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# **The Suez Canal Crisis 1956: Egypt's pulsation**

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## **Dedications**

Seven long years since my dear dad passed away, I dedicate this to him. I cherish the past we shared but miss the future we will not have. I would like to thank you for all the things you have done for me since day one. You were always there when there was a problem. You helped me as much as you were able to. I am Extremely Proud to have you as my father wish you were here to see me at this level . Thank you for the memories god bless you .

Thank you mom for every thing this work is according to your encourage , i am blessed to have such a beautiful, smart, and strong woman to call my mother. Mom, words can never express the deepest gratitude i have for you. You have been there for me my whole life and i love you so much for it. I mostly admire and love you for the person you are..

These lines are also dedicated to my lovely sister who helps me in my work I love you.

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## **Abstract**

After the end of the second World War, the world knew crucial important and dramatic turmoils .The Suez canal crisis on 1956 – 1957, helped Egypt to become a free state and the end of all interventions on its land and affairs especially Britain. Yet this was after a hard period for Egyptian people and the president Jamal Abdel Nasser. It was undeniably one of the most serious events that era which irrevocably changed the history of the entire Middle East as well as the history of the world, because it ushered in new powers regionally and changed the world order globally.

The Suez crisis of 1956 has attracted significant attention from British because Britain was always believed on “Empire” this is why it wanted to takeover and control any state in any way, especially if it had a wealth like the Aswan High Dam and the Suez canal. This dissertation aims at analyzing different elements of British foreign policy in the context of the Suez crisis, 1956, starting with a brief analysis of the origins and evolution of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Then, the emergence of the new Egyptian regime under the Free Officers in 1952 and a deep insight in the policies and circumstances which were to pave the way to the crisis. Focus in this work is on the impact of the Suez crisis on the new superpower the United State and Soviet Union, Britain, Israeli, Egypt, and France.

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## List of Acronyms

**USSR:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USA:** United State of America

**RCC:** Revolutionary Command Council

**IDF:** Israeli Defense Forces

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO is an organization to which many European countries and the US and Canada belonging .they agree to give each other military help if necessary.

**Peninsula:** An area of land that is most almost surrounded by water but is joined to a larger piece of land.

**Isthmus:** A narrow strip of land with water on each side that joins two larger pieces of land.

**Realpolitic:** A system of politics that is based on the actual situation and needs of a country or

**Joint Resolution:** (in the US) a decision that has been approved by the senate and the house of representative.

political party rather than on moral principles.

**Feudalism:** The social system that existed during the Middle East Ages in European in which people were given land and protection by noblemen and had to work and fight for him in return.

**The Entente Cordiale:** The friendly understanding reached between the British and French government in 1904,mainly about issues relating to their colonies around the world .

**Exchequer:** In Britain, the government department that controls public money.

## General Introduction

Getting independence is not easy at all, especially for those countries that were weak such as Egypt during The Suez Crisis of 1956 was one of the most crucial events of the Cold War era, which caused a deep dispute within the Western alliance. The crisis was a turning point in the modern history of the Middle East as well as in the campaign of decolonization on the Third World after that. The nationalization of the Anglo-French owned Suez Company was not the main cause of the tripartite invasion in Egypt in October 1956, but other factors had a significant role like, the Cold War Arab Nationalism, the Arab-Israeli dispute and the attempt of the old imperial powers to preserve their status and hegemony on the area. It was started with the end of second world war (1939-1945), when Egyptian president Jamal Abed Nasser announced to nationalize Suez Canal on 26 July 1956. The apparent purpose for nationalization was to use the materials to finance the building of Aswan dam yet, in the reality Nasser's action was an act for retaliation against British and France who had controlled the canal which this later led to struggle precipitated an international crisis over ownership and operation of Suez canal and all that for several reasons as : the invade of tripartite aggression was primarily to return western domination of the canal and immediate the fall of Nasser from power. The Suez Canal immediately became a very strategically important issue, it serve as the shortest ocean that link between Mediterranean and the Indian ocean. It also facilitated commerce for trading nation and particularly assisted European colonial.

This study concerns the historical and political factors and consequences of the Suez crisis on Egypt, Britain, and superpower at that time it highlight the relations among Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Egypt after and before Suez Canal crisis. The present dissertation will treat the following research questions:

- 1- what were the circumstances of the 1956 in the Middle East/ world?
- 2- what was the point of success or failure of British policies to preserve their imperial policy in Egypt?
- 3- what were the impacts and after math of Suez crisis?

This is an important issue that it highlight the British foreign policy among diplomacy and duplicity and other western-middle east relations. The reader can understand the major



## General Introduction

factors and circumstances that led to change the middle east area in this period following the Suez Canal crisis. This research also will be based on data collected from the library and internet. Throughout this research, this will carry out the descriptive analytical method.

The Suez Canal is a crucial issue way that is treated by different historians, such as William.R.Patterson and David Wilby. The Suez crisis, indicate to a tripartite and, it was an offensive war fought by France, the United Kingdom, and Israel against Egypt starting on October 29, 1956. Thus, and by virtue of William .R.patterson: we find that The Suez Crisis started on July 26, 1956 when Egypt's President, Jamal Abdel Nasser occupied the action of

nationalizing the Suez Canal. This was a direct challenge to British strategic control in the Middle Eastern region. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 had granted the British a lease over the canal and the British had a great troop Presence there until 1954 when they agreed to pull most of them. The French were also worried with the nationalization of the canal since they think it would strengthen Nasser's influence over their North African colonies. Israel was also worried that the hostile Egyptians would interfere with their shipping rights through the canal. In response to Nasser's action, the British, French and Israelis held a secret meeting to plan retaliation. It was decided that Israel would invade Egypt and try to obtain domination of the Sinai Peninsula. The British and French would then intervene as a 'peacekeeping' force and demand that Israeli and Egyptian forces each withdraw from the canal, all that to participate in hostility against Egypt and control on Suez canal. In other side, we find David Wilby who supported William's idea when he said that: Suez was the biggest crisis Britain had faced since the Second World War. It began when Egypt's President Nasser nationalized the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company in July 1956. In revenge, Britain and France secretly backed an Israeli infestation of the Sinai Peninsula. London and Paris then offered to intervene and build a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt, however when that was rejected, on 31 October 1956, their troops went in and took over the Canal Zone. The crisis raised when the Soviet Union offered its support to Egypt. This was during the Cold War, the United States wanted to stop any expansion of Soviet influence. Which it put pressure on Britain and France to pull out, which they did in November.

**1.1 Introduction**

History has testified always to the people for their ability to create miracles of civilization and humanity. In the nineteenth century, Britain's foreign policy faced different periods up to the Nationalization of the Suez Canal that was the last provocation made by Colonel Nasser challenging Britain's status in the Middle East. Britain was one of the most affecting players in the Middle East at that moment, only the Ottoman Empire and France challenged its role in the area. France sign the Extente Cordial and recognize Britain's role in Egypt, while the Ottoman Empire decline after the First World War leaving Britain as the major power there. After the Second World War relations, whereas changed the situation because of the upgrowth of two new superpowers, the USSR and The US, political, and economic unsteadiness that Britain was facing when trying to conserve its old values. The Suez Crisis came to mark that British could not able to do things without the aid and the support of the USA.

The First period was started with the historical situation of the Suez Canal and the cruel contest with France through Egypt around the Nineteenth, whilst Britain win in invading Egypt in 1882 ended by the signature of the Entente Cordiale up to the war when Egypt was announced as protectorate. As for the second period was the stage between the two wars when Britain did its best to protect Egypt although its economic disturbance at home by signing the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 1936. It ending when the Free Officers movement undertook the Coup d'état of 1952. The third stage was from the coup up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal when signature of the base agreement of 1954 proved to be a defeat for Britain undermines president Nasser policies.

**1.2 The historical background of the Suez Canal**

The Suez Canal is called the "crossroads to Europe, Africa, and d Asia" because the route was used to transport goods to and from all three continents, (figure1) ( Dawling (2011:pp1).The canal is a 119 miles long artificial waterway that has served the global trade over the last one and half century. The canal connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Gulf of Suez providing navigational access to Far East Asian countries . "The Suez Canal in Egypt West of Sinai Peninsula connects port Said on the Mediterranean sea to the port

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of Suez on the Red sea like in the picture (1), and provides supply an essentially direct route for transport of good , between Europe and Asia .It supports about 8%of the world's shipping traffic nearly fifty ships traveling though the canal daily. The Canal is about 195 kilometers (121 miles) long, and 300 meters wide and a minimum channel width of 60 meters (197 feet), the Suez Canal is able to accommodate ships as large as 150,000 tons fully loaded. Because no locks interrupt traffic on this sea level waterway, the transit time only averages about 15 hours. (Roger (2010):pp10).

In 1854, a French former diplomat Ferdinand Marie de Lesseps achieved an agreement with the Ottoman governor of Egypt to construct a canal 100 miles across the Isthmus of Suez. In 1856 "the Suez Canal Company was formed and granted the right to operate the canal for 99 years after completion of the work", and in 24 April ,1859 the construction was started "digging was done by hand with picks and shovels wielded by forced labor". European workers with dredgers and steam shovels arrived labor conflicts and cholera epidemic building, and the Suez Canal was not finished until 1869. (Roger (2010):pp12).

On November 17, 1869, the Suez Canal was opened to navigation Ferdinand de Lesseps would later try, but unfortunately it was not successfully to construct a canal across the Isthmus of Panama ( Varble.(2003):pp9.10). Finally, when it opened, "the Suez Canal was only 25 feet wide at the surface". Therefore, fewer than 500 ships navigated its first full year of operation .Great advancements started in 1876; nonetheless, the canal became fastly one of the world's most heavily traveled shipping lanes. In 1875 Great Britain became the largest shareholder in the Suez Canal Company when it purchased the stock of the new Ottoman governor of Egypt .In 1882, Britain occupied Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1936 made Egypt virtually independence, but Britain protect rights for the protection of the canal. (Roger (2010):pp10-27).

In the Post World War two period, Egypt pressed evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, and in July 1956 Egyptian president Jamal Abel Nasser nationalized the canal believing to charge tolls that would pay for construction of big dam on the Nile River. As a reaction, Israel occupied in late October, and British and French troops landed in early November, invading the Canal Zone. Under compression from the United Nations, France and Britain retreat in December, and Israel forces withdraw in March 1957.In the

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same month, Egypt obtain control to canal and opened again to commercial shipping. (Roger (2010):pp16).

