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Discourse of Gender-based Violence

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Sexually Harassed Teenage Girls' Narratives of Personal Experiences

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Dedications

"This work is dedicated to my family members and my friends who have supported me in one way or another while this thesis was being written"

"This is also to Hadj Benaissa ;his endless support will always be remembered."

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Abstract

This doctoral research analyses Algerian sexually harassed teenage girls' narratives of personal experiences focusing on how linguistic resources are used to index their identities. More precisely, this thesis aims at examining the several ways in which the understanding of public sexual harassment is both discursively gendered in the name of the so-called honourable cultures and the social gender norms deeply rooted in the cultural epistemology. Hence, we attempt to devote the first two chapters to the major concepts of the study, while the last two chapters are purposefully designed for the methodological framework and the discussion of the findings. On this basis, the researcher seeks to test the validity of what were hypothesized by including a variety of well- known methodological frameworks. Besides to observing the research site, interviewing the participants and distributing questionnaires, we had to draw on resources from critical discourse analysis and feminist approaches which take the constitutive nature of discourse as its focus. The research findings indicate that sexual harassment is discursively gendered in its practice, depictions and blaming.

Key words: CDA, Gender Identities, Violence and Narratives.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACHPR…….....African Charter on Human and People's Rights

CDA……..Critical Discourse Analysis

CDS…….……Critical Discourse Studies

CL…….……Critical Linguistics

DHA…….……Discourse- Historical Approach

CASAW……Centre for advanced Study of the Arab World

CEDAW……..The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women

GBV…….……Gender Based Violence

IHRL……..International Human Rights Law

NGO……Non-governmental organisation

UNHCR…….United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

VAW……..Violence against women

VAWG……. Violence against Women and Girls

WHO…….World Health Organization

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General Introduction

Is it a matter of locking doors and windows?, or is it simply avoiding dangerous spaces?. Perhaps it is all about keeping silent to escape the harm ... Its threat, however, is behind all those doors and well- hidden even in the so called secure places, it occurs everywhere; in private and public spheres with many faces, it pervades our lives and yours as well. Absolutely, sexual violence is the invisible widespread pain of all human beings. It can often be an ambiguous category because its definition shifts between cultures and societies. In other words, what is regarded as a sexual violent act in one period may well be regarded as a non-sexual violent one in another and vice versa. Therefore, whatever its meaning is, any kind of sexual violence has a serious impact on individuals and groups. Women, in particular, are experiencing what they probably call "the real fear" from different violent acts that might not include an exhaustive list. According to the World Bank data (2012), women aged 15-44 are more at risk from rape and domestic violence than from cancer, car accidents, war and malaria. Having read this report, it is supposed that although sexual violence has been investigated by many researchers and many methods as well (such as sociology, history, psychology…etc), it still remains a great complex issue indeed. Therefore, an immediate alertness suggests that it must be examined from a new perspective which emphasizes on the constitutive nature of discourse.

Undoubtedly, scenarios of sexual violence can be well described and interpreted via language. Scholars do agree that discourse is the crucial medium through which one perceives the world. In view of that, the most two inquisitive questions that are believed to be necessary raised are: why and how?. Kjerstin Andersson (2008: 22) describes Foucault' notion of discourse as that which makes it possible or impossible to talk about things, phenomena, relations and positions in particular ways. To state it differently, discourses are patterns of language that are socially and culturally produced and to understand the social norms and cultural values is to elicit the narrative discourses of what, when, where, why and how people think and do. While this work studies public sexual harassment and gender identity, to quote Hans J. Ladegaard (2012: 452) "narratives are seen as a fundamental means for organising our understanding of the world".

It is then the endeavour of narrative discourses to tell stories of what is deemed as great, perfect, violent, nasty and wrong…etc. Besides, since we can tell different narratives

"accounts", we can shape different depictions of sexual violence and make sense of different identities including victim's identity.

With these objectives in mind, full attention is drawn on issues connected to both sexual violence and gender identity in relation to narratives. Sexual violence is the act of forcing females to engage in sexually motivated activity without their consents. It is often known as 'gender-based violence' because it partly stems from the subordinate status of women's gender in society. Regardless of the dispute between approaches, the well known concept "gender" is highly discussed by valuable studies, but our study, in particular, is organized to make sense of people's daily experiences with gender. Gender stereotypes create sex differences in traits and lead to social exclusion of those who do not fit these traits. In this sense, because of stereotypes, women and men's discourses of sexual violence might be different and constructions of their identities, therefore, might have also been developed differently.

As indicated in the title "Discourse of Gender based Violence", the discussion of this work will focus on one worst undeclared taboo type of sexual violence: public sexual harassment. The researcher seeks to explore how discursively the figured world of sexual harassment is expressed and also study the function narrative discourses have in constructing victim's identity in the name of the so-called honourable cultures and social gender norms. More precisely, this doctoral research aims at analyzing the several ways in which public sexual harassment is discursively gendered (in its depiction- practice- victim blaming) and how victim's identity is constructed when telling those short stories.

In brief, despite of the fact that there are no ample statistics available by women's centres and other formal institutions, many if not most of the Algerian teenage girls for sure have worse tales to tell. Hence, we must begin with a reading of life stories in which the respondents could express what their perceptions of public sexual harassment are and what the harasser and the harassed "themselves" are through their actual stories.

For many people, reading is not a choice but a necessity, for others, one can also learn by experience however. Regardless of the few books and the brief internet search I have examined, the key factor behind conducting this study is my personal connection to the topic. In short, it is my story. I noticed how I was already taking responsibility, as a female victim who experienced pain, difficulty and silence as well, while gendering males' sexual violence

against me as rational and justifiable. What became apparent to me was how sexual harassment was completely viewed as the product of men's natural drive for sex and as a 'natural' problem. Indeed, these discourses left me with a sense of pessimism about how to challenge and prevent particular problematic experiences in the public spaces. Doubtless one may ask how such painful experiences can be conducive to do research. In one clear answer, it is through my thesis that female victims are blamed and stereotyped to receive no support, yet it is also through it that change of their actual live stories is quite possible if only these female victims can be motivated- in spite of the lack of motivated environments- and voluntarily agreed to be interviewed to tell their untold stories.

Sincerely, the significance of this work might be judged by how many times you "the readers", when reading, question the events of public sexual harassment during the course of your lives with a very simple question: "but, why …?." Thus, the main purpose here is to do much more than a mere doctoral research on sexual harassment against teenage girls, but also for and with them. Given that any attempt to describe the world is made via language (Elderly 2001), our primary aim is to examine how these discourses of gendered sexual harassment have special function in constructing victims' identities. By insisting on the possibility of telling sexual harassed teenage girls' stories, we aimed at:

1. making sense of the phenomenon of public sexual harassment against teenage girls;
2. understanding its types and causes;
3. describing the ways this social problem "sexual harassment" is gendered;
4. attempting to depict the important aspects of the accomplishment of victim's identity;
5. revealing the relationship between the Algerian patriarchal culture and the probability of sexual harassment;
6. seeking to devote the present study in developing a useful program to prevent sexual harassment.

Generally, any research is not welcomed with the absence of its well-defined pillars. As far as this form of sexual violence "public sexual harassment" is concerned, this study raises the following three main "how" research questions concerning:

1. How is “sexual harassment” in public spheres thought about and practiced through narrative discourse?

2. How is blaming manifested in these narrative discourses?

3. How can we become more sensitized to and willing to speak out against public sexual harassment?

It is very important for this study to raise these sub- questions :

1. How do the respondents account for the use of “sexual harassment in public spheres?

2. How do the victims react against sexual harassment in public spheres in these narratives?

3. How is the identity of the sexually harassed victim constructed in these stories?

4. How do the so- called “the Algerian culture of honour” and public sexual harassment discursively interact? How does their culture influence their stories? Why do accounts of stories such as these continue to perpetuate stereotypes and generalisations?

On the basis of these questions, we hypothesized that the informants express their frustration because of males’ annoying and pestering acts, but they are not quite aware that these acts fall under the name of the worst type of sexual violence “sexual harassment”. Evidently, their conceptualizations of what counts as sexual harassment in general may include just giving a massage around the neck or shoulders, touching the person's clothing, hair, or body, hugging, kissing, patting, or stroking, touching or rubbing oneself sexually around another person, standing close or brushing up against another person. Their opinions raise the question of whether different behaviours can or should all be defined as sexual harassment. The respondents agree that naturally males do commit these behaviours. They naturalize and justify these forms against them because this happens to all females and they get accustomed to that. Some of them, however, are in complete ignorance why these acts are performed because males have no reason to do that.

Additionally, it is impossible and undesirable for these girls to become such agents who decide to make a complaint against their harassers. If they decide to be no longer victims and defend themselves, they would be considered as violent hysterical and dishonourable females. Besides, teenage girls do not dare to tell their parents/brothers- in some cases their mothers- if they are harassed because they will be blamed and may be beaten because they are the symbols of their families' honour. They feel that teenage girls purposefully dressed up and acted to attract violence or threat upon them. That is to say, men's sexual harassment is excused because of the faults of teenage girls. Perhaps not the harassers but teenage girls' ways of dressing and walking, choices of time, place when and where they go out are the key independent variables that drive males to sexually abuse these girls.

As a result, the majority of the concerned populations are discursively affected by gender norms. For them, sexual harassment is exclusive to males and no need to report these incidents to the police. As having fixed occupied identities of sacrificial daughters and pretty sisters who are doing honourable and the so called "correct "things, teenage girls should not show any sign of resistance because the Algerian patriarchal culture of honour has strongly legitimizes this against them. Briefly, we may find this sexual unwanted conduct is gendered in its practice, depictions and blaming. So, in addition to this forced occupied victim's identity, it could be also generalized that it is a gendered term.

For the purposes of this discussion; research methodology is the most crucial section that would be evaluated and harshly criticized if the techniques used are not carefully weighed up. Beiske (2002) states that while factors such as time and costs certainly play an important part in deciding how to approach a particular research problem, the subject of the research itself should ultimately determine the methods used".

Keeping these points in mind, this doctoral research includes a variety of well- known methodological frameworks. Initially, the process of collecting data was based on a participant (unstructured) observation of the spaces of investigation. The questions of sexual harassment and gender identity in narrative discourse require different approaches and research tools. So after careful readings, two main techniques seem suitable to this topic: both direct semi-structured interview (for the collection of narratives) and structured questionnaire are chosen to cover the topics that guide to the answers of the research questions.

For the collection of life stories, Algerian teenage girls (The minimum age is 14 years and the maximum is 22 years) are asked for their consents to be interviewed and tell their narratives in order to be transcribed later in the English language. Like other studies, this research seems to have some difficulties. That is why for ethical issues, it is very necessary after explaining the research topic, the participants should be encouraged and guaranteed anonymity. Based on the seminal work of Labov and Waletzky (1967) that best identifies the key components of oral narratives, we suggest then to be in favour of plea for diversity. Based on resources from critical discourse analysis and feminist approaches, this thesis answers questions about the way specific discourses of the term 'sexual harassment' construct identity, the operation of gendered power relations within sexual harassment discourses and the way aspects of ideology underpin social interaction.

For the same aims, questionnaires are distributed to a diverse sample of participants. Their opinions, perspectives and experiences are important since we are dealing with public sexual harassment in patriarchal communities. Moreover, it is also suggested to have some discussions with various official representatives in order to examine their attitudes and the measures that could be taken to combat this sensitive phenomenon.

Owing to the basic structure of these four chapters, the abovementioned organized parts can be clearly connected. Following the general introduction, the researcher attempts to devote the first two chapters to the major concepts involved in this study, while the last two ones are purposefully designed for the methodological framework and the discussion of the findings. The following overview of the organisation of this thesis will provide a sense of how the theoretical and methodological approaches outlined above shaped the overall project.

The first chapter is dedicated to the general and basic interdisciplinary issues surrounding the topic of gender identity in discourse. It covers the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of stereotypes that are attributed to both men and women based on their gender. In addition, it insists on revealing the early work on context, gender and language as well as presenting the most recent studies on the construction of gender identities in discourse. Finally, these diverse theoretically approaches serve to raise awareness that intersections between the constitutive nature of discourse, gender identity and power have to be included and integrated in this chapter.

In the second chapter, we move to consider the most important feminist theories of gender-based violence, including the types of sexual violence and public sexual harassment in particular. The construction of sexual harassment as a form of violence drew attention to how this social phenomenon is firmly embedded within relations of gendered power and patriarchy. Drawing on much feminist work in this area, we fully elaborate the claim of how sexual violence may be seen actually shaping gender relations while in turn sexist beliefs may be seen as both the causes and consequences of sexual violence. Running through this chapter, we critically consider how an intersectional analysis specifically explains why certain experiences that are unique to particular groups of victims are rendered invisible and may not receive careful attention.

Taken together, chapters three and four attempt to outline key theoretical and methodological considerations that guided the development of knowledge production in this study. Chapter three describes the research setting, the target population then it continues to provide an account of the data collection instruments and the methodological approaches employed in the data analysis. Initially, it describes the key elements and functions of narratives. Furthermore, it concentrates on justifying why we are in favour of diversity to test the research hypothesises. This chapter ends with a discussion of the ethical issues raised through the research process.

Chapter four is of great importance, it is used to present a detailed discussion of the data analysis. It reaches many conclusions concerning the topic being studied. More precisely, it examines relevant issues in multiple understandings of sexual harassment. Central to this specific examination is the operation of gendered power relations and various constructions of resistance within sexual harassment discourses. Thereafter, some suggested recommendations and implications for further research are mentioned to enhance the value of this present work.

1. Chapter One: Gender identities in discourse

1.1. Introduction

Quite frankly, this chapter took shape during the week we participated in the intellectual dialogues and the stimulating debates organized by Mostaganem University (Algeria) First International Conference on Women Empowerment, Citizenship and Development in Partnership with the University of Manchester, Centre for advanced Study of the Arab World (CASAW), November 2015. We took care that it will address most of the questions we formulated. So as its title suggests, this chapter differs markedly from the other ones in its special focus on gender identities and in the attention it gives to gendered discourse. It introduces the conception of gender as a social construction, that is, in no need to belabor this point here, it clarifies the confusing relation between gender and sex. As outlined in the current section, it is widely shared that gender is one of the social factors that shape the labels female/feminine or male/ masculine (Holmes, M: 2009). It might appear at first glance that, to a large extent, this reflects the impact of socialization that is highly gendered. What continues to concern us most is the literature that has contributed to the understanding of the major research on language and gender. It is imperative then to consider the most commonly cited previous theories concerned with the language men and women use and the language used about them.

Although much of what may be written is about how it is possible to talk about men/women, what they do and should do and how they act and should act, in pursuit of our stated intent therefore, this chapter highlights the need to re-examine the ways in which individuals construct and maintain their identities in practice (CofP). We note at once how it is of great importance to not ignore the profound connection between identity and discourse, pointing out that discourse is constitutive and performativity is central to any discussion of this issue. This proves conclusively that the ways patriarchal power men/women experience creates docile bodies. By and large, it is important to remember that inasmuch as carrying out

For the purposes of this chapter, we have had two groups of readers in mind: we hope it will be useful for imparting knowledge to learners specializing in this inter-disciplinary field and that it also can, with a course of time, lead non-specialists to think about the unnoticed social and cultural complexities of gender identities in discourse.

1.2. Questions of Sex and Gender Differences

From the time we first began doing some research on language and gender; we thought we were on familiar ground. The point was that we all necessarily interact well with women and men; we all know a tremendous amount about their relations, however it was not the case. We found ourselves merely describing people's daily experiences and therefore unintentionally imposing our own set of beliefs and expectations of what questions to ask and how to go about answering them. One of the dichotomies that surely proves problematic is the one between sex and gender. This leads us to a brief consideration of what the subtle difference between gender and sex is and why we are talking now about gender differences and not about sex differences.

Just as one learns early in life and largely takes it for granted, there are several instances here and there where the two terms *gender* and *sex* might easily replace each other. From different recent newspapers stories, two adapted examples are here in quotes meant to be illustrative of the cases where it is not easy to discern whether one is talking about *sex* or *gender:* (01) "it is said that the *sex* of the baby has not been determined yet"; (02) "she lifted one leg, saw the *gender* of the baby, then she said the baby is a boy" (Language and Gender, 2007:02). Similarly, this is just what is noticed in the definitions provided by the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2003). The term "sex" refers to (a) *the state of being either female or male;* (b) *all females/ males considered as a group.* The definition of "gender" in the same dictionary is consistent with the usage seen in those newspapers stories. All we can know is that gender / *(sex): is* "*the physical and/or social condition of being male or female"; (b) all males or all females considered as one group".*

Although the two terms were (are) often used as synonyms for each other, as the need was being increased to study in depth sex and gender differences during the early 1970s, confusion associated with the terms *sex* and *gender* has recently increased. This may be purely and simply due to the feeling, our present work loosely follows, that gender is not something we *are born with*, and not something we *have*, but something we *do* (West and Zimmerman 1987) – something we *perform* (Butler 1990). If we consider this description of features and limits of gender, distinct theoretical traditions can be developed to explain gender, including the essentialist and the social constructionist theorists.

Contrary to what has been referred to as (01) "*gender is not something we are born with"*, scientists have been eager to establish a biological basis for gender differences. They have commonly argued that men and women are differentiated biologically in many ways. These two examples might help to clarify the issue: one has to do with the larynx and the other with the brain. It has been shown that the length of the vocal folds of post pubescent males is longer than those of females of the same age (Language and Gender, 2007:11). Furthermore, with respect to brain anatomy, it has been mentioned that because of the higher levels of testosterone, men are said to be more aggressive than women; besides, left-brain dominance is said to lead men to be more 'rational' while their relative lack of brain lateralization should lead women to be more 'emotional'. Given that work on sex differences in the brain is very much in its early stages, Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) points out that it is not certainly conclusive, the finding- that women's corpus callosum, the link between the two brain hemispheres, is relatively larger than men's – is still anything but robust, it is based merely on very small samples (Language and Gender, 2003).

Nonetheless, the point at issue here is not whether there are robust findings about biological differences, even there are; what is at issue is the *essentialist view*[1] of gender that rests on the assumption that gender stereotypes reflect inherent and stable sex differences. In other words, according to this biological approach that emphasizes nature over culture, there are gendered social behaviours produced directly from biological sex (for example, women are inherently more sensitive due to the state of being naturally mothers), the so called logical reasons therefore are given for maintaining a patriarchal system of power to create a consciousness among men and women that women are naturally better suited to 'domestic' roles (The social psychology of Gender, 2008).

Put more boldly, this belief however is far from being generally accepted. The majority of language and gender researchers, many of them women, assert that women's marginalization has generally been seen as 'natural' and a fact of their biology. However these biological differences cannot explain why women have less access to power and lower status than men. They decided then to typically use the term "sex" when strictly referring to the biological categories of male and female; and when referring more broadly to social constructions of masculinity and femininity, such as stereotypes and roles, they typically use the term "gender".

[1] Essentialism: the belief that beings or things have innate characteristics that are largely unchanging (Gender matters in global politics, 2010)

This simple distinction, which masks a number of problems associated with the usage of these two terms, has fast gained support by a great many theorists; among those we have the following carefully selected ones:

The British sociologists Anthony Giddens (1989: 158) defines "*sex as 'biological or anatomical differences between men and women', whereas 'gender' 'concerns the psychological, social and cultural differences between males and females";*

Graddol and Swann (1989:03) give reasons that "*gender is a socially rather than a biologically constructed attribute – people are not born with but rather learn the behaviours and attitudes appropriate to their sex";*

For Litosseliti, 'sex' typically refers to the biological distinction between men and women, meaning: *"…the physiological, functional anatomical differences…";* while gender: *"…refers to the social behaviours, expectations and attitudes with being male and female" (2006:10).*

It is also worth mentioning that even so it is said that the social structural theories can help to integrate both biological and cultural views, they fit under the general umbrella of social constructivism[2]. The social structural theory has worked on the basis of gender as a social construction but with an important twist: it does not view social conceptions of gender as accidental products of specific cultural beliefs but rather as predictable consequences of how societies are organized. More importantly, similar to cultural theorists, social structural theorists view socialization as a significant mechanism that shapes men's and women's traits and behaviours, yet it must be said, by giving a lot of attention to both the 'social position' and the 'structure of intergroup relations'. The first element refers to the roles and occupations members of a group typically perform (division of labour) whereas the second one refers to how situational context shapes intergroup relations (such as cooperative vs. competitive groups). As directly as possible, it is supposed that these social structural theories help to: (1) explain the underlying origins and content of gender stereotypes as well as actual sex differences in traits and behaviors; (2) predict the degree of consistency versus variation in stereotypes and

[2] Constructivism The theoretical position that sees reality as intersubjectively constituted rather than existing objectively (Gender matters in global politics, 2010).

behaviors across cultures and historical periods; (3) explain when and why gender stereotypes become prescriptive ideals, how men and women ought to behave (The social psychology of Gender, 2008).

On the basis of *the constructivist view*, of what is to be female or male, it seems that what deserves to be taken seriously for gender studies is NOT only the critique of the assumption of the biological binary concept of sex, the presupposition that the differentiation between the two 'sexes' is a natural fact, 'evidently' represented in the body, but also the often accepted biological determination of culturally particular characteristics as 'gender typical qualities'. To unpack what this means, feminists[3] admonish evolutionary theorists for those traits based on the genotype and genitalia one possesses when born to justify the unequal and unjust treatment of women are derived from traditional stereotypes, to say it once again, such as the myth that all women are 'caring' from birth in a biologically determined way. Likewise, they criticized most cultural and social theorists who view gendered beliefs (such as the traditional division labour that, for feminists, do reinforce and perpetuate these myths) as arbitrary cultural products, mere accidents of history and cultural development. To state differently, essentialism in this formulation assumes that all manifestations of gender difference are innate and transcultural and historical (Gender and Discourse, 1997).

