting into practice the very principles on which discourse analysis is based.

Chapter III : The Analysis of Pinter's Victoria Station

Introduction

So far, in the first chapter, the ways in which tools from discourse analysis can help explain the meanings that are intuitively perceived in any exchange have been introduced. However a better understanding of it can be achieved from more extended analysis, in view of the remit of this dissertation, of dramatic dialogue. To that end, I now turn to an examination of a complete play by Harold Pinter called Victoria Station.

It has been stated earlier that we have intuitive predictions about what constitute well-formedness, coherence and appropriateness in discourse. These predictions will be set against the dialogue of the play and any discrepancies between them will be investigated. This is because “the lack of fit between your predictions and the text means that there is a rich stylistic space which can be explored” (Simpson 1997, p.166)

The analytic tools assembled in Simpson’s three Ss model cover both the structure of discourse and the strategies speakers use in discourse. The strategic models are drawn from that branch of discourse analysis called pragmatics, which sees the meaning of language as largely affected by the context in which it occurs (Simpson 1997, p.131). Such analytical orientation, Simpson (1997, p.168) asserts, involves the analysts trying “to position” themselves in the displayed interaction: what, for example, they would think if they were witness to this interaction and what their responses would be if one of the characters in the dialogue spoke to them. In other words, ‘to position’ oneself in the interaction would mean to give one’s intuitions and impressions about the text. My analysis will be, therefore, based on the impressions I get from the dialogue. First, I will present my intuitive reading-responses of the text under analysis and demonstrate features of the text that ground these intuitions. I will articulate what I feel to be some effects generated by the play. Then, I will apply the analytic apparatus as specified by Simpson in his model to show how the rules of natural conversation are used and exploited in the text to create the effects that I notice and finally show how the dialogue of *Victoria Station* represents the discourse of the absurd. This would however mean that my analysis is in no way exhaustive. Readers and analysts can understand the text differently and can offer and justify an alternative set of observations. Burton (1980 cited Merritt 2007, p.166) admits that discourse analysis cannot “say everything one wants to say about the text”. Yet, what it does tell us, it says it “very precisely, clearly, rigorously and consistently”. So, in keeping with the rationale of stylistics, my analysis seeks to base interpretations on systematic and retrievable methods of analysis.

Before stating what my impressions about the play are, first a brief synopsis of the play will be introduced to make discussions comprehensible and to serve as a reference.

III.1 Synopsis of *Victoria Station*:

Victoria Station is a short play by Harold Pinter. It was first performed at the national theatre of London in October 1982 as part of a triple bill collectively entitled 'Other Places' which consist of two other plays: a Kind of Alaska and Family Voices.

Victoria Station consists of a radio dialogue between a controller of a radio cab company and a driver supposedly waiting for further instructions. The driver '274' is contacted by his boss, the controller, and told to proceed to Victoria station where a certain traveller from Boulogne will be waiting for him. But the driver resists his controller's order to pick up the passenger at Victoria station because he is "cruising" and therefore is not available. The driver insists that he has never heard of Victoria station and that he is with a passenger on board parked beside Crystal Palace and claims that he can see it: "it's a wonderful edifice". As the play develops, the controller with increasing verbal abuse orders the driver to drop the passenger and take up the assignment. But the driver reveals that his passenger on board is a woman seemingly asleep and with whom he has fallen in love and from whom he refuses to part. The controller orders the driver not to move and the driver promises to stay there and wait for his arrival.

Among the impressions I got from the play is that it sets the unusual against the mundane. As it has been stated earlier as users of language we have intuitions about what constitute normal social interaction (Mandala, 2007). In a taxi company institution, a taxi driver and the dispatcher are supposed to be part of a conversational situation normally governed by strict rules: the controller who is the boss orders and the taxi driver obeys. However, after reading Victoria Station, I was struck by the fact that what I expected in discourse was a far cry indeed from what Pinter provides in the text. In their first exchanges, the driver resists the controller's order to pick up a passenger from Victoria Station and refuses to state where he is, what he is doing or indeed if he can take up the assignment. The driver even calls into question the controller's position of authority when he asked the controller "who are you?"

The dialogue in Victoria Station begins with the mundane; the controller wants the driver to go to Victoria station to pick up a client. The driver though a professional taxi driver responds that he has never heard of such a place. As the controller grows frustrated in attempting to persuade the driver to take the job, it becomes clear that the situation is altogether weirder than it first seemed. The driver's responses quickly move the story from the comically absurd to a perturbing enigma whereby the casual takes on almost a sinister

edge. The wayward driver who seems to have lost his bearings and sense of identity continues to refuse the assignment but opposes anyone else being selected for the job: “don’t leave me”, “they’re all bloodsuckers”. As the play develops, the controller’s orders become ominous threats: “I’m going to flog you to death”. The driver who apparently exists in a state of suspended conscious finally answers the controller’s questions about his whereabouts and claims that he is in Crystal Palace, which obviously no longer exists as the controller tells him “I think you’ll find Crystal Palace burnt down years ago”. But most shocking is, when the driver feigning casualness, reveals that he has already a passenger on board, first referred to as a “he” and later as a “girl” who is asleep in the backseat and which I assume is imaginary. With this girl, he claims he has fallen in love for the first time and that he even wishes to marry her despite his previous admissions that he is married and that he has a daughter. By the end of the play, the controller insists to meet the girl: “I’d like to meet your lady friend”, cajoling the driver “to stay exactly where” he is. But one may still wonder if he might actually retain some menacing possibilities hence masking more nefarious intentions towards the driver.

The overall effect that I intuitively perceived in *Victoria Station* is that of mystery, uncertainty and ambiguity with an atmosphere of violence and menace permeating the play. The sense of menace is apparently reflected in the characters’ feeling of fear, insecurity and hopelessness. Nevertheless, the play can be very funny at times. The comic effect, I notice, is mostly connected to the characters’ conversational behaviours.

As far as the characters of the play are concerned, I was able to make intuitive statements about them as well. The characters of *Victoria Station* are depicted as two individuals subjected to imprisonment and dehumanisation within the oppressive institutions of modern society. The characters are locked in their institutional space: the controller in his office and the taxi driver in his car. The play highlights the characters’ inner turmoil as they are clearly undergoing existential crisis. Existential crisis defined by Bennett (2012, p.53) as “a stage of development at which an individual questions the very foundations of their life: whether their life has any meaning, purpose or value; whether their parents, teachers, and loved ones truly act in their best interest; whether the value they have been taught have any merit; and whether their religious upbringing may or may not be found in reality” .The driver’s and controller’s state of being besieged by feelings of isolation, frustration, insecurity and dissatisfaction with their lives forces them “to look more consciously to what they have

been doing to themselves” (Arasteh, 1965, p. 154). This is reflected in the driver’s contribution: “I honestly don’t know what I’ve been doing all these years”.