After ten years, Egypt closed the canal again following the six day war and Israel's of the Sinai Peninsula .For the next eight years, the Suez canal which divides the Sinai from Egypt, existed as the front line between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. In 1975 Anwar El Sadat Egyptian President reopened the Suez canal as sign of security after talks with Israel. Nowadays, an average of 50 ships navigates the canal daily, carrying more than 300 million tons of goods a year. ( Simmon.(2010),pp2-12).



**Figure1:** The Suez Canal as crossroad from Europe to Asia and Africa (klapholz. (2013):pp12.)

### 1.3 The British imperialism policy and Egypt from 1800 to 1941

Egypt was the ‘swing door’ of the British Empire. Which situated on the Isthmus of the Suez, Egypt controlled the shortest overland route from Britain to British Indian, the far Eastern possession and Australian continent. Command of the Isthmus by a hostile power would have endangered Britain’s control of these imperial possessions. With the loss of the American colonies in 1783, Britain’s Eastern Empire, centered in India, greatly increased in crucial to it. Napoleon clarified the centrality of Egypt to British power with his aspirant try to capture it and the overland route to India in 1798. When the attempt to seize control

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of the overland route floundered due to Nelson's Victory at the Battle of the Nile, it caused near panic in ministerial circles in London. The Ottoman Empire considered Egypt was nominally a part throughout the nineteenth century as it has been for over 500 years. In fact, it was increasingly independent under a succession of powerful Khedives (viceroys). The Khedives were reformist, and sought to transform their country into industrialized society with the aid of European expertise and finance, partly increase Egypt's independence from Constantinople. The centerpiece of this industrialization programmed was the construction of a canal along the Isthmus of Suez by a French company between 1859 and 1869. Permitting ships to sail through Egypt directly, the canal dramatically increased the strategic significance of Egypt was paid for by massive loans from French and British bankers, which the Egyptian government found increasingly hard to service. British investment was driven by the fear that growing French financial and political impact over Egypt could not go unchallenged for fear that they would gain control over the canal route. In 1875, Benjamin Disraeli, the British government prime Minister, took the chance offered by Egypt's need for liquidity to buy, the British government, the Khedive Ismail's (1863-79) 44 per cent share of the Suez Canal Company. The major aim of this purchase was to prevent the French gaining exclusive control. The times commented that we have now an abiding stake in the security and welfare of Egypt. (McNamara. (2003): pp 11).

However, Disraeli's injection of liquidity failed to treat the enormous financial issues of the khedive. The European powers, led by France and Britain, imposed a financial settlement, on khedive Tawfig (1879-92), which saw two thirds of the revenue of Egypt going to service the massive foreign debt which it had accumulated. By 1881, the financial pressure was becoming too much to bear for an increasingly disaffected Egyptian army which had not been paid for months. In September of that year, a senior officer, Arabi Pasha, carried out a coup d'état and made himself Minister for War. Fearing that the Egyptians might default on the enormous loans that British and French capital had poured into Egypt and the inability of the Egyptians to protect foreign citizens, the British Prime minister, William Ewart Gladstone, deployed naval forces to Alexandria in a show of force initially the expedition was supposed to be a joint effort with the French. Indeed an Anglo-French joint note was issued in January 1882 as support for the khedive against Arabi. However, the French withdrew from the proposed mission, letting the British deal with the

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crisis alone. In May 1882 a naval force was sent to Egypt. This had effect of inciting anti-foreign feeling leading to riots in Alexandria which left 50 Europeans and 170 Egyptians dead. On 10 July 1882, after rejecting a British ultimatum to disarm forts around the city, the Royal Navy bombarded Alexandria. The bombardment only served to increase the disorder and anarchy in Egypt as well as further threatening the safety of the large community of foreigners. The liberal government in London decided to order an invasion of Egypt and crush the Arabi regime-actions which went very much against the ethical inclinations of Gladstone's Foreign policy. In the case, he appears to have fallen in with the arguments of the Liberal imperialists in his Cabinet such as Joseph Chamberlain who wished to overthrow the Arabi government, not in order to protect the British and French loans and investments, but 'to protect the canal and exact reparations for the Alexandria outrages'. Gladstone, according to Gallagher and Robinson, was particularly swayed by the argument about the canal and the need to protect the India route. In the House of Commons, he justified the intervention on moral and realpolitik grounds.(Vatikiotis. (1961): pp 33)

In the next month, a British expeditionary force, under General Wellesley, defeated Arabi and his army at Tel-el-Kebir and brought the country under de facto British control for the next 40 years. Gladstone dispatched Lord Dufferin to Egypt to see how the country should be administered in the future. Egypt became an imperial hybrid. It was neither a colony nor a protectorate and outwardly was independent under the Khedive, who remained under nominal Ottoman control. The truth was somewhat different. Egypt was controlled by a British run civil service and the 'ultimate sanction was in the hands of the British consul and the English advisers in the government departments. Milner encapsulates the fact in his description of Egypt as the Veiled Protectorate. The personification of British rule was lord Cromer who held the rather benign and unimportant-sounding titles of British Consul-General and Agent from 1883 to 1907. However, he controlled the levers of power in Egypt, damping down unrest and restoring the country to solvency. Cromer operated in a paternalistic manner, treating the Egyptians and any nationalistic ambitions they held with contempt. Britain made over 66 declarations of its intention to quit Egypt between 1882 and 1919. A.G. Hopkins argues that this did not happen because Britain had important interests to defend in Egypt and she was prepared to withdraw only if conditions guaranteeing the security of these interests were met-and they

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never were. A further complicating matter was the Sudan which was conquered by the British in 1898. They agreed to share sovereignty with the Egyptians who saw it as part of Egypt. (McNamara. (2003): pp 11-15).

In 1914, Britain interned war with the Ottoman Empire, which required that Britain formalize the relationships with Egypt in a protectorate. The reigning Khedive, who tried to confederate himself with the Turks, was overthrown to make way for a more quiescent figurehead. The First World War broke Turkish power in the Middle East. In the middle of the war, Britain and France agreed-under the Sykes-Picot understanding-to arbitrarily divide up the Turkish possessions of the Middle East between them. The League of Nations mandate system gave this shabby exercise in great power cynicism both a retrospective legality and a more progressive ring. The British High Commissioner in Egypt had over the war entered into correspondence with the Arab leader, the Sheriff Hussein of Mecca. He wanted and received a pledge of British support for an Arab state that would include most of the Ottoman Empire. The grandiose, but essentially empty, promises of self-determination for subject people made, most notably, by the American President Wilson in his fourteen points and other speeches further fuelled the sense of betrayal of Arabs. ( Ashton and Stockwell. (2012): pp 27 ).

Egypt shared in the general Arab sense of betrayal by the British, and was shaken by an uprising in March 1919 caused by the decision to deport to Malta an Egyptian delegation (wafd), which asked that Britain grant the independence that had been promised when Britain needed Arab aid. The disturbances that ensued cost the lives of thousands of Egyptians as the British, in one of their forgotten wars of Empire, crushed the rebellion with great brutality. Field Marshal Allenby, the commander of British Middle Eastern forces, was made High Commissioner and Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for War, was sent out from Britain to inquire into the disturbances. Strongly supported by Allenby, he chose, surprisingly, considering his record on other imperial questions, to conciliate Egyptian opinion as much as possible. He supposed that in order to 'deflate the Wafdist cause, Egypt should be offered independence and a treaty of alliance that would guarantee Britain's imperial interests'. He saw that the key issue was the achievement of an agreement that protected British benefits in the canal. In February 1922, a reluctant Cabinet was persuaded by Allenby to accept his proposals. The Allenby declaration was issued later that month. It conceded formal independence to Egypt and recognized the



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Khedive as king, but reserved 'absolutely' for the British government the following: the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; the defense of Egypt against foreign intervention; the protection of foreign interests and the Sudan. The Allenby declaration did not mean all that much. It was merely the concession of 'little more than a constitutional nicety'. The colonial Secretary was at pains to point out to the dominion governments that it preserved fully the 'status quo with regard to the special interests of the British Empire in Egypt'. The problem of base rights for British troops was not finally resolved until 1936 because neither the Wafd, which had transformed itself into the most powerful nationalist movement in Egypt, nor the royal court was willing to sign a treaty which would be acceptable to the British-for fear that it would lay them open to attacks by the other side. Martin Daly argues that the failure to agree on the unification of Egypt and the Sudan was the key reason that the negotiations failed. (M. W. Daly. (1991): pp 53-8). Furthermore various small pressure groups, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan ) and Young Egypt used street protest to prevent a moderate compromise. However, the Egyptian government finally gave in 1936. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 negotiated by the young British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, gave Britain wide-ranging military rights in Egypt including the occupation of The Canal Zone, an area that is roughly equivalent in size to Wales. Other rights included full use of the naval base at Alexandria and an alliance with Egypt. (Hurwitz.(1979): pp 487-8).

The flaw in the agreement was that it satisfied British security benefits without really raising the Egyptians from their previous status as second-class partners. Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador, continued to interfere regularly in Egyptian internal politics and believed it his duty to maintain a Cromer-style influence despite Egyptian independence. While the Second World War broke out the British used Egypt as their main Middle Eastern base. Such was its significance that, in 1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in a directive, could state that the 'loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a disaster of the first magnitude to Great Britain, second only to successful invasion and final conquest'. (McNamara. (2003): pp 11-15).

### 1.4 Britain and Egypt in Second World War

During the Second World War Britain invaded Egypt in order to protect its benefits from falling into the hand of Axis powers. In 1940, the Egyptian government of the



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Nationalist Ali Maher Pasha, considered pro fascists by Britain, was imposed to resign under the pressure of Britain which was considered by Egyptians as another of sign foreign office's choice. Furthermore, Britain was able to carry out the military campaigns that secured the allied control of the Middle East, and supply the base area and British troops that defeated the Axis at the Alamain battle and in North Africa. Anti British sentiments grew again in Egypt as the first conference for Arab Unity in Alexandria, 1944 failed to consider Britain as friend of Arabs. Egypt finally announced War on the Axis wishing to have a place with the emerging United State Nations Organization. Egypt in December 1945 called for the revision of its alliance. In fact wanted a retreat of British forces from its territories. (McNamara. (2003): pp 15.