If there is one important thing we need to consider hitherto, it is of course Simone de Beauvoir book (1949) 'The Second Sex' in which she wrote her famous words: *"one is not born, but rather becomes a woman…"* As the saying implies, Simone de Beauvoir explored such distinction two decade previously, she made clear that one does not just become a man or woman on the basis of being born with a male or female sex, and therein lies, Litosseliti (2006) expounds, the assumption that gender becomes a social category and unlike sex, it is a continuous variable (Graddol and Swann, 1989: 8). Penelope Eckert and McConnell – Ginet (2003:10) provide good examples to clarify this assertion. For them, it would not be so difficult to imagine a small boy following his father in a proud way trying to do everything he can to be like his father- to be a man. The same sounds normal and right when a small girl put on her mother's high heeled shoes, smears makeup on her face only to be like her mother- to be a woman. It is likely that when the boy and girl are grown they will not mince across the room and swagger respectively. It is likely also that while the boy will try on occasion mincing across

[3] Feminists believe in the belief that women should be allowed the same rights, often being involved in activities that are intended to achieve change.

the room in a pair of tight trousers, the girl would decide sometimes but not often to swagger as well. It is nothing then but socially won't be considered cute; if not acceptable at all. Penelope Eckert and McConnell – Ginet (2003) keep saying that gendered performances are available to everyone but society tries to find connection between ways of behaving with biological sex assignments. What we find here is that there are no biological reasons why the boy cannot display feminine characteristics just as the girl cannot demonstrate masculine ones. Men and women's identifiable physical features (chromosomes, hormones, genitalia…etc) do not influence their choices as well as do not keep them from choosing their behaviours. No matter how important gender may be related to our bodies, it is socially constructed, and not derived directly from biology (Language and Gender, 2003).

Coming to the notion of '*gender as performative',* Judith Butler' theorisation (1990) is said to be the most radical at all (Jane Pilcher & Imelda Whelehan 2004). By this, Speer (2005) emphasises, Butler does not conceive of sex and gender as having different 'realities' or as belonging to different 'realms'—a primary, independent biological realm (sex) and a secondary, dependent, cultural realm (gender). Instead, in Butler's framework (1990:7), both sex and gender are socially constructed. Apart from the two poles of the nature - culture debate, to take Penelope Eckert and McConnell – Ginet 's own words (2003), while we think of sex as biological and gender as social, this distinction is not clear-cut, there is no obvious point at which sex leaves off and gender begins. In this perspective, not only gender, but even sex is regarded as a socially developed status. That is to say, to quote Ruth Wodak (1997:03):

"It makes no sense therefore to assume that there is merely one set of traits that generally characterizes men and thus defines masculinity; or likewise, that there is one set of traits for women which defines femininity".

Repeatedly, for Eckert and Ginet (2003), this has been explained by Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000:03) as follows: *"Labeling someone a man or a woman is a social decision. We may use scientific knowledge to help us make the decision, but only our beliefs about gender - not science - can define our sex. Furthermore, our beliefs about gender affect what kinds of knowledge scientists produce about sex in the first place".*

It is worth noting that Judith Butler (1990) draws inspiration from Austin's theory of performative utterances. According to the philosopher J. Austin (1962), we can recognize seven

different kinds of utterances, or speech acts[4], classified according to their general purposes. Performative utterances are valid if they are spoken by someone whose right to make them is accepted and in circumstances which are accepted as appropriate. "Naming babies, pronouncing judgments in a courtroom, marring a man and a woman…etc" can be valid performative utterances only if spoken by an appropriate verb (bet, declare, baptize, pronounce…etc), subject (I or we) and appropriate situations (Introducing English Semantics, 1998). What we have to say right away is that Judith Butler developed Austin's theory of performative utterance, here Penelope Eckert and McConnell – Ginet (2003) illustrate, to describe that performativity is not just a matter of verbal but also other performances. Relevant to this, Kulick (2003) points out that *performance* is not exactly the same as *performativity*, performance is what subject does (linguistic and non linguistic practices that constitute our understanding of gender) whereas *performativity* is the process through which the subject emerges. Besides, *performativity* is concerned with both questions what is performed by a person and how it is performed in relation to time and space (Telecinematic Discourse: Approaches to Language of films and television series, 2011).

The most important in what is being discussed about her notion *'performativity',* Laura J. Shepherd (2010) expands on, is the idea that discourse constitutes the objects and subjects of which it speaks; this can be seen as a *discursive* account. In view of that, Shepherd continues saying, the sexed body is as much a product of discourses about gender as discourses about gender are a product of the sexed body. If it is hard to say what this means, it is preferably to start with this quote:

"Consider the medical interpellation which . . . shifts an infant from an 'it' to a 'she' or a 'he' and in that naming, the girl is 'girled' . . . But that 'girling' of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout various intervals of time to reenforce or contest this naturalized effect" (Butler 1993: 7–8).

To fully elaborate this claim, at the moment when a baby is named as a 'boy' or a 'girl', the body is at times aligned with one of the dichotomous gender framework, one purpose is to put emphasis on the '*matrix of intelligibility'*. This is clearly means that is so as to be easy recognized to others and oneself, one's gender must be performed within particular cultural and

[4] For further explanations, see Charles. W. Kreilder (1998: 181).

historical limits. Butler's view (1999) is more extensively illustrated by Shepherd (2010) as 'the cultural matrix', through which gender identity has become intelligible, requires that certain kinds of identities cannot exist.

Furthermore, the preceding quote is concerned with the repeated acts or the stylized repetition of acts. Crucially, on this view, Butler in Phelan (1997:17) believes that gender performativity: *"…is not a matter of choosing which gender one will be today. Performativity is a matter of reiterating or repeating the norms by which one is constituted; it is not a radical fabrication of a gendered self.'*

Put simply, through their use of language (verbal performance) and other natural ways of expressing themselves in their interactions (other performances such as gestures and movements: ways dressings, looking, behaving, talking…etc), people acquire a set of repeated acts and therefore perform particular gendered (among other) identities. It is generally agreed that, as we repeat such acts, most often than not this is done unconsciously. Note also that what is highly consistent with this discussion is that in this way, bodies themselves take on the gendered characteristics appropriate to their designated 'sex' from birth and throughout life gender is performed repeatedly. The reiteration of elements similarly worked in the past is of course the continuing construction of identity through the process Butler calls 'performativity' (Gender Matters in Global Politics, 2010).

One way to think of this is to consider the example studied by Brian Paltridge, Angela Thomas and Jianxin Liu (2011). They examined extracts from the television series *Sex and the City* in terms of genre and performance. The findings about 'performance' are of concern to us. Sex and the City is a TV series adapted from a best seller with the same title written by Candace Bushnell (1996) who chronicles the cultural elite and especially the poignant world of Manhattan nightclubs and Hampton beach houses inhabited by cynical women and rich soulless men. Each episode of the show includes regular meetings by the four main characters: Carrie, Samantha, Miranda and Charlotte as their gaze, their style of hair, the way they talk, the values they express, the way they behave, the clothes they wear, the flawless makeup they put, the restaurants and the bars they visit, …etc all contribute to the performance of gender which is not certainly the same across languages and cultures. Accordingly, Bednarek (2010) concludes that the thing we should know is that their performances then are not just linguistic; they are multimodal 'more than one mode'.

Paltridge, Angela Thomas and Jianxin Liu (2011) explore this issue a little further. Because of those repeated acts, the lead characters are constructed as desirable assertive women who do many things they want from life. In other words, such identities then could not exist before because such different gender performances or repeated acts acquired through interactions did not exist. Gendered norms then are rectified or reversed in the process of performance that draws heavily on *discourse histories* of similar performances. But it needs frequently to point out that, as Butler already argued, *"the practices which constitute us as gendered subjects also provide the possibility of agency*[5] *and resistance"* (Jagger, 2008: 89). In this show, women every so often change to a conservative position when it comes to marriage:

Miranda: I am going to ask you an unpleasant question now. Why did you ever say yes?

Carrie: Because I love him…A man you love kneels in the street, and offers you a ring. You say yes. That is what you do. (Change of a Dress, 4:15)

In her performance of a single woman being offered a proposal of marriage, Carrie could resist but she does not; showing her awareness of particular gendered and social norms. Butler's approach has been embraced in particular by queer theorists[6], however, she has more recently denied that performativity allows the degree of 'free play' with gender that some of these theorists have suggested (Butler in Phelan 1997). Performativity does not mean that individuals are free to perform gender as they wish; rather, the 'matrices of intelligibility' constitute its limits (Butler, 1993 cited in Shepherd, 2010). Conclusively, according to Butler (1990) gender is not something individuals acquire once and for all at an early stage of life (Penelope Eckert & McConnell – Ginet, 2003), it is an ongoing accomplishment produced by one's repeated actions (Cameron, 2004). Gender is '*a performative accomplishment compelled by social sanction and taboo'* (Butler 1990:271). Even so most of the time, building on the biological base man and woman has from birth, each constructs his/her gender respectively through life with the experiences which take place first in the family then in society (interaction with others).

[5] The capacity to act (Gender Matters in Global Politics, 2010).

[6] 'Queer theory' developed in the humanities in the mid-1980s and grew in the wake of growing theoretical interests in sexuality, particularly through the work of Michel Foucault. 'Queer' has come to be associated with a new militancy in gay and lesbian politics – a determined push for visibility and a celebration of the transgressive- (Jane Pilcher & Imelda Whelehan 2004).

Consequently, societies have distinct gender identities and any individual living in them may or may not comply with the presumed gender identity.

1.3. Socialisation and Gender Roles

However what is meant by the fundamental concept *'socialisation'*, it appears to comprise a number of points that are worth noting here. Sociologists use 'socialisation' to refer to the complex lifelong process whereby individuals learn the culture of the particular society they live in. They generally do agree that the way we are, behave and think is the final product of socialisation, or in other words, we are all the products of our social experience. One thing therefore that allows them to feature this concept in explanations of gender differences is their recognition of what kind of concept '*socialisation'* is. This might be sufficient to introduce the more focused ongoing process '*gender role socialisation'*, where emphasis is given to:

" *The process, through which children of different sexes are socialised into their gender roles* (Giddens, A. ,1993) – *and taught what it means to be male or female"* Condry, J. C., & Condry, S. (1976);

"The process of how the child becomes an individual respecting his or her environment laws, norms and customs" Rossi G. (1998);

"*The process of how individuals learn to become masculine or feminine in their identities, appearance, values and behaviour*" Pilcher, J. & Whelehan, I. (2004).

These statements may provide and justify the following view. Generally speaking, researchers (for example, Gleitman, H., Fridlund, A. J. & Reisberg, D., 2000) do much to determine that gender socialisation begins the moment we are born, as from the simple question 'is it a boy or a girl?', continuing throughout life. As it is true that various features of socialisation can be recognized as part of its description such as: natural vs. planned/ narrow vs. broad and positive vs. negative socialisation, it needs to be noticed that it is usually divided into two important parts: the (1) *primary socialization* and (2) *secondary socialization*. More specifically, unlike scholars who give reasons that only one or the other of these happens, most social scientists tend join the two together, showing that the (1) primary stage of socialisation occurs during infancy and childhood, via interaction between adults (especially parents) and

children. (2) As life goes on, they relocate to new environments and continually experience new situations and so learn new aspects of femininity or masculinity (Pilcher, J. & Whelehan, I., 2004).

If it is usually accepted that, for the reasons given in the preceding page, without socialisation human infants cannot develop a set of attitude, beliefs, values and behaviours according to the sex they had been told, notice also that successful socialisation enables them to fit into all kinds of social groups. Now then, it may be sensible to return to consider the main types of the theoretical approaches to gender socialisation: the psychoanalytic theory and the social (role) learning theory. With regard to the cognitive developmental theory, it is our considered decision to not include it exclusively here because some variants of its perspective assume that children learn gender roles through their mental efforts; that is as a natural rather than a social facet of the world. So, when it comes to the prominent examples of psychoanalytic socialisation theory, consider how Nancy Chodorow (1978) might explain gender differences. Chodorow's theory places great emphasis on the mother–child relationship, its role in gender socialisation and interestingly in the reproduction of gender inequality throughout society. Chodorow states that until the age of three, boys are developed in just the same ways as girls. Basically, in comparison with the father who plays a limited role until the child reaches the so called "oedipal" period (beyond age 3); the mother seems to be the dominant figure in the child's life. Like Freud, Chodorow notes that gradually, as part of psychological development, children develop a less deep dependence on their mother; they try to separate themselves from the clutches of their mother so that they establish their own identities. Inasmuch as questions about gender role socialization are concerned, this separation can be seen as a contrasting exercise for boys and girls (Pilcher, J. & Whelehan, I., 2004).

Chances are that girls and their mothers look very alike, a special closeness is supposed to exist between them for longer. By contrast, boys are completely different from their mothers because they experience a sudden break; they are no longer very attached to them. It would seem on the face of it that this is natural; but Chodorow examines how different this is for boys and girls. Psychologically, the outcomes are that a girl's developing sense of self is connected with those of other people in such a way that, Nancy Chodorow writes (1978:167), '*girls emerge with a stronger basis for experiencing another's needs or feelings as one's own (or of thinking that one is so experiencing another's needs and feelings)'*. There is no doubt then that a boy's self- identity is less bound up with those of others, it is not easy for him therefore to

become less emotionally independent and autonomous in his personal relationships. Admittedly, this could be an explanation for the big difference for instance in the number of chores the girls do versus the boys. To quote Chodorow one again (1978:169):

"*Women's mothering, then, produces asymmetries in the relational experiences of girls and boys as they grow up, which account for crucial differences in feminine and masculine personality, and the relational capacities and modes which these entail".*

Social learning theorists (for example, Hartley 1966; Parsons and Bales 1956; Weinreich 1978) share the view that social learning theory does not need to have direct experience of rewards and punishments, as earlier behaviourists thought likely to be true, but also it has indirect learning through observation and imitation. It must be now obvious that, Penelope Eckert & McConnell – Ginet (2003) state, the newborn depends on others to do its gender. They reflected that it is possible at this early life stage that gender is a '*collaborative affair'*. To illustrate, from infancy, children need support from their surroundings to perform their gender. They learn the appropriate behavioural roles for their sex during primary socialization through interaction with others and parents in particular. Parents, for example, provide their children, according to their sex, with clothes of appropriate colours and commonly equip them with an appropriate stock of toys. It is also easy enough to show that parents also talk to them differently. The often quoted examples are that parents use more diminutives (*kitty*, *doggie*) and inner state words *(happy*, *sad)* when speaking to girls while they use more direct prohibitives (*don't do that!*) and more emphatic prohibitives (*no! no! no!*) when speaking to boys. Automatically, the clothes, the toys and the expressions children received help them become familiar with their gender roles[7]. We might say that children are encouraged to conform to roles and behaviour appropriate to their sex through a system of rewards and punishments operated by adults (parents). To state it differently, socialisation within the family can come from the use of positive and negative sanctions. Girls might be praised for wearing a bow in their hair, flowered pajamas and having barbies to play with, but perhaps they feel discouraged if they dress in blue and play football or climb trees. Chances are that boys may be also praised for not playing with dolls; as they may feel it wrong when they cry, as they are told, 'do not cry like girls'. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that imitating adults' behaviours is certainly important in reinforcing gender roles. That is through the process of imitation, children might

[7] Set of social and behavioural norms that are considered to be socially appropriate for individuals of a specific sex in the context of a specific culture, which differ widely between cultures and over time (Wikipedia).

learn the social roles expected from them; one example of this is the way girls and boys play 'mummies and daddies'. Right now, it surely better to quote Pilcher, J. and Whelehan, I. (2004) who review these main points in few words:

"In addition to the positive and negative sanctions operated by adults, children themselves begin to internalise appropriate behavioural norms and characteristics and thereby unconsciously regulate their own behaviour, in line with the masculine or feminine roles into which they are socialized"(2004:161).

Social learning theorists do identify families as of paramount importance but further research essentially shows that school, peer groups and mass media as unavoidable agents have been unjustifiably neglected in gender socialization (such an attitude finds many supporters). From the outset, no matter how valuable is this further research, the family is considered as the main agent of primary socialization because it is said before that parents are the primary influence on gender role development in the early years of one's life. Muncie, J. et al. (1999) characterize the family as the first experience of relation with males and females. In addition to that, they think that gender identities and the expectations towards male and female roles (socialized within the parents-children relationship) are today various and new compared with the past. Parents nowadays may have different norms and values of everyday life from those their parents had. In so many words, socialisation within the family can come from different process of imitation as well as different use of positive and negative sanctions.

Owing to the stereotypical models of masculinity and femininity they convey, schools are seen as the next environments where (un) conscious gender role socialisation is happening. Similar efforts continued to characterize schools as a social institution that has direct responsibility for instilling the norms society considers important for social life. Strangely enough, schools do not only involve rewards and punishments on the basis of performance (Teachers reward children when they behave properly and exhibit desirable attitudes 'how to dress, how to walk…etc); but also they involve a hidden curriculum (hidden aspects of culture). They introduce gender representation through different teaching materials. Looking at textbooks and dictionaries, we may see women with babies in their hands, women preparing food, nursing, teaching…etc. In the same time, we may see men playing some prestigious sport, carrying weapons, being soldiers, leaders and the like. These perceptions and others induced in

children's minds foreshadow further distinctions; that is to say schools teach children that women have to give and to accept and men have to take and to impose (Jivka Marinova, 2013)

Another agent of socialization that helps children to get socially involved and gain acceptance in the society they live in is the peer group. A peer group is a group of individuals of roughly the same age, interests and probably the same backgrounds. There is no denying that children within the peer groups are not under the care and the supervision of adults as they are in families and schools. Children usually belong to several peer groups; they may belong to a play group in the neighborhood, a clique at school, a sport team…etc. Moreover, it often happens that teens are rewarded by their peers when they conform to gender norms and stigmatized when they do not. We need to point out here that a child must behave according to the usual standards of behaviour which are expected by the group/society to earn his/her social position. It is noteworthy that what makes a peer group an important factor in gender socialisation is that it enables children to engage in experiences which they would never experience within their families. Children may experience conflict, competition and cooperation; as they may have new ways of thinking, feeling and behaving. For these clear reasons, many sociologists agree with Judith Harris' extreme conclusion (1998) that peers are more important than parents in socializing children.

Many do believe that mass media is the strongest and the most argued indirect agent of gender socialisation. Mass media are means of communication designed to reach a vast audience in society. They include television, radio, the internet, billboards, newspapers, magazines…etc; in fact, it may be best to think of all the types of media as highly influential in promoting traditional ways femininity and masculinity and making them so strong and deep-rooted that they stay with us throughout our lifetime. As already emphasized, the agents of socialisation[8] have a very profound effect on our development; but they depend largely on the parameters of time and space.

Again with reference to socialisation theories, though it is apparent that they usefully describe the ways individuals develop gender stereotypes about males and females within social contexts, they tend to depict individuals as socially programmed, over socialized, voluntary and

[8] Read more at http://www.buzzle.com/articles/agents-of-socialization.html (November, 2012; 17:10).

passive conformers. Much of what has been briefly noticed is that some may see that while the psychoanalytic theory neglects the wider social contexts which affect mother–child relations (Sayers 1986), the social role learning theory relies on a dichotomous biological distinction (Connell, 1987), it fails to explain where the specific and differentiated content of gender roles come from, and whose interests they represent (Walby, 1990). Pilcher, J. and Whelehan, I. (2004:163) therefore concluded that: "*Individuals are not 'cultural dopes', passively accepting pre-written scripts for gender behaviour, but nor are they entirely free to develop and act out their own scripts"*

Research within the field of gender studies[9] makes worthwhile observations regarding these agents. For particular reasons, it examines the presence of gender stereotyping and its link with gender inequality (50 Concepts in Gender Studies, 2004). Actually these points need greater elaboration, but before; an individual must first be made knowledgeable about the main concepts that would serve our purpose better. First of all, the concept of a stereotype was introduced into social science in 1922, when Lippman used it to describe the 'typical picture' that comes to mind (cognitive method) when thinking about a particular social group (Macrae et al. 1996). Following this description, one may look further and perhaps more deeply into the definition of a stereotype. We can discover that not just a stereotype can be thought of as a cognitive method, only contained within an individual mind, but it also exists at a collective level (a shared element). Moreover, let us not just dismiss the idea that a stereotype as a typical picture about a social group may be negative or positive, accurate or inaccurate, justified or unjustified. However the essential thing to keep in mind is that what concerns us, Schneider (1996) argues, are the negative, the inaccurate, and the unjustified stereotypes (50 Concepts in Gender Studies, 2004).

On this view, the emphasis on a stereotype as a fixed idea or a belief that has special meaning about a group of people, should not lead us to ignore defining gender stereotypes and gender stereotyping. A gender stereotype can be defined as, to quote Enteman cited in Pilcher, J. and Whelehan, I. (2004):

[9] The emergence of gender studies can be traced back to late 1960s, and its development can be triggered by second wave feminism. Along with developing a critique of gender inequalities, (especially economically and politically), second wave feminism began to draw attention to the ways in which academic disciplines (the social sciences in general and sociology in particular) acted to exclude the experiences, interests and identities of women (50 Concepts in Gender Studies, 2004).

"*A standardised and often pejorative idea or image held about an individual on the basis of their gender. At a general level, the effects of stereotyping can mean that, rather than treating people as individuals, 'we treat them instead as artificial persons, which means as an extension of the category we have constructed'* (1996: 10).

Now while it may be seen that gender stereotypes are related to different expectations for male and female behaviour, gender stereotyping hence is how we perceive each other, especially those outside our group (Hibbard, D. R. & Buhrmester, D., 1998). Back to the socialisation process, the child learns models of what and how appropriate behaviours are. Certain agents of socialization- family, media, peer group and the school- are models for these behaviours (a number of observations have been made). For example, Epstein, Kehily, Mac an Ghaill and Redman´s (2001) ethnographic study of primary school children's play found that football and fighting became a measure of success for boys in the school context, but also a way of creating masculinity.

In the same vein, Mills (2001) argues that the school is, as research shows, a major institution where femininity is produced and reproduced. Sports are one major thing in school that is mostly focused on boys. The exclusion of girls is a way of showing or creating femininity among the girls. These sports tend to be those which glorify the strong, tough, aggressive and competitive males. By contrast, femininity is stereotyped in the most societies as taking care of the family, being dependent on someone, being sensitive and fragile. A girl that is being dominant and aggressive is seen as different or simply behaves "like a boy", she is not getting an "authorized" femininity because girls are stereotyped to be physically and emotionally weak.

Research on gender stereotyping in the media is also of great value. Ironically, females are routinely associated with domesticity and sexuality. Tuchman' findings (1981) of media depictions of American women from the 1950s onwards, were that women were stereotyped either as sexual objects, or as housewives, or in particular they were performing domestic duty and caring role. A report by the European Commission (1999) also showed that, unlike men, '*women portrayed in the media are younger, more likely to be shown as married, and less likely to be shown in paid employment' (1999:* 12).