For the controller, an existential awareness was instigated by finding himself in a situation in which power loses its security value (ibid, p. 90). The controller feels like the emissary of god on earth proclaiming thus his powerful status but only to find himself leading “a restricted life”. When the characters of *Victoria Station* grasped the absurdity and meaninglessness of their lives, they first chose to break “free of reason” (ibid, p. 365) to find meaning to their otherwise purposeless existence in hope and faith, that is, “the illusionistic trick played by religion or philosophy” in Bennett’s words. Illusion is what the controller and driver resorts to in order to relieve their mounting tensions and minimise their plight. Self-delusion, thus, becomes a medium behind which they find a shelter to conceal their real feelings. The controller, for instance, tries to find meaning in his ‘God-given job’. Besides, he indulges in a fanciful dream to spend a holiday in “sunny Barbados” offering to take the driver with him. As to the driver, his feelings of loneliness lead him to the illusion of companionship. *Victoria Station* actually illustrates the trapped state of men in modern society plagued by loneliness which for the driver and the controller stems from the nature of their jobs. Their actions, thus, are motivated by unsatisfied needs for belonging, love, affection as well as relationships and companionships. Their feelings of a lack of social connectedness are reflected in the driver’s repeated pleas for the controller not to leave him and the controller’s desire to join the driver. In contemplating their torments while they were having an existential crisis, both the controller and the driver realise that it is in their conscious rational revolt that they can find meaning to their lives. The controller leaves his hostile environment of a freezing office and seeks to build warmer human relationship: “I’m going to shut this little office and I’m going to jump up ...” fulfilling, thus, his needs of affiliation. The driver, on the other hand, accepts the controller’s offer to join him and is willing to meet him.

Victoria Station dramatizes the characters’ quest for dominance and control where each one seeks to establish his own discursive strategies to exert power over one another. The play depicts the controller as an insolent and hostile person who tries to prove his superior worth and the driver as a wayward figure who attempts to hold ground denying, thus, the controller’s supremacy over him.

By looking at the dialogue present in *Victoria Station* from a linguistic perspective I will attempt to explore my impressions stated earlier about normal and unusual interactions in

greater depth. I will try to account for the different effects perceived in the play like mystery and humour and show how the characters' language use discloses traits about their personalities such as isolation, need for security, bewilderment, frustration, etc. In addition, I will demonstrate how language serves to communicate power and how each character sets up his own discursive strategies to achieve verbal dominance.

Now, Simpson's model will be brought to bear on the dialogue present in Victoria station and each tool comprising his model will be directed towards different aspects of the text organisation.

III.2 Analysing the discourse structure of Victoria Station

A key structural feature of the play is its disorderliness of discourse transactions. Transactions are broadly defined as blocks of exchanges related by a common topic (Simpson, 1997, p. 167). The creation and negotiation of topics, "what is being talked about" (Brown and Yule, 1983, p. 71), is a salient feature of conversation (Young and Weiyun He, 1998, p. 32). Topic negotiation involves the participants' collaboration as they are supposed to pick up elements from other participants' contributions to the preceding discourse and incorporate these elements in their own contributions (Brown and Yule, 1983; Tannen, 1989). In other words, they make their contributions relevant in terms of topic framework (Aijmer, 2002, p. 65).

However, a participant may want to change the topic in order to realise some goals as topic changes are mostly strategic. (Van Dijk, 1984). Transitions to new topics are usually accompanied by certain discourse markers such as 'well' and 'by the way', etc. A change of topic would be understood as abrupt or blatant if it is not properly prepared (Aijmer, 2002, p. 75.). The play is marked by abrupt changes in the topics and sharp transitions between the discourse transactions. While the initial discourse transaction that is concerned with the controller's attempt to contact the driver and ultimately direct him to pick up a passenger occupies the bulk of the dialogue, both characters, mainly the driver, gratuitously veers away from the main topic. Bolton (2001, p. 23) explains that speakers divert in conversation for many reasons. For instance, while indicating his whereabouts to the controller as being sat underneath Crystal Palace, the driver suddenly mentions that his "wife's in bed, probably asleep" and that he has a daughter. By so doing, he is "grabbing the focus of attention for" himself (Bolton, *ibid*). As for the controller, while trying to coerce the driver into yielding to

his orders to drop the 'mysterious' passenger on board, he unexpectedly diverts the topic and lets the driver know about his dream to go to "Barbados". The controller here is apparently extremely annoyed at the driver's recalcitrance and resorts to topic change to avoid the "uncomfortable emotions stimulated" by the conversation with the driver as many people dislike talking about anger or conflict (Bolton, *ibid*). These abrupt changes in topic will be profoundly accounted for when I will be dealing with the analysis of the strategies used by the characters.

As far as exchanges are concerned, they are, broadly speaking, of question-answer type and request-reaction type. Questions and requests are mainly associated to the controller as he wants to elicit information from the driver to know where he is and what he is doing and then direct him to Victoria station to pick up a waiting fare. The controller's opening moves are mostly elicitation, directives and requestives, to take Tsui's 1994 classification of initiatory moves, while the driver's initiations are requestives and informatives.

Another salient structural aspect of Victoria Station is that the controller is responsible for initiating the majority of the exchanges in the play as it is he who makes all the opening moves except for two exchanges where the driver makes the initiations: the first one occurs when he reveals to the controller that he has already a passenger on board and the second one in which he tells the controller that he has fallen in love "for the first time in my life" (Pinter, 1982, p.60). As Tsui (1994, p. 223) explains, any initiatory move be it an elicitation, an informative, a directive or a requestive, prospects an appropriate response. A speaker, who initiates the exchange, restricts his interlocutor to a response which is related to the type of the initiatory move. Elicitations, for example, prospect specific types of information, informatives prospect acknowledgments and requestives and directives prospect compliance. Initiations and responses in this sense are seen as having controlling force in that they require specified moves from the other speaker. As to the interactional import of initiatory moves, Tsui (1994) contends that the number of initiations made by a speaker in conversation indicates the number of times this speaker has attempted to control the other speaker's conversational behaviour in terms of move types. The distribution of such initiation-response exchanges, Tsui (1994) asserts, can be a strong indicator of global dominance. Thus, the controller's numerous initiating moves can be regarded as the number of times he has attempted to control the driver's conversational behaviour. However, a successful controlling action occurs only when an initiation is followed by a prospected response, explains Tsui

(1994), otherwise it is viewed as attempted controlling action. In Victoria station, the controller's moves can be considered as attempted controlling actions for most of his initiatory moves do not get the prospected answer. Bellow I will illustrate some instances of the controller's successful and attempted actions.

1 -**Controller:** is that 274?

Driver: that's me.

2-**Controller:** what are you doing?

Driver: I'm not doing anything.

Controller: how's your motor? Is your motor working?

Driver : oh, yes

In the exchanges above, the controller's initiatory moves are elicitation. Elicitations, according to Tsui (1994, p. 80-81), require a specific type of obligatory verbal response or its non verbal surrogate. In example 1 and 2, the controller makes the initiation which is followed by the driver's responses supplying the information prospected by the controller's moves. These exchanges can be considered as instances of successful controlling action for the controller.

Attempted controlling action occurs when an initiation do not receive prospected response as in the example bellow where it is clear that the controller's elicitation does not get the information it expects as the driver responds with another elicitation for clarification. This can be viewed as an attempted controlling action for the controller.

Controller: where are you?

Driver: what?

The following exchange is an example of the controller's initiation as a directive.

Controller: drop our passenger. Drop your passenger at his chosen destination and proceed to Victoria station.....

Pause

Controller: 274?

Directives are supposed to receive a non-verbal response with the expectation of compliance (Tsui 1994, p. 116-134). However, instead of complying with the controller's directive the driver does nothing to perform what he has been asked to do. This exchange can be therefore identified as attempted controlling action for the controller.