In the end Second World War, Britain remained the paramount Middle Eastern power. Its positions in the region appeared even more firmly entrenched after than the First World War There were over 50,000 British troops in Egypt occupying the major cities of Cairo and Alexandria as well as the Canal Zone. British military planners reiterated at the end of the war that the region was second only to the British Isles in terms of its strategic value. The chiefs of Imperial General Staff in Britain argued that, for Britain to remain a great power, it was imperative to remain control of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Egyptian base was to remain a vital cornerstone of British strategy both as guardian overlooking Britain's vaster Middle Eastern responsibilities in the Post-war nuclear age as a potential airbase for launching atomic attacks against the Soviet Union. The Chiefs of staff emphasized that; No effective Middle Eastern Defense can be undertaken without a suitable base to support it...Only Egypt can such facilities be found in the scale required, and nowhere else in the Middle East could existing facilities be expanded to form substitute except at prohibitive cost ( Mason. (1991), p.46).

Nonetheless, the issue was that Britain strategic requirement needed an adequate reaction to growing Arab Nationalism. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary was convinced of the value of the Middle East unlike his Prime Minster, Clement Atlee, who questioned in 1946-47 the assumptions about the region. He felt that Britain could not afford the burden of maintaining a massive military presence in the area nor was necessary.<sup>20</sup> The consequence of Atlee's thinking would have meant a sever truncation of Britain's global role by abandoning the base of Suez and evacuating from Egypt. (McNamara. (2003): pp 16).

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In the Second World War, the British had brought goods and services from the Egyptians, as a result sterling balances to the value of £400 million were owed to the Egyptians. These remained unconvertible to dollars owing to the British mechanism known as 'blocking', but would eventually be so. Chancellor of the Exchequer Dalton feared that to maintain the base in Egypt would mean that Britain could find itself 'in the impossible position of borrowing money from the Egyptians in order to maintain forces in Egypt'. Despite this powerful argument, Bevin maintained his policy in the Middle East considering the area that most sensitive one for Britain through its heavy financial burdens and political conflicts among the members of the British Cabinet. In 1945, Egypt had replied to Bevin's call to partnership by asking for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on 20 December 1945 and in 1945, following the advice of Antony Eden, Secretary of the State, contributed to found the Arab League Organization in Cairo. This action was an acknowledgment of Egyptian role, but rather to use its relation with it to protect its interests in the area, and in 2 April 1946, the British government sent a delegation to Cairo to negotiate. The chiefs of staff were willing to compromise that British ground troops could go but that airbases were needed but the Egyptians wanted a full evacuation. The leader of the British delegation recommended accepting the Egyptians' demand. In May 1945 Bevin and Attlee agreed that they would publicly offer the withdrawal of all British forces from Egyptian territory before sitting down to discuss future defense arrangements; this brought a furious reaction from Winston Churchill on the opposition benches. He remained an inveterate opponent of compromise with the Egyptians. Bevin ignored Churchill's concerns and proceeded to withdraw British troops from Cairo and the other major cities to the Canal Zone by March 1948. He also tried to renegotiate a more palatable agreement on future British use of the base. Sadly, Bevin's plans for a new partnership with Egypt were still born. Negotiations on the base soon were mixed up with the other issue that separated the two sides: the future of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Egypt wanted that country which was officially governed and arrangements for joint sovereignty between them and the British to be unified with Egypt under the Egyptian crown. Whoever controlled Sudan would control the headwaters of the Nile, the lifeblood of Egypt; it would also of course allow a massive expansion of the territory of Egypt. The British felt that the Sudan would be more malleable toward British policy if it were free from the influence of the Egyptians. In the end of January 1947, negotiations on the base broke down over the Sudan disputes. (Kent. (1993): pp50).

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For Bullock this 'prejudiced any chance of agreement in the Anglo-Egyptian talks' (quoted in (2003): pp 18). Of all the many faults made in the history of the Anglo-Egyptian relations, this was perhaps the gravest error made on the Egyptian side. If the Egyptian had agreed to this terms Britain would have retreat its troops nearly a decade before it eventually did under the arrangement negotiated by Nasser. He received no better terms in the Sudan or on the base in 1953-54 than could have been negotiated in 1946-47. (Bullock (2003): pp 20).

Otherwise, Britain's Egyptian relations went badly because of creation of Israel in, May 1948, out of the Palestine mandate. The harsher defeat of the British supplied Arab armies convinced the Arab Leaders in general and the Egyptian ones in particular that Britain was deeply involved in betraying the Arab state though it rejected to recognize the State of Israel at the beginning seeking maintaining its effect in the Middle East. But, the Arabs were convicted Britain would not side with them against Israel According to the historian Vatskiotis: their firm belief that their defeat in the field had been due mainly to the British control of Egyptian military training and arms supplies and to the involvement of the palace and politicians in several arm scandals (quoted in. McNamara. (2003): pp 18).

The defeat in the first Arab-Israeli War caused too many problems for Egyptian politicians mainly for the King and his Prime Nahas Pasha appointed in 1951. Both agreed on calling immediate evacuation of British troops and unification of Egypt and Soudan after Herbert Morison's annunciation seeking a new Anglo-Egyptian agreement in April 1951. Morrison refused a withdrawal unless Egypt would guarantee its alliance with the West. The tension kept going on and no agreement was signed. Still the Anglo-Egyptian agreement was not ratified and the relations came into ahead after the 1952's *coup d'etat* by the free officers. (McNamara (2003): pp 17-19).

### 1.5 The free officer movement of 1952

The rebellion of 1952 what is came to be called the Coup which was planned by a group of junior military officer since the early 1940, calling themselves the free officer that headed by colonel Jamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). The group consolidated with an executive committee of nine men and decided to carry out coup as possible of the event of black Saturday, the experiences of Nasser were exemplary of free officer that helped to

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explain the impact which formed the new generation of Egyptian rulers. Nasser's father was a rural villager who moved to Alexandria and became the postal service where his son (Jamal) was born. The resident Nasser lived a hard life when he was eight and his mother died therefore Nasser rose and grew up with different relatives in Cairo and Alexandria and at his high school year, he participated in an anti demonstration and he was wounded through the protest. (Vatikiotis. (1961): pp 47-49).

After his high school graduation in 1936, Nasser became accepted at the Egyptian military school which had opened its doors to the sons of lower and middle classes. And in 1938 was spent a war year in Sudan and Western Desert and in this time he set up relations with numerous individuals that later shaped the executive committee of the free officer. In spite of Nasser's commendable performance in Palestine war he and his other officers suffered from humiliation of the Egyptian defeat by Israel which later caused by the corruption of the king Faruq, the civilian politicians and some figures of high command. The feeling of Nasser and his colleagues by the patriotic duty made him to avenge to the disaster of 1948. (Cleveland.(2000): pp 280).

Nasser and several of core participants in the free officers movement were not scions of the landed and professional elite but the sons of the small peasant proprietors, minor government officials and petty merchant and other groups came from the middle class but they were all from the strata of society that shafted under the British occupation and harbored grievance at the indigenous ruling classes as well as they stood for the emergence of a new generation into position of authority. During the revolution the ages of all junior officers marked a difference from 28 to 35 years, moreover they might not have enough public support for their youth and opacity and before carrying out the coup, General Mohammed Najib was appointed as figure head of the free officer for his senior and became the most popular figure in the regime from the 1948 conflict.(W.Roger Louis (1989) pp :110.).

The free officers were willing to end the British occupation and reforms, social justice that came into ambiguous nations also the free officers were pragmatic nationalists and diligent military bureaucrats with no predetermined view on political organization or ideological direction. The program of the free officer in 1951 contained six points which were; end and elimination of the British colonization and fight down of its collaborators, avoid of feudalism, the ending of the political control of the state by foreign capital, the

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establishment of social justice, the formation of strong national army and the creation of healthy democratic life. (R. Louis & R. Owen ( 1989) pp: 20).

The previous officers undertook a power and they joined themselves into Nasser led organization called the revolutionary command council (RCC) that worked as the executive body of the government. The RCC had no preconceived plan for management the country, it tend to respond to situation as they arose and in this way the regime gradually took shape and found its direction. While the organization that headed by Nasser wasn't completely without plan. And in the process of coalesced its power the RCC reduce twofold campaign. It started by the rival concurrent for power and the second one tried to gain popular support by proclaiming reforms and introducing new constitution. The purpose of the first rival to deal with King Faruq who was obliged to abdicate after three days of coup, the last ruler in the line Mohammed Ali travelled out Alexandria harbor on the royal yacht and he destined idle away the remainder of his life on the French Riviera. In 1953 Egypt declared a republic and monarchy abolished, according to the Wafd and other parties the RCC announced a series of sweeping political change that effectively avoided the old order he constitution of 1923 abolished, parliament was dissolved and all political parties were prevented. The regime went on to declare a three year transitional period during the RCC would act as the supreme executive. Nagib assumed the offices of president and prime minister, but secretly Nasser remained minister of the interior, and other civilian politicians members subrogated by the RCC members and the additional officer were appointed to oversee the bureaucracy, the military was assuming a complete control of the state. In 1954 another RCC decree prohibited anyone who held public office from 1946 to 1952 from doing so again. This effectively prevented the old order politicians from participation in public life and opened the way for new generation from different stratum of society to assume position of authority within the bureaucracy. The RCC organize a party which called liberation Rally, it gained control and support of such interest groups as student and workers, in this time the liberation Rally was the only party permitted in the country but unfortunately failed to generate much enthusiasm. (Cleveland.(2000): pp 295).

The Muslim brotherhood was the main rival for power o the RCC what was way from the political organization in the country, at the time of the coup 1952 many of the free officer had close ties to the brotherhood and there was an early phase of cooperation

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between the two organization as each hoped eventually to control the other, they could not however, coexist and in 1954 the RCC provide with an excuse to strike when members of brotherhood tried to murdered Jamal Abdel Nasser. The RCC peevd and avenge by executing six of brotherhood's leaders and imprisoning thousand of its members although the organization was driven underground it was neither forgotten nor eliminated and would be heard again. The RCC also struck hard against group on the political left, strongly after the coup, workers at large textile plant near Alexandria went on strike and rampaged through the factory in the name of the people's revolution. The RCC ordered the military to put down the strike arranged for the trial and execution of its ringleaders and tool advantage the existence of the labor unrest to imprison leaders of communist party and other leftists. (Cleveland.(2000): pp 297).