More seriously, we may find ourselves asking not so much what and how gender stereotypes are but more fundamentally what they serve. With this point in mind, it may deserve complete attention to say that stereotyping has consequences, it has a polarising effect- that is

assigning positive attributes to the in-group and negative attributes to the out-group (Schneider 1996). From this perspective, many theorists indeed would link stereotyping to the issue of power (Jenkins, 2000) and more closely to the concept of 'the Other' (Pickering, 2001).

Using few words, to possess power is to have the ability to achieve whatever is desired regardless of any opposition. As it is already mentioned in the first chapter, power may be expressed in two forms: through overt coercion or consent based on the perceived legitimacy of those who hold it (some cultures perhaps allow for the alignment of both models of power). Passing to the modern democracies, we see a superficial limiting of power. The perspective which of course was of special concern to feminists over the past thirty years was the one affirmed by liberal democracies, that is the general policy of non-intervention in the home. Feminists showed that the state policy of non-interference in the home can lead to a legitimation of male power (in cases such as domestic violence). In other words, through less tangible means (ideology), power can be exercised to support the political and economic status quo (Pilcher, J. and Whelehan, I., 2004).

With a view of changing current relations of power, feminists tried to embrace working definitions of power. Those commonly labelled 'radical feminists'[10] were inclined to conceptualise power in terms of patriarchy. Literally, patriarchy means rule by the male head of a social unit (for example a rule of the father in the family), however since the early twentieth century, this concept has been extended to refer to the social system of masculine domination over women, in the words of Laura J. Shepherd (2010), the power and authority of masculinity. Radical feminists became hugely disenchanted with the male-dominated power; they assume that even though the most disenfranchised man was seen to have more access to power and the privileges of our culture than any woman. As a result, what they regard as a significant statement is that men as part of the problem should be part of the solution (ibid.).

What was observed, always in connection with this idea of patriarchal power, was that if it failed, it would be for its lack of any historical specificity. As a reaction, Marxist feminists, those who links changes in women's social conditions with the overthrow of industrial

[10] Despite the fact that feminism can be used to reflect a personal political position, there are dominant strands that make up modern feminist thought as we encounter it today. Radical feminism is usually associated in the popular consciousness with separatism and man-hating. The politics of radicalism wanted a political formation freed from the taint of maleness (50 Concepts in Gender Studies, 2004).

capitalism and changing relations of the worker to the means of production, devoted their time to examine what is called a 'patriarchal ideology' and the ways whereby the state operated, more than anything else, in the interests of men.

Such interpretations were regarded from different viewpoints however; or more generally, they have attracted widespread criticism. In brief, theories in which patriarchy is a central concept have been criticised for having problems of reductionism (reduce their explanations to one (or two) factor(s), such capitalism or the family), ahistoricism (the absence of historical variations in gender relations) and universalism (failing to recognise cultural variations, in their assumption or suggestion that relations between women and men are the same the world over). Indeed their main problem was their limited conceptualisation of gender relations, as occurring only between women and men. Considering these points, Walby (1990) treats in great details the theory of patriarchy. For her patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women. To overcome the weaknesses of patriarchy, she identifies six structures of this concept (household production, paid work, the state, male violence, sexuality, culture) that together may capture the depth, pervasiveness and interconnectedness of women's subordination. Despite this, Walby's attempt has itself been subject to criticism. Pollert (1996) notices that, instead of identifying the origins of patriarchy, Walby's theory of patriarchy combines two separate things: explanation and description of the features of the system of patriarchy itself (ibid.)

For these reasons, some feminists reached a general consensus that patriarchy cannot be used effectively as an explanatory concept and that it should only be used as an adjective to describe relationships or institutions where men dominate women. They therefore turned their attention to Foucault's theoretical reflections on power. Clearly, instead of treating power as being an exchange between oppressors and oppressed, they treated it as a form of self-governance (See the following pages: 81-85).

Coming back to the notion of (the) 'Other', as used by the French writer Simone de Beauvoir, we may note that in patriarchal and androcentric societies, where the culture, knowledge, organizations and institutions reflect and reproduce the dominance and power of men, women are seen as 'the Other'. To illustrate, unlike all the features that can be recognized to describe the man as being for himself and not with reference to her, a woman is defined only in relation to him. De Beauvoir wrote: "*…she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to*

the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other" (The Second Sex, 1997 [first published in1953]: 16).

Drawing heavily on the philosophical arguments of Hegel and Sartre, de Beauvoir showed that each individual self tries to act freely and autonomously, but exactly at the same time, needs interaction with others in order to define that self. On reflection, she concluded that: *"the subject can be posed only in being opposed'* (1997:16). One general observation in this context is that as we see other individuals as 'the Other', they undoubtedly see us as 'the Other'. However the case of men and women makes an exception, this reciprocity of Otherness, de Beauvoir argues, is not recognized (man is the One, woman is the Other).

One thing that de Beauvoir agrees with is that women do not reach the status of being 'the One' due to the fact that they largely accept this androcentric world; they regard themselves as 'the Other'. Interestingly enough, it could seem that, de Beauvoir points out (1997:21):

'Woman may fail to claim the status of subject because she lacks definite resources, because she feels the necessary bond that ties her to man regardless of reciprocity and because she is often very well pleased with her role as the Other'.

Notwithstanding these reasons, it must be stressed that the concept of "the Other" can be also found in the work of some postmodern feminist writers such as Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva. Following de Beauvoir, they focus on women's Otherness but interpret it differently. For them, it is essential to realize that the evaluation of Otherness can be of great advantage to criticize the dominant patriarchal culture (Pilcher, J. and Whelehan, I., 2004).

1.4. Language and Gender: The Feminist Contribution

Needless to say, research on language and gender has been considered worthy of study. Also worthy of mention are those questions of how women and men should speak and of how they actually do[11]. With very few details, as both less and more experienced, we have been

[11] Ideas about how men and women actually talk (apparently differently) have come to be known as 'folklinguistics' (Jane Sunderland, 2006). Folklinguistic notions not only tell us how women and men are perceived to speak, but also how they *should* speak (Speer 2005:30-31).

surrounded with so powerful commonsense ideas that tell us that men and women use language in different ways. Proverbs, films, plays, songs and (misinterpreted) texts to name but a few do all focus explicitly on the ways women and men do and should talk. It is widely supposed that men talk about sport and cars, they talk like books, women gossip, waffle; men are assertive, logical and women are submissive; illogical…etc. Ironically, earlier academic studies to examine the relationship between men/women and language also reflect what circulate widely in society. In 1922, the Danish male linguist Otto Jespersen was also prone to this. In his book, "*Language: Its Nature, Development and Origin",* more precisely, a chapter on sex differences and language called 'The woman', Jesperson confidently went to prove that really there are sex differences in language. With regard to lexicon and syntax, he argued that women are noticeably less inventive and have less rich and extensive vocabulary than men. They tend to overuse hyperbole and adverbs of intensity like 'awfully pretty, terribly nice, so charming, thank you so much…and so on. Additionally, for him, women speak more quickly than men: "*they more often than men break off without finishing their sentences, because they start talking without having thought out what they are going to say', and produce less complex sentences"*(Jespersen 1922: 251).

From a male perspective, women's language is again negatively evaluated and disparagingly referred to; it deviates from the normative use of language exhibited by men. His work is considered as a typical example which treats one group as the norm and the other group as deviant. Feminists however wondered what proved that, the data on which Jesperson based his claims was gathered mainly by no systematic and empirical research. His own observations were not based on actual conversations of women but almost completely on literary texts and women's dialogues written by male novelists. Otto Jesperson therefore was taken to task, his work was criticised as stereotypical and sexist. It is presumed that because of Jespersen's overt prejudice against women and the insufficiency of his method, his work should be considered as a product of the androcentric ideology (Susan Speer, 2005)

Notwithstanding these arguments, it is important to think that the problem is not only that Jespersen's work is stereotypical, but; as it is already mentioned; we must take into account that these stereotypes are probably still believed by the public and even by Jespersen's critics themselves; feminist linguists have not always probed into those folklinguistic stereotypes however. Relevant to this, it seems possible to raise these most pressing questions: are there really sex differences in language? If so; let us agree that there is evidence to support this

assumption, is there consensus regarding what these sex differences in language in fact consist of? and how we might account for those differences?

As regards these questions, our intention is not only to provide an in-depth examination of those prescriptive and descriptive ideas about men and women's language but more exactly how to interpret male-female linguistic differences instead. We will focus more closely on the three classic studies by Robin Lakoff (1975), Dale Spender (1980) and Deborah Tannen (1990). These studies are broadly representative of the 'deficit framework', 'the dominance framework' and 'the difference' framework'.

1.4.1. **Early work on Language and Gender**

Now we may ask what we mean by the 'deficit' framework, but at the outset, it is worth considering why Robin Lakoff's article *'Language and woman's place'* (1972) so readily brought about a flurry of inspiring research and debate. Though it has also been widely disapproved of, for some, most of them women, Lakoff's incisive questions and insightful answers did not merely mark the beginning of the twentieth-century linguistic interest in sex differences but indeed has changed the way they understood things dramatically and for the better. Undeniably, *Language and Woman's Place (1975)* is regarded as the first book in feminist linguistics because, as Cameron (1998: 216) asserts, *'it probably did more than any other text before or since to bring issues of language and gender to wider attention and to place them in the context of the post-1968 Women's Liberation Movement'*.

According to Speer (2005), the 'deficit' framework refers to any approach which interprets male-female linguistic differences as evidence for women's powerlessness and inferior status vis-à-vis men, and Robin Lakoff therefore is widely regarded as a pioneer in this particular position. It is well known that, Speer keeps saying (2005), Lakoff in her book 'Language and Women's Place (1975)' examines linguistic disparities in two facets: (1) 'the ways women are expected to speak', and (2) 'the ways in which women are spoken of'. We should like now to deal with each in turn.

1) Talking Like a Lady

As far as speech by women is concerned, the American linguist Robin Lakoff argued that women have a different way of speaking from men - a way of speaking that both reflects and produces a subordinate position in society. According to Penelope Eckert and Sally McConnell Ginet (2003:158), Robin Lakoff proposed that American women were largely confined to soften their expression of opinion through such devices as:

a. Tag questions (‘‘this election mess is terrible, isn’t it?”) and rising intonation on declaratives (A: ‘‘When will dinner be ready?” B: ‘‘Six o’clock?”)

b. The use of various kinds of hedges (‘‘That’s kinda sad” or “y’know”)

c. Boosters or amplifiers (‘‘I’m so glad you’re here”)

d. Indirection (saying ‘‘Well, I’ve got a dentist appointment then” in order to convey a reluctance to meet at some proposed time and perhaps to request that the other person propose an alternative time).

e. Diminutives (*panties)*

f. Euphemism (avoiding profanities by using expressions like piffle, or heck; using circumlocutions like *go to the bathroom* to avoid ‘‘vulgar’’ or tabooed expressions)

g. Conventional politeness; especially forms that mark respect for the addressee.

(Language and Gender, 2003:158)

Furthermore, Lakoff went to argue that women tend to avoid the type of speech that conveys strong emotions. They generally use ‘weaker’ expletives than men, for instance *Oh dear* instead of *shit*. Another aspect of women’s speech is that they use different set of adjectives to convey their opinions, for instance *charming and sweet* as opposed to the ‘neutral’ male terms *terrific and cool.* Women also employ more standard grammar, such as *am not* instead of *ain’t.* Moreover, it is a female characteristic to speak in ‘italics’, which means to put extra emphasis on certain words so as to express the importance of what is said (Susan Speer, 2005).

2) Talking about Women

Apart from those aspects of women's language which are explored with regard to lexicon and syntax, speech about women is analysed with regard to symmetrical role terms that have taken on non-equivalent meanings for men and women (Speer, 2005)

Robin Lakoff (1973) asserts that, similar to their use of language, women's representation in language reflects and perpetuates their inferior position within society: *'men are defined in terms of what they do in the world, women in terms of the men with whom they are associated'* (1973:64). To elaborate this point, an attempt is made to show that this was true. Lakoff, cited in Speer (2005:24), found differences in the ways women and men are referred to:

a. Unlike men, women are more often referred to as 'girls', whatever their age.

b. Concerning the terms 'master' and 'mistress': 'master' is used to refer to a man who has acquired a comprehensive grasp of an object, activity, or field, 'mistress' however is used in its sexual sense.

c. The same is true of the categories 'bachelorhood' and 'spinsterhood': whereas the term 'bachelor' is considered as positive and desirable, the term 'spinster' is, on the contrary, a negative and undesirable one.

d. Women and not men are defined in terms of their marital status (Mrs.). Besides, most women take their father's name at birth and their husband's name on marriage.

(Susan Speer, 2005:24)

We think that it is evident from this discussion that Lakoff's main focus was on the marginality and powerlessness of women as reflected in both the ways they are expected to speak, and the ways in which they are spoken of. While there are of course other possible interpretations, Lakoff claims that both facets of language cause women to experience 'linguistic discrimination'. Considering the number of cases in which it seems clear that women are discriminated against, it is Lakoff's (1975) impression that women are not naturally deficient, but sound and behave that way because they are socialized to do so. Interestingly enough, women must learn to speak appropriate women's speech (speaking like a lady) to avoid

being sanctioned and criticized as unfeminine but at the same time they are not rewarded for doing so. Their language is used to ridicule them and justify their lack of authority, seriousness, conviction and confidence in their conversation. To state it differently, women face a '*double bind'*; so they are damned if they do, damned if they don't. In short, if it is agreed that both facets reflect a deep cultural bias, Lakoff talks very briefly about what might be done, and perhaps what should not be done, to remedy things. She concludes that women need to gain some authority and power by learning to use what she terms the 'neutral' language of men (Speer 2005).

Although the fact remains that it persists as the most substantive research to deal with women's language, Lakoff's work has been subject to a number of criticisms. It is found that there are some obvious parallels between Lakoff's work (1973) and Jespersen's work (1922). She has been truly lambasted for assuming that female speech is a deficient variation of the so called neutral male norm. In other words, what she actually did was merely listing folklinguistic stereotypes separately and often including details. Therefore, her wok has been attacked by feminists as stereotypical and androcentric. In addition to this, there is a problem with her method. Her claims were gathered mainly by introspection: she examined her own speech and used her own intuitions in analyzing it (ibid.)

Five years after *Language and Woman's Place*, a rather more hard-hitting book 'Dale Spender's *Man Made Language* (1980)' came out. This book is often cited as an example of the 'dominance' framework. It interprets linguistic differences in women's and men's speech as a reflection of men's dominance and women's subordination. From this perspective, women are quite dominated by men in their talk, in terms of both the amount they talk, and their control over the topic (Speer, 2005).

At first, notice that most of the works following Lakoff are empirical studies, which means that what makes the dominance theory different from the deficit theory, is that it relies on empirical research and evidence in real situations rather than on intuition and retrospection. Another important thing to think about it that, like Lakoff, the main proponent of this theory the radical feminist Dale Spender (1980) also writes about sexism in language (Jane Sunderland, 2006:14). Yet, Spender introduces some new ideas; she (1980:13) traces many of the 'inadequacies and inaccuracies' of the deficit framework. Her serious challenge to Lakoff's tendency "*to separate the form of language from its function - to treat language 'as an abstract system without reference to the context"* of course begs the question of the origin and function

of sexist language, how it evolved, how it works, and how it can be changed. In useful shorthand, Spender claims that what is needed is an analysis of *'patriarchal order'*. This is not to say that we will pose questions that are framed in terms of deficiency, and which will, therefore, automatically lead to answers which support the view that there is something wrong with women and their language, but what we should recognize here, according to Spender (1980:13), is that our attention should be turned towards *'the social context in which the language is used',* and therein, she (1980: 51) continues saying, it becomes evident that both the form and the function of language are part of the same process - *the silencing* of women (Speer, 2005).

If it is indeed true that the rules we live by are not natural but rather are 'man-made', as stated by Spender (Speer 2005:37), then those who are not of it are allocated to a category of deviation. And similarly this operates mainly through language: *'it is language which determines the limits of our world, which constructs our reality'* (1980:139). In other words, language is sexist because men have had the position, for instance, grammarians, politicians, orators, philosophers and linguists, to name the world from their own perspective. Women thus are given no choice; they are forced to express themselves in a language that is not their own, a language that is created by men and suits the ends of men (ibid.).

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Spender provides evidence for this claim. She focuses on how, in mixed sex talk, men are more successful at having the topics they bring up and how they control the conversation by questioning women, devaluing their opinions and using interruptions to prevent them from speaking: *'women are "queried", they are interrupted, their opinions are discounted and their contributions devalued in virtually all of the mixed-sex conversations that I have taped'* (1980:87). Drawing on empirical studies, such as that of Zimmerman and West (1975)[12] who proved that women use fewer interruptions than men in mixed-sex conversations, Spender (1980:44) asserts that "*men use interruption as a mechanism by which to prevent women from talking and to gain control of the floor for themselves".* In this case, what about the research which purports to represent women as excessively talkative? Since in a patriarchal society, silence is the desired state for women, Spender keeps explaining, it is not that women talk too much vis - a- vis men, rather they talk too much vis - a- vis silence: *"when women are supposed to be quiet, a talkative woman is one who talks at all*" (1980:43). Now then, there is no question

[12] Zimmerman & West (1975) investigate casual mixed-sex conversations on a campus and report that 96 percent of the interruptions are produced by men.

that what is needed is the way to remedy this situation. So as to create a different reality, Spender believes that the semantic rule that denotes males as positive and females as negative have to be changed. To state it clearly, women need to liberate the language from male control; they need to create a female language by constructing their own words and expressions (ibid.).

While we could admit value of the dominance approach, we could also see androcentric traps. Taking the aspect of interruption into consideration, it is important to point out that there is an ambiguity in the definition of an interruption. In few words, to claim that, one recognize an occurrence of interruption without anlysing several factors such as length and frequency of speech is in fact a subjective judgment. Furthermore, the view that men use linguistic resources to maintain their power and silence women points indeed to a more general conclusion. It seems to portray women as passive victims and oppressed group while it offers a simplistic 'monolithic' view of male power. This implies that this approach ignores some other circumstances where some women have had more power than other groups. Perhaps most surprising, Spender also treats language as something which men use to impose limits on what women can say, and what they can experience. Her research therefore has been widely criticized for generating a picture *"of bullying men and meek, oppressed women […] and […] of men sitting round conspiring how to do women out of their linguistic inheritance"* (Goddard and Patterson 2000:100, cited in Speer 2005:41).

What came to be called the difference approach, known also as the dual-cultural approach**,** is most commonly associated with Deborah Tannen's seminal and best -selling book *You just Don't Understand*! *Men and Women in Conversation* (1990). The third theory, the difference approach, emerging later than the dominance approach, emphasises the idea that women and men have different ways of talking; however no pejorative value should be attached. In an explanation simpler than that, the linguistic differences can be explained with reference to neither women's inferiority (Lakoff) nor men's dominance (Spender). In essence, Tannen (1990) accepts that men are dominant, but the claim that conversations fail because men purposefully dominate women is in dispute. Instead, she argues that since they '*grow up in different worlds of words*' (1990:43), men and women have '*different but equally valid styles'* (1990:15).

Proponents of this approach explain that the reason for the different conversational styles used by men and women is due to the separate and different cultures they grow up in; or more exactly due to their early socialisation. Drawing on work by Daniel Maltz and Ruth Borker (1982), Tannen draws an analogy between the different subcultures girls and boys live in and the distinct subcultures associated with those from different class or ethnic backgrounds. To illustrate, boys and girls grow up in different 'worlds of words' (1990:43); their linguistic style differences are akin to the differences we might expect to see between people from different cultures or subcultures. In fact, John Gray in his book (1992), *Men are From Mars, Women are From Venus*, assumes that men and women communicate in such different ways that they seem to be from different planets. In short and clear form, Freeman and Mc Elhinny (1996) contend that differences appeared in childhood where boys and girls tend to play in single-sex groups with different sets of norms. Girls play almost exclusively in small, cooperative groups whereas boys play almost exclusively in larger, more hierarchically organized groups. By dint of that, it is widely supposed that men see life as a struggle and contest to preserve independence. Women on the other hand perceive life as a community, a struggle to maintain closeness and avoid isolation. Accordingly, because men and women have different conceptions of the social world, they thus systematically develop different forms of language (Speer, 2005).

In Tannen's view, men and women express themselves in different ways and for different reasons. Men use communication to maintain *independence*, while women talk to maintain *intimacy*. Men often talk to establish *status* from others. For women, talking is often a way to gain confirmation and *support* for their ideas. Women use words to connect themselves emotionally, to express feelings, or develop a good rapport. Men however use language to communicate information. They use to communicate as "*rapport* vs. *report*" or "*cooperative* vs. *competitive"* styles respectively. For Tannen, it is owing to those differing styles men and women use in mixed- gender conversation that misunderstanding occurs. As Lotta Kilic (2007) writes, an example to this miscommunication could be *minimal responses*, such as nods and comments like *yes* and *mm hmm*. In comparison with women who employ them to signal that they are listening, men use them to indicate agreement with whom they are speaking. Given this gender miscommunication, Deborah Tannen (1990) concludes that the solution to this problem is that both women and men learn to use the others' style, without adopting it completely. So, women would benefit from assertiveness training just as men might benefit from sensitivity training.

When Tannen reviewed the linguistic differences between women and men, she indeed overcomes many problems identified in both 'the deficit and the dominance approaches'. She neither views female speech as a deficient variant of the male norm nor does she support the claim that men purposefully silence women. This emphasis on no pejorative value increasingly reveals that, to quote the feminist psychologist Mary Crawford (1995:93),

"*The two- cultures model offers a 'no fault' approach to difference, which 'transcends' woman-blaming, and which 'is less likely to lead to woman-as problem research programs or to widespread attempts to change women through therapy and skills training'*

(Speer, 2005:31-2).

As was often the case, the aspects of talk thought to characterize women's language were negatively evaluated. There was always an intention to represent women as deficient language users or as victims. But as shown by Cameron (1995:39), *"the [cultural] difference was the moment of feminist celebration, reclaiming and revaluing women's distinctive cultural traditions'*. The difference' researchers and theorists aimed sometimes to positively revalue women's talk. Coates for instance uses empirical evidence to support the notion of women's linguistic cooperativeness, she (1989: 98) came to the conclusion that *'all-woman conversation…has as its chief goal the maintenance of good social relationships'* (Jane Sunderland, 2006).