So far, it has been demonstrated that employing Tsui's framework of initiation-response characterisation can be useful for the analysis of conversational dominance that pertain in the dialogue between the controller and the driver. Similar to the concept of initiation-response is the concept of Adjacency Pairs upon which Tsui herself has drawn her framework (Itakura 2001, p. 49). The notion of adjacency pairs was predominantly developed by the conversational analysts Sacks and Schegloff (1973) and which they consider as one of the most basic forms of speech. A pair is a sequence of two utterances which are adjacent, produced by different speakers, ordered as a first pair part and a second pair part and so that a first pair part requires a particular second pair part. For instance, greetings stimulate reciprocal greetings, questions require some kind of answers and invitations require acceptance. Nevertheless, first pair part does not always receive responses of equal status as a second pair part: some are preferred and others dispreferred. This has been referred to as preference organisation. Preference organisation, propounds J. Liddicoat (2007, p. 10), is essentially social in nature. Preferred responses maintain social relation and dispreferred are disruptive of the relationship of the speaker has with his/her interlocutor. As a general statement it may be said that agreements, acceptances, etc. are preferred while disagreements, rejections, declining, etc. are dispreferred. In conversation speakers chose among these alternatives to design a particular contribution on the talk. That is when speakers do not provide the preferred second pair part it is often for social and strategic reasons (Chaiyanara 2012, p. 59). The ordering of adjacency pairs needs to be understood as rule-governed in the sense that any deviations from the projected second pair part are "*noticeably and relevantly absent*" (Sacks and Schegloff 1973, p. 295) and thereby something for which can be held accountable. An investigation into the adjacency pairs in Victoria Station, therefore, can give us more insights on the conversational structure of the play and show us how deviations are marked by the characters.

The example below is supposed to be a summons- answer adjacency pair in which the controller designs his first pair part to get the attention of the driver.

Controller: hullo?

Controller: 274?

Controller: hullo?

The projected second pair part would be an answer to the controller's summons but the driver remains silent. The second pair part is thus dispreferred.

Request prospects acceptance as preferred second part and refusals are considered dispreferred. In the following example:

Controller: can you help me on this? Can you come to my aid on this?

Pause

The controller issues a request but the driver remains silent and does not provide any sign of acceptance. This is again a dispreferred response to the controller's first pair part.

Preference organization in question-answer adjacency pair are particular in the sense that not any response can be accepted as preferred. The answer must be direct for it to be a preferred response. Unexpected, indirect answers or rejections of one or more presuppositions of the question or of its pragmatic force are considered as dispreferred.

In the example below though the driver provides an answer to the controller's question about his whereabouts, his response is not the expected one for the driver is not supposed to be cruising around.

Controller: where are you?

Driver: I'm cruising.

In the following adjacency pair the driver does not answer directly to the controller's questions. His responses thus can be regarded as dispreferred.

Controller: where?

Driver: by a side of a park

Controller: what park?

Driver: a dark park

Controller: why is it dark?

Pause

Driver: that's not an easy question.

The example below is an instance of confirmation-agreement adjacency pair.

Controller: I know what it is. It means you've got a passenger on board.

Driver: that's right

The controller's first pair part is a confirmation that prospects an agreement. However, it was met by an assessment. The second pair part is obviously at odd with the present context as it is reminiscent of teacher's feedback in classroom discourse.

The driver's majority second pair parts are certainly dispreferred in Victoria station. His responses do not fulfil the expectations set up by the first pair parts provided by the controller, hence constitute challenging moves.

The exchanges bellow are examples of the driver's challenging moves as he does not maintain the discourse framework of the controller's opening moves.

Controller: 274?

Driver: hullo?

Controller: where are you?

Driver : what?

Controller: can you help me on this?

Driver: sorry?

Controller: and this is a good job, 2074. He wants you to take him to Cuckfield.

Driver: eh?

In the first two exchanges, the controller's questions do not get the answers which they predict; the driver instead follows the controller's opening moves with other questions. In the third and fourth exchanges, the driver does not react to the controller's request and ask questions for clarification.

The questions the driver asks after each opening move made by the controller halts momentarily the progression of the dialogue. As they constitute a breach in the discourse framework, the driver's contributions can be considered as challenging moves.

The driver's challenging moves issued by questions can be seen as requests for clarification or requests for repetitions. When the driver asks: what?, hullo?, Victoria what?...etc, it can be considered as the driver not being able to hear the controller given the fact that the driver and controller are communicating over a radio where words are sometimes difficult to hear because of the noise generated by the radio or the engine of the car. The driver can also be absent minded or overwhelmed by strong emotions such as: the euphoria of love, loneliness, insecurity or fear. This state of bemusement not only does hinder him to clearly perceive the controller's opening moves but also renders him unable to speak. Non-speech or silence therefore constitutes most of his challenging moves as he refuses to respond to many of the controller's opening moves. Sacks et al (1974) points out that turn-taking system can account for the various silences that can occur in talk. Central to the dynamics of interaction is the concept of turn "which can be glossed, informally, as the enactment of a speaker's right to speak by taking an opportunity to speak in a speech event or a situation" (Herman, 1998, p.19). Turn taking activity is viewed as having an underlying structure which contains a turn-allocational component that regulates the changeover of turns and a turn-constructive component which regulates variables like the size or length or linguistic texture of a turn.(Sacks, 1978; Levinson, 1983, p. 296-303).

An exploration of these components can offer insights on dramatic texts as Herman asserts (1998, p. 214-5). She notes that the order and content of turns at talk in play are “controlled by the dramatist for a purpose” and by looking carefully at patterns of these features in the dialogue reveals a great deal about how the play achieves its effects. Herman confirms that the various exploitable resources of the turn-taking system are manipulated and shaped in various ways to create the required situation. As far as turn order is concerned there are two basic options for turn change: the first option is when current speaker selects next speaker by name, gaze or by pointing. In *Victoria Station* the driver, for instance, is given a number instead of his real name. The driver here can be seen as undergoing a dehumanisation process in that he is stripped of one of the characteristics that make him human. Being dehumanized is also being denied of one’s identity (Oliviu and Felecan, 2014, p. 208) as personal names are “correlated with human identity” (Zangenberg et al, 2007, p.103). The second option consists of the next speaker self-selects when nothing in the previous talk has selected this person to be next speaker. However, when the current speaker stops and none of the options for new turn is used, there is a lapse of a turn. The use of such a non-speech option makes the silence or a lapsed turn an attributable silence. In the following examples,

1 -**Controller**: where are you?

Pause

e.g.2 **Controller**: what do you mean?

Pause

e.g.3 **Controller**: don’t cruise. Stop cruising....

Pause

e.g.4 **Controller**: are you in a driving seat?

Pause

Controller: do you understand what I mean?

Pause

Controller: Do you have a driving wheel in front of you?

Pause

The controller produced many turns which require further talk from the driver: answers to his questions. The controller selects next speaker and this next speaker has an obligation to speak on the completion of this turn. The silence here is therefore attributable to the driver and is interpreted as the driver not speaking. Here, the driver's silences are interactionally relevant: he is not speaking in a place where he is required to speak.