It was difficult for RCC to set up control of the armed forces and ensure their loyalty to investigate in the end the close friend of Nasser Abd El Hkim Amr appointed and elevated to the post of commander in the chief by Jamal Abdel Nasser, opposition Amr occupied as the regime's political operative within the military for the next fifteen year. The relation between the RCC and military (free officer) were severally tension by the contest for power between Najib and Nasser that broke into the open in the early for 1954. Instead acting as purely figure head president that RCC intended Nagib became a popular public personality and started to illustrate his own views on the direct of revolution, views that often differed from Nasser but Nasser was determined to retain control of revolution and thrust a private struggle against Najib. Nasser argued the letter in fighters and in November 1954 was banged of supporting Muslims brotherhood therefore he removed from the office and forced to endure until his death in 1984. Wthin two years of the coup Nasser had broken the existing centers of civilian power, purged the military of potential rivals and maneuvered himself into position as the dominant political force within Egypt, through consolidation power (free officer and RCC) the RCC retain a popular support through the introduction of reforms and in 1954 it investigate the agrarian reform law of September, the main term of the law limited the amount of agricultural land a signal individual could own 200 feddans and the surplus redistribution to peasant who less than 5 feddans as well as the land and properties of the royal family were confiscated and include into redistribution program and regime's purpose was reducing the political and economic power land holding elite. Although the land reform were imperfectly administrated their

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very existence showed the new regime repudiation of the old social, economic and political order and this later become hallmark of Nasser era and was subject of considerable favorable commentary both within and outside Egypt during the regime's early year. (Cleveland.(2000): pp 295- 300).

### 1.6 Conclusion

The conclusion of this first chapter which gave a historical context of the Anglo-Egyptian relations, since the invasion of 1882 until 1951 with focus on the major event that influenced on those relations as well as we expressed the duplicity and diplomacy of the British to remain its benefit in Suez Canal. Also it was a summarized insight to effective role of the free officer movement who were willing to end British occupation and Faruq's regime and open the way for new generation to assume the authority.

## **2.1 Introduction**

The 1956 Suez Crisis is one of the most important and controversial events in British history since the Second World War. I should be explain its most influencing context, the Cold War was a result of accumulating events of competition among the two blocs that wanted to control and presented the Middle East. The United State and the Soviet Union willed to protect their interest in the area by more inference in regional affairs. However, Britain and France wanted a military intervention to overcome President Nasser. That led to objective among the Western countries on how to deal with Nasser, which triggered American policy makers of possibility the Soviet from exploiting the situation in the Middle East. In addition the Crisis transferred to when the tripartite alliance of Britain, France and Israel decided to invade Egypt without consultation the American. Despite the military success, the war was followed by harsh political economic troubles for the aggressor who was subjected to serious financial and political pressures to halt their military intervention and to look for a political means to solve the issue via the United Nation Organization.

## **2.2 The Suez crisis and the cold war**

The cold war faced deepening Soviet-American competition in the middle east from the mid 1950 on the three level, started by geopolitical struggle to join allies and secure access to resources such as oil, where the second one is ideological rivalry for the nature of the Muslims and the third one diplomatic maneuvers. Yet, the Soviet power and the United State were not only factor affecting the situation in the region, the British also played great power after the United State and the Soviet Union as well as it considered as a strongest of Western Europe (France, Germany in political and economic). In spite of the British exchequer's bankruptcy and its precarious economic position in 1947. Britain did not hinder from playing important role with Western alliance against Soviet communism in the period of the cold war, in these moment Britain and United State agreed and established a copartner ship that objective on restraining communism in Europe and Asia and because of the British's economic disability the British president decided to advance United State in Europe affair and exploit the opportunities that offered by Truman Doctrine, the Marshal plan and the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO).(Jackson.(2001): pp26.27).



In 1950, Britain had interests on the Middle East in politic and economic and exactly in the half of the nineteenth century the diplomatic aim of great Britain in the middle east showed as defend and preservation its Indian Empire. However, with the competition of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to increase the British interest in the middle east because of the Suez Canal drastically shortened the time, the passage to India and other British possession around the Mediterranean sea. It was great importance to the British trade, that why any interruption of free passage through the canal would put the British financial and trading interest in an embarrassing situation. In addition, the Suez Canal become very important to the British interest when the oil discovered in Iran and other middle Eastern countries in the early of the twentieth century. In fact, the canal was perceived as imperial lifeline that facilitate the oil trade and considered as vital route communication to the British interest in the far east e.g.: Malta and Empire in the east Africa and Australia.(Almong.(2003): pp 1.2).

The Suez Canal was used for troops for seventy-five year and it was operated by Anglo-French company and was advocated by 30,000 Tummies that stationed at the Suez base. As well as the Suez Canal during the early years of the cold war considered as a home to royal air force squadron which aimed and intend bombarded the Union Soviet by automatic bomb. In July 1952, Jamal Abdel Nasser and his friend (the group of officer) assumed the power in Cairo and declared to overcome British influence and in 1954 Jamal Abel Nasser tried to move back British troops from Suez base and he demanded from United State a military support in the year that following an Israel attack on Egypt troops in Gaza. In September 1955 Nasser exchanged Egyptian cotton for Czechoslovakia's weapons (Eastern bloc) and all that after Washington refused to uphold Egyptian's arm. The main aim of Nasser was to make Egypt at three center circles ( Africa the Arab World and the emerging non-aligned movement) rather than to become soviet satellite. During the mid 1950, the soviet primer Nikita Khrushchev was blessed to provide Egypt by gains and rubbles. However, Nasser opposition to the western regional defense organization like Baghdad pact and his support for non-aligned like Indonesia's Sukamo suit the soviet plans and encouraged the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia against Europe colonial power and their American allies.(Douglass.(2010): pp 306.307).

Eisenhower and his secretary of State John Foster Dulles provided economic assistance to engage Egypt toward the west in order to prevent Russian contravention in the middle east. Furthermore, Britain and United State, the world bank granted Nasser's 200 million to build high dam on the upper Nile at Aswan, a monumental public works project, whereas during of 1956 the project of the Aswan was resolved just when it arrived in Washington and London and in July.19 Eisenhower announced that they should move back U.S offers and at the same time John Foster Dulles reported the Egyptian ambassador "no single project was as unpopular today as Aswan dam" so the United State showed that it was not willing to provide financial support to Egypt even though the American official recognized that Egypt had ability to pay their loans. (Douglass.(2010): pp 307).

Nasser was offended from the American decision and because he was communicated with them previously. Tus, he had secured a million 400 which engagement from Kremlin in early June in addition he supported by Soviet military and economic assistance. On July 26 Nasser declared that Egypt was expropriating the Anglo-French company that operated the Suez Canal and world tools to finance the Aswan dam that led British official to resentment and during a late night cabinet meeting, Anthony Eden and his colleagues vowed never to accept Egyptian control of the waterway and agreed that our essential interest in these era, must if necessary be safeguarded by military action. The president Eisenhower also regarded Nasser's action as sham full but he was worried that armed intervention would back fire and instructed Dulles to seek a diplomatic solution. Whereas the diplomatic informed the Egyptian made certain note to disrupt the oil tankers passing through the canal, but reinforcing the American view that any resort to military force would be misguided and premature that stimulated Britain and France to send troops but Eisenhower warned Eden on September "the people near east and north Africa and to some extent of all Asia and all Africa would be consolidated against the west to degree which I fear could not be overcome in a generation in a generation and perhaps not even in century particularly having in mind the capacity of the Russian to make mischief" (quoted in. Douglass. (2010):pp308).

On October 23 British, French and Israel official met secretly at Sever in order to organize the tripartite scheme, thus Israeli planed to invade Egypt and March to Suez Canal whereas Britain and France decided to withdraw ten miles from the waterway and

when Nasser failed to pull back his forces from their own territory the French and British would intervene. Six days later, the Israelis organized a lightning attack and at this time Washington demanded an immediate ceasefire under UN auspices and cautioned London and Paris to stop sending troops and worked to prevent Moscow from intervening however, Eisenhower announced that any aggression happened on November 6 he would condemn the Israelis as aggressors to this end Khrushchev embraced Nasser and sent a nuclear threat against Britain and France and offered to send in Russia peacekeeper to guarantee regional stability. (Douglass. (2010): pp307-9).

### **2.3 The nationalization of the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam**

The period of growing uncertainty over the US Anglo-Egyptian co-operation about the Aswan dam project, Nasser and the Egyptian government placed at the Aswan dam as high enterprise on the agenda, and because it was an immense project that required a huge finance, the World Bank was the obvious source and in the end 1955 the World Bank announced that the project was acceptable from an economic and technical point of view, at the same time Egypt was negotiating with Britain treasury to pay the debt (15 million) that was owed to the Egyptian from the end of the second world war and that was a blocked account in the bank of England. On December 2 the World Bank decided to concede the Egyptian government 20 million and to bear the defray at all cost as well as the US and British government declared that they were willing to give Egypt 56 million and the 14 million in the high of alpha plan. Though, the antagonist of Nasser toward alpha plan and the west led to disturbance the British and American government. In addition, they started to doubt Nasser's ability to pay off loans. The business resulted an exception by the Senate Appropriation committee which decided in the end that none of the funds for Egypt that was to finance the Aswan Dam, however the river Nile considered as lifeblood of Egypt and more importance. Moreover when the president of the World Bank, Eugene Black arrived to Cairo to discuss Nasser with final offer, she showed kinds of counter proposal for the loans that was unacceptable to capitalize the project. (Heikel. (1986):pp102).

On July 19, Dulles told the Egyptian ambassador, Ahmed Hussein, that US government had decided to withdraw their offer to finance the Aswan dam, these later came as surprise and shock to the both : the British government and Egypt therefore

Macmillan wrote later “ when he heard, on 19 July , Dulles had bluntly told the Egyptian ambassador, Ahmed Hussein that US government had decided to withdraw their support from the scheme” (quoted in p76). Two later days Britain announced its retreating from the undertaking because these later deemed as relief due to its own hard financial situation.