However, Speer (2005:44) herself makes it clear that Tannen *"fails to contextualize her arguments against much of the feminist literature that would have been available to her at the time she wrote"*. Basically, her hypotheses are used to assert that women and men are essentially different and that is all. That is to say, her ideas do support those sexist stereotypes. Weatherall (2002) demonstrates that Tannen's use of contrasts is exaggerated (the female speech style is cooperative and the male speech style is competitive…etc), in other words, there is a risk that similarities are understated. All in all, as Speer (2005) argues, Tannen does acknowledge that women as a class are dominated by men as a class, but at the same time, the overall impression of her book is of a *'sanitized world in which men and women's linguistic contributions are of equal status'*. Cameron (1992:43) discusses this reasonably; she suggests that *'so long as women are subordinate to men, their language will continue to be stereotyped as indicating natural subservience, unintelligence and immaturity'.*

Aki Uchida (1992) makes a similar point, saying that, whether or not men and women have equally valid styles, it is certain that they still exist in a relationship with one another where men are culturally dominant. Uchida (1998:285) adds, *"women and men belong to many interconnected social groups in addition to that of their own sex, and an individual is more than a 'woman' when interacting with others*". Furthermore, many of the features which characterize the world of adults are different from that of boys and girls. In view of this, the assumption that the same norms apply in these different contexts is simplistic (it can cause omission of important details). Eckert & McConnell- Ginet (1992), (1995) and Henley & Kramarae (1991) also join in the criticism. They find that the difference approach seems lacking; it does not consider power / dominance relations as a significant factor in understanding men's and women's interactional styles. Then again it would of course be interesting if the 'dual-culture' model attributes breakdown in communication between men and women to power relation rather than to cross-cultural misunderstanding.

Again and again, researchers have always valued the findings of the three abovementioned frameworks; however the problem lies in their assumptions. All the approaches are more likely to be trapped in 'essentialism'; they share an essentialist view of gender identity. As it has already explained in this chapter, essentialism is the belief that treats gender as a relatively fixed trait or essence; meaning that the majority of researchers hypothesise the same thing. They treat men and women as belonging to two homogeneous groups (all men and all women). In other words, the speaker's sex is deemed as an important social category that accounts for the different speech styles women and men employ. It can be said that, to quote Susan Speer (2005:57): *"all three researchers adopt materials, procedures and analytic techniques which are driven by the analyst's assumptions and folklinguistic stereotypes about the talk of men and women*". In a strict sense, there is always women's language which is different from men's language.

Although these studies are backed up with empirical evidence, they are somewhat confused in terms of the interpretation of data. Their findings reveal a striking lack of consensus. Weatherall (2002) offers two explanations for the lack of consensus within gender and language research: the form-function problem and the problem of context. Put very simply, the first problem refers to the fact that "*there are few direct relationships between a linguistic form and its communicative function*" (2002:59). Weatherall doubts whether there is a static one-to-one relationship between certain linguistic strategies and specific communicative

functions. Hedges for example are assumed to have only function, namely hesitancy, but they actually have diverse meanings. Hedges may indicate insecurity as they may protect the speaker's and the addressee's face needs, they may also indicate that the speaker is having trouble finding the right words (Coates 1996:158), or show that the speaker is avoiding to 'play the expert' (1996: 160).

Second, the problem of context has to do with the fact that *"the way language is used and understood varies depending on when, where and under what circumstances an interaction is taking place"*(Weatherall 2002:62). This implies that, with some justification, what counts as definitive differences could not be found since researchers have downplayed the importance of context, for instance, age, status, ethnicity and so on. Consequently, when research focuses on the sex of the speaker, it disregards *"the variability, complexity and dynamism of linguistic behavior in ongoing social relations"* (2002:7). Perhaps, there is no escaping the fact that, as everyone may agree, women and men do speak differently, notwithstanding the differences, since gender and its construct is dynamic and variable, Weatherall (2002:86) argues, '*it is impossible to identify the exact nature of the differences'* (Lotta Kilic, 2007).

We must now conclude that it is senseless to conceptualise the distinctive female/male linguistic characteristics like a binary opposition; researchers need to go beyond the simple constant dichotomous categories in linguistic research: '*gender is no longer viewed as "an essential characteristic of an individual's psyche, but as a thoroughly social construct, one that is produced by language and discourse'* (Weatherall 2002:76).

1.4.2. **Context, Language and Gender**

Due to the critique of the three key former studies, feminists gradually started perceiving the need to rethink the theories of language and gender; in fact they felt the need to challenge the binary thinking associated with sex differences research.

It seems, and continues to seem, for them that if one analyses data asking the question 'in what ways do men and women speak differently?', then that is what one will find. But here above all, the problem for these critics is not with difference as such, but with gender polarisation. This is to say that, unlike the past theories, recent research of language and gender

entails asking questions about how men and women perform their gender identities within specific contexts. As Litosseliti (2006) contends, the social constructivist approach puts great emphasis on two key ideas: *'doing' gender'* and *'sensitivity to context'.*

Beyond binary thinking, gender has begun to be approached and conceptualised differently. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, rather than seeing gender as a possession or set of behaviours which is imposed upon the individual by society, as many essentialist theorists have done so far, many feminists extend their thinking to recognise gender as something we *do* (West and Zimmerman 1987) – something we *perform* (Butler 1990). In her book *Gender Trouble* (1990), Butler argues that gender is 'performative' and that gender identities are not internal essences but external performances. For her, gender is a repeated performance of a range of behaviours associated with a particular sex. In brief, many feminist theorists have been influenced by Judith Butler's work; following her focus on performativity, gender has not been seen as a *noun*, but rather as a *verb* (Crawford, 1995). In this view, it is interesting to note that since Butler conceives of gender as something that is performatively achieved, her work represents an implicit challenge to all 'sex differences' research that places too much reliance on gender dualism (Speer, 2005).

More importantly, studies have shown that one of the problems with early feminist research was that it was often full of sweeping generalizations; it focused exclusively on two homogenous social groups: all women and all men. As is hinted earlier, in common with social constructionist thinking, it is argued that researchers must not attribute every difference between male and female speech to only gender, they must pay sufficient attention to other social variables that could explain language variations. Sunderland and Litosseliti (2002) note that putting as much emphasis on context entails a focus on two aspects: *specificity* and *complexity*. Specificity is to look at particular men and women in particular settings, locations and time. Complexity however is to analyse the ways in which gender intersects with other social factors such as age, race, ethnicity, status...etc. Gender in isolation from those constitutive aspects of identity is, as Penelope Eckert and McConnel Ginet (1992: 471) metaphorically put it, *"to paint with one eye closed"* because "*speakers are not assembled out of independent modules: part European American, part female, part middle-aged, part feminist and part intellectual*" (Muna Mohammed Abbas, 2010).

So far we have captured the essential tenets of the social constructivist approach; it is therefore worth considering to focus on the data it revealed. Depending on the different perspective many feminists write from, gender differences that appear to be well founded in verbal interaction become open to reinterpretation. They make claims that what is universalized as gender differences in communication may only describe communication patterns for males and females of a certain age, race, class and so forth. Women do not form a homogeneous social group, nor do men. In fact, we find contexts in which men and women are able to display both masculine and feminine styles of interaction. Independence and intimacy, competitiveness and cooperativeness, dominance and submissiveness are not characteristics of men and women, respectively; they are, as Muriel Dimen (1991:348) puts it, *"different moments of the self".* Thus, as Janis Bohan (1993:13) suggests, "*none of us is feminine or is masculine or fails to be either of those. In particular contexts, people do feminine; in others, they do masculine".* This is an important point; variability in the performance of gender makes researchers more skeptical of the popularized beliefs about gender differences, so does the sensitivity to context (Elizabeth Aries, 1996). As regards the dynamism of linguistic practices and gendered identities, feminists have something further to offer the field of language and gender with the concept of 'Community of Practice' (Henceforth CofP). Below, we will provide the reader a flavour of why this concept has proved to be satisfactory in gender and language studies.

1.4.3. **Community of Practice in Gender Research**

The concept "Community of Practice" was actually introduced for the first time to language and gender research by Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992). Following Lave and Wenger (1991), they defined a 'CofP' as follows:

"an aggregate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an endeavor. Ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations – in short, practices – emerge in the course of this mutual endeavor. As a social construct, a CofP is different from the traditional community, primarily because it is defined simultaneously by its membership and by the practice in which that membership engages" (1992:464).

Now there are a number of points that are worth noting here. Central among these is that the notion 'CofP' has emerged as an alternative to other current sociolinguistic models. One can notice that, as this definition emphasizes, the notion 'CofP' offers something different to

researchers than the traditional concept; more particularly in the area of language and gender, *"speech community".* Though this observation may seem a matter of trivial detail, the point it illustrates is a crucial one. We do mean by this simply that unlike 'SpCom' that is evidently fraught with difficulties, 'CofP' is of special value to researchers in language and gender. This indicates that both concepts differ considerably in terms of several factors.

Historically speaking, Leonard Bloomfield (1926) is considered to be the father of the speech community idea, starting from his assumption that within communities, utterances are "partly alike". Crucially, this claim has been challenged by various authors usually within the field of sociolinguistics. Lyons (1970), for instance, argues that all the people who use a given language or a dialect constitute a speech community. But in reality, what is most striking is that how 'SpCom' is precisely defined is a matter of debate; there is no single lasting and consensual definition of it (Janet Holmes, 1999). Susana Tosca (2002) still thinks that the ideal speech communities much debated by the early theorists do not exist at all. Tosca therefore prefers looser definitions like that of Romaine (who follows Gumperz):

"A speech community is a group of people who do not necessarily share the same language, but share a set of norms and rules for the use of language. The boundaries between speech communities are essentially social rather than linguistic". (1994:22)

Generally speaking, this definition has tended to see a speech community as a group of people who may share both particular sets of vocabulary and grammatical conventions (speech styles, genres…), but they do share a specific set of norms for language use (for how and when to speak in particular ways). Whether any sense can be attached to both the development and divergence of 'SpCom' is not something we shall discuss here, but one thing must be admitted: gradually a number of problems with this formulation became apparent. In other words, in order to present an alternative to 'SpCom' approach, one must first thoroughly understand its inadequacies. With a view to doing this, let us consider the following adapted table:

Speech Community	Community of Practice
▪ Shared norms and evaluations of norms are required. ▪ Shared membership may be defined externally. ▪ Nothing to say about relationship between an individual's group and personal identities. ▪ Non-teleological. ▪ Nothing to say about maintenance or (de)construction of boundaries between categories. ▪ Acquisition of norms.	▪ Shared practices are required. ▪ Membership is internally constructed. ▪ Actively constructed dependence of personal and group identities. ▪ Shared social or instrumental goal. ▪ Boundaries are maintained but not necessarily defined in contrasts with outgroups. ▪ Social process of learning.

Table.1.1. *Different assumptions and predictions that can be used to distinguish research based on the speech community and community of practice (J. Holmes & M. Meyerhoff, 1999: 179).*

In fact these points are discussed in much greater detail in the article by Mary Bucholtz: *"Why be normal?: Language and identity practices in a community of nerd girls.* Bucholtz (1999:207) suggests six ways in which the speech community has been an inadequate model for work on language and gender:

a. Its tendency to take language as central;

b. its emphasis on consensus as the organizing principle of community;

c. its preference for studying central members of the community over those at the margins;

d. its focus on the group at the expense of individuals;

e. its view of identity as a set of static categories;

f. Its valorization of researchers' interpretations over participants' own understandings of their practices.

The fact that definitions of the speech community are somewhat diverse could not be a good reason to ignore the common features. It is said that every definition focuses on language as a primary criterion of community. On the face of it, what is taken as shared may be the

linguistic system (Bloomfield 1933); or shared linguistic norms (Labov 1972, Guy 1988); the pattern of variation (Milroy 1992); or only a set of sociolinguistic norms (Romaine 1982). The same point can be made here; they all assume a consensus model of society. After all, speech community is constituted around shared norms favouring the interest of the powerful; non-linguistic aspects of social activity are treated as they are not important at all.

And again, with regard to the language norms, to be sure, some members of the speech community are central (they are of interest) while others are marginal. In this case, speakers who do not share the same norms should be excluded from the group and therein lies the main weakness of speech community. In fact, 'SpCom' places a special emphasis on the group at the expense of the individual. Individuals are viewed as having particular fixed identities throughout their lives s a result of their position in the social. As pointed out by Bucholtz (1999), this perspective fails to acknowledge the flexibility of identity construction, gender does not have the same meanings across space and time, and it is realized differently by different members of a community. The argument here is that 'SpCom' is in favour of the analyst's interpretations over participants' own understandings of their practices. Needless to say, because it presents special difficulties, 'SpCom' seems woefully an inadequate model for language and gender research. Gender researchers therefore note the need to focus on gender in its full complexity and the concept of 'CofP', they suggest, has proved useful in their own research.

To put it in a nutshell, community of practice has been defined by Wenger and Lave (1991: 12) as *"groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly*". Well, it would be possible to say that the convenient starting point of 'CofP' idea, developed by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991, 1998), is that people typically come together in groupings to carry out activities in everyday life. Strictly speaking, it puts high value on the notion of 'practice', focusing on what the members do, and more particularly, the practice that indicates that they belong to the group. Added to this, it must be noted that not everything called a community is a community of practice. A neighbourhood for instance, is often called a community, but is usually not a community of practice. To be considered a 'CofP', neighbours have to be engaged in joint activity where they share what they are experiencing, that is they should have common goals and challenges over which they interact, help each other and learn. Actually, it is the combination of these elements that constitutes a community of practice.

Though other likely, if not necessary features are proposed[13], communities of practice, according to Wenger (1998:76), have three crucial constitutive features. These are:

a. Mutual engagement;
b. a joint (negotiated) enterprise (or domain);
c. a shared repertoire of negotiable resources accumulated over time.

a. Mutual engagement

Notice that a lot depends on this dimension. Wenger (1998: 73) says a 'CofP' can be made possible when *'people are engaged in actions whose meanings they negotiate with one another'.* This emphasis on an ongoing /regular interaction among members is so necessary for a 'CofP' to exist. We might think of groups of teachers, students, administrators, engineers, surgeons, police partners…etc who live locally and most of the time meet face-to-face at work, talk on the phone, exchange electronic mail, or even being connected by radio (Wenger, 1998). But as it is shown above, geographical proximity in itself is not sufficient for a group to be named a community of practice (example of neighbours). Having the same jobs, the same friends, living in the same place or so on does not constitute a community of practice unless members interact and learn together. This implies that the interactions administrators, for instance, have with each other should create meanings at many levels, with a few well chosen words; they should have real outcomes (Bethan Davies, 2005).

b. Joint enterprise

In considering this element, it is important to remember that it is a complex concept. In Wenger's words (1998: 80), this refers to a process: what sufficiently guarantees a shared enterprise is not merely a *shared domain of interest*, but a negotiated enterprise, involving the complex relationships of mutual accountability that become part of the practice of the community (see Bethan Davies, 2005). Meyerhoff (2002:528) however claims that the shared enterprise should *'be reasonably specific and not very general or abstract'*. Briefly stated, membership therefore implies a common endeavour (David Barton & Karin Tusting, 2005) a commitment to the domain, and a shared competence that distinguishes members from other

[13] See Etienne Wenger (1998 :125-6).

people (Wenger June, 2006): a 'CofP' of dentists consists of people who have some knowledge and passion about teeth issue.

c. Shared repertoire

With a course of time, the members of a community practice develop a shared repertoire. This may include linguistic resources such as specialized terminology, concepts and expressions. It may also include resources like historical stories, greeting rituals, ways of dressing, making meals, artefacts…or in short a shared practice.



Figure.1.2. Dimensions of practice as the property of a community (Etienne Wenger, 2006).

Using few words of Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (1992), communities of practice may be large or small, intensive or diffuse; they are born and they die, they may persist through many changes of membership, and they may be closely articulated with other communities. In addition to this, it should not be a surprise to say that individual membership in a 'CofP' differs indeed. Some people may be core members while some others may be peripheral ones. According to Holmes and Meyerhoff (1999), the basis of this variation clearly lies in how successfully an individual has established particular ways of engagement with other members, fitted the goal(s) of the joint enterprise or acquired the shared repertoire.

Following what we have discussed so far, it is fairly obvious that 'CofP' is built to serve a variety of different needs; it provides a shared context and a new model for connecting people, who might never have the opportunity to interact, in terms of learning, knowledge sharing as well as individual and group development. If this is so, one consequence is that 'CofP' must be welcomed in many fields, including language and gender research.

By way of a reminder, one of the most noticeable features of gender and language previous studies is that gender works independently of other aspects of social identity[14] and that gender-specific manifestations are the same across communities. But as has just been suggested, we again suggest that 'CofP' notion proves so invaluable for language and gender researchers. Holmes and Meyehorff (1999:180) consider it as "*a corrective to an unsatisfactory essentialist approaches to language and gender*". In particular, it may be best to think of the marriage between language and gender research and community of practice approach as a turning point to abandon those prevailing assumptions. Eckert and McConnel- Ginet (1992), who are by far the most cited, do make this link in their seminal article '*look locally and think practically*'. They state that 'CofP' is both effective and relevant because:

"*to understand precisely how language interacts with gender (and with other symbolic and social phenomena) requires that we look locally, closely observing linguistic and gender practices in the context of particular community social practices*"(1992: 464) .

This idea is worth pursing here. Taken together, these points do implicitly emphasise Butler's concept of 'performativity, as a consequence, gender is viewed as something that emerges from practice, from what people *'do'* rather than what they intrinsically '*are*' (Cameron, 2005). In connection with this, instead of emphasizing gender differences as a result of early socialisation, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992:466) point out that, gender researchers can more fruitfully focus on *"people's active engagement in the reproduction of or resistance to gender arrangements in their communities".* We return to put much emphasis on the need to focus on gender in its full complexity, that is as constructed by community members in their practice and intertwined with other social parameters as status, age, class and so on.

[14] The term "social identity" refers specifically to those aspects of a person that are defined in terms of his or her group memberships, for example, as a woman, as a Muslim, as a marathon runner, or as a Democrat (Kay Deaux, 2001:01). See below.

With its criterial characteristics then, according to Janet Holmes and Miriam Meyerhoff (1999: 182):

"CofP provides an ideal framework for exploring the process by which individuals acquire membership in a community whose goals they share; it provides a means of studying the acquisition of sociolinguistic competence, as individuals locate themselves in relation to other community members; and, for similar reasons, it provides a framework for examining language change".

To paraphrase Bucholtz (1999), unlike speech community, the attraction of 'CofP' is in its appeal to practice; a group of people oriented to the same practice. The engagement in the same practice however does not necessitate consensus or (linguistic) uniformity but difference and conflict instead. Likewise, its focus on individuals as well as groups does integrate structure with agency. 'CofP' does not assign a complete freedom to individuals but rather admits the social constraints on them; it allows researchers to examine both the actions of individuals and the social structures. Consistent with this, the essential thing to keep in mind is that practices have implications for identities. Identities are not rooted in categories but rather in actions, in a word; 'CofP' captures the multiplicity of identity. Jane Sunderland (2006) gives an example of this claim: being a member of an adult education class in creative writing may change person's sense of who s/he is through the practices s/he engages in with others. At the same time, friends, relatives and associates may 'ascribe' a certain identity to her/his because of her/his membership of the class.

There is no question that the term *'identity'* came up at a number of occasions in this chapter; however it is not addressed directly. At this juncture, we propose that it is time to clarify this notion. By the way, this is not a change of the topic but rather a shift in its focus.

1.5. Gender Identities and The Constitutive Nature of Discourse

Certainly it is true that across the social and behavioural sciences, there has been an increased interest in identity as a subject of inquiry and, consequently, a vast body of literature in the area (Tope Omoniyi & Goodith White, 2006). It is also true that identity has become a very important concept in language and gender studies, but perhaps surprisingly, the concept of identity itself has always been a fuzzy one, it has been challenged from different quarters

and it can mean different things to different people: *"the notion of identity is a slippery one, often used but rarely defined, varying from one discipline to another, and an on-going subject of academic endeavour"* (Lia Litosseliti & Jane Sunderland 2002:6).

Before proceeding, there are some points we would like to make with regard to identity research. Issues of identity are an integral aspect; and thus inseparable from issues of sociolinguistics (Labov 1966), the social psychology of language (Giles and Bourhis 1976), applied linguistics (Ivanic 1998), and sociology of language (Fishman 1999, Omoniyi 2000) among others. These studies, according to Tope Omoniyi & Goodith White (2006), focused on the end-product (identity categories), rather than the production process. The sociolinguistics of identity, for example, emphasised the ways in which people position themselves and are positioned by others through the use of language and with reference to all of those variables that are identity markers such as race, gender, class...etc. According to Hans J. Ladegaard (2012), identity research in sociolinguistics has focused on two areas of study: *quantitative social dialect research* which identified how people signal their identity through phonological and morphological choices, for example; and *qualitative research* which examines pragmatic devices and discourse strategies. Wodak and Benke (1997) term them respectively: *variationist work* vs. *interactional linguistics*. Suffice it to say, the sole objective of these studies was to categorize individuals and groups. Romaine (2003: 100) argues that within variationist research the concept of social class is fundamental. In early sociolinguistic research, as evidenced in the works of Labov (1966) and Trudgill (1974), social identities are defined on the basis of membership of social classes (differences in distribution of social roles and statuses, and access to and control of the means of production). Moreover, variationist studies have attracted widespread criticism because of the conceptualisation of gender and the conceptualisation that *'language reflects already existing social identities rather than constructs them*' (Romaine 2003:109). Speakers are classified as either male or female, and their linguistic behaviours are categorized as a consequence of this classification (the difference model).

Our general point exactly is that identity research has witnessed a tremendous growth; there has been a movement from *variationism* to *social constructionism*. In this regard, Tope Omoniyi and Goodith White (2006) have identified three key changes which have quite considerably impacted identity research. Firstly, they point out that identity research has become multitheoretical and multidisciplinary (race, class, age, ethnicity…and identity). Note that language remains central to this tradition, as Joseph (2004) asserts, *'language and identity*

are inseparable'. Secondly, there has been a shift from essentialism to performativity. We might note in passing, incidentally, that this shift has marked the progression 'from 'acts of identity' (LePage and Tabouret-Keller 1985) to 'styling the other' (Rampton 1995), 'performativity' (Butler 1997 and Pennycook 2003). Thirdly, identification is a multilayered process: *"the same person from one moment to another is able, and may need, to project various 'selves' as they deem appropriate"* (Omoniyi & White 2006:18).