Silence was regarded as an absence of meaning and intention (Salville-troik, 1994; Zerubavel, 2006, p. 13). It is only with the advent of tools from discourse analysis, conversational analysis and pragmatics that the linguistic study of silence has undergone a shift whereby many studies presented a range of body investigations about the meanings and functions of silences. Lakoff (1990) for instance, states that silence can be indicative of power depending on the context. Gal (1990, p. 19), on the other hand, maintains that silence can be powerful when people have the choice to be silent. She contends that silence can also be a means of resistance and subversion of dominance. It is a way of holding one's ground against the encroachment of the oppressor. If we go back to Victoria Station, we notice it is a story about a controller who attempts to direct a wayward driver who refuses to perform the controller's orders. The driver, obviously relegated a lower status than the controller, tries to hold ground and resists the controller's dominance over him. By being silent, the driver ignores the controller and denies his supremacy over him. The idea of the driver's attempt to empower himself is further fostered by his marked use of challenging moves. Challenging moves, explains Mirrer (1996), seem to undermine the strategies used by people with power and hence act as means of empowerment for less powerful people. This is quite obvious in the following exchange:

Controller: I'm talking to 274? Right?

Driver: yes. That's me. I'm 274. Who are you?

The controller here has control of the first part of the driver's move where the driver provides the answer the controller's opening move requires. Followed by this is another

question issuing thus a challenging move: 'who are you?' which calls into question the controller's dominance over him.

Mirrer (1996) confirms that her conclusion is based on Burton's (1980) view which holds that opening, challenging and supporting moves are linguistic indicators of the superiority or inferiority of characters. Burton confirms that, in dramatic texts, characters whose contributions are marked by challenging moves dominate over the one whose language is marked by supporting moves.

The turn pattern employed in Victoria Station does not attempt an A-B-A-B...alternation that interactants would normally expect in conversation between two people. In dyadic dialogue communication between humans, conversation between speakers is characterised by a turn taking pattern whereby one participant A, talks, stops; another, B, talks stops, and so we obtain an A-B-A-B distribution of talk across two participants. But in Victoria station the driver's turns are dominantly constructed by lapse options and the resulting turn pattern is B-B-B-B as in:

Controller: are you in the driving seat?

Pause:

Controller: do you understand what I mean?

Pause

Controller do you have a driving wheel in front of you?

Pause

Controller: because I haven't, 274.....

Pause

Controller: listen, 274.....

Interpersonal reality, (Herman 1995, p. 95) states, is created and reinforced by instances in which options to speak or not to speak to respond or not to respond. The form of

interaction that ensues between the driver and controller introduces us into an interpersonally hostile world.

In turn-taking system, lapses are incorporated into the current turn as pauses till turn change occurs via one of the other options for turn taking (Sacks et al, 1974). In the above extract, the controller re-initiates over and over again his turns incorporating the driver's lapses into his turns as pauses in order to get a response from the driver. The controller's reinitiations are metacommunicative: "listen, are you hearing me?", "Do you understand what I mean?", etc. emphasising thus by these cues his own awareness of the driver's intentional, non-responsiveness and the fact that the interaction is blocked. The driver's lapses can be viewed as part of his interactive strategies with the controller as he communicates non-availability for speech. Communicative frustration, Herman (1995, p. 95) insists, is foregrounded by such means. The controller continues to extend his turn by repeated attempts to get a response from the driver. The driver attempts to coerce the controller into the silence he desires and the controller in reverse attempts to coerce the driver into speech and this results in mutual provocation.

Pauses in which speakers break the flow of their speech with brief silences can be regarded as hesitations (Herman 1998). Conversational hesitations are important indicators of a characters state of mind in that they usually imply uneasiness, insecurity or uncertainty (Benison in Culpeper et al, 2002, p. 73) as in:

Controller: oh, you've got a little daughter?

Pause

Driver: yes, I think that's what she is.

The driver's answer to the controller's question for confirmation is quite at odd with his previous assertion that he has a daughter. The driver first affirms that he has a daughter then hedges his answer using a discourse marker 'I think' which denotes hesitation. The exchange below is an instance of the driver's uncertainty. After having confirmed to the controller that he sees Crystal Palace he is no longer sure if it exists. The pause is indicative of his uncertainty.

Controller: I think you'll find the crystal palace burnt down years ago, old son. It burnt down in the great fire of London.

Pause

Driver: did it?

Chafe (cited Tannen and Saville-troik, 1985, p. 79) argues that such pauses have different functions. They can be strategies which reveal the speaker's attempt to bring together thought and language, or memory and language. Herman (1998, p. 96) believes that pauses can therefore be used to signify thoughtfulness or attempts to bring into consciousness some aspects of past events for some communicative purpose. Those pauses are also employed as an indication of privacy or self-enclosure as if lost in memory, or lost in thought (Herman, *ibid*). Pauses give the driver an appearance of enacting the disjointedness of thought as if responsive to the working of his mind which has to be brought into relation with the demands of external life. This point will be dealt with in details when I will be focusing on the characters' strategies to use memory in order to escape their present lives.

It is worth mentioning that silence is not related to the driver only but to the controller as well. However the controller's silences denote other thing than exerting power, resisting oppression or indicating thoughtfulness. Like Pinter's other plays, silences or pauses are ubiquitous throughout *Victoria Station* as well and are indeed salient elements in the discourse structure of the play. Tannen (1990, p. 261) states that "Whereas all plays make use of pauses and silences in their performance, Pinter's plays have pauses and silences printed in the dialogue". About the importance of these silences and pauses in Pinter's works Sir Peter Hall says they are "as important as a line", and that they are all there for a reason. Burkman (1971, p. 9) agrees that Pinter's pause is "as prominent and suggestive as the dialogue". It would seem to follow that silence in *Victoria station* does not imply an absence of meaning or failure of communication. As an answer to those who fix the phrase "failure of communication" to his work he believes that "we communicate only too well, in our silence, in what is unsaid" (Pinter cited Burkman 1971:9). Tannen (1990) investigated silences and pauses in Pinter's work *Betrayal* and concluded that Pinter makes an art of silence as a way of masking strong unstated feelings. Esslin (1970), on the silences in Pinter, says that they indicate that intense thought processes are continuing.

Controller: I'm talking to 274? Right?

Driver: yes. That's me. I'm 274. Who are you?

Pause

The controller is obviously irritated and even offended by the driver's question "who are you?". The Pause, here, indicates the processing of what has been said because the controller does not comprehend how the driver cannot recognise him for in a context like this only the controller of the taxi company who can make contact with the taxi drivers.

In the following extract, the controller seems distressed and angry not only because the driver refuses his instructions to pick up the new passenger but also his questions are not getting any answers. So, after a pause during which his emotions are churning, he launches into a long burst of speech about his miserable life and finally reveals his rage.

Controller: Are you in the driving seat?

Pause

Controller: Do u understand what i mean?

Pause

Controller: Do u have a driving wheel in front of you?

Pause

Controller: Because I haven't, 274. I'm just talking into this machine, trying to make some sense of our lives...I lead a restricted life. I haven't got a choke and a gear lever in front of me...

Pause

When the controller commands to the driver to proceed to Victoria Station the driver tells him that he does know it in :

controller: go to Victoria station.

Driver : I don't know it

Controller: you don't know it?

Driver:no, what is it?

Silence.

Silence here is written as part of the dialogue. It echoes the controller's most intense moment of stupefaction and astonishment. The controller is shocked that the taxi driver does not know one of London's busiest stations. The controller prefers non-speech as a means of "conflict management" (tannen 1990, p. 206).

Mandala (2007) states that most problematic of all is the attributable silence that occurs when the speaker selects a next speaker who chooses not for whatever reason to take that turn. This is a sign that something has gone wrong and the recipient of the attributable silence will attend this point in an attempt to repair the perceived damaged. Repair refers to the various strategies employed by speakers in talk to correct perceived problems in an interaction such as mis-understandings of what is said or mis-hearings (Levinson, 1983, p. 340). Such troubles in talk cause communicative breakdowns which require repair strategies for the breach in discourse structure to be mended.