The president Jamal Abdel Nasser protected the Aswan Dam was very important for Egypt as a whole therefore he did not remain sleepy so on 26 July 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez canal company and took over operation of the canal, and at that day Nasser announced in his speech that he nationalized the Suez canal in order to use and exploit the revenue of Suez canal company’s large part to fund the construction Dam. Nasser’s act came as massive shock to the British government and affirmed their worst doubts Nasser, yet when Anthony Eden, he was totally frustrated and wrote “I had no doubt” in addition Eden believed that Britain lost to keep all British assets and the Suez canal as international waterway. In this decision necessitated a prompt reaction by France, Britain and the United State. Two years later of nationalization Nasser legally could nationalize the canal and to pay the compensation to previous owner but his promises about use income of Suez canal for construct Dam was so such ambiguous which mean that no intention of paying compensation. Nasser’s action threatened Britain’s status in the Arab World therefore the British government took speed reaction; thus on 28 July the bank of England and commercial banks were granted authority to block the current Egyptian sterling balances in London in addition the funds and assets of the Suez Canal in London were protected against Egyptian expropriation and all export of arms and military material banned but in the same time this crisis also a dangerous effect toward Britain’s finance, in particular it threatened the position of pound because the most countries which were transferable its large amount of sterling were Arab countries and oil companies so, if the Canal or communication lines were interrupted, the position of Britain would obviously worsen, that mean that Britain would have to buy her oil in dollars which means this later that Britain lose her advantage from supplying oil. Due to the crisis oil, Anthony Eden said “we had prepare to back our remonstrations with military action” (quoted in. Almong (2003): pp 77) as well as Anthony Eden wished from US government to resist with them against Nasser.

French was supported Britain in its action because the French were readiness and eager to attack and organize military operation against Nasser because French believe that Nasser's defeat would solve their problem in Algeria. The French government was an anxious to attack Nasser more than British government and it believe that the United State would stand by them regardless of the situation. Though Britain and France did not share the same outlook but they interested so much on issues that related to Middle East as whole and in Egypt particular and all that to secure their position and income. On 29 July the French prime foreign minister said "one successful battle in Egypt would be worth ten in Africa".(quoted in. Almong .(2003): pp 73).One the same day the French were showed their willing to cooperate with British military commanders in order to make air force over Egypt and to proceed a military planning against Nasser as a result they did an operation which called Musketeer that aimed to all control over the canal and changing Nasser's regime.

The American was countered the both French and British for using the military force because they feared the military forces against Egypt may be have a grave result therefore the president Eisenhower tried to persuade his view Eden but without any advantage, the British and French government were absolute to complete the military forces. (Almong. (2003):pp 75-78).

## **2.4 The Importance and the advantages of the Suez Canal**

Ezzat M.El Sadek debated that the Suez Canal had a main advantages and importance which these later made the western-eastern bloc were interested around it, the main advantages and to Ezzat were the following:

### **a. Importance of the canal**

The Suez Canal is considered to be the shortest link between the east and the west due to its unique geographic location; it is an important international navigation canal linking between the Mediterranean sea at Port Said and the red sea at the Suez. The unique geographical position of the Suez Canal makes it special importance to the world and to Egypt as well. The importance getting augmented with the evolution of maritime transport and world trade. The maritime transport is the cheapest means of transport, whereas more

than 10% of the world trade volume is transported via waterways (seaborne trade ).The canal route achieves a saving in distance between the ports East and West the Canal, the matter that is translated into saving in time, fuel consumption and ship operating costs(Ezzat.Sadak.(2009):pp20).



**Figures01:** The Suez Canal as shortest link between the west and east (quoted in.Ezzat.Sadak.(2003) pp :23)

### **b. The main Advantages of the Suez Canal**

The main one is that it is the longest canal in the world without locks which the navigation goes day and night. Its liable to be widened and deepened when required to cope with the expansion in ship sizes of the world fleet, and the last one is that with the adaptation of Vessel Traffic Management system ‘VTMS’ (a system depending upon the most up to date radar network ), vessels can be monitored and followed on every spot of the canal and intervention in emergency cases can be taken.( Ezzat.Sadak.(2003):pp 10).

### **2.5 The Suez Canal conflict (October 29-November 6, 1956)**

On July 26, 1956 the objective of nationalization was to use the tools to finance to construct Aswan dam, thus Nasser announced that France and Britain could “shake on their rage». Britain and France were disappointed and immediately expropriated Nasser’s

action and tried to regain international control over the Canal Suez. Furthermore, the prime minister Anthony Eden sent the first telegram to President Eisenhower declared the military options were being investigated from outside:


“As we see it was unlikely to attain our objective by economic pressure alone .....we out in the first instance to bring the Maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt .....My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his sense”.(Mc Dermott. (1998): pp 193).

Eisenhower's initial reaction to Nasser decision was stopped o possibly dangerous of military engagement. (Mc Dermott. (1998) pp135-138).In addition, during the years since Israel became a nation in 1948, The attack on Suez was considered as one of the most Israeli –Egyptians clash at that time, the British and French entered into attack with Israeli and attempted to take back the control over Suez canal due to Egypt's nationalization decree of July 26, 1956. And Because Egypt had rejected the Israeli ships from using the canal, the Israeli's interest increased about the status of the canal and they wished to annul Egypt's nationalization decree of July 26, 1956.as wall as London and Paris were very confident that Cairo did not refuse them to using the Suez canal because the west European nations relied on oil supplies that passed through the Suez canal. After Nasser's nationalization decision,, England and France broke out maritime troops and paratroopers into region and they intimidated Egypt to use force if Nasser did not want to take part with them on the control of Suez canal .but between on July and October all the equalization's effort and solutions were failed. So, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State investigated to engage in the Suez Canal by association that called Suez Canal User's Association (SCUA) but unfortunately Jamal Abel Nasser denied Dulles's suggestion. Next, the UN Security Council worked out a compromise for an international canal agency. On October 13; the Soviet Union seemed to Egypt as it accepted the plan but in fact the Soviet Union vetoed the plan and when the compromises began and continued, the French, British, and Israeli held secretly military meeting against Egypt. On October 24, at Sevres, near Paris, the three nations (Britain, Israeli, and France) agreed to carry out and trigger the aggression as they designed at Sevres. on October 29, Israeli forces triggered a raid against Egypt and advanced across Sinai toward Suez canal like in the map bellow. The next day ,the government of Britain and France ordered Cairo and Tel Aviv to

ceasefire thought they perceived that Nasser would refuse therefore , On October 31 ,British and French planes bombed Egyptian airfield and destroyed most of their air force .They also bombed Cairo . On November 2, British's naval troops and its paratroopers took up Port Said and they forced the Egyptian forces to withdraw from the west of the Canal Zone. However, the reaction of UN to stop the crisis was, initially, ineffective. Thus, British and French denied the decision October 31 Security Council to “refrain from the use of force.” Also On November 2, a UN General Assembly resolution required to ceasefire and withdrawal from the region but without any benefit and implementation. Therefore, on November 4, Lester Pearson of Canada suggested that a UN Emergency Force should control the ceasefire. On November 6, the Soviet Union upheld Egypt also the president of union soviet, Khrushchev intimated the western bloc to intervene immediately by sending their forces if they did not stop attack or ceasefire .therefore Eisenhower and Dulles objected the aggression of the three nation from the outset and they decided to use both of United Nations and backed Pearson's attempts for appropriate compromises. (Mc Dermott. (1998) pp:138).

On November 6, the president Eisenhower decided to apply greater pressure on Britain and France. Financial pressure was applied by the United States' selling British pounds on the exchange to damage British currency rates and cutting off oil supplies from Latin America to Europe. Before the end of the day, November 6 the fighting in Suez had stopped because the British, French, and Israelis accepted the ceasefire and the intervention of the UN supervisory force. (Michael. (2009): pp 2).





Figures 2: Israeli's invasion during d October, 29, 1956 (Scott. (2009): pp5)

## 2.6-Conclusion

This chapter investigates the different contexts of the crisis, most important of all that of the Cold War with focus on American-Soviet attitudes toward the crisis leading to the Suez War. The Suez War will be referred to briefly but the analysis will mainly stress the tripartite strategy for the invasion of Egypt. Finally, international reactions to the War will be probed, mainly the American-Soviet roles, in forcing a cease fire and thus by halting the invasion the Suez war ended.

### 3.1 Introduction

The Suez crisis of 1956 was one of the most important and controversial events in British history since the Second World War. Britain and France, their empires were in an advanced stage of decline. They lost leadership in the Middle East and in other regions to the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Consequently, the competition for influence in the Third World began between the two superpowers.

### 3.2 The effect the Suez Crisis on the Soviet Union

The impact of the Suez crisis was explicated by Moscow that was argued the Soviet Union was the major beneficiary of the 1956 crisis. However Britain and France didn't believe that their effect in the Suez region was ended while the United States was not related to its allies so much therefore the Soviet Union exploited the position to be the champion of third world especially the Arab. However and due to behavior of Soviet Union the Soviet-Arab relations was apparent as well as there were a numerous element that were dissonance. (Iroe and. Shemesh. (1990): pp 212).

First of all the Egyptian tried to take a credit from the Soviet in order to defeat the west politically in addition the Egyptian attitude was clear in their media and careful insistence upon the unique Arab role in the crisis and the stress of Egyptian did not mean that they would give to soviet threat a coverage's editorial or any gratefulness. But, Jamal Abdel Nasser believed the other outside effort (as effort of President Eisenhower) rather than the Soviet Union.

Secondly the Egyptians were offended because of soviet's postponement and its inactivity during the Suez crisis in addition Nasser declared clearly in his speech that the Soviets waited nine days to do what they want and what they were in their mind as well as Sadat announced that his disappointment with Moscow started since now and he said that the Americans would able to play the major role in finishing the crisis. In addition to that Heikal said that the main corruption in the 1958 and 1960 crisis was the soviet and Egypt relations

Thirdly, the Arabs became a wise to the priorities of soviets and they perceived that their concern over the crisis was the secondary concern to the Soviet. In these times the soviets wanted to do a little rather than to involve into propaganda action and they wanted to

exploit the crisis to their political advantage. Instead the Soviets saw the poor role of the Arab armies with support of soviet arms could reinforce those with Kremlin who proved for the clause the newer and better supplies which assist and train the Arab armies. At the same time it may have reinforced in the same degree those who object the participation in the whole as produce a various views around the issue. However and as a result the war between the Arab and Israeli which came in the near of the future would be positive option for the Soviet's unwillingness to intervene. And by highlighting on the importance of United State and its risks emanating of military power, it might led to the confrontation between the Soviet Union and United State. In spite of crisis of Suez gave the Soviet Union prestige in the eyes of some region, Eisenhower Doctrine which resulted from the crisis by president Eisenhower led to negative phenomena for the Soviet Union, thus the reaction of Moscow was not importance because the only one who had right to chose were Egyptians . However in 1957, February the Soviet suggested a Soviet- American cooperative approach that contain a finding a peaceful solution to the Arab - Israeli dispute in order to make the relation between Egyptian and Soviets satisfied and improved and these relation was build on the two point .the first point that the soviets were unwilling to do anything and everything in the way of providing the supplies and equipments to Egypt .and the second point Union soviet did not want to make confrontation between Soviets -Americans also they were unwilling to support the way by better weapons because in their opinion there was preference for political means over military (.Iroe and. Shemesh. (1990): pp 212\_13).