Bearing in mind how increasingly multidisciplinary identity research is, for the purposes of this chapter, our task is neither to review the approaches and developments in language and identity research nor to assess the analytic tools employed in it. We simply need to look more closely at the impact of the second change, or more exactly, to review the marked contrast between the essentialist notions of identity and the more recent preference for viewing identity as fluid, to wit: *essentialism* vs. *performativity*. So to begin with, Tope Omoniyi (2006:16) expressly said:

"...essentialism is the philosophy behind labelling any number of normative characteristics or practices as constituting the core of an individual or group which are then used to define them and held to be true of all members of the group".

By way of explanation, Gee (1999:39) cited in Lia Litosseliti & Jane Sunderland (2002), observes critically that *"some people ... tend to reserve the term 'identity' for a sense of self that is relatively continuous and fixed over time*". A sober look at the world around us shows that there are general as well as specific examples of this remarkable observation. Advertisements, for instance, frequently exhibit the same woman here and there: in domestic, maternal, professional or/and romantic roles. Now then, inasmuch as identity is recognized as fixed, rigid and always being static, many problems definitely can be inferred[15]. Ivanic (1998) knows how to put it. Even though identity is a useful term, it is indeed "*misleadingly singular*" (1998:11). She continues writing:

"The plural word 'identities' is sometimes better, because it captures the idea of people identifying simultaneously with a variety of social groups. One or more of these identities may be foregrounded at different times; they are sometimes contradictory, sometimes interrelated: people's diverse identities constitute the richness and dilemmas of their sense of self".

[15] Problems with essentialist notions of identity in language research (See: Sociolinguistics of Identity, 2006:16).

In this quotation, Ivanic (1998) appears to be answering questions which might be asked before. Let us now look at how these common assumptions may help us interpret her claim:

a. identity is not fixed;
b. identity is constructed within established contexts and may vary from one context to another;
c. these contexts are moderated and defined by intervening social variables and expressed through language(s);
d. identity is a salient factor in every communicative context whether given prominence or not;
e. identity informs social relationships and therefore also informs the communicative exchanges that characterize them;
f. more than one identity may be articulated in a given context in which case there will be a dynamic of identities management.

Sociolinguistics of identity (2006:02)

Whilst one speaks convincingly of the need of the plural word "*identities*", what is of essence hitherto is the question: *"where do identities come from?"* According to Ivanic (1998), social constructionists share the view that identity is the result of affiliation to particular beliefs and possibilities available in the social context, in any case, they offer a possibility of resistance. Jaworski and Coupland (1999) give a quick paraphrase of what Giddens has said. Giddens sees identity as a series of '*choices'* one continually makes about oneself and one's lifestyle. With this result, identity is a process and not a state or set of personal attributes. Lia Litosseliti & Jane Sunderland (2002) have the same opinion that identities can be seen as emerging from affiliation and choices (though not free choices), but they further claim that identities also come from the ascriptions of others, from an individual's different sorts of relationships with others. Identities then change as their relationships change (within a Community of Practice; see above). Similarly, the development of gender identity can be recognized as fluid and never complete. Butler, a feminist of great renown, insists that *"there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results*". She believes that masculinities and femininities are results we perform by the activities in which we partake, not predetermined traits we possess. However that does not assume that individuals are free to perform whatever '*gender identity'* they choose, Butler (1990: 33) herself acknowledges that acts of identity performance take place within a

'rigid regulatory frame'. In this sense, if social norms are broken, then negative evaluation can occur (Tope Omoniyi & Goodith White, 2006).

At any rate, there is a profound connection between gender and identity; however, we should add that other factors like race, nationality, religion, social class, age and ethnicity, to name a few, do determine the formation of identity. If we study the example given above, we would strongly believe that it is useful to talk in terms of multiple identities. The same identity of the woman shown in various advertisements may differ radically depending on whether she views herself/may be ascribed as, for example, a feminist, a businesswoman, a competent teacher, a housewife, a Christian, and so forth. Given the complexity and multifaceted nature of identity, intersectionality, as a concept, is absolutely an indispensable analytical tool for revealing the multiple experiences in which the intersection of gender and other social variables is invisible (See chapter three).

One more point to make here and which ties in well with the claim we expressed earlier is the relationship between *gender identity* and *discourse*. All we know thus far is that, as Cameron (2001) argues, our words always tell our listeners something about ourselves. In conjunction with the social constructionist approach to gender, some recent studies adopt a dual definition of discourse[16]. Discourse, in its traditional linguistic sense, as '*language beyond the sentence',* and discourse, in a much broader sense, to return to Foucault's words of pluralized discourses as (1972:49): *"practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak"*. The manner in which these two strands of analysis are crucially interlinked will now be fully elucidated.

Most scholars, following Ochs (1992), agree that *: 'any aspect of language can become indexical of social identities, from phonological variables to individual words, to complex discourse structures such as patterns of actions in narratives'* (De Fina, Schiffrin and Bamberg 2006: 15). As is evident from this view, it seems reasonable then to suppose that the indexicality model explains the way in which linguistic forms relate to diverse identities. Ochs (1992:341) points out that very few linguistic forms directly index gender (e.g. Mrs., Mr. s/he…). This means that, she comments, linguistic strategies should be seen as being *indirectly* indexed with (gender) identity *(indirect indexicality).* Directly related to performativity, indices are non-

[16] See Gendered Discourse in the Professional Workplace (2007).

exclusive; Ochs (1992) said, and added that the same linguistic form can be used by man or woman. By way of example, McElhinny (2003: 35) observes, female speaker does not use a tag question simply because she is a female speaker but she may use it because she is abiding by cultural and ideological expectations about femininity. So there is no reason to catalogue speech styles according to sex because linguistic features may be employed to index social meanings (stances), which in turn help to constitute gender identities.

Following the oft-cited Foucaultian view of discourse (1972), we can say that discourses do not only represent something already existing, discourses are both representational and constitutive. This perhaps has a closer meaning to Bucholtz's view (1994:4): *"speakers' identities emerge from discourse".* On reflection, it is arguable that identities are both discursively represented and (re) constituted. According to Lia Litosseliti & Jane Sunderland (2002), the way we speak both to and about others can be seen as affiliation (there is some space for individual choice); but the way we are spoken about can be seen as attribution/ascription. Identity therefore, is a ***two-way process***: the result of joint production (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). Within this particular process, individuals can be (presented) more or less active. This mention of individual's identities as embedded within discourse raises the idea of ***"discourse mediating/shaping identities***". Discourse which gives meaning that, for example, women by their dress or behaviour are often responsible for rape and sexual harassment, can be regarded as having the potential to shape or mediate the identities of some women. This constitutive capacity of discourse, identified by Hollway (1984) does not only represent gendered social practices, but also maintains and re-constitutes them. Altogether this implies that there is a link between Foucault's definition of discourse and performativity. Coates (1997: 291) states that we all have *'access to a range of discourses, and it is these different discourses which give us access to, or enable us to perform, different 'selves'".* Coates has been able to shed light on two different discourses. She (1997) defines *dominant* discourses, which legitimize male superiority, and *resistant* / *subversive* discourses, such as feminist discourses. What she was able to deduce is that these discourses compete and can co-occur within the same stretch of talk. Finally, while plausible, it seems that a focus on identity and discourse inevitably entails an exploration of power relations (Lia Litosseliti & Jane Sunderland, 2002).

1.6. Gendered Bodies and the disciplinary power

Turning now to the discussion of how useful is Foucault's concept of the disciplinary power for analyzing patriarchal relations between men and women in modern societies; we need first to introduce the Panopticon model.

Undoubtedly, to promote his brother's invention, the philosopher and the social reformer Jeremy Bentham (1787) developed an ideal architectural design for the prison. Bentham's machine (all- seeing) ensured that prisoners should always feel themselves under surveillance and everything they do must be monitored and controlled. To achieve this, the well known building "the Panopticon" is structured in such a way that inmates in the cells do not interact with each other and are regularly visible from the central tower. As described by Lee Bartky (1997), while prisoners cannot see their observer, they must believe that they could be watched at any moment however. Therefore, instead of the violent methods that were previously used with the inmate, the Panopticon offered a coercive force performed through the constant inspection. As a result, prisoners behave themselves and control their own actions so as to avoid physical punishment.

It is unsurprising that for Jeremy Bentham, the Panopticon is designed to maintain continuous efficient surveillance in prisons, whereas for the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1972), the Panopticon is adopted to assure the automatic functioning of power in modern societies. In Foucault's words, unlike previous societies, modern society has seen a great emergence of new disciplinary systems that easily produce *"docile bodies"*. To show the meaning of this point more clearly, since the prisoner, who is subjected to the visible tower, knows that he is seen without being able to see his watcher; he becomes to himself his own jailor. The shift here is that these disciplinary practices are not restricted only to prisons but also to schools, hospitals, factories and cities. Indeed, Foucault extends Bentham's work and shows in details how disciplinary power works and how human bodies follow the norms because of the threat of the modern panoptic societies. For him, discipline is a set of strategies associated with certain contexts which pervades the individual's general thinking (mind) and behaviour. To be clear enough, as prisoners; individuals (such as a student within a classroom, a soldier at a drill) also turn their gaze upon themselves and discipline their bodies with the appropriate gestures and movements in various contexts according to the expected and stereotyped social cultural norms. Therefore, Foucault introduced the term "docile subjected

bodies" and put it as that: *"…the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it…" (1979: 138).*

More precisely, those gestures and movements that are required from the individual have to be internalized as being "the self". The body is absolutely controlled not by external means but through the internal control of the person himself. That is the reason why Foucault conceives human subjectivity in terms of passive docile bodies and claims that the effect of power on these bodies results in reducing social agency and autonomy as well.

Foucault however could not escape the criticism because of his blindness to pay any attention to the gendered body: *"…But he is blind to those disciplines that produce a modality of embodiment that is peculiarly* feminine …" Lee Bartky (1988:27). For him, the female body is as the same as the male body that is subjected to many disciplinary practices in modern societies. Feminist scholars however, assure that women; unlike men; must view their bodies as objects that need self- surveillance within panoptic patriarchal societies in particular. Like the prisoner, student and the soldier, woman follows these norms because of the way she looked at by others besides to the threat of being sanctioned (laughed at or blacklisted for instances) by male patriarchy. Her self-control is achieved through the lens of man's perception of the ideal female body. Indeed male gaze and judgment make women confine to some stereotyped gender roles and just feel as if they are behaving naturally. In fact, as one could not ignore that Foucault's work usefulness is quite remarkable for Feminist studies, one could not ignore too that women's bodies are more docile than men's bodies. In the same line of thought, what made Foucault's work receives severe criticism is the exclusion of the subjected bodies of women.

Cultural ideologies and stereotyped gender roles dictate that women are expected to have an acceptable beautiful ideal thin body (depends on the context, so certainly the list might not be exhaustive). In other words; because of the unequal power relationship between the watcher "male" and the watched "female, women lose their sense of autonomy when trying to appear desirable to men. As shown by Lee Barkty, being a female involves internalizing these biased gendered norms. Consequently, she refers to the expression *'the modernization of patriarchal power'* so as to assert that the disciplinary power that specifically creates passive female body *is everywhere and nowhere*. In addition to that, Barkty (1990:27) examines three categories of those disciplinary practices; that stem from patriarchal oppression; which are as follows: an ideal size, appearance and movement.

When reading Lee Bartky's article, we gradually learn a lot about what is expected from the body. Through her specific examples, she illustrates how panoptic societies can with no doubt produce dominant ideologies which definitely reinforce the regulation of human body and its occupied position. To quote her: *"There are significant gender differences in gesture, posture, movement and gender bodily comportment…".* Our interpretations of this extract reveal that in our world; certainly there is a general agreement on ways in which men and women differ as if they are from different planet (does not apply to all men and women). They have different needs, goals and even gestures and postures.

Regardless of the various machines women and men engage themselves with to discipline their bodies; women particularly are the most consumers mastering them. As we can see, the discussion of the self-regulation actually emphasizes on classes of disciplinary exercises *meant for women only*; including a weight loss, eating habits, the suitable size, a specific repertoire of gestures and movements designed by a patriarchal world. Exactly as it mentioned, dieting for instance becomes a sign for physical fitness and a special disciplinary exercise for the requirement of the female beauty. Yet, this discipline imposed on the female body is no more seen as a choice but rather a necessity. Looking at Marianne Wex' photos (1979), one may notice at once that these stereotyped necessities are present. While using their bodies to prove their masculinity, men for instance sit in a special way with legs thrown wide apart and arms flung out at some distance from the body. Women, by the contrary, are more restricted in their manner of gestures and movement. Since they take up a little space, they entirely make themselves small and narrow. *"Under male scrutiny, women will avert their eyes or cast them downward";* Barkty keeps saying. That is to say that women's attractive beauty is incomplete unless they are taught to smile more than men and advised to manage self movement. Therein, the bodily experience of men and women do differ and their relationships with the modern society are not the same as well. Thus, this representation of both types of bodies then helps to maintain a series of unequal power relations between those who *usually have an unnoticed normal body* and those who *constantly have more docile objectified body.*

When exploring these social power relations, we start perceiving human need for the mastery of distinct preparations, from the right size and posture to every procedure of hair-care, skin-care and aesthetic activities. To see no discrepancy between themselves and the desirable idealized image, women (not necessarily men) are required to have special knowledge about the application of make-up and the selection of clothes in particular. Their skin must be smoothly soft and the hair should be removed from large surfaces of the body. Woman who

want permanent results they are obliged to try painful and expensive strategies. Furthermore, as they must follow many instructions they must avoid many too. They should avoid strong facial expressions to get what experts call "good skin-care habits". Make-up removers, nourishing cream, night cream, eye cream, hand cream, body lotion, facial mask and other thousands products are all marketed by big bill boards, magazines and advertisements campaigns for women to make them closer to what males (or what other females) call for. Plastic surgeries too participate in making women look better in terms of "lovely, thin, sexy body and the like". In reality, women are not aware that they are targeted and especially objectified. Therefore, it is also suggested that women are at risk; eating disorders like anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa are increasing in many countries because of their fondness of thinness and refusing of fatness (dangerous female model). In a world dominated by men, women who do not abide by these disciplinary procedures (who do not impose on themselves self regulation) will often face severe sanctions. Sincerely, what is stated here could provide ample evidence of (men's) and women' own experiences of how the modernization of power is imposed in this world.

Although much of what is written bombards us with the so-called female body, Bartky's analysis concludes with a clear oppositional view. For her, if women can do something, it does not mean that they should do it. One actually found it shocking when it is noted that women are punished because of their inability or unwillingness to imprison their bodies, monitor everything they eat and check their make-up many times per day. In this spirit; Bartky reveals how the modern anonymous imbalanced disciplinary power exists by questioning some random perceptions: what happens if women's lips are not kissable and her eyes are not mysterious?; why are not all these procedures suitable to him not necessarily to her?. What about the women who cannot have insufficient time or money to provide themselves with the minimum of what is required from them?, are not these racist disciplinary regimes designed for women having a specific class and race only?

As noted earlier, Feminist scholars assert that this self-control is a form of obedience to patriarchy *"We are born male or female, but not masculine or feminine. Femininity is an artifice, an achievement…" (1997:132).* Females are under surveillance in a way males are not, and whatever they are/ become/live, the ideal female body can never ever be reached. Moreover, women's bodies will always be seen as deficient and lacking many good preparations. But the most inquisitive questions that are believed to be necessary raised here

are: *"Why do some women resist the abandonment of those aesthetic activities?"* and *"why are not all women feminists?".*

On this basis, Bartky supposes that not of course all women are feminists because not all of them express their frustration because of males pestering and violent acts as black South African women do. In addition to that, we may suggest that these women do not want to bear this burden; they refuse to be those victims who receive the threat of annihilation. Indeed they don't want to chock because they agree that naturally women should perform these behaviours and the radical feminist critique may pose a threat not only on women's identity but also the structure of their world[17]. As a result, they naturalize and justify these disciplinary practices against themselves because for them this happens with all females and they get accustomed to that.

In conclusion, for feminist theorists such as Jana Sawicki, such a model makes it possible for us to think beyond a concept of power as a possession and to think about *'how subjects are constituted by power relations'* (Sawicki 1991: 21). She continues asserting that Foucault's conceptualisation of power moves beyond the idea of it being merely repressive to it also being productive, causing new behaviours, identities and knowledge to emerge, but usually through discourse. Discourse itself acts as a kind of surveillance, Foucault argues.

If Foucault provides a positive way to challenge power, there is no denying that through his suggestion, he gives reasons that with power comes the possibility of resistance, of course according to the ways various discourses are used because *'[d]iscourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it'* (Foucault 1979: 101).

[17] Many of radical feminists' aspirations have been ridiculed or misunderstood by others partly because of the way in which they wanted to shape their own movement (50 Concepts in Gender Studies, 2004).

1.7. Conclusion

In fact, the bulk of this chapter provides a brief account of the development of language and gender studies and makes some general remarks about the key slippery elusive concepts themselves. In other words, its focus is largely the shift from 'sexist language' and 'gender differences in talk' to discourse. It would not be bizarre then to recommend that it is necessary to read the sections sequentially, one following the other.

Worthy of mention is that there has been an extensive body of research on sex differences in language. Such prescriptive ideas actually stem from stereotyped beliefs; nonetheless they enhance the polarisation between the men and women. Researchers saw what they wanted to see, they interpreted their findings in sexist ways. The central concern of many feminists then has gone beyond the simple female/male dichotomy. In this rejection of what might be described as an essentialist framework, they have an alternative, a constructionist approach to *performing, doing* or *accomplishing* gender. Butler's notion of performativity has been very influential in feminist linguistics; she (1990) alternatively argues that '*who you are, and are taken to be depends on your repeated performance over time of the acts that constitute a particular identity'*. Compared to the sex differences studies, the performative model allows for speakers' (no absolute) agency. Overall, it has been emphasized that there are a range of complex aspects to take into account when conducting a study of language and gender. The CofP framework, for example, has already been successfully applied to analyzing language and gender, a number of researchers have summarized the usefulness of the CofP approach, pointing out that it is through CofPs that the multiplicity of identity is captured. In conjunction with the social constructionist approach to gender and the CofP framework outlined above, it is believed that gender identities are constantly being performed in discourse.

Current gender identity and discourse study is interdisciplinary, it can and does utilise a whole range of related theoretical approaches. As regards the approaches, we avoided overly theoretical frameworks which do not play a key role in shaping the direction of this thesis. Having now described broad issues around gender identity and discourse that became relevant to the collection of data for this project, in the following chapter, attention is shifted to a critical consideration of broad scholarly concerns centering on some important issues in the research of gender identity and discourse of violence.

2. Chapter Two: Feminist thought on sexual violence

2.1. Introduction

Imagine hearing that someone has experienced violent acts. Conjuring up an image of this hypothetical scenario, we need therefore to hear about all of it, not just what we want to hear. Now then, do you imagine a male perpetrator? If so, few would deny that men and violence are closely related. Is the imagined victim specific? If it is envisaged that a victim is female, though we do not intend to deny the violence women commit against men/women, according to the World Bank data (2012), *"women aged 15-44 are more at risk from rape and domestic violence than from cancer, car accidents, war and malaria*". Is the story then as the same as that of abusive men and victimized women? Statistically speaking, research shows that male violence often targets other men than women, but for Eisenstein (2007: 34), "*men who are tortured and sexually degraded are 'humiliated' because they are treated like women; they are forced to be women – sexually dominated and degraded".* Furthermore, an intriguing question here is what forms are manifest as actual violence in this possible scenario? A designed list may include most serious violent acts: pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, kicking, biting, hitting with a fist or using a weapon. What is obvious about these factors is that they all relate to what is considered to be gendered physical violence as the most likely scenarios.

In case of the hidden nature of the relationship between gender and violence, we are not concerned with evaluating what is believed but with explaining and understanding it. A more profound understanding of this relationship may be achieved through, first; conceptualizing *'gender'* as performative, closely *intersected* with other variables, and, second, visualizing *'violence'* as a continuum. Violence must not be narrowly defined. Even the issue of what types of behaviours are regarded as violent is complex. Whatever the theories and whatever the causes in fact make it difficult to have an agreement concerning what is, or is not, 'violence'. Violence may be seen actually shaping the gender relations of a given society, while in turn sexist beliefs may be seen as both the causes and consequences of violence. Well, since violence is intimately interconnected with gender, does its discussion evoke fundamental issues such as power, ideology, culture, identity and discourse? To pose these questions and others is not to acknowledge that we have a perfect chapter that escapes all these difficulties, but to claim that we still have insufficient knowledge about gender and violence.

2.2. Defining Violence

'No one is untouched by violence'. This anonymous expression alerted researchers to the possibility of a universal scourge that threatens the happiness of us all. Violence thus is an extremely sensitive issue. Many of us have difficulty confronting violence because they have considerable discretion in defining it, and that the various ways in which they do so, may mask considerable differences in its seriousness. The truth is that, even among scholars there is not even the beginning of an agreement concerning a definition of what exactly 'violence' is, seemingly, Stanko (2003: 3) keeps saying, '*what violence means is and will always be fluid, not fixed'*. Following this overarching convincing assumption, it must be emphasised that defining violence is not an exact science but a matter of judgement (World Report on Violence and Health, 2002). According to Bufacchi (2005), there are two ways of thinking about violence, on the one hand there is a narrow, '*minimalist conception'* and on the other, a broader, *'comprehensive conception'*. At the very least, in order to come to grips with the fluidity of this concept, we need to spend some time looking at the starting point for some narrow definitions.

Etymologically, violence refers to the Latin word "*violentia"* which means damage and physical force to hurt someone or something. Not very dissimilar, Robert Paul Wolff (1969) defines violence as *"the illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desires of others"*. The anthropologist David Riches (1986: 8), whose definition is compatible with the basic properties of violence, sees it as *''an act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses''.* Violence, as defined by the National Research Council of the American Academy of Sciences (Reiss & Roth, 1994: 2), involves *''behaviours by individuals that intentionally threaten, attempt, or inflict physical harm on others''*. John Keane's view of violence is moreover summed up as: *"...the more or less intended, direct but unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others, who are consequently made to suffer a series of effects...* (1996: 67).