Reinitiations or requests for repair are some of the tactics that can be used as repair devices (Simpson in Culpeper et al, 2002). Repair is generally classified into four types based on who initiates the repair and who takes steps to resolve the trouble source in conversation (Hutchby and Wooffit, 1998, p. 61). Self-initiated self-repair is when the speaker who has produced the trouble source both initiates and carries out the repair (i.e. the speaker corrects him or herself without prompting from anyone else.). Self-initiated other-repair is when the producer of the trouble source solicits help from the recipient in order to repair the trouble. Other-initiated self-repair is when the speaker of the trouble spot carries out the repair; but in response to the recipient (i.e. the recipient prompts the speaker to fix the trouble). Other-initiated other-repair is when the recipient initiates and carries out the repair (i.e. the hearer corrects the speaker). Pizza (1999) notes that self-initiated self repair (henceforth SISR) is the least concerned with the recipients and the characters using this mechanism are not so much

inarticulate as isolated. The feeling of isolation is apparent in the controller's recurrent use of SISR. Whenever he produces his turns to which the driver fails to respond, he reinitiates his turn to solve the communicative trouble. In Victoria Station there are also instances of other-initiated self repair (OISR) where recipients notice the trouble spot and bring it to the attention of its producer as in:

Controller: where?

Driver: by the side of a park.

Controller: by the side of a park?

Driver : yes

Controller: what park?

Driver: a dark park

Controller; why is it dark?

As evident in the dialogue cited above, the controller's turns are instances of successive requests for repair. As Piazza (1999, p. 1020) observes, these other-initiated request for repair are a sign of the "malfunctioning of the communication channel" that "parody the back channelling function". That is, they may at first glance seem to be nothing more than the controller showing interest in the driver and his talk. But this is not, as the text makes clear, a hypothesis that can be sustained. Requests for repair tend to convey surprise or incredulity, Piazza (1999:1018) says, as in:

Driver: I've got a P.O.B.

Controller: you've got a P.O.B?,

or in:

driver: can't. She's asleep in the backseat.

Controller: she?

The controller's request for repair here obviously indicates his astonishment because the driver after having referred to the passenger as a 'he' he now points at it as a 'she'.

OISR can also convey indifference or even threat and hostility (Piazza, *ibid*) as in the following examples:

Controller: I want you to go to Victoria station...

Driver: Victoria what?

Controller: station.

Pause

Controller: can you help me on this?

Driver: sorry?

Controller: and this is a good job, 274. He wants you to take him to cuckfield.

Driver: eh?

Controller: he wants you to take him to Cuckfield....

Driver: hullo?

It can be noted that each of the driver's requests for repair realizes a challenging move. Requests for repair and challenging moves, explains Mandala (2007:16), are not in and of themselves abnormal in talk or indicative of aggression. Indeed, they can, as Tannen (1984) points out, function to show recipient interest as part of "high involvement style". However, if made repeatedly they can result in conflict talk, discourse in which "participants oppose the utterances, actions, or selves of one another" (Vuchinich, 1990, p. 118). Thus a normal feature of talk that can signal support when over-used becomes veiled threat, (Piazza 1990) notes, and subversions of patterns in ordinary talk such as these are one means of introducing the air of menace so often commented upon in Pinter's work.

An analysis of the repair mechanisms employed in *Victoria Station* can account for how the play comes to be pervaded with the sense of menace frequently discussed by critics such as Esslin (1968, p. 265) who notes that a trademark feature of Pinter is “the commonplace situation that is gradually invested with menace, dread and mystery”. By looking at repair mechanism, it can be possible to show how these patterns convey isolation and subtle conflict in the play.

It has been stated earlier that turn-taking system involves two components: turn-allocational component which deals with the change-over or the distribution of turns between participants and turn-constructive component which deals with aspects of the turn itself such as its length size and texture. It has been demonstrated that an investigation into the allocational component can account for the different silences and pauses that occur in talk as well as repair mechanisms and how they function to reveal some aspects of the characters such as isolation, hostility and the sense of menace that gradually creeps into the play. It is time now to explore the turn-constructive component in *Victoria Station* whereby the length and the size of the characters turns will be analysed to discover how aspects such as these serve to underscore the kinds of power relationship that obtain between the characters in *Victoria Station*. In this respect, Benison in (Culpeper et al 2002, p. 67) states that an examination of the length of turns can provide useful initial clues to character’s behaviour, their interest in a particular conversation but most importantly their relative power. Itakura (2001, p. 1860) states that “everyday conversation is rarely symmetrical” and that this asymmetry is indicative of one speaker’s control over the other as longer turns may hinder access to the floor for potential speakers and can be one marker of the exercise of interactional dominance (Herzamin, 1998, p. 114).

In *Victoria Station*, it can be noticed that the controller’s turns are relatively longer than that of the driver whose turns are laconic in nature. The controller’s long turn can have different meanings in the play. If the driver employs linguistic strategies such as challenging moves and dispreferred responses to hold ground and resists the controller’s dominance over him, the controller in response tends to hold the floor in an attempt to regain control via the use of longer turns. The controller and driver are engaged in ongoing battle for power which Pinter once called “a repeated theme in my plays” (cited Diamond, 1985, p. 211). This is why we get the impression that the characters’ talk in *Victoria Station* is oriented towards what Burton (1980, p. 87) describes as “getting the upper hand” or “winning a round of talk”.

Victoria station, hence, turns to the classic dominant-subservient relationship frequently commented on by critics and this is transacted through the use of such techniques. In a typical implicit Pinteresque inversion of power dynamic, the controller's use of the long turns as a ploy for dominance paradoxically begins to reveal his vulnerability. The audience loses the sense of the controller as the superior and is even led to sympathy for him. The controller's authority collapses and the driver becomes the nucleus of a new power structure to which the other find himself drawn.

A long turn can also carry, as Tannen (1990) explains, an emotional burden and "occurs only at points of maximum distress". As Pinter (1962) was quoted, it is a variant of silence. Pinter remarked, silences are technically of two kinds; the first being cessation of speech and the second a "torrent of language". This speech, he continues, "is speaking of a language locked beneath it. That is its continual reference. The speech we hear is an indication of that which we don't hear". Employed in this evasive manner, concludes Pinter, speech maybe viewed as "a stratagem to cover nakedness".

The following example is a long turn by the controller which indicates his frustration and dissatisfaction with his life:

Controller: Do you have a driving wheel in front of you?

Pause

Controller: Because I haven't, 274. I'm just talking into this machine, trying to make some sense of our lives. That's my function. God gave me this job. He asked me to do this job, personally. I'm your local monk. I'm a monk. You follow? I lead a restricted life. I haven't got a choke and a gear lever in front of me. I haven't got a cooling system and four wheels. I'm not sitting here with wing mirrors and a jack in the boot. And if I have a jack in the boot I'd stick it in your arse.

Ironically, the controller whose god-given job, he asserts, is to "make sense of their lives", loses control, driven by the driver to desperation.

Long speeches, (Herman, 1995, p. 119) says, are also used in order to "dramatise moments of sustained emotional release" as in the example bellow by the controller in which he expresses his rage over the driver who refuses to go to pick up the passenger.