### **3.3 The effect of Suez Crisis on United States**

The Suez Crisis of October 1956 deeply changed the policy of Washington toward the Middle East. The events that occurred and its remembrance stimulated the United States to become the strongest power in the Middle East in the first period, after Britain and France. When the Union Soviet acceded in United Nations and decided to cease the attack of British, French and Israeli on Egypt, the American government disturbed from the Union Soviet (Moscow) and expected and persuaded that the Soviet Union would be the major competitor in the Middle East. When the United State's president, Dwight Deisenhofer declared to help non –communist states in the Middle East by his new doctrine From January 1957 until July 1958 and when American marines stationed in Beirut, the Eisenhower administration practiced three principals which related to Suez region that were as following ; (1) The United

States had greater influence in the Middle East than any other outside power. (2) Communism was the major problem of the Arab Middle East. (3) Jamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt was an agent of the Soviet Union. But unfortunately the Eisenhower's policy for investigating these three principals was failed. (.Iroe and.Shemesh. (1990): pp 189).

When the American government disregarded the quarrel which occurred among Arab and Israeli, the American diplomacy became demoralized and their influence in the Middle East was turned back. After that, Eisenhower administration called the three aggressor (Israeli-British-French ) to retreat its invasion on Egypt, but these later was very difficult for secure the constancy. The aftermath of Suez left Washington with impasse because of the United State seemed as it able to solve any problem but in the fact it rarely was gave the suitable solution. (.Iroe and.Shemesh. (1990): pp 190).

President Eisenhower confirmed on 5 January, 1957 that the middle east was always desirable by Russia therefore Eisenhower demanded military assistance from congress to the countries of the middle east in the next tow year because he wanted to execute the international communism in the region in addition he required to put American military forces which considered as it came to protect the integrity and independence of nation and countries which assumed by international communism .However, congress refused Eisenhower request. But with the time the American could stop the aggression on Egypt thus, they could carry the United State than European power also and at the same time American diplomacy sorrowed when they entered the Union Soviet into United Nation in cease fire. The president Eisenhower announced in the end of 1956 that Jamal Abdel Nasser believe Moscow than Washington in cease the war as well as he describe him as evil influence and he declared to Dulles that they would exploit the opinion of Britain and France against Egypt and all that for restraining the Union Soviet forces .the aim of the United State was bring attention of Arab State about Nasser's dangerous and change their opinion toward Nasser but without any benefit. The views of most stats did not alter against Egypt. Thus, American government hated Nasser for many reasons such as: desire Nasser to transact with Union soviet, his request for military assistance from the Soviet for his armed forces and his recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China and willingness Nasser to unify the Arab world led to disturb the United Nation .therefore with the effect of Suez the United State played as savior of conservative Arabs from Nasserism. The method was designed to be more acceptable in the Middle East. (.Iroe and.Shemesh. (1990): pp 191).

After two months, many of politician's debate contributed in modifying the version of the Eisenhower Doctrine which was adopted by Joint Resolution. As well as congress annulated the assertion which contain the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination; peoples now free and independent. Although congress had authority to make war, congress did not permit the president to send forces and troops in the event of the Middle East crisis. But its resolution gave to United State the right to prepare itself to using the military forces to help any nation that demanding assistance against armed aggression. Therefore some observers concluded that congress declared that the president had the right to anticipate this emergency power when necessary and it deemed as resolution to congress when appropriate as well as this report came to persuade the president Eisenhower to use and put the armed forces at the presidential will. (Iroee and Shemesh. (1990): pp 191).

Although Congress discussed the resolution of Eisenhower doctrine, but the States of the Middle East expressed widely different views around the Eisenhower doctrine for instance in January, v Lebanon welcomed the resolution and three member of the Baghdad pact (Turkey, Iran, Iraq). Lebanon reinforced this declaration in general approach. However Egypt and Syria accused the United State for its proclaimed that international communism was the real dander and its disregarding to Western imperialism and Zionism which were In fact the real danger in the Middle East. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Jordan declared that they would not authorize foreign globe to intervene in their region. However, after a late of January King Saud soon annulated himself and he visit to Washington and at February meeting in Cairo he spoke in favor of Eisenhower's anticommunism. Therefore by March, the Eisenhower Doctrine had hardened divisions in the Muslim world between the 'Northern tier' of mostly non-Arab states in the Baghdad Pact, which supported the U.S., and those closer to Egypt, opposed to it. Lebanon, confronting Syria and Israel, welcomed any outside support. The reaction of Israel was not enthusiasm because they were preoccupied with. Early 1957 American demands that they quit the Sinai and Gaza in return for United Nations guarantees. (Iroee and Shemesh. (1990): pp 192).

### 3.4 The effect of Suez Crisis on Israel

Although of the difficulties which faced Israeli in Gaza during the period that following its withdrawal from Sinai. The Suez operation was argued for that the security and international status of Israeli was improved in the initial period complication in addition the Suez operation proved that Israeli was the only party which profited from the Suez war. As well as Suez operation handed a sense of safety for Israeli and it achieved the security for southern border in the region while the activities of fedayeen contributed to stop the Israel's military victory and helped to demoralize turmoil and the claim of Israeli that it had an ability to defend by itself. However, during 1957 and 1958 there were major events that occurred, for example Israeli's ability to condemn itself became hard than previously and its military victory in Suez smoothed the way for a new era in Israeli. In this period Israeli was interested to investigate its internal aims more than before, for example Israelis wanted to: building its internal strength, invest in science and higher education, and absorbing the mass Jewish immigration from North Africa and the Eastern bloc. Addition, it extended its relations with new countries and built a more positive image worldwide. Therefore the prime minister, Ben-Gurion informed IDF ( Israeli defense forces ) in December 1956 that triumph of Israeli in Suez gave great advantage and he assured that he could obtain freedom to use passage through Tiran Straits also Ben-Gurion added that Israeli wanted the world's recognition for its right to exploit the freedom passage and its right to use force in order to protect these passage and in order to open the gate which was among Asia and Africa therefore Ben-Gurion announced as a result that the Sinai war was like ' lightning that rekindled the fires of inspiration in the Jewish people. ( Quoted in Almong. (2003). pp 128). Ben-Gurion declared in his speech to the significance of western power and his willingness to do relations with all world's region, as well as he announced that the international role of great power was still alive even though they didn't stay in the same situation as before so, it means that France and Britain were still great power which were contributed gigantically to civilization. Ben-Gurion thought that the only country which would demand its withdrawal from the Suez was United States therefore Ben-Gurion declared that, ' we must be aware' and he told, 'that Israel's security and strength depended not only on its military capacity, but to a large extent on its position in the international sphere. ' ( Quoted in. Almong. (2003): pp 128). In these statement Ben-Gurion pointed that the emerging a good Israeli's security was not relied only on military

forces but also it was required the developing its foreign relation in order to set up its status in the worldwide. But, the result of Suez crisis mad Ben Gurion to insist more than ever and at the same time the British ambassador Sir Francis Rundall noted the impact of Suez war on Israel's self-confidence and he wanted to exploit the position and take revenge in any time. At the same time the Israeli perceived the possibility of economic pressure especially from the United States due to the stress of Suez campaign therefore it became more aware of public opinion. However the barbarity of the bygone years changed by growing realization of Israeli which must persuade the grimmer to live in area of active tension between East and West. Moreover Israelis government 'deemed the risk was necessary because it would gave far greater repercussion than ever to any initiative on their part and he also believed that the maintenance of the status quo in the region was of major interest to Israel. When they settled in the Suez crisis they tried to bring the security to Israeli on the southern border and to make vast relation with many countries. The main Israel's agenda was after Suez was making relation with Asian and African state. So Ben-Gurion noted the significance of these relations and he tried to express that important for Israeli because he believed one day the African and Asian states would be strongest political factor in the world. Thus during the 1950s and 1960s, the relation between the African-Asian states and Israeli called as the 'Periphery Treaty 'which considered as the main priorities in that period. Ben-Gurion perceived that the relation of African and Asian was important especially in the light of the cold when the fight was triggered in the Asian and African among the west and east and at the same time he observed that the African and Asian which became independent didn't will to be related with western power that was previously occupied it therefore Israeli noted that there was an opportunity for it, thus it was exploited the position of small nation which were under the British imperialism in order to offer aid to and advice to those nation. (Almong. (2003): pp 127).

Thus, the Suez affair contributed to give an positive image for Israeli especially with those countries therefore Ben-Gurion was always perceived the friendship among the African-Asian and Israeli was based on common ground for instance Israeli tried to partake the fear of the pan-Arab movement. Israeli was wanted to help these countries in repairing their towns by helping their inhabitant in training their inhabitants to work in factories and in helping them with advances in agricultural and medical fields and that by a special department in the Israeli Foreign Ministry which was established to guide activities in these countries. And through the strong willingness of Israelis to build these relationships, the Israelis were willing to explore



any possible channel that could help them broaden their contacts with countries in this region and sought British help to achieve this goal. Walter Eytan, the General Director of the Israeli Foreign Office, told Sir Francis Rundall on 27 July 1957, that her Majesty's Government would be able to assist Israel in these matter, for instance in its relations with Burma. He said that Israel had begun to establish good relations with that country, but then the Burmese had suddenly changed their attitude and he was suspicious that Britain was involved in this. In fact, the Foreign Office in London noted Israel's relations with Asian and African countries quite favorably, and because of Israel's influence, as a pro-Western country, could work against that of communism and the pan-Arab movement. The benefit to Britain was that it assisted Israel to find an outlet for trade, thus avoiding the Arab boycott. If the boycott succeeded in bringing Israel's economy to a standstill it would pose a danger to Middle East peace and therefore to Britain's interests. In addition, the Foreign Office wished that the relationship between the African-Asian states and Israel would contribute to a decreasing of Israeli feelings of isolation and claustrophobia. (Almong. (2003): pp 127-130 )

### **3.5 The effect of Suez crisis on Egypt**

In the Middle East, The crisis resulted in a new order as president Nasser proved to be capable of managing increasing traffic via the Suez Canal. This was the last link in the chain that included the removal of the British Base, as Nasser's government was not put down as the tripartite invasion had desired. Nasser's success politically despite his military defeat, raised his position not only in the region but also in the entire Third World as he was portrayed as an anti colonialist hero , and thus, national movements all over the World were encouraged by his example. (McNamara.(2003): pp 15).