These definitions have in common the equation of violence to the use of force or unlawful use of physical force by an individual against others. Being exactly the same, violence is defined by the Encarta World English Dictionary (1999) as:

a. The use of physical force to injure somebody or damage something;
b. The illegal use of unjustified force, or the effect created by the threat of this.

Among the features that have been observed is that, Riedel and Welsh (2002: 3) comment, *"one of the most common ways of defining violence is to only consider forms of criminal violence and to argue that violence is the use of force that has been prohibited by law*". However, there may be more to this concept than at first meets the eye. To make it as clear as day, since Minimalists define violence restrictively; in terms of physical force and '*bodily response and harm'* (Glasser 1998); the notion physical violence in this case represents a surprisingly broad spectrum of incidents (Waddington, Badger & Bull, 2004). The problem, of course, is and remains the question: why are theorists rejecting the narrow concept of violence?

Whilst it may now be seen that narrow definitions rest on the belief that there is no clear distinction between 'force' and 'violence', Hannah Arendt (1970: 44-5) points out that 'force' should be limited to the forces of nature which is not necessarily a violent action. Buffachi's (2005) attempt to distinguish between the two concepts appears to be quite successful however. Both terms are obviously different, but even so one might involves the other. More noticeably, let us not just dismiss the idea that narrow definitions are criticized as giving no attention to the wider contexts of social relationships in which violence takes place; including the possibility of non-physical and unconsciously intended harms. That is to say, Minimalists tend merely to focus on the visible, intentional harm between individuals. Besides, it is found that, with reference to Riches' definition, the concepts 'legitimacy and illegitimacy' do raise problems. Legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence seem to be ideologically constructed. Something similar is that not every violent act always requires physical force (poisoning or squeezing), and not everything violent do violence to everyone, as not everything causes pain can be defined as a violent action (medical operations). The issue of what types of behaviour are defined as violent is subject to social and political context that is both contested and subject to change. Today a teacher, in Great Britain for example, can be prosecuted for using physical restraint of any kind on a child.

It appears to be self- evident that a broader approach includes not only physical acts but also other forms. For violence experts, limiting violence to physical acts makes it more restricted in focus. Elizabeth Stanko's often-cited definition is that violence is *'any form of behaviour by an individual that intentionally threatens to or does cause physical, sexual or psychological harm to others or themselves'* (2001: 316). This might be reasonable working definition but it has something in common with the restrictive definitions. The committing of the violent act itself is associated with '*intentionality'* and, for no doubt; the notion '*threat'* is

problematic. Significantly, particular recent inclusive definitions of violence may be better presented by Henry (2000) and Barack (2003) respectively. Henry (2000) believes that a more integrated definition of violence should replace the term 'force' with 'power' and takes a more comprehensive view of harm. Violence therefore is regarded as *''the use of power to harm another, whatever form it takes''* (2000: 3). Barack also made an attempt to not exclude other forms and expressions of violence; he (2003: 26) adopts a definition of violence as *''any action or structural arrangement that results in physical or nonphysical harm to one or more persons''.* Felson (2009) says clearly that the "harm" perpetrators produce is not necessarily physical, he continues, '*it could be a social harm or a deprivation of resources'*. As it is necessary to belabor the point in bold type, Johan Galtung's concept of '*structural violence'* merits serious consideration. Johan Galtung (1990) introduces violence as the avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life. Violence is purposeful, intentional action or threat of action that is aimed at hurting another human being or the environment such as acts of rape, and killing, repression, detention…and so forth. To know well the operation of violence at multiple levels, in "Typologies of Violence" originally written in 1981, Johan Galtung establishes a very useful scheme of violence.



Figure. 2.1. Galtung's Typology of Violence (www.turning-the-tide.org).

a. *Direct violence* (known as personal violence) is the only type that could be acknowledged as real violence. It refers to the acts of violence that are committed in an observable manner. These include acts of rape, torture, maiming, and killing, as well as those that hinder the acquisition of a person's basic needs for identity and freedom, such as repression,

detention, de-socialization from one's own culture and re-socialization into a new one. In brief, direct violent actions do not come out of nowhere; its roots are cultural and structural.

b. *Cultural violence* uses any aspect of culture that is used to legitimize direct or structural violence like language and religion. Consider historical stories that glorify wars and military victories for example.

c. *Structural violence* (known also as indirect violence) is less obvious; it is not necessarily carried out by individuals. It is the hidden violence (to a greater or lesser extent) committed by social structures and institutions. These structures serve to exploit or marginalize "the other" in order to achieve such inequality. Examples of structural violence may include policies that sustain wage discrimination on the basis of gender or race. Its results are racism, poverty, hunger and the violation of other human rights. Stated differently, whenever people are denied access to resources, various forms of violence exist.

A further common distinction is made between 'instrumental' and 'expressive violence' (e.g.,Wieviorka 2009: 35/ 88–9). Felson (2009) considers violence as always instrumental behaviour, oriented to specific goals, that is always perpetrated for 'gain' of something. Felson understands 'gain' broadly, including thrills[1], retribution, compliance as well as monetary gain. Likewise, one of the oldest and most prevalent classifications is between instrumental versus hostile aggression. Englander (2007: 3–4) writes, 'instrumental aggression' is committed to reach a goal as compared to 'hostile aggression' that is performed for its 'own sake' as a form of stimulus-seeking. This latter may be described as expressive violence which is usually performed for intrinsic gratification and might show a feeling of hate for instance. Wieviorka (1995: 69-76) uses the instrumental/expressive dichotomy to differentiate types of racist violence. Racist instrumental violence might be connected to maintaining the inferior position of the racialized group. Even though the instrumental/expressive distinction has been likely to be present in many studies, they have been widely criticized because, in practice, the two are often combined (What is Violence, 2010).

One ongoing debate, for example, is that the term violence, in some definitions, appears to have the same meaning with aggression and bullying. Violence and aggression might be used

[1] There is an extensive literature that points to the (learned) pleasures of violence (What is Violence, 2010).

interchangeably (Jones Stephen, 2000) but there is a general agreement in the difference of their nature or origin. The difference between aggression and violence could be found in the fact that aggression is a behaviour guided by the instincts and therefore characteristic of other animal species whereas violence is rather the product of the interaction between biology and culture, and it entitles a conscious intentionality (Sanmartin, 2004). Forms of aggression may include physical assaults/violence, verbal or nonverbal threats, offending remarks, harassment or sarcasm. It may, on the other hand, also be more subtle behaviour like nasty or offending teasing, spreading false rumours, gossip and slander. If such behaviours are repeated may be perceived as bullying (Einarsen et al., 2000). On the basis of what has been said, bulling takes place when a person is exposed to aggressive or negative act(s) repeatedly and over an extended period of time. Besides, bulling, for some research, is supposed to be the most prevalent form of the general concept "violence". To be precise, bulling is defined by Farrington (1993) as a *repeated* oppression of a less powerful person, physical or psychological, by a more powerful person.

Especially worthy of notice here is the idea of a 'continuum of violence', one example of this broader approach, within which a range of harmful behaviour is included, from physical acts of murder and rape to verbal acts of sexualised and racialised abuse. This, according to Waddington, Badger and Bull (2004:145), would be a definition:

''*which implicitly claims that a 'violent act' can be anywhere along a continuum running from an angry and hostile glare (which in certain circumstances can cause a degree of alarm), through verbal abuse, a verbal threat, threatening gestures, a single blow, an attack causing minor injuries, an attack causing major injuries, to an attack causing death''*

By broadening their views, compared to Minimalists, proponents of *'comprehensive conception'* avoid some of those difficulties. For some obvious differences, violence may be seen as anything avoidable that impedes human realization, violates the rights or integrity of the person and is often judged in terms of outcomes rather than intentions. Undoubtedly such definition is valuable as allowing informants to express their diverse experiences. Notwithstanding; more recently Waddington, Badger and Bull (2004) have found considerable drawbacks associated with it. Connectedly, broader definitions may involve a risk of that analysts might fail while referring to very different experiences using the same conceptual apparatus (Willem de Haan, 2008).

For now it may be useful to come to a full stop. Perhaps not surprisingly, as is already mentioned, these definitions of violence have met with skepticism. In the words of Bauman (1995: 139), the concept of violence is *''either under-, or over-defined, or both''.* That is to say, the concept 'violence' seems to be either unsubtly defined as just physical acts, or it may be very broadly referred to as a violation of the basic human rights of the person. To repeat what Pilcher and Whelehan (2004: 173) claim, the political consequences of choosing a narrower or a broader definition of violence have to do with many factors: the perceptions of the prevalence and frequency of violent behaviour, the connections between different forms of behaviour, the process of recognising who the perpetrators and victims are, and what the causes and consequences of violence are, as well as the development of appropriate policy responses to counter violence. The general point here may be reflected in Levi's and Maguire's claim (2002:796): *'violence' is ''a slippery term which covers a huge and frequently changing range of heterogeneous physical and emotional behaviors, situations and victim-offender relationships''.* While it may be true that the debate about the preferable definition of violence is about whether violence should be defined from the perspectives of different actors, it is worthwhile and important immediately to introduce the characters of violence. The people involved in violent acts are usually the perpetrators, targets (victims), protectors and the by standers (Nicoletti, J. et al, 2009).

1. Perpetrators: are those who commit the acts of violence such as rapists, murders, aggressors …and the like.

2. Targets (victims/survivors): the targets of violence can be intended or by choice, primary, secondary or tertiary.

a. Victims of choice: the perpetrators systematically seek for particular victims or victim qualities to carry out their violent behaviour. They may choose professors, supervisors, officers, girls, babies…etc.

b. Victims of opportunity: victims of opportunity are often in the wrong place at the wrong time. The rioters and suicidal perpetrators usually involve victims of opportunity.

c. Primary victims: They are those individuals who have experienced the acts of violence directly.

d. Secondary victims: are the room-mates friends, witnesses, parents, rescuers and others involved but not directly impacted by violence.

e. Tertiary victims: are those who consult, advise and listen to the perpetrator's stories. These helpers may also become affected by some violent behaviours.

3. Protectors: are those who do what is in their power to prevent violent incident from occurring. In schools, for example, the security forces are the protectors.

4. By standers: This community has not received a great deal of attention for their role of perpetrating and preventing violence. Regardless of their true feelings about the violent behaviour, the silent presence of the by standers has strong influence on the continuing of the violent incident. When they do not stand up and confront the perpetrators, their silence is interpreted as disapproval of the actions taking place. If it is the opposite, it would be a support to continue the violent act. Most of the by standers might not step forward and get involved because they fear they will become the next target of the perpetrator.

2.3. World Report on Violence and Health: Forms and Contexts

Because the need to define violence is always so urgent, WHO raises the alarm by releasing the first 'World Report on Violence and Health'. The report, the first comprehensive summary of this problem, uses the definition of violence developed by a WHO working group in 1996*:*

"the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (2002:5).

It comes to one's notice that this particular broad definition covers a wide range of violent acts; going beyond physical acts to include threats and intimidation. On the basis of this definition, the World Report on Violence and Health further divides the concept violence, according to the victim-perpetrator relationship, into three broad categories: *self-directed, interpersonal, and collective violence*. Each category is subdivided to reflect specific types of violence, settings of violence and the nature of violent acts (physical attack, sexual attack, psychological attack, deprivation and neglect).



Figure.2.2. A typology of violence (WHO world report on violence and health: 2002: 7).

Self-directed violence takes place when the perpetrator and the victim are the same person. It is subdivided into suicide and self-abuse. The former includes thoughts, attempted suicides or deliberate self-injury. Self-abuse, in contrast, includes acts such as self-mutilation.

Interpersonal violence happens between individuals, and it includes two subcategories: (1) family & intimate partner violence and (2) community violence. The former category, largely between family members and intimate partners; includes forms of violence such as child maltreatment; intimate partner violence; and elder abuse. The latter however happens between individuals who are unrelated, and who may or may not know each other. It is broken down into acquaintance and stranger violence and includes youth violence; assault by strangers; violence related to property crimes; and violence in workplaces and other institutions (usually outside the home).

Collective violence refers to the violence committed by larger groups of individuals and can be subdivided into social, political and economic violence. Collective violence includes, for example, terrorist acts, war or some attacks committed by groups with the purpose of disrupting economic activity and so on.

Nearly all studies concerning the concept 'violence' demonstrate that violence not only is difficult to be defined but also its forms create ample controversies. Again and again, violence is complex because it takes on many different forms which are exhibited in a wide range of contexts. Coming to details, it may, for example, be distinguished in 'youth violence', 'gang violence', 'school violence', 'street violence', 'teen violence', 'dating violence', 'intimate violence', 'domestic violence', 'workplace violence', 'suite violence' (Punch, 2000), 'urban violence', 'interpersonal violence', 'random violence', 'racist violence', 'media violence', 'mimetic violence', 'systemic violence', 'symbolic violence', 'structural violence' or even 'apocalyptic violence' (Hamm, 2004). Most commonly we think of violence as physical ('aggression', 'abuse' or 'assault'), but it can also be verbal ('bullying', 'humiliation' or 'intimidation'). It can be overt but also covert like in language and literacy, abstraction, interpretation and representation, and in the violence of 'censure' (Valier, 1997). Violence can be individual or collective, interpersonal or institutional, national or international, symbolic or structural (Willem de Haan, 2008).). 'Some incidents occur, more or less, 'out of the blue', whereas others occur within some form of relationship in which conflict escalates. Some incidents are concluded in a few moments, whereas others evolve into long-term conflict relationships (Waddington, Badger and Bull, 2004). Some forms of violence may be remained hidden and unrecognized particularly in private contexts. In a very brief form, the emphasis on context for both the *performance* and *understanding* of violence is of central importance.

As this abbreviated account suggests, violence is an extremely multifaceted phenomenon that has its roots in the interaction of many factors. So that to understand this multifaceted nature of violence, consider the following ecological model:



Figure.2.3. Ecological model for understanding violence (WHO world report on violence and health: 2002: 9).

It is echoed throughout the *World report on Violence and Health'* (2002) that there is no *single factor* to account for the use of a violent behaviour either by an individual or a community. This ecological model was introduced first in the late 1970s for the study of child abuse and subsequently employed in other violence research. Each level in this model above has been successfully used to examine the factors which increase the risk of committing or being a victim of violence.

The first level (individual) identifies biological and personal history factors that influence individual's behaviour and increase his/her likelihood of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence. Examples of these factors may include demographic characteristics (age, education, income), psychological or personality disorders, substance abuse, and a history of behaving aggressively or experiencing abuse.

The second level (relationship) examines close relationships, such as those with family, friends, intimate partners and peers, and how they increase the risk of being a victim or perpetrator of violence. In youth violence, for instance, having friends who engage in violence may be a key factor of being a victim or perpetrator of violence.

The third level (community) describes the community contexts in which social relationships occur, such as schools, workplaces or neighbourhoods, and identifies the characteristics of these settings that increase the risk for violence (for example: high levels of unemployment or the existence of a local drug trade).

The fourth level (societal**)** looks at the broad societal factors that have its roots in acts of violence. It focuses on the social and cultural norms. Taken for granted norms may include those which give priority to parental rights over child welfare, those that regard suicide as a matter of individual choice, those that support male dominance over women, those that agree with the use of excessive force by police against citizens, and those that give encouragement to political conflict. This level also looks at include the health, economic, educational and social policies that help to maintain economic or social inequality between groups in society.

Note with great concern that, besides helping clarify the roots of violence, the ecological model also suggests what needs to be done to prevent violence. This includes, for example: modifying individual risk behaviours, working to create healthy family environments, as well as monitoring public places such as schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods and taking steps to change the larger cultural, social and economic factors that encourage to violence.

2.4. Theories of Violence

Having reached the question "what causes violence?" the primary step we wish to make is to narrow our focus to the main existing explanatory theories of violent behaviours. Violent behaviours can be divided into two broad theoretical groups: *active/innate drive theories and reactive/environmental theories.* On the one hand, *active or innate drive theories* see aggressiveness as an innate human component where aggressive acts respond to impulses or internal motivations of the person to commit a violent act. On the other hand, according to the *reactive or environmental theories*, the environment is regarded as the main responsible for the origin of violence, in the sense that the person's behaviour is a reaction learnt through specific environmental events. The rest of the most relevant aspects of each theory will be explained as what follows.

2.4.1. Active or Innate Drive Theories

The main active or innate drive theories include the genetic theory, the ethological theory, the psychoanalytic theory, the personality theory and the frustration theory. As it has already mentioned, these theories see the origin of violence in the individual's internal characteristics.

The Genetic Theory stresses that the inherited traits and the genetic syndromes have a special role in the development of the aggressive behaviours.

The Ethological Theory: Ethology is defined by Klopfer (1974) as the study of any behaviour from a biological viewpoint. Fox (1982) described aggression as being 'as natural as copulation or eating'. Based on his study of fish, birds and certain mammalian species, Lorenz (1966) described aggression as being a drive common to most animals and to man. It was described as an accumulating force which needed to be discharged, usually in response to a specific stimulus. Aggression, springs from an aggressive instinct that man shares with many non-human species, however the innate fighting instinct does not occur unless it is provoked.

The Psychoanalytic Theory: Just as Lorenz's name dominates the ethological theory on aggression, Freud is seen as the first and most popular name associated with psycho analytical explanation of aggression. Freud considered aggression to be instinctual and inevitable. According to him, the aim of all instincts is to reduce tension or excitation to a minimum and eventually to its total elimination. Aggressiveness operates as a powerful instinct, the impulses generated from this instinct gradually build up over time (accumulation of specific energy) and unless periodically released in safe and non-injurious ways, it will soon reach dangerous levels, thus this aggressive energy must be released or the person will "explode" and kill him/herself or another. From this perspective, aggression is the result of internal negative feelings that the person is not able to exteriorize through accepted social behaviours.

For the Personality Theory, the violent behaviour is concerned with personality traits, such as the absence of self-control and impulsivity. Following this, it is considered that the personality factors determine or may sometimes increase the probability of the person to be involved in aggressive behaviours.

The Frustration Aggression Theory, offered by Dollar & Miller and other colleagues at the end of the thirties, is based on some of Freud's psychoanalytic concepts. This hypothesis claims that frustration always produces aggression and aggression is always the result of frustration. Frustration is defined as the blocking of ongoing goal directed behavior leading to the arousal of a drive whose primary goal is to harm. This aggressive drive leads to aggressive behavior. While sharing Freud's view on aggression being an innate response, Dollard et al. (1939) believed aggression would only be aroused by frustrating situations and events

(external factors). For example, children who are frustrated by only being allowed to watch other children play when they expected to be able to play. Their frustration may be resulted in any form of aggression. Some years later Berkowitz (1962) published a revision of this theory by including some modifications. He claimed that frustration yields anger rather than aggression. For anger to lead to aggression, certain cues would be required. In other sense, this theory suggests that certain cues in our environment have become strongly associated with aggression and aggressive behavior. If, then, a person becomes frustrated in the presence of these cues, he will behave more aggressively.

2.4.2. Reactive or Environmental Theories

The main reactive or environmental theories include the social learning theory, the social interaction theory, the sociological theory, and the ecological systems theory. All these theories believe that the environment influences the future violent behaviour.

In the Social Learning Theory, Albert Bandura (1976) considers that the violent behaviour is learnt through the modeling[2], or the "observation and imitation" of behaviours that occur in the immediate contexts to the individual. The imitation of the violent behaviour will depend on whether the model observed gets positive rewards for his/her actions or not: if the person had a benefit through the violent behaviour, the observer will probably imitate such behaviour, but if the model is punished for his/her violent behaviour, the probability of imitation will decrease. Bandura outlines as well that in many cases the violence is not only a mere imitative behaviour, but that new forms of violence arise, generalizing the model effect. To summarize, being exposed to violent models not only proportionate the information on how to act but also what the consequences of those actions are. From this perspective, the behavioural models which play an important role as socialization agents such as parents, teachers, friends and media, are crucial from this theory. This would be, for example, the case of the positive reinforcement produced by praising and been applauded by the peers when an adolescent carries out a violent behaviour at school or when parents tolerate violent behaviours at home.

[2] Modeling - the process through which a person observes the behavior of another, forms an idea (encodes it), and uses the performance as a guide to her own behaviour.

The Social Interaction Theory underlines the interactive character of the human behaviour, and the fact that the violent behaviour is the result of the interaction between the individual's characteristics and the circumstances of the surrounding social context. This theory emphasizes that the environment influences the individual and the individual influences the environment. In the explanation of the behavioural problems in adolescence both the family and school contexts are seen as fundamental. Some important points in this sense are: deficiencies in the family socialization and in the relationship between parents and children. These and other contextual factors are extremely relevant and will increase the probability of the adolescent acquiring this type of behaviour.

The Sociological Theory interprets the violence as the product of the cultural, political and economical characteristics of society. Factors such as poverty, marginalization, and the difficulty of intellectual development or social exploitation are in many cases the origin of some violent behaviours or may be the first cause of behavioural problems. In some cultures, violence has a positive value: it is considered as a 'normal' behaviour in order to solve conflicts and problems, and it is not only allowed, but also praised. This tolerance influences society and citizens.

The Ecological Systems Theory proposed by Bronfenbrenner (1979), suggests that the individual is involved in a network of interconnected and organized in four main levels. These levels reflect four contexts of behavioural influence: (1) Microsystem, composed by the immediate context of the individual, such as family and school. It includes all those activities, roles and interpersonal relations that the person experiments in his/her immediate environment; (2) Mesosystem, makes reference to the interactions existing between the microsystem contexts, such as the communication between the family and the school; (3) Exosystem, that clusters the social environments in which the individual does not participate actively, but in which there are facts that might be affecting the nearer contexts, such as his/her parents' or siblings' groups of friends or the mass media; and (4) Macrosystem, that makes reference to the culture and the socio-historical moment in which the individual lives, and includes the ideology and values of that culture. The ecological approach, therefore, highlights the fact that in order to understand the violent behaviour of an individual it is necessary to consider both the micro-violence present in his/her immediate contexts (family, school or working place) as well as cultural and structural macro-violence in the society. In this sense, therefore, it would be

more useful to promote effective changes in the context in order to intervene or prevent the problem, instead of exclusively paying attention to the individual involved.