Controller: Drop your passenger. Drop your passenger at his chosen destination and proceed to Victoria Station. Otherwise I'll destroy you bone by bone. I'll suck you in and blow you out in little bubbles. I'll chew your stomach out with my own teeth. I'll eat all the hair off your body. You'll end up looking like a pipe cleaner. Get me?

Benison in (culpper et el 2002) has demonstrated that long turns can indicate the characters feeling of isolation or their state of being wrapped up in their own world as in the following turn made by the controller when he talks about his dream to go to Barbados

Controller: you know what've always dreamed of doing? I've always had this dream of having a holiday in sunny Barbados. I'm thinking of taking this holiday at the end of this year, 274. I'd like you to come with me to Barbados. Just the two of us. I'll take you snorkelling. We can swim together in the blue Caribbean.

Pause

In the mean time though, why don't you just pop up back to the office now and I'll make you a nice cup to tea? You can tell me something about your background, about your ambitions and aspirations. you can tell me all about your little hobbies and pastimes. come over and have a nice cup of tea, 274.

The controller's last turn amounts to an extreme example of what Pinter describes "a deliberate evasion of communication". The controller here indulges in a cross-talk, "in talking about other things, rather than what is at the roots of their relationship" (Pinter as cited in Burkman, 1971, p. 53). It is clear that he is so frightened and unwilling to bring into discussion his frustration and his feelings of loneliness and his need for companionship. He, thus, gets involved in a crosstalk to hide his insecurity and vulnerability.

As for the driver, his turns are minimal. Short turns, explains (Herman, 1995, p. 119), can signify panic or fear and they can serve to animate the lack of common focus on the content of speech. That is why we can infer the driver's absent-mindedness and uneasiness from his short contributions.

An analysis of the structure of the dialogue present in Victoria Station employing tools from discourse analysis and conversational analysis has revealed many aspects about the characters' personalities and state of mind. It has been possible to point at the deviant

structures in the play and the way they convey certain meanings and effects perceived in the text. However structural models tend to explore the surface of discourse rather than the strategies which operate below the surface. What follows will focus on an analysis of the strategies used by the characters and which shape the overall structure of the play.

III.3 Analysing the discourse strategies of Victoria Station

III.3.1 Gricean maxims:

The entire rationale behind flouting maxims is to generate implicatures. So, looking at the character's flouts of the maxims will enable us to infer the meanings that are generated and understood in the play without being directly derivable from the surface structure of what the characters say. However, It should be noted that as characters speak to each other, the playwright is speaking to the audience, and implicatures generated at one level (e.g. between the playwright and the audience) may not be generated at the other level (e.g. between the characters).(Short, 1989, p. 149)

Much of the dialogue is effective in its purpose of raising audience suspicion because flouts, deliberate failures to observe the various maxims, occur at the level of discourse obtaining between the playwright and the audience. What I have discovered is that these flouts are for the controller and the driver violations, quiet and unostentatious failures to observe the maxims as they are employed by them to mislead each other.

Flouts exploiting the quantity maxim

In the examples bellow, the driver's replies violate the maxim of quantity. The controller poses questions, which they need to be answered by the driver. What the driver says is insufficient. He prefers to refrain from providing the controller with the answers. He does not say as much as it is necessary to make his contribution cooperative and leaves his listener unsatisfied.

By so doing, Harold Pinter invites not only the controller but also the audience to search for interpretations of the driver's utterances that make sense in the context. What is a violation at the character level turns out to be a flout at a higher level.

1- **controller:** where are you?

Driver :I'm cruising.

2- **controller**: where?

Driver: by the side of a park?

Controller: what park?

Driver: a dark park

By being uninformative, the driver wants to deprive the controller of some information. We can infer that the driver exploits the quantity maxim to hold power and show mutiny to the controller's orders.

Controller: do you have a driving wheel?

Pause

Controller: Because I haven't, 274. I'm just talking into this machine, trying to make some sense of our lives. That's my function. God gave me this job. He asked me to do this job, personally. I'm your local monk. I'm a monk. You follow? I lead a restricted life. I haven't got a choke and a gear lever in front of me. I haven't got a cooling system and four wheels. I'm not sitting here with wing mirrors and a jack in the boot. And if I have a jack in the boot I'd stick it in your arse.

The controller's above utterance flouts the maxims of quantity. He says more than is required for the current purposes of the exchange. The controller's verbosity indicates his need to vent his discontentedness with his life. By his own account, he has less power than the lowly driver who at least has control of the car in front of him.

Flouts exploiting the quality maxim

Controller: ... I'm your local monk, 274. I am a monk.

The controller says something which is not true. He is not a monk but given that monks often live apart from other people and do not marry or have personal possession, the implicature generated reinforces the controller's feelings of loneliness and isolation. By flouting this maxim, the controller

voices deep dissatisfaction with his life situation. His frustration is further fostered when he explicitly says: I lead a restricted life.

Another example of flouting the quality maxim is the following contribution by the controller:

Controller: well, it'll be nice to meet you in the morning. I'm really looking forward to it.

The intended meaning, here, is obviously the opposite of what the controller asserts. The controller, being annoyed and irritated by the driver seems to mask evil intentions of what to do with the driver when they meet. This is revealed in the second part of his contribution: "I'll be sitting here with my cat o'nine tails, son. And you know what I'm going to do with it? I'm going to tie you up bullock naked to a butcher's table and I'm going to flog to death all the way to Crystal Palace".

Flouts exploiting the maxim of manner:

Driver: thank you very much.

Controller: Don't mention it. I'll have to make a note in my diary not to forget your Golden Wedding, won't I? I'll bring along some of the boys to drink your health. Yes, I'll bring along some of the boys. We'll all have a few jars and a bit of sing-song.

In the example above, a sentence like "don't mention it" would have been enough, but unnecessary prolixity generates a sarcastic tone. The controller seems to ridicule and mock the driver's idea to marry the woman in the car.

The following exchange is an instance of a flout of manner maxim the driver uses an acronym of the word passenger on board which common between the controller and driver. However at the level of playwright-audience we can infer that the driver has been listening to the controller's question all along the play but he refuses to answer.

Driver: I've got a P.O.B

Controller: you've got a P.O.B?

Flouts exploiting the maxim of relation

Driver: don't have anything to do with 135? They're all bloodsuckers. I'm the only one you can trust.

Pause

Controller: you know what I've always dreamt of doing? I've always had this dream of having a holiday in sunny Barbados.....

The controller, here, clearly made a disconnected contribution and indulges in a plan to have holidays. He breaches the maxim of relation as a medium to relieve his mounting tension and anger. By so doing he wants to escape his life gripped with loneliness and hollowness.

Controller: you've never heard of Victoria station?

Driver: never. No

Controller: it's a famous station.

Driver: I honestly don't know what I have been doing all these years.

The driver flouts the maxim of relation as soon as he realises the meaninglessness of his past life. He is mesmerised by a moment of epiphany which foregrounds his uncertainties and the absurdity of his life. In Bennett's (2012) words, he is experiencing an existential crisis; a moment of contemplation.

The flouting of the maxims does not only generate implicature but it is the origin of much of the comic effects perceived in the play.

The following exchange is an example of how the infraction of conversational maxims by the driver, for instance, the maxim of quantity (make your contribution as informative as required) generates humour.

Controller: where?

Driver: by a side of a park.

Controller: what park?

Driver: a dark park.