The Suez crisis caused harsh economic and military troubles for Nasser. After the end of the war, he tried to rebuilt the country's economy and army. Increasingly, hisrole in the Middle East was flourishing as a result of sympathetic attitudes held within almost all Arab citizens towards his anti colonial policies. Nasser was seen as a hero of Arabs after being resisting to three powerful countries. Inspired by his nationalist Convictions, he went into a series of resistance against Western policies aiming at harming him by using local actors such as King Saud and the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq and Jordan. Particularly The West played on his policies of establishing Arab republics based on social Nationalism to alert royal system of ambitious Nasserism. (McNamara.(2003): pp 16).



After the crisis, the region went into conflicting alliances which resulted in serious crises. The Eisenhower Doctrine which aimed to establish and help loyal regimes to the USA created a headache for Nasser, mainly after the Jordanian-Saudi withdrawal from the Arab Solidarity Pact of 1955. In response to Western interference in Arab affairs, Nasser went into Alliances to resist Western pressures by trying to meet the Western policy of isolating him from his vital environment in the region. Therefore, he followed a policy of resistance outside his borders to challenge western interests and its allies as he did in Jordan and Syria in 1957, in Lebanon and Iraq in 1958, and in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1961. (McNamara.(2003): pp 17).

The Suez crisis completely changed the policies of Arab regimes. Before the crisis Jordan had been one of Britain's closest regional allies .Nasser tried to gain as much sympathizers as possible within Jordan by subdividing Nabulsi's government in Jordan. By the beginning of 1957, king Hussein, under pressure of his pro-Nasser Prime Minister, agreed to align Jordan with the Arab Solidarity Pact. As a consequence of Suez and their adherence to the Pact, Jordanians wished to abrogate the military alliance with Britain , which gave Nasser the right to station his troops in Jordan as well as defending the small kingdom in case of foreign attack. (McNamara.(2003): pp 18).

The Jordanian request for the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty was Conceded by the British .Yet, under western pressures, King Hussein surprisingly forced Nabalssi to resign in April 1957 claiming that he was cooperating with communists and conspiring with Nasser to overthrow him. King Hussein sought American help, which came the form of pressures on King Saud who came in support of Hussein with Iraq despite the old rivalries among them. Nasser portrayed Hussein as a tool of imperialism in the region. Moreover, King Saud of Arabia was increasingly resenting Nasser's popularity among Saudi people and his reference to Saudi oil as belonging to the Arabs. Consequently, the Arab Solidarity Pact was shattered. In those circumstances, only Syria remained in favour of Nasser's policy. Thus, proved a relative retreat in Nasser's status in the region when loosing three major countries at once. King Saud despite his old rivalries with the Hashemite declared that: *'... The Baghdad pact was in accordance with the United Nations charter and in benefit of Arab world.* (A.Dawinsha,p.411.). Nasser thus was weakened through using local actors against his policies instead of military actions already proved to be a total failure in Suez. According to Mc Namara: *'... Britain after being convinced by the US had succeeded in sustaining Kings Hussein and Saud against their syrio-Egyptian plot...'* ( R.Mc Namara,p.79.).

After isolating Nasser in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and relatively in Lebanon; Nasser did all his best to keep Syria in his camp. Syria had been the cause of much instability since its independence in the Middle East mainly due to the conflict between pro western agendas and strong supporters of Arab Nationalism..The Baath Party, the strongest nationalist party in Syria shared Nasser's views of Arab unity. The Party members succeeded in accessing to serious positions in the army as well as in other sensitive political spots. The Party saw Nasser as a foundation for its grand dream of Arab Unity and a support for its own power at home because he would for sure support the party in his campaign to reach authority in Syria. For Nasser, The involvement in Syria had many reasons ; accomplishing his desire of Arab Unity, forbidding Syria from drifting into either of the competing blocs , and to avoid any other western attempt to isolate him in the area. ( Lloyed.(1961):pp89).

In January 1958, a delegation of Syrian Army came to negotiate the unity in Cairo. Nasser suggested a strong central government based in Cairo under his presidency, the exclusion of the army from the political life, and the abolition of all political parties except his own. The Syrian agreed on these terms scarifying themselves for the dream of Arab Unity. On February 1, 1958, The United Arab Republic was proclaimed. Nasser declared : *'...Today Arab Nationalism is not just a matter of slogans and shouts, it has become an actual reality'* ( M.Karmava,p.89.) .The foundation of the UAR was to destroy what was left of Britain's power in the Middle East.

The creation of the UAR marked the complete success of the Nasserit project in Syria. Hopes that the British and the Americans might have entertained that Syria could be brought into the Western camp were finished. Reactions from the West and the other Arab powers were unfavourable Dulles, Lloyd and the other foreign ministers of the Baghdad Pact were meeting when informed about the fact. The tone of the meeting was intensely hostile to the Egyptian- Syrian merger. Nuri al-Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, spoke at considerable length. He said that :

*'the union idea was being pushed by the Soviet Union and by Nasser. Nasser's object was to obtain domination over the Arab world and union with Syria would certainly be followed by heavy pressure to bring the other countries under his control... It was difficult to know*

*exactly what should be done about Union with Egypt, but certainly it should be opposed.*” (Lloyed,p94).

The other Arab leaders felt similarly about the union. What was surprising perhaps, was that the British and the Americans as led by Lloyd and Dulles appeared to write a blank cheque for any forceful action that the Arabs might take. Lloyd intervened early in the discussion saying :

*“ it was clear that the proposed union was a danger to all our interests.. but the question is how and whether we were able to do it successfully; to fail would be a diplomatic victory for the other side. .”* (Lloyed,p97).

The creation of the UAR was a huge blow to Iraq still key regional British ally. Nuri Said still hoped to bring Syria into his camp. Britain tried to reinforce its axis to deal with the new situation by subdividing local Syrian politicians to end the union. However, Nasser successfully achieved what he wanted in Syria. He went on Seeking a more influencing role in the area through supporting Arab nationalists all over the Arab world mainly in Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia which created troubles for West elsewhere. Because most of the Egyptian-Syrian activity was aimed at Jordan and Lebanon, the British and the Americans had believed that Iraq was a stable and secure ally. Nuri Said and the Iraqi monarchy were weakened gradually by the successive crises of the Baghdad Pact, Suez and the constant Egyptian propaganda. Britain was well aware of the undercurrent of support for Nasser on the streets, believed that Iraq was safe from revolution. Within the Iraqi army, a Free Officer movement similar to the Egyptian model had been in existence for some time. In early July, a plot against King Hussein of Jordan was uncovered in Jordan. Nuri reacted by ordering his troops led by Abdalkarim Qasim, to move an Iraqi infantry brigade to Jordan. Instead, Qasim took the opportunity to overthrow the Iraqi government in the early hours of July, 14. For a couple of days, mobs ruled the streets. Nuri, the King and the royal family were all murdered. Iraq was the Arab country with the most economic potential, combining a substantial population with substantial oil reserves. Therefore, losing Iraq to the revolutionary forces in the Middle East was a devastating blow to the West’s cause. It forced Britain, to defend

last-ditch positions in the Persian Gulf, such as Kuwait. Britain thus had to challenge Nasser through another Arab regime for the time being. (Lloyed, p97).

In other words it transformed the basis of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship completely. News of the revolution in Iraq must have come as a devastating blow to the British Cabinet. Not only had the Iraqi monarchy fallen, but there was also a plea from President Chamoun for the deployment of Anglo-American forces in Lebanon. To the British, the figure at the centre of all this turmoil was President Nasser. With the question of using force in Iraq, the attention of the allies was turned to securing the Lebanon and Jordan. Within hours of Chamoun's request for the deployment of forces, the United States moved marines into Beirut. This was a unilateral United States action and the British were specifically requested by Eisenhower to keep out. (Dawinsha (2003): pp409).

The attempt to focus the blame for the whole crisis on the United Arab Republic was a major concern of the British government. The Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Home, was even more explicit in his denunciation of the United Arab Republic:

*“Unless somebody puts a stop to this process which the United Arab Republic is fomenting in this part of the world, then not only shall we see the whole of the Middle East go, but the rot will spread to Africa and beyond.”* (Eliot, p.166.).

Britain's lack of intervention pushed it to recognize the new Iraqi regime and that 'good relations' should be established with it, and that it might be possible to exploit the natural differences in outlook between the Iraqis and the Egyptians. When the crisis broke, Nasser appeared to have been worried that the Anglo-American operations in the Lebanon and Jordan were aimed at toppling the new Iraqi regime or even his own regime. With this fear in mind, he immediately set off to the Soviet Union to get Russian support in the event of an Anglo-American operation to retake Iraq. The Soviet refused and Nasser, in spite of the disappointment in Moscow, concluded a military pact with the new regime in Baghdad. President Nasser thus, gained a new ally in the region though the Iraqi new government will not be as co operative as Nasser desired.

Despite the relative detente that followed the Iraqi crisis, Anglo-Egyptian relations went again badly mainly during the Yemeni crisis. Upon acceding to the premiership in Britain, in 1964, Douglas-Home ordered a review of British policy towards the Yemen. What was most worrying to the British government was the increasing signs that an Egyptian-backed campaign against British rule in South Arabia was taking shape. The British strongly suspected Yemeni and Egyptian involvement. Moreover, it was the signal for the beginning of an urban guerrilla war aimed at driving the British out of the area. Nasser began to gear up for a major anti-British offensive strengthened by a successful Arab summit in Cairo, 1964. (A.Dawinsha, (2003): pp 484).