Following what has been explained, it is worth remembering that, whilst some of these theories have been criticized and others have been applauded, they all participate and at such an extent succeed in understanding the complexity of violent behaviours committed in numerous societies. By and large, as these studies show, it is significant to bear in mind that the context is truly of central importance when dealing with this issue.

2.5. Galtung and Feminist Thought on Violence

"*Whether a narrow or more broader concept of violence prevails, however, it remains the case that violence is gendered. In other words, it exhibits patterns of difference between men and women, being especially associated with the behaviour of men*."

(Jane Pilcher and Imelda Whelehan 2004:173)

As a point of departure, let us say that Galtung's articulation of direct, structural, and cultural violence offers a unified framework within which violence can be seen (*see p.115*). Feminists however were not far from the first persons to question Galtung's theory of violence. Catia C. Confortini (2006: 333) insists that feminism can contribute to and enrich Galtung's theory of violence in four possible ways:

a. Galtung's theory needs to incorporate notions of *gender* as a social construct embodying relations of *power*.

b. Dichotomous, mutually exclusive categories that shape our understanding of the world are gendered and they are keys to the production and reproduction of violence at all levels.

c. Violence produces and defines gender identities and, in turn, is produced and defined by them (Gender and violence are *mutually constituted*).

d. Gendered *language* defines the possibility and impossibility of pursuing different visions of the social world. Violence and peace can be constituted through language.

Leaving these major points aside for the moment, echoing Catia C. Confortini's claim (2006), feminism and peace studies have much in common, the contributions they can make to each other should not be disregarded. Strictly referring to both fields, some feminist writers on the subject of pacifism in the 1970s and 1980s proposed that women were, 'by nature, upbringing, and/or by virtue of being mothers and caretakers, morally superior to and more peaceful than men'. At this point, of course nobody has been alarmed to hear this statement; rather it is perhaps better in terms of giving pleasure. The use of the term peace in connection with women disconcerted many feminists however. Jean Bethke Elshtain (1990), particularly cited as belonging to this tradition, emphasises that claims made about women's *natural* or *cultural* superiority in issues of peace and war only reproduce a world based on gendered dichotomies and power hierarchies. In agreement, Ann Tickner observed that:

"The association of femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need of protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naïve in matters relating to international politics. An enriched, less militarized notion of citizenship cannot be built on such a weak foundation."(1992:59)

This quote indeed yields a much richer basis for the discussion of the distinct contributions of feminist thought to Galtung's theory of violence. Contrary to Galtung's assumptions that *'gender'* is only one variable in an analysis of violence, feminists believe that *'gender'* as a social construct is essential to understand the origins of violence and the mechanisms through which it works. Seen in this way, gender is consistently perceived to have much to do with the concept '*power*' as understood by the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1980:97-98), that is to say, 'as a pervasive regulatory system for social control, in which all individuals and social institutions participate'. Feminists, besides, have been influenced by the Italian Marxist political philosopher Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony[3] (1992), which means 'dominance achieved through a mix of moral persuasion and consent by ruling elites over the majority of society'. To this interesting view, Joan Scott (1988:42) added the idea that gender is composed of two interdependent components: "*gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes," and "gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power*". This oft-cited definition has been used to

[3] More details on the Gramscian concept 'hegemony' see chapter one, p.45.

suggest that gender as a relation of power shapes, regulates and justifies other social relations which are in turn all gendered.

With gender as a synonym of sex, Galtung concludes that men tend to be more violent and women tend to be more peaceful. Following this perspective, it was hypothesized that male sexuality and violence are seen neurological neighbours and hence they might be mutually triggered. This most certainly concerns feminist social scientists. Research has been opened into the supposed biological links between male sexuality and aggression. Joshua Goldstein (2002) finds that testosterone levels are not a cause of aggression; this is to say that this explanation has been proven weak. Even then, the point to be gleaned of all this is that most feminists do not deny the existence of some biological sources of violence, but they think that gender, not sex, has a lot to do with this process. Moreover, as J. Ann Tickner (1997) puts it, feminists remain skeptical about the claim that 'science' has been invoked to justify political and ideological agendas. It is amply demonstrated by Confortini (2006: 344) that *'the argument that men are naturally more predisposed to violence than women has long served to maintain a status quo based on women's (and other categories of people's) subordination'*. In other words, while associating men with the use of violence; Galtung ends up unintentionally encouraging the type of thinking which perpetuates violence in society. Understanding things this way, people rely on a binary opposition, they think in terms of two dichotomies and two categories: activity versus passivity, rationality versus emotion, strength versus weakness and war/violence versus peace. Consistent with this, they legitimize relationships of subordination and domination at all levels.

If we read with attention, when feminist scholars in international relations (IR), which takes seriously issues of war and peace, talk about peace, they ignore the wars happening inside homes, to wit: they ignore 'domestic violence'. As a consequence, the field fails to notice forms of violence against women such as rape in wartime, battering in intimate relationships and sexual harassment in public spheres to cite but a few. Entirely different, recognizing the shaping power of social contexts on women's lives prompted feminist IR scholars to study instances of violence against women such as military prostitution and domestic work. In fact, they contend that direct violence posited by Galtung (which we already mentioned earlier), for example domestic violence, is a method for the social control of women. Abusive men use it to prevent women's access to education, work, social relations, etc. Women are more fearful about violent crime than men, and that this fear impacts upon their freedom of movement when outside the

home. Simply put, the emphasis here is on Galtung's underestimation of both the presence of domestic violence and the tight connections between wife abuse and structural violence against women (Catia Confortini, 2006).

What has been just noted, at one reading, indicates that the legitimization/justification of men's violence against women has especially been the concern of feminist researchers. Connell (2000: 22), cited in 50 concepts in gender studies (2004), identifies a range of ways in which men *'predominate across the spectrum of violence'*, as members of the armed forces, violent criminals under the law, abusers of family members, or as participants in and audiences of the various contact sports which centre around the use of physical force. This may necessarily mean that, as Official criminal statistics for Europe, Australia and the United States suggest, men are believed to be responsible for around *"85 per cent*" of all violent crimes (Breines et al. 2000). Such evidence is suggestive of the important role played by patriarchal power (see chapter two, p.78) in the theorization of violence. According to Dobash and Dobash (1991), men learn the appropriate contexts in which to use violence 'through a male culture that condones and encourages violence'. In their research (Family Violence Professional Education Taskforce), they found that:

"*In the violent events experienced by women . . . violence was used by the men they lived with to silence them, to 'win' arguments, to express dissatisfaction, to deter future behaviour and to merely demonstrate dominance*" (1991:116).

One manifestation of this control is indicated by the traditional notion of women as being the chattels of men, even to the extent that their violent behaviour toward women is not officially recognised in legal terms, and nor does it appear in the official crime statistics. More compelling, with a view to examining men's understandings of their own behaviour, Cavanagh, Dobash, Dobash and Lewis (2001) found that the concerned men used a range of rhetorical devices to *minimise* the significance of their violent behaviour, in a strict sense, they define it as 'not violent' at all. Yet, Kelly and Radford found that, often, the significance of the experience was *minimised* by the women through their use of the phrase 'but nothing actually happened' or 'nothing really happened'. On reflection, it is not so strange that the justification of this superior status of violence owes much to gender relations. In a word, violence becomes a normalized feature of contemporary gender relations (Jane Pilcher and Imelda Whelehan, 2004).

It should be remembered that, Michael Kaufman (1999) explains, men's violence is not something that happens only to women but it also linked to other men and to the internalization of violence, that is, a man's violence against himself. Correspondingly, male-dominated societies are not only based on a hierarchy of men over women but some men over other men. To look closely at men's violence toward women, it may be instructive to start with what social structural and cultural theorists did offer. In sum, these approaches examine how social structural variables (e.g., the degree of gender hierarchy) and related ideologies (e.g., ambivalent sexism and culture of honour norms) affect the prevalence and forms of violence toward women (The social psychology of gender, 2008).

In rates of violence in relationships for example, cultural variations correlate strongly with sex differences in status and power (Archer, 2006; Vandello & Cohen, 2006; Yodanis, 2004). If women in a society have higher status, resources, and power, the result might be then lower rates of wife abuse. On the contrary, with low status, few resources, and little social power, women obviously suffer a heightened risk of violence from their husbands. To consider these explanations more carefully, we turn to Archer's findings (2006). Using Archer's data, it is found that this appear to be the case in more than fifty nations. Additionally, women's lack of structural power (power differences) in a society has cultural values and ideological consequences that offer justifications to traditional gender roles. Considered this way, commonly sexist ideologies justify male violence as morally and culturally correct. This point should not surprise us; even the powerless group may accept these ideological and cultural values. As we will see shortly, this means considering what violence in the name of culture is.

Culture, the broader concept, is difficult to define (Williams 1981; Cruz and Guins 2005: 4); but many anthropologists and sociolinguists have attempted to define it. For Goodenough (1957) quoted in Hudson (1980), *"a society's culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members".* Brown (1980:122) also states: *"culture is a way of life. It is the content within which we exist, think, feel and relate to others. It is the glue that binds a group of people together".* Besides, because of its function in society, culture is strongly linked to development. According to Mazrui (2002), cited in Moha Ennaji (2005), culture has several functions: it influences people and how they perceive themselves and the world'. One function worth noting is the shaping of violence. More importantly, violence is made visible by culture; a fundamental distinction between its legitimate and illegitimate forms is established and maintained culturally. Questions we pose

about who are the perpetrators and victims of violence, relating them to social variables such as class and gender as well as to attitudes toward the self are also shaped through culture. Cultures of violence, however, do more than simply differentiate right from wrong: they help individuals to answer such questions, making things seem real and therefore naturally true. Johan Galtung (1990) proposes that a culture of violence stems from a worldview that represents the world in dualistic, mutually exclusive terms: good and evil. It can be derived from certain interpretations of various sacred texts or from ideologies like nationalism, sexism, racism, etc. It provides justification insofar as it embeds the inevitability and righteousness of violence into people's worldviews. All this may presuppose that cultural violence is "*those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence ... that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence" (1991:291).*

In some cultures for instance, there are still crimes being committed, generally by men, in the name of honour. Studies show that honour beliefs may represent an extreme version of ambivalent sexism; they socially permit male violence toward female relationship partners, including killing. A legal study by Mona Zuhail Yacub (1999), included in the book (*Ces Morts qui nous tuent*) showed that in Lebanon between 1958 and 1967 the court ruled 125 honour-crimes, an average of 12.5 honour crimes per year, and between 1995 and 1998 Lebanese courts ruled on 36 cases (Moughayzel & Abdel Sattar 1999) an average of 12 crimes per year. Simultaneously, in Jordan an average of 20 women are killed yearly in honour-related crimes, considered to be the highest in the world in comparison to Jordan's population of five million (*As-Safir* Newspaper, Beirut, February14th, 2001). Honour killings are also still socially encouraged in places such as rural Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey (Baker et al., 1999). Vandello and Cohen (2003) highlight interesting examples of those who seem to approve honour beliefs and those who typically do not subscribe to them. As regards this latter, they compared between attitudes in Brazil and Northerners in the United States. The Brazilians, but not U.S. participants, share the view that a husband is perceived less trustworthy and manly if his wife was said to be unfaithful. Unlike the U.S. informants who saw it the other way around, the Brazilians take the attitude that a wife's infidelity stains/ruins the man's honour and it can be only reclaimed through violence toward her. In a related vein, violence in the name of honour is often carried out in especially brutal ways, including stoning or burning. More recent research suggests that women may risk being killed for failing to live up to ideals of feminine purity, modesty, and deference. More interestingly, even the mere allegation of female sexual impropriety or disobedience can damage male relatives' reputations. To talk further about

disobedience, in cases of marriage, fathers sometimes kill daughters who marry a man of their own, rather than their father's choice. Similarly, people hold the view that husbands are justified for killing a wife who seeks a divorce and those who commit killing may face little risk of prosecution (The social psychology of gender, 2008).

The truth is that, in some countries, honour killings are not simply accepted but enforced by laws and carried out by legal authorities. Elizabeth Stanko has focused on similar elements in the relationship between culture and different forms of violence, she notes:

"Violence in the home, bullying at school or in the neighbourhood, courtship violence, gay bashing, racial harassment and crime, sexual harassment and intimidation, 'fair' fights between adolescent men or women – little of which comes to the attention of the police or any official agency – are commonplace and rarely classified within the narrow boundaries of the criminal law" (1994: 33-38)

Just as, at first sight, it seems that, to use Vandello and Cohen's words (2003), a woman's sexual purity or fidelity determines not only her own honour but the honour of men in her family. Men for this reason are forced to defend his honour by protecting her, controlling her, and jealously keeping her in a continuum of the patriarchal authority in the family. Culture that puts emphasis on honour and encourages females to remain loyal and committed even in the face of violence is a result of tribal values. Hijazi's convincing argument is based on that honour crime is:

"The retrieval and prohibition of a woman who tried to belong to herself, or who was seduced; it is an act to constitute a tool owned by the tribe, whose property is transferred to the husband in exchange of an advantage, an amount of money or effects by a father, a brother, or an uncle" (1998: 10).

From the vantage point of Hijazi (1998), a woman is seen as a tool that does not exist outside the frame of the tribe; her entire value is limited to her virginity. Or to state it clearly and unequivocally, her virginity is the honour of men. In this brief overview, Vandello and Cohen (2003) continue to insist that 'honour' appears to be an extremely gendered term: honour norms show that men gain honour through autonomy and toughness whereas women gain it through purity, self-sacrifice, and deference to their fathers, brothers, and husbands. Such

cultures promise women paternalistic protection but they implicitly promote aggression against them. The kernel analysis of this explains how cultures of violence, however sweet they may seem on the surface, reflect a system designed to control and trap women into a narrow range of behaviours.

Very important elements of culture are social identities[4] which could also have a function of violence legitimization. Giving little detail, culture becomes a frame in which people develop a sense of who they are, what activity they should take, and what are their social goals. In regard to this view, culture becomes a basis of identity, it for instance delineates between *'us'* and '*them'* (Others), mobilizes individuals and collectives and provides validation for individual and group aspirations. Discussing this is not only to argue that identities have a major impact on conflict but, Cook-Huffman (2009) says, identities are also transformed and reconstructed in a conflict process. To focus too much on the role of culture in propagating, mediating and controlling violence in society, concentrating on the relationship between culture, identity-formation and violence, the Nobel laureate economist 'Amartya Sen' (2006) notes that when people acquire a strong and exclusive sense of belonging to a single group, the conditions ripen for violence and when shrunken and shorn of its layered complexity, identity can kill. In other words, Sen persuasively presents his arguments: hatreds around the world are ignited by illusions of unique and choiceless identities. His basic thesis is that human beings have multi-identities and each identity may bring richness as well as constraints and freedom to one's life. Moreover, Amartya Sen challenges Samuel Huntington's thesis *'the Clash of civilizations*[5]*'* for categorizing human beings by civilization as an attribute rather than having plural identities. He is clear about how dangerous path is this type of reductionism. In short, he suggests, singular identity is an illusion and those who encourage violence exploit it by ignoring other factors such as race, religion, ethnicity, class, age, gender, and nationality….that may allow other identities to exist. In the same line of thought, gender identity is a case in point. One's gender- most typically as a man or woman- is one of the most frequently mentioned identities. As it is already apparent, feminists believe that it is not useful to think of gender as

[4] The term "social identity" refers to those aspects of a person that are defined in terms of his or her group memberships: as a woman, a Muslim, a marathon runner, or a Democrat… (Kay Deaux, 2001).

[5] Clash-of-Civilization Hypothesis: Recent theoretical and empirical research in both political science and economics points to the growing importance of religious differences as a cause of civil conflicts (Testas, 2002).

a single social category (violent men / peaceful women) through which *violence* may be legitimated in society. Rather, many have argued for a concept of *gendered identities.*

A pertinent question to ask hitherto is: how can we describe the relationship between gender and violence? It has been stressed at the outset that Galtung relies on biological sex to understand the process by which violence becomes acceptable in society. Feminists however talk about masculinities and femininities as socially constituted ideal types to which the so-called 'real' men and women must conform. They see the gender order[6] as dependent on power hierarchies of femininities and masculinities. At the bottom of the gender hierarchy is femininity and at the top there is 'hegemonic masculinity', as defined by Connell (1990), "*the culturally idealized form of masculine character"* (p.83) which emphasizes "*the connecting of masculinity to toughness and competitiveness*" as well as "*the subordination of women and the marginalization of gay men"* (p.94). Connell argued that such an idealized form of masculinity becomes hegemonic when it is widely accepted in a culture and when that acceptance reinforces the gender ideology of the culture. For feminists therefore violence is a socially learned expression of this specific kind of masculinity; that is to say, it is seen as implicated in the construction of hegemonic masculinity.

Relating directly to the subject being considered, in his research on men in sports, Michael Messner (1990) showed that violent sports were created expressly as a training ground for the shaping of the male body into the ideals of hegemonic masculinity. Correspondingly war *"was widely believed to develop those martial qualities in men that were seen to be needed in the struggle for life, and it was widely thought that there was an inseparable link between the fulfillment of martial ideals for the individual man and imperialism abroad"* (Alan Petersen, 1998:52)

"War may be seen as actually shaping the gender relations of a given society, while in turn a certain gender order may be seen as predisposing a society to war"(Reardon 1996; Goldstein 2001; Cockburn 2007 cited in Laura J. Shepherd, 2010:105).

In this context, Laura J. Shepherd (2010) goes on to say that the relationship between gender and war is often represented as a somewhat *casual* and *contingent*, a kind of relationship

[6] The concept of the gender order was first developed by Jill Matthews (1984). It means a patterned system of ideological and material practices through which that forms or codes of masculinities and femininities are created and recreated, and relations between them are organized (Jane Pilcher and Imelda Whelehan, 2004).

which is accorded to '*who does what'*. Instances such as the sexual division of war, training men to fight and war fighting could really help to fully understand this relationship. As Shepherd points out in considerable detail, quantitative information does reveal something interesting about experiences and attitudes of women and men in relation to wars. Men and women noticeably play different roles. In all armies men are the majority of combatants. They experience a brutalizing training regime and are expected to kill. Their military training has historically been constitutive of a specific kind of masculinity; it has been as much about shaping and modifying their bodies for battles. It also predisposes them to see themselves as potential fighters and to consider armed conflict normal, even a fulfillment of their manhood. By contrast, more women do commonly suffer heavy casualties, dying of disease, malnutrition and sexual violence in wars. UN statistics consistently show that the role of women in wars is in general looking after the young, elderly and sick in extreme conditions. Then again, the experience of being a woman soldier is different from that of being a man soldier. Women may have the right to join be a soldier, even then their experiences may be very different from that of men. A useful example is the women soldiers who experience sexual harassment and rape by their male comrades and superiors.

On the basis of this discussion about violence and masculinities, cultural environment that makes violence acceptable and legitimate, as Galtung claims, seems to be by no means the whole story. Violence is both made *possible* by the existence of power/gender relations, and power/gender relations *rely on* violence for their reproduction. In light of this, violence and gender are involved in a relationship of mutual constitution (they are mutually productive):

"A more profound understanding of 'gender and war' may be achieved through, first, conceptualizing gender as an enduring relation of power, closely intersected with ethno-national and economic power relations, and, second, visualizing war as social, systemic and as a phased continuum. Within a sociological framework of this kind a study of institutions, processes and cultures reveals patriarchal gender relations to be both cause and consequence of war." (Laura J. Shepherd, 2010:106).

Above all things, we would like to emphasise that one of the vehicles through which this relationship is worked out is discourse. While this concept is discussed further in the previous chapters, this section also makes a contribution to its discussion. As we have already demonstrated how, in different context, discourse makes it possible to talk about things,

phenomena, relations and positions; and makes it possible or impossible to talk about these issues in particular ways' (Foucault 1972), to not complicate things, this concerns how discourses set the parameters for what is regarded as normal, deviant, true, false, right and wrong, meaning that discursively, naming something as violence, implies categorizing a social action as illegitimate. In this respect, to employ what is called *discourses of violence* is to make it possible to talk about violence, towards whom it can be directed, and how it should or should not be inflicted. This may indeed enable or restrict talk about violence towards women than violence towards men.

As it is hinted earlier, the different levels at which violence manifests itself might well be exemplified by Galtung's violence triangle, but they cannot be divorced from gender. Feminists fully endorse the idea that gender is a key to understand talk about violence, they recognize the role gendered language plays in breeding a culture of violence. It is therefore widely acknowledged that Galtung's work in particular is insufficiently concerned with the discursive space available for men to talk about their own use of violence, depending on context. Galtung doesn't talk about the mechanisms through which discourses serve to justify violence as domination against women. Now then, violence is constituted by and constitutive of gender relations of power, it depends on gendered dichotomies for its existence. Violence as a process and not a static entity is also embedded in gendered discourse which is constitutive as well as reflective of reality. To make their work further relevant for peace studies, feminists also make very helpful suggestions: that we specifically focus on conceptualizations of power that address violence, and that we focus our analysis on acts of resistance and emancipation. In a word, the feminist project of transforming patriarchal gender relations is a necessary strategy if peace is to be achieved and sustained. R.W. Connell writes: "… *Masculinities are the forms in which many dynamics of violence take shape… Evidently, then, a strategy for demilitarization and peace must include a strategy of change in masculinities*" (2002:38).

2.6. Gender based Violence: Facts and Figures

It truly makes no sense to assume that all violent acts are perpetrated by men; or likewise, that all violent acts are committed against women. But C. Medina's (1998) argument is still found convincing, 'even though a woman may not be a victim herself, gender based

violence shapes all women's lives and affects their choices'. At this point, it only needs to be noted that gender-based violence (GBV) was not considered an issue worthy of attention or concern, victims suffered in silence with little recognition of their conditions. It has been always present but it is just over the past few decades when the global world has begun defining it. Gradually, this issue has become a priority for women's organisations and a subject for feminist thought, and just in recent years governments have begun to recognize it as a legitimate human right issue and as a significant threat to women's health and well-being. Of course, gender-based violence is most prevalent in environments where there is a general lack of respect for human rights. Studies on this subject indicate that its impact clearly differs depending on the sex of the victim however. Though more often than not *gender-based violence, violence against women and sexual violence,* are terms that are commonly used *interchangeably* (UNHCR, 2003), GBV is the general term used to capture violence that occurs to both genders. This means that violence against women/girls (VAW/G) constitutes a part of GBV. Compared to other forms of violence, violence against women exhibits some characteristics that provide a basis for its classification as gender-based violence. For the sake of comparison, a closer look at the following descriptions will give us clues:

From United Nations (1993**)**, the term violence against women means: *" any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life*".