Obscurities and ambiguities, that is, the flouting of the maxim of manner also produces humour as in the following exchange:

Controller: where are you?

Driver: I'm cruising.

This flout comes in a form of a double-entendre in which Pinter humorously suggests the idea of the driver being engaged in a love affair despite the fact that he is married.

Repetition of words is a frequent source of comedy, often underscored by tautology as in,

Controller: go to Victoria Station.

Driver: I don't know it.

Controller: you don't know it.

Driver: yes, what is it?

Controller: it's a station, 274.

The comic effect can also be noticed at the level of responding moves when they are responses to reclassified initiative moves. The exchange below substantiates this case,

Driver: I've got a POB.

Controller: a POB?

Driver: yes, a passenger on board.

Controller: I know what it is. It's a passenger on board, 274.

Driver: that's right.

The driver reclassifies the controller's Elicit: Clarify "a POB" as a straightforward Elicit: Inform, request for information, and makes a positive response to it. Then, the controller makes an Informative: Report which is again reclassified by the driver as an Informative: Assessment and makes an evaluation that, according to him, agrees with the controller's initial judgment. This exchange is funny and weird because providing an evaluative response is the most prominent function of classroom discourse which is altogether incongruous with the present context.

For a text to be humorous, it must exhibit at least some sort of stylistic incongruity as Simpson (2006) noted. Incongruity as defined by Attardo (1997, p. 393) is "divergence from

expectations” which constitute previous knowledge and experience of similar situations. This existing knowledge is referred to as scripts.

Scripts can be understood as representations of expectations and the opposition of which underlie every humour instance, according to Raskin and Attardo (1991) who set out a theory which is script based, called General Theory of Verbal Humour (henceforth GTVH) in 1991, and further developed by Attardo in 1997 .

Under a GTVH approach, Victoria station can be seen as a taxi-company script. According to this script, readers might reasonably predict certain stereotypical behaviours from the dispatcher and the taxi drivers. This might include the dispatcher giving instruction, and drivers follow them. As the story progresses, however, what goes in Victoria Station opposes these expectations as the driver engages in mutiny. The driver’s challenging moves, dispreferred responses and silences and the controller’s attempt to gain control go contrary to our pre-existing knowledge of such a script. Therefore, comedy is a dominant aspect in Victoria Station.

III.3.2 Relevance theory

Driver: that’s where I am! I knew I knew the pace.

Pause

Driver:I’m siting by a little dark park underneath Crystal Palace. I can see the Place. It’s silhouetted against the sky. It’s a wonderful edifice, isn’t it!

Pause

Driver: My wife’s in bed, probably asleep. And I’ve got a little daughter.

In relevance theoretic terms, the ostensive inferential communication failed because the driver did not recognize the controller’s intention .Though the controller’s ostensive stimulus is clear, the driver failed to establish relevance because the inference he has drawn was not the right one. His inferencing halted when he accessed the most relevant stimuli for

him. The Controller's intention was Crystal Palace, a residential area in south London, while the Driver's inference was The Crystal Palace (that great building made of glass and iron, designed to house the Great Exhibition presenting the major works of technology and industry from 1851 to 1936). Crystal Palace symbolizes beauty, pride, social and economic prosperity. That is why the driver's mind, triggered by the ostensive stimulus (Crystal Palace), seemed to be wholly taken up with reminiscences of the past utopian society. However, the driver describes it as dark since the Crystal Palace is also a symbolic expression of modern man's surrender to technology and material power. The driver's account of Crystal Palace takes readers from the present to the old time where the life of past is contrasted to contemporary time which implies the contrast between the past and the present, sub-consciousness and consciousness. Harold Pinter, here, dramatizes the inner reality of the character who is liable to the influence of the two voices- the social and the private which collide and conflict. Coward in (Peacock, 1997, p. 108) describes Pinter as "a superb craftsman, creating atmosphere with words that sometimes are violently unexpected" .The driver begins a reorientation towards inner time and space as soon as he realizes that it is present time where he leads a dull life. Again, in Camus's philosophy, the driver tries to find hope in some transcendent meaning.

III.3.3 Politeness phenomena

Positive politeness:

e.g.1-**Controller** : Did I book this job?

Driver:No, I don't think you came into it.

e.g.1- **controller**: oh, you've got a little daughter?

Driver: yes, I think that's what she is.

The driver, here, hedges his contribution with 'I don't think' and 'I think'. The use of such hedges indicates uncertainty (Holmes 1985).

Negative politeness

Controller: He wants you to take him to Cuckfield

In the example above, the controller impersonates the FTA by removing any reference to his responsibility for producing it.

In the following example, the controller resorts to indirectness by employing an oblique grammatical form: the 'declarative form' that is tangential with the discourse function.

Controller: I want you to drive there.

In the example below, there is a mismatch between grammatical form and discourse function as the controller employs the interrogative form instead of the imperative

Controller :Can you help me on this?

The controller in all the above exchanges resorts to indirectness as an attempt to persuade the driver to go to Victoria station after the driver refuses his commands.

Negative face-threatening acts

The controller employs different strategies to damage the driver's negative face such as orders as in:

Controller: drop your passenger. Drops your passenger at his chosen destination...

This FTA is on-record in that it contains clear semantic link to the specific service requested. It is extremely blunt as it contains no softeners or mitigating elements.

Positive face -threatening acts:

The controller is obviously employing lots of linguistic acts that damage the driver's positive face such as threats as in:

Controller: I think I'm going to tie up bullock naked to a butcher's table and I'm going to flog you to death all the way to crystal place in little bubbles. I'll chew your stomach out with my own teeth. I'll eat all the hair off your body. You'll end up looking like a pipe cleaner. Get me

Controller: ...otherwise I'll destroy you bone by bone. I'll suck you in and blow you out in little bubbles. I'll chew your stomach out with my own teeth. I'll eat all the hair off your body. You'll end up looking like a pipe cleaner. Get me?

The controller's threats allow us to deduce that the controller and the driver are of roughly equal social statuses. Burton (1980, p. 184) notes that commands and orders like threats are not accessible to all the participants in a particular situation and therefore mark clear social relationship.

Controller: Well, it'll be nice to meet you in the morning. I'm really looking forward to it. I'll be sitting here with my o'nine tails, son.

Controller: I think you'll find Crystal Palace burnt years ago, old son.

The use of 'son', here, clearly undermines the driver. Thus, it is a positive face threatening act.

The controller also uses name-calling which causes maximum positive face damage as Culpeper et al (1998, p. 90) confirms.

Controller: you're beginning to obsess me. I think I'm going to die. I'm alone in this miserable freezing fucking office and nobody loves me. Listen, pukeface.

It can be noted that the controller's contributions contains many swear words such as in :

Controller: report to the office at 9 a.m. 135? Where are you? Where the fuck is 135?...

Controller: he can go and fuck himself.

Jay (2000) suggests that the primary purpose of swearing is to express the speaker's emotional state such as expressing anger or releasing stress or tension as in the examples above where the controller is clearly trying to release negative emotions. Stapleton's (2003) study has shown that swear words act as intensifiers which strengthen the force of the adjectives or nouns used by the speaker as in: "freezing fucking office" where the controller employs the swear word's emphatic function to get his message across.