President Nasser was equally prepared to escalate. On 23 April, he made his first visit to Yemen and attacked British policy and bases once more. This further increased the determination of Britain to strike back. Butler commented the Egyptian supportive attitudes towards Yemeni revolutionary activities by saying:

*The British cabinet was not proposing to take part overtly in the Yemen war Nevertheless, we were quite unwilling to allow the UAR to get away with the present situation, and we would not wish to see the Royalist cause go under ( R.Louis,p1986).*

A clash seemed to be inevitable, the war began in Yemen between royalists of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen and factions of the Yemen Arab Republic from 1962 to 1970. The war began with a coup d'etat carried out by the republican leader, Abdullah as-Sallal, which dethroned the newly crowned Imam Al-Badr and declared Yemen a republic under his presidency. The Imam escaped to the Saudi Arabian border and rallied popular support. The royalist side received support from Saudi Arabia, while the republicans were supported by Egypt and the Soviet Union. Both foreign irregular and conventional forces were involved. The Egyptian President, supported the republicans with as many as 70,000 troops. Despite several military moves and peace conferences, the war sank into a stalemate. Egypt's commitment to the war is considered to have been detrimental to its performance in the Six-Day War of June 1967, after which Nasser found it increasingly difficult to maintain his army's involvement and began to pull his forces out of Yemen.

The Yemen War caused heavy implications for the Saudi royal family when a pro-Nasser clique was formed, culminating in the declaration of the Free Princes by Talal ibn Abdalaziz. After Nasser allowed the Free Princes movement to operate from Cairo, it gained a considerable following among minor Saudi princes and the co-founder of the organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Abdulla Al Tariki. In addition to those developments, Algeria became independent of France. Nasser considered this a victory for himself and the Arab nationalist movement. Then, on 8 February 1963, a military coup led by Ba'athists and Nasserists was staged in Iraq, overthrowing Qasim who was shot dead. Although Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr orchestrated the coup, Nasser's sympathizer Abdel Salam Aref was chosen to be the new president. The Iraqi and Syrian regimes, both ruled by the Ba'ath party, soon sent Nasser delegations to push for a new Arab union on 14 March 1963. Nasser berated the attendees for being "phony nationalists" and constantly changing direction. He presented them a detailed plan for unity, favouring a federal system which began with the merger of defence and foreign policy. A four-year term for president was stipulated, in addition to legislative councils being responsible for overseeing the functions of the state. The measures would be implemented slowly and in segments. By the end of his lecture, Nasser stated that he was the *"leader of the Arabs and without me you are nothing. Either take what I have to offer you or leave and never return."* ( A.Dawinsha, (2003 ):pp486).

After all the crises following Suez, President Nasser proved his capacity to challenge Britain in almost all the Arab countries throughout the 1950's up to the Six days war, 1967, which is considered as the decisive moment of Nasser's downfall in terms of influence in the region after the harsh defeat of Arabs against Israel. The war caused tremendous troubles for Nasser at home as well as in the Arab world until his death in 1970. But still he remained the most influential political figure in the modern Arab history. ( A.Dawinsha, (2003 ):pp488).

### 3.6 The effect of Suez Crisis on Britain

The political objective of the Suez war on the British politics, Anthony Eden who demitted from the office on 1957 and accused of betrayal parliament and after a great pressure that paved by the President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the United States government, Antony Eden barely remained prime minister for two year in the time of resignation, However, his failure in treating the Suez crisis outshined all what he had investigated in different

government and objection roles in the previous 30 year. In these time his successor, Harold Macmillan tried to speed the decolonization and to regain the benevolence of the United State and. Thus the British foreign policy thinking became increasingly removed from acting as a great imperial power. ( Jakson. (1980): pp 115).

In 1960, the Prime Minister Harold Wilson refused continuously support the American war in Vietnam by British troops in spite of Americans insistence all that because unwillingness of Americans to provide Britain during the Suez crisis. After the events that led to Eden's resignation, Britain could enforce its military abroad without the support of the United State until the Falkland war in 1982. Thus and according to evidences of some the crisis noted a final power that transformed to new superpower that were the United States and the Soviet Union. Although unwillingness of United State to support Britain and in spite of suffering the British domestic policy, the relationship between United State and Britain did not undergo due to the final consequences of the Suez crisis. Thus the relationship between the Britain and United State after the Suez crisis became special and more active and revival. And according to Risse-Kappen "The two government... engaged in almost ritualistic reassurances that their 'special relationship' would be restored quickly. " ( Quoted in. Suez crisis. (2011):pp 13). Therefore Eisenhower at that time showed his repentance when he rejected the joining to British, French and Israeli in the crisis.

Eisenhower demitted from his office he saw the Suez crisis might his greatest foreign policy mistake not only that but he saw also United States contributed to invalidate the European allies in the cold war as well as he suggested Nasser to be a man who controlled the Arab world and in the following years some argued that real mistake during the Suez crisis was done by Eisenhower not Eden because Eisenhower in that time showed the west was divided and weak due to his refusal to reinforce his allies and his leaving the Soviet Union to exploit the position and when leadership failed to find solution to end the Suez crisis Eisenhower and United Nation didn't care about the military campaign of Anglo-French against Egyptian and his reaction was muted and he showed the possibility of British and French troops to take canal although he was afraid to support his allies that might damage his successful in re-election as president. Through a visit of the UK Foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd at the Walter Reed Hospital to Dulles in Washington, he questioned Lloyd why he stop the war and why he did not complete Nasser's defeat and the same thing to Eisenhower who showed and his secretary of state the identical note. (Suez crisis. (2011) pp 13 )



### 3.7 The effect of the Suez crisis on France

The relation among Franco-American never improved from the Suez crisis and that for different causes, in the fact, before the Suez crisis there were a tension which triggered and confused the relation between French and American because Paris deemed U.S as betrayal of the French war effort in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. This event illustrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in alliance in its lack of planning and co-operation beyond the European stage. Generally the Suez crisis demonstrated the allies of France could not stand with France such as Britain decided to ceasefire in midst for war without consulting French moreover to the political objection of Americans to. (Jakson. (1980): pp 110-113).

### 3.8 The Suez Crisis's winners and losers

Jamal Abel Nasser, the Egyptian president become the hero of the Arab world because he challenge and got up against Britain and France who controlled the Middle east for a long time, Jamal Abdel Nasser had obtained complete control of Suez canal and large quantity of British military supplies and due to the assistance of us the Suez canal reopened in 1957 and although Egypt lost territory when Israeli attacked Sinai, Israeli obliged by United State to withdraw in the early 1957 in addition Nasser declared that the defeating of Egyptian was turned back to the support of Britain and France for Israeli . However, the Israelis also made gains and their rapid triumph over Egyptian forces in Gaza and Sinai and that later proved that they had strongest Defence Forces in the Middle East. While to the Britain and France, they deemed as loser of the Suez war. Britain and France failed to regain control of the canal and they had failed to overthrow Nasser, thus the long period of Anglo-French domination of the Arab was ending. (Scott. (2012): pp 5).

Finally, the major impacts of the Suez Crisis was to make many of the Arab state more anti-western than ever: not only had Britain and France tried to overthrow the government of the leading Arab nation, but they had used Israel to do so. Now, more than before, Israel looked like outpost of western imperialism. Also the Arab become more willing to seek Soviet aid therefore the Soviet Union began to support most Egypt's weapons and to pay for building of the Aswan dam and many other project. However, Nasser did not want Egypt to be tied to the Soviet Union and he was certainty not communist because he wanted Egypt and other state to be neutral. And in 1964 Jamal Abdel Nasser, invited the leader of Arab state to conference in Cairo. Although many of them mistrusted each other, the one thing that united



them all was opposition to the state of Israel and support for Palestinians (Figure3). (Scott. (2012): pp 6).




Figure 03: Planning of Suez crisis from the nationalization to the effect (Scott. (2012): pp6).

### 3.9 Conclusion

Finally, this chapter looks in the effects of the Suez Crisis on super power and Britain France, Egypt and Israel, for example, according to Egypt Jamal Abdel Nasser become the hero of Arab world because he challenge and stood against Britain and France, but France and Britain they failed to regain the control of the Suez Canal and removing the president Nasser from the power but the superpower of United state created and used the Eisenhower doctrine which contained using the military forces if requested by any country in the middle east to check aggressors whereas Israel made gains and their rapid triumph over Egyptians in Gaza and Sinai that later proved they strongest defense forces in the Middle East..

The Suez Crisis, 1956 came to prove that the whole Middle East had indeed entered a new era of successive crises. The British-Egyptian struggle did not come to an end until the 1970's. During this period, Britain could no more solve the political mess in the Middle East as it did before when it was at its peak of imperial power. The US flourished as the major player from the western bloc with its allies. Whereas, the USSR challenged western interests through different strong relations with local actors as well as with revolutionary movements. President Nasser came to be the hero of Arabs, and consequently, he played a significant role in the area throughout his rule up to the harsh defeat in the Six Days War of 1967. For Britain, The Suez Crisis marked the most influencing incident of its decline in the Middle East. After the crisis, Britain looked for an American partnership to deal with the new situation in the region. Moreover, the crisis marked the failure of British Foreign policy because it did not just fail to reach its goals, but still it caused a serious disagreement among the members of the western bloc, which was mainly concerned by the containment policies toward the USSR. Also Britain was proved to be forceless in its attempt to maintain its imperial status. Of course, not only the Suez Crisis which was the cause of Britain's imperial status decline, but other factors played a significant role, such as its economic problems inherited from the Second World War and the immense losses in its empire, mainly the Indian subcontinent. The USA did not emerge in the region from nowhere. The crisis emphasized its leading role in the region as its two important European allies were declining there. Though the US succeeded to some extent in playing the leading role, but the policy of containing the Soviet Union in the Middle East failed through the Eisenhower Doctrine. Thus, the US could not put the Egyptian leader down neither in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq or in other 54 sensitive areas, of the Arab world, nor neutralizing him efficiently from the USSR. The US policy was to isolate Nasser from any possible ally in the area politically via subdividing old rivals of Nasser in the region unlike British policies which used arms and force. The USSR relatively benefited from the situation by playing on the anti colonial sentiments of the Arabs as it very often considered capitalism as the highest stage of imperialism. The USSR, additionally, went on a more decisive policy via seeking economic and political success over the west mainly by Arm deals and great projects and investments Both President Nasser and the USSR profited from each other to topple the western presence in the region. In Egypt, despite the military defeat in the Suez War and its consequences on the economy of the country, The Egyptian leader successfully challenged western interests not only in the Suez Canal but also in almost all the countries of the region. He could do so as Arab Nationalism was in its peak. Nasser's policy

## General Conclusion

was to protect himself from all the attempts made by the west to isolate him from his allies in the region and to neutralize him from probable allies within the Eastern Bloc. Neither goals were achieved. Also, his attitudes made the Arabs afraid of possible direct interference in their affaires which created for him troubles in the area. Only the Six Days war put an end to his role. Yet, his experience remains the most significant in modern Arab history, for challenging the west.

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