The controller's utterances are full of verbal violence. Prentice (2000, p. 16) notes that violence in Pinter's work ensues when a character attempts to maintain rather than gain dominance. She says "violence is linked to the struggle to maintain dominance in interaction". In *Victoria Station*, each time the controller's position as the dominant character is threatened he resorts to verbal violence. The driver threatens the controller's powerful position by using different strategies such as employing challenging moves, silence, which is one of the most face-threatening options available, and providing dispreferred responses, etc. the controller in return uses swear words, name-calling, derogatory nominations such as 'old son' and 'son'.

By employing those devices, both the driver and the controller seem to care less about saving each other's faces. Culpeper (1996) uses the label 'impoliteness' to describe these kinds of strategies. Impoliteness in real life says Culpeper in (Culpeper et al, 2002, p. 87) is perceived as unexpected or foregrounded behaviour. This will trigger attributional interpretations. In drama, such behaviours are likely to be interpreted as a message from the author about an aspect of the dramatic world. Impoliteness in drama is not thrown haphazardly for the audience entertainment: "it serves other purposes", claims Culpeper in (ibid, p. 86). The fact that the controller's behaviour is constantly breaking the rules of social norms, specifically that of politeness, invites explanation. We are likely to attribute the following interpretations to his behaviour: the controller is an embittered man by the meaninglessness of his life or that he is enraged by the driver's attitudes. While politeness upholds social cohesion, impoliteness causes social conflict and disharmony, says Culpeper (2002, p.89). In drama, where there are conflicts and tensions between characters, we are more likely to see developments in character and plot, says Culpeper (ibid, p. 89). Boosfield and Locher (2008, p. 8) state that impoliteness is an exercise of power. Culpeper (1996, p. 354) also connects power to the use of impoliteness. He states that impoliteness is more likely to occur when the speaker is more powerful than the addressee. In their power battle, their quest for dominance leads to verbal attacks in the form of impoliteness used mainly by the controller whereas the driver employs other discursive strategies which enable him to resist to the controller's domination over him.

Conclusion

The aim of my dissertation has been to demonstrate that methods, findings and perspectives from linguistics are relevant to the stylistic analysis of Pinter's works. As the preceding analysis of *Victoria Station* has demonstrated, bringing explicit linguistic knowledge of talk to bear on the study of the dialogue can enrich our understanding of the play. The analysis of the language in *Victoria Station* and the attempt to explain it from a discourse-stylistic perspective has offered many insights on the way Harold Pinter fashions his language to create the effects perceived in the play.

Different analytic models constituting Simpson's 3Ss model have been brought to bear on the character –to-character communication exhibited in *Victoria Station* and each has been directed towards different aspects of the play. An investigation into the structure of the dialogue has revealed many aspects about the characters' quest for dominance and control in which power balance reverses between them. Each character tries to set up his own power system in his discursive space where he can dominate and exert power on each other. They do it by employing various strategies and tactics. The driver, for instance, employs challenging moves, dispreferred responses and silences to deny the controller's supremacy over him. An

analysis of the turn-system mechanisms in the play has shown how the length and size of turns contribute to the characters' battle for power. Long turns, as they block access to floor for potential speakers, the controller employs them to maintain power. In exploring turns, it has been noticed that turn-lapses constitute one kind of Pinter's famous silences. Silences in the guise of lapses can be used for conflictual purposes as well as for managing potentially conflict-inducing emotions. For example, at maximum rage, the controller resorts to silence to avoid conflict. It can be said that Pinter's pauses and silences in the play are used to cover up emotions but also paradoxically to show that strong emotions are to be revealed. Pauses and silences bring an attention to what goes unsaid, chart the processing of what has been said and indicate a radical shift in power dynamics.

The analysis of the strategies used by the characters has offered an account for the linguistic choices the controller and the driver make in the play. Looking at the observance or non-observance of Grice's maxims by the characters in the play has shed light on different aspects about the characters' inner world. Elements of uncertainty and ambiguity are generated by the driver's violations of quality and quantity maxims. Because of the layered nature of dramatic discourse these violations which are at the character level turn to be flouts of quantity and quality maxims at the level of the audience and the author. The driver, for instance, deliberately gives insufficient information by saying something insincere, irrelevant or ambiguous for deceptive reasons. These violations results in implicatures at a higher level where the audience is encouraged to search for their meanings.

Many traits of the characters' personalities and assumptions about their intentions prove to be the result of the characters flouting the maxims. In fact this has been possible thanks to the playwright judicious exploitation of the cooperative principle. By flouting the quantity maxim Pinter intends to dramatise the controller's anxieties, frustrations and isolation. The sense of mystery and vagueness which permeate the play are the result of the characters not adhering to the maxims of relevance and manner. The flouting of the relevance maxim has been dealt with in details within the analysis of the relevance theory whereby an investigation of the play has shown how the characters' ostensive-stimuli make them drop the markers of traditional time and begin a reorientation towards inner time and space where they escape their present world and seek relief in illusions and past recollections. Both the characters and the audience fail to make the right inferecing which adds to the conflict and the already intense atmosphere.

An application of politeness theory on the play has revealed that it is rather impoliteness which characterises the controller's and the driver's contributions. It has been demonstrated that linguistic impoliteness used for power struggle is one of the main strategies in the play. Victoria Station represents the discourse of the absurd in that it puts an emphasis on the way the controller and driver's interaction exhibits a sense of alienation, existential crisis and bewilderment and on how it unveils the isolation of the individual in modern society. Absurdity is reflected in the character's confusing statements, uncertainty, vagueness which Harold Pinter argues about the absurdity of the human condition.

Pinter's great merit is to have shown all these aspects about human condition through language. Pinter's absurdity lies not in the action, it has been argued, but in the way language is used. Pinter's play is absurd not because the human condition it depicts is hopeless but because the language through which this is depicted is unconventional. By applying Simpson's model which employs methods of analysing naturally occurring language it has been possible to demonstrate how the language used in Victoria Station compared to the routines of everyday speech or verbal interaction stands out as deviant. The mechanisms of talk which are adopted by Pinter in the play seem to be incongruous in terms of our understanding of shared knowledge. Pinter's uses a kind of incongruity that comes from the mismatch between communicative strategy and discourse context often deriving from the characters not adhering to the expectations that are cued by everyday discourse contexts and these incongruities often have humorous outcomes.

Humour, far from being, as suggested by Esslin 1960s, a "liberating effect" or the result of the audience's inability to identify with the character, lies in the way language is used. Repeated words, flouting the maxims and reclassifications of the initiative moves are frequent sources of comedy in the play.

In Victoria Station Pinter shows language as a weapon of power. Nevertheless, the language of power can also reveal the speaker's vulnerability. The play demystifies the power of the seeing dominant to the point that the audience is led to sympathy for him. Language in Victoria Station is used by the less powerful against the encroachments of the dominant. It has been demonstrated that language is a source of hiding one's real emotions. Language in Victoria station is what Billington describes it: "a continuous battle-tactic: a potential weapon of domination, a defensive posture to secure one's position, a source of evasion to hide truth" (2007, p. 213). It follows that language in Pinter's works is a source of emotional camouflage.

It is nothing to do with ‘failure of communication’ and instead of any inability to communicate “there is a deliberate evasion of communication” (Pinter in Billington, *ibid*)

The critics’ insistence over the meaninglessness of dialogues and failure of communication in Pinter’s works appears to be the result of the lack of insights into the right analytical methods. Employing approaches from discourse, conversational analysis and pragmatics along with Bennett’s reading of Camus’s philosophy allows me to say that Pinter’s work is not only meaningful but it is about how to make life meaningful.

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