The Convention of Belém and Parà (1995) defines violence against women as *"any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or private sphere*" (cited in Katrin Tiroch, 2010: 374).

Hazel Reeves and Sally Baden posit that gender-based violence *"is any act or threat by men or male-dominated institutions that inflicts physical, sexual, or psychological harm on a woman or girl because of their gender"* (2000:23).

At first glance, it is more coherent to say what really differentiates this most pervasive type of violence from other forms of aggression or coercion is that the risk factor in this case is the mere fact of being a woman (because of their gender). Gender violence can take many forms, depending on various contexts. It can occur in private as well as public spheres. At

second glance, one detects that the last definition connects the existing asymmetry in the power relations between men and women and forms of discriminations against women remarkably well. The story thus is as the same as that of abusive men and victimized women because of patriarchal societies. To clarify this point it is useful to look once again at these major sites of gender based violence: *the family, the community and the state*. (1) The family is the primary site which prepares its members for social life; forms gender stereotypes and the binary structure of thinking itself. It is the arena where some physical and/or psychological abuses occur. While perhaps violence within the family is often seen as a private issue, information about it is lacking therefore. (2) Community (society) as a group sharing common social, cultural, religious or ethnic belonging, it perpetuates existing family structure and power inequalities in family and society. At the same time, it justifies the behaviour of male abusers and supports harmful traditional practices (e.g., corporal punishment). (3) Finally the state legitimizes power inequalities in family and society and perpetuates gender based violence through enactment of discriminatory laws. In doing so, the state is to be considered the responsible for tolerance of gender violence on an unofficial level (i.e. in the family and in the community). Women/girls who are subject to this treatment are deprived from their right to participate in the societal life as a whole and they are treated as prisoners under the special conditions set by the immediate social setting, cultural norms and values shared by the majority. In picturing the scene this way, it is imperative above all to consider gender violence as a *violation of women's rights* and a form of discrimination against them. Such an understanding is directly related to the recognition that women's rights are human rights and that women experience injustices solely because of their gender (Hazel Reeves and Sally Baden, 2000). In 1948, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) brought to light the idea of the universality of rights, but failed to take into consideration women's needs. Its focus was merely on the public sphere: formal political and civil rights. Violations which occurred in the private sphere were not part of the human rights discourse. Years after, an important step towards explicit prohibition of discrimination against women was marked thanks to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) established in 1979. From then on, many lessons have been learned, during the preparations of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993), women's groups mobilised around the slogan of *"women's rights are human rights!"* which signifies the indivisibility of women's rights from universal human rights. This conference was a watershed; it marked the first international recognition of violence against women as a human rights violation. This provided a link to the change UN Beijing Women's Conference (1995) made. Participants continued with this call,

attempting to broaden the conception of rights to include social, economic, and cultural rights, as well as sexual rights such as the right of women to freedom from rape, from sexual assault as refugees and displaced women, from abuse in custody, from domestic violence…In actual fact, the list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Acts of gender-based violence can be grouped into five categories:

1. Sexual violence;
2. Physical violence ;
3. Emotional and psychological violence ;
4. Harmful traditional practices ;
5. Socio-economic violence.

1. *Sexual Violence* : Relevant to the current discussion, sexual violence is defined by the World Report on Violence and Health (2002:150) as: *"any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person's sexuality using coercion (can cover a whole spectrum of degrees of force), by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and work"*. These include, for example:

1.1. *Rape and marital rape:* the invasion of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body by force, threat of force, coercion, taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving genuine consent (International Criminal Court). It can be perpetrated by any person in a position of power, authority and control, including husband, intimate partner or caregiver.

1.2. *Child sexual abuse, defilement and incest:* any act where a child is used for sexual gratification or any sexual relations/interaction with a child. It can be perpetrated by any one the child trusts, including parent, sibling, extended family member, friend or stranger, teacher, elder, leader or any other caregiver, anyone in a position of power, authority and control over a child.

1.3. *Forced sodomy/anal rape:* forced /coerced anal intercourse, usually male-to-male or male-to-female. It can be perpetrated by any person in a position of power, authority and control.

1.4. *Attempted rape or attempted forced sodomy/anal rape:* attempted forced/coerced intercourse; no penetration. It can be perpetrated by any person in a position of power, authority and control.

1.5. *Sexual abuse:* actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, including inappropriate touching, by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. It can be perpetrated by any person in a position of power, authority and control, family/community members, co-workers, including supervisors, strangers.

1.6. *Sexual exploitation:* Any abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust for sexual purposes; this includes profiting momentarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another (IASC); sexual exploitation is one of the purposes of trafficking in persons (performing in a sexual manner, forced undressing and/or nakedness, coerced marriage, forced childbearing, engagement in pornography or prostitution, sexual extortion for the granting of goods, services, assistance benefits, sexual slavery). It can be perpetrated by anyone in a position of power, influence, or control, including humanitarian aid workers, soldiers/officials at checkpoints, teachers, smugglers, or trafficking networks.

1.7. *Forced prostitution (also referred to as sexual exploitation):* forced/coerced sex trade in exchange for material resources, services and assistance, usually targeting highly vulnerable women or girls unable to meet basic human needs for themselves and/or their children. It can be perpetrated by any person in a privileged position, in possession of money or control of material resources and services, perceived as powerful, humanitarian aid workers.

1.8. *Sexual harassment:* any unwelcome, usually repeated and unreciprocated sexual advance, unsolicited sexual attention, demand for sexual access or favours, sexual innuendo or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, display of pornographic material, when it interferes with work, is made a condition of employment or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. It can be perpetrated by employers, supervisors or colleagues, any person in a position of power, authority, or control.

1.9. *Sexual violence as a weapon of war and torture:* crimes against humanity of a sexual nature, including rape, sexual slavery, forced abortion or sterilisation or any other forms to prevent birth, forced pregnancy, forced delivery, and forced child rearing, among others. Sexual violence as a form of torture is defined as any act or threat of a sexual nature by which severe mental or physical pain or suffering is caused to obtain information, confession or punishment from the victim or third person, intimidate her or a third person or to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Often committed, sanctioned and ordered by military, police, armed groups or other parties in conflict.

2. Physical Violence:

2.1. *Physical assault:* beating, punching, kicking, biting, burning, maiming or killing, with or without weapons; often used in combination with other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. It can be perpetrated by spouse, intimate partner, family member, friend, acquaintance, stranger, anyone in position of power, members of parties to a conflict.

2.2. *Trafficking, slavery:* selling and/or trading in human beings for forced sexual activities, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or removal of organs. It can be perpetrated by any person in a position of power or control.

3. Emotional and Psychological Violence:

3.1. *Abuse/Humiliation:* non-sexual verbal abuse that is insulting, degrading, demeaning; compelling the victim/survivor to engage in humiliating acts, whether in public or private; denying basic expenses for family survival. It can be committed by anyone in a position of power and control; often perpetrated by spouses, intimate partners or family members in a position of authority.

3.2. *Confinement:* isolating a person from friends/family, restricting movements, deprivation of liberty or obstruction/restriction of the right to free movement. It can be perpetrated by anyone in a position of power and control; often perpetrated by spouses, intimate partners or family members in a position of authority.

4. Harmful Traditional Practices :

4.1. *Female genital mutilation (FGM) :* cutting of genital organs for non-medical reasons, usually done at a young age; ranges from partial to total cutting, removal of genitals, stitching whether for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons; often undergone several times during life-time, i.e., after delivery or if a girl/woman has been victim of sexual assault. It can be perpetrated by traditional practitioners, supported, condoned, and assisted by families, religious groups, entire communities and some States

4.2. *Early marriage:* arranged marriage under the age of legal consent (sexual intercourse in such relationships constitutes statutory rape, as the girls are not legally competent to agree to such unions). It can be committed by parents, community and State.

4.3. *Forced marriage:* arranged marriage against the victim's/survivor's wishes; often a dowry is paid to the family; when refused, there are violent and/or abusive consequences. It can be perpetrated by parents or other family members.

4.4. *Honour Killing and maiming:* maiming or murdering a woman or girl as punishment for acts considered inappropriate for her gender that are believed to bring shame on the family or community (e.g., pouring acid on a young woman's face as punishment for bringing shame to the family for attempting to marry someone not chosen by the family), or to preserve the honour of the family (i.e., as a redemption for an offence committed by a male member of the family). It can be perpetrated by parent, husband, other family members or members of the community.

4.5. *Infanticide and/or neglect:* killing, withholding food, and/or neglecting female children because they are considered to be of less value in a society than male children. It can be committed by parent, other family members.

4.6. *Denial of education for girls or women:* removing girls from school, prohibiting or obstructing access of girls and women to basic, technical, professional or scientific knowledge. It can be perpetrated by parents, other family members, community, some States.

5. Socio-Economic Violence

5.1. *Discrimination and/or denial of opportunities, services):* exclusion, denial of access to education, health assistance or remunerated employment; denial of property rights. It can be perpetrated by family members, society, institutions and organisations, government actors.

5.2. *Social exclusion/ ostracism based on sexual orientation:* Denial of access to services, social benefits or exercise and enjoyment of civil, social, economic, cultural and political rights, imposition of criminal penalties, discriminatory practices or physical and psychological harm and tolerance of discriminatory practices, public or private hostility to homosexuals, transsexuals or transvestites. It can be perpetrated by family members, society, institutions and organisations, government actors.

5.3. *Obstructive legislative practice:* Denial of access to exercise and enjoy civil, social, economic, cultural and political rights, mainly to women. It can be perpetrated by family, community, institutions and State.

But what else, one might ask, to say on the question of women's rights and gender based violence? Whilst there has been progress in the recognition of women's human rights, there is evidence that while GBV and particularly sexual violence can also be directed against men, women have been the predominant victims. Actually, it is estimated that, worldwide, one in five women will become a victim of rape or attempted rape in her lifetime (UNITE, November 2009). The fact that no society is free from it, Kelly (1987) introduces the concept of a *continuum* of sexual violence. It is intended to highlight the fact that sexual violence exists in most women's lives, while the form it takes, how women define the events and its impact on them at the time, and over time, varies. This is the case because available findings in many countries confirm that most women generally experience multiple acts over time. Consider this few facts from (1) Violence against Women: The Hidden Health Burden World Bank 1994), (2) Fact Sheet on Gender Violence: A Statistics for Action Fact Sheet (L. Heise, IWTC, 1992) and (3) Progress of the World's Women (UNIFEM, 2000):

a. World-wide, an estimated 40 to 70 per cent of homicides of women are committed by intimate partners, often in the context of an abusive relationship.

b. Around the world, at least one in every three women has been beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused in her lifetime.

c. Trafficking of humans world-wide grew almost 50 percent from 1995 to 2000 and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that as many as 2 million women are trafficked across borders annually.

d. More than 90 million African women and girls are victims of female genital mutilation.

e. At least 60 million girls who would otherwise be expected to be alive are missing from various populations, mostly in Asia, as a result of sex-selective abortions, infanticide or neglect.

f. In recent years, mass rape in war has been documented in Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, Peru, Somalia and Uganda. A European Community fact-finding team estimates that more than 20,000 Muslim women were raped during the war in Bosnia.

g. Ninety-four percent of displaced households surveyed in Sierra Leone have reported incidents of sexual assault, including rape, torture and sexual slavery. At least 250,000, perhaps as many as 500,000, women were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

Needless to say, in the field of violence against women there are many topics worthy of further study. So, one simply needs to determine what kind of information is most needed in a specific context. Linked to this, it is important to narrow the focus of inquiry, to ask precisely what we want to know and what is worth knowing about serious forms of violence where the source of vulnerability is the mere fact of being a woman. In considering the answers we could give to these questions, probably the best way is to begin to examine the most common types of violence to which women can be subjected to during the different stages of their lives. As it is developed by L. Heise, in UNHCR (May, 2003), the phases and the type of violence as well are as follows:

a. *Pre-birth:* the type of violence present can be sex-selective abortion, battering during pregnancy or coerced pregnancy;

b. *Infancy:* female infanticide; emotional and physical abuse; differential access to food and medical care;

c. *Girlhood:* child marriage; genital mutilation; sexual abuse by family members and strangers; differential access to food, medical care and education;

d. *Adolescence:* violence during courtship; economically coerced sex (e.g. for school fees); sexual abuse in the workplace; rape; sexual harassment; arranged marriage; trafficking.

e. *Reproductive age:* physical, psychological and sexual abuse by intimate male partners and relatives; forced pregnancies by partner; sexual abuse in the workplace; sexual harassment; rape; abuse of widows, including property grabbing and sexual cleansing practices.

f. Elderly: Abuse of widows, including property grabbing; accusations of witchcraft; physical and psychological violence by younger family members; differential access to food and medical care.

2.6.1. Sexual Harassment

Considering the definition of sexual harassment included in the table above (p.141), it may be necessary to pick out these talking points:

Sexual harassment, a form of sexual violence, is conduct that:

1. is sexual in nature;
2. is unwanted and unwelcome;
3. though it can occur between individuals of different or same genders, it affects women most regardless of their age, relationship, disability, physical appearance, background or professional status): '*In 2010, there were nearly 12,000 charges of sexual harassment received by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, of which 83 percent were filed by women.'*(www.nsvrc.org).
4. It can take different forms depending on the harasser and the nature of the harassment; it can also be nonverbal, verbal, or physical.

a. Sexual harassment in the workplace:

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has shown in its guidelines that:

'Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment' (in Stephanie Riger, 2000:83).

Stephanie Riger (2000) makes it clear that sexual harassment falls into two categories: the first two parts of the definition refer to '*quid pro quo* sexual harassment' and its third part refers to '*hostile environment* sexual harassment'. In Latin, *quid pro quo* is defined as *"this for that"*. In other words, the harasser implies or demands sexual activities in exchange for a service, *for example, a supervisor fires an employee because that employee will not go out with him or her.* 'Quid pro quo harassment' is when employment decisions for an employee are based on that employees' acceptance or rejection of unwelcome sexual behaviour. Here incidents of this type need happen only once to fall under the definition of sexual harassment. *A hostile work environment* however is created when the actions of those who are sexually harassing become so pervasive that they adversely affect an individual's work performance (ability to do his or her job) or create an offensive environment. Put simply, they interfere with the work performance of the victim in an unreasonable manner and intentionally leave the victim in an intimidated or hostile work environment, *for example, pervasive unwelcome sexual innuendoes or jokes.* Incidents falling into this category must be repeated, pervasive and severe in order to establish such an environment. But what *'if the harasser does not do it intentionally, does it then constitute sexual harassment?*' This is the same as saying directly: *on what basis a behaviour should be deemed as sexual harassment? on its effects on the recipient or the intentions of the harasser?*

What is interesting, Stephanie Riger (2000) writes, is that definitions of sexual harassment are socially constructed. Both men and women may agree that certain blatant behaviours, such as sexual assault, constitute harassment, but women are more likely to see as harassment more

subtle behaviour such as sexual teasing, looks or gestures. Men are also more likely than women to blame women for being sexually harassed. Even though, gender bias notably affects males' and females' interpretation of the definition of harassment, sexual harassment is not primarily about gender, but it's about power – and the abuse of that power (*patriarchal power* as an example). For one, no matter how we think of sexual harassment, no matter what the motive is and regardless of the conduct of the victim, the fact remains that as long as it goes against the will of the victim, makes her/him feel offended, humiliated or intimidated, it can be deemed as sexual harassment.

b. Sexual harassment at school:

This form of harassment refers to the unwanted sexual conduct at school. It denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from a school's education programme (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, 2008). Again and again, both male and female students can be victims of sexual harassment; and the harasser and the victim can be of the same sex. School staff can be harassers, but student peer-to-peer sexual harassment makes up the bulk of sexual harassment in middle and high schools (Eckes, 2006). Note that, the two types of sexual harassment (quid pro quo and hostile environment) are always present in school settings. Teachers and school employees can engage in either type of conduct whereas students can engage in only one type. More recent studies show that the vast majority of sexual harassment at school falls into the category of '*hostile-environment* harassment', meaning, unwanted sexual conduct that is "sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive" to limit a student's participation in an educational activity (Catherine Hill, Ph.D.& Holly Kearl, M.A.2011). Yet the story does not end here. Usually, teachers and administrators abuse their power to coerce a student into sexual activity in exchange for a good grade or participation in a school activity. This kind of exchange '*quid pro quo harassment'* is unlawful whether the student resists or acquiesces: 'sexual harassment is whether the behaviour is unwelcome rather than whether the victim accepts it voluntarily' (International Labour Organization, December, 2010).

c. Public/Street harassment

One recent example is worth quoting, we argue; to help find out more about this issue:

"I feel unsafe almost every day on my walk home from the subway after work. I am constantly cat-called, harassed, touched, whistled at, threatened, followed, and leered at. My neighborhood is my home, though, and I don't want to leave. But what else can I do?"

_Anonymous survey respondent (cited in Holly Kearl, 2009) _

This brings us to the general points with which we started this project. 'Street harassment or public harassment' describes unwanted interactions in public spaces between strangers that are motivated by a person's actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, or gender expression and make the harassed feel annoyed, angry, humiliated, or scared. Street harassment can take place on the streets, in stores, on public transportation, in parks, and at beaches. It ranges from verbal harassment to flashing, following, groping, and rape. It differs from issues like sexual harassment in school and the workplace or domestic violence because it happens between strangers in a public place. This description serves the purpose of showing street harassment as human rights violation and a form of gender based violence. To see this point more clearly, there is little doubt that street harassment has real consequences in people's lives. It causes many harassed persons, especially women, to feel less safe in public places and limit their time there. It causes them to avoid certain places and stay on guard when being alone in public. In other words, street harassment keeps them from having equal access to public spaces and resources (A National Street Harassment Report, 2009).

Studies around the world (a Canadian study in 2000, for example) show that 80 to 100 percent of women experience street harassment. In a study of 816 women from 23 countries, almost one in four had experienced street harassment by age 12 (22%) and nearly 90% by age 19 (mcasa.org). In respect to these findings, it is hard to escape the conclusion that street harassment can remind women of their vulnerability to sexual violence. As sexual harassment at work or school, which can cause women to choose to quit their jobs or drop a class, it is not a coincidence that public harassment can cause them to choose to stay home at night, avoid going out in public alone, opt to exercise indoors, take longer routes to their destination, and restrict their clothing choices (Holly Kearl, 2009).

Forms of sexual harassment can be expressed in many ways, from very subtle to very obvious:

a. Non-verbal: looking a person up and down (elevator eyes), staring at someone, blocking a person's path, following the person, giving personal gifts, displaying sexually suggestive visuals, making sexual gestures with hands or through body movements and making facial expressions such as winking, throwing kisses, or licking lips.

b. Verbal: referring to an adult as a girl, hunk, doll, babe, or honey, whistling at someone, cat calls, making sexual comments about a person's body, making sexual comments or innuendos, turning work discussions to sexual topics, telling sexual jokes or stories, asking about sexual fantasies, preferences, or history, asking personal questions about social or sexual life, making kissing sounds, howling, and smacking lips, making sexual comments about a person's clothing, anatomy, or looks, repeatedly asking out a person who is not interested and telling lies or spreading rumors about a person's personal sex life.

c. Physical: giving a massage around the neck or shoulders, touching the person's clothing, hair, or body, hugging, kissing, patting, or stroking, touching or rubbing oneself sexually around another person or standing close or brushing up against another person….

2.6.2. Rape

"Women should wear purdah [head-to-toe covering] to ensure that innocent men… are not unconsciously forced into becoming rapists."(Parliamentarian of the ruling Barisan National in Malaysia, cited in Heise et al 1994: 03)

Pause now and read with care this quotation. Of particular concern is whether this decision saw rape as a traumatic experience and sensitive issue. The equation: [women with purdah = innocent men do not become rapists] implies that work to prevent rape lies at the heart of the hypothesis of victim blaming. Rape is the inevitable consequence if women dress provocatively. Still, there is something very surprising. To put it bluntly, while maintaining a space for the innocence of male rapists, there is no space of why else they are forced to be rapists. To touch on some explanations of rape, evolutionary theorists view rape more as a by-product of evolved men's sex differences in sexuality and aggressiveness. These traits may foster men's propensity to resort to coercive and aggressive tactics to obtain sex. By contrast, social structural theorists view rape as being all about men's social power. At both societal and individual levels, when women lack power and status, they experience a greater likelihood of

being victimized by rape and wartime rape is an extreme example. Narratives of war, whose key intention is to illustrate the prevalence of rape committed by men against women, seem to have a long history. According to Gottschall (2004), explanations for wartime rape include viewing it as a deliberate strategy to demoralize the enemy, emasculating men in the opposing group by demonstrating that they cannot protect their wives, sisters, and daughters:

"Rape, when used as a weapon of war, is systematically employed for a variety of purposes, including intimidation, humiliation, political terror, extracting information, rewarding soldiers, and 'ethnic cleansing" (Amnesty International USA 2005a).

These kinds of explanation still beg the question of whether the true nature of rape is reflected. This to say that we have reached a point of return to the beginning of this section: how rape is defined and what are its common forms? These questions are open to multiple interpretations: does rape occur for example only when a stranger attacks an adult woman using overwhelming force? Indeed, besides to controversy over the explanations of rape, theorists disagree even about how to define it.

Rape has occurred throughout history, though this, the birth of the anti-rape movement in the US (San Francisco and Washington) occurred only in the early 1970s. It was recognized that rape matters, as it was especially hurtful and had a devastating impact on women's health and freedom. The aims were to educate society about rape, rape-prevention and to improve the treatment of victims in the criminal justice system. In 1962, the United States Model Penal Code (MPC) defined rape as *"a man who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if . . . he compels her to submit by force or threat of force or threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or Kidnapping*" (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994:07). In addition to limiting the definition of rape to a male crime against a woman, this code was also very narrow. It did not acknowledge rape, for example, within marriage or co-habiting couples as well as it focused on the perpetrator's forcible conduct rather than the lack of victim's consent. In the 1970s and 1980s, the legal definition of rape dramatically changed. So far, in international legal regimes, there are four ways in which rape is conceptualised: as a violation of women's human rights (UN General Assembly Resolution 48/104 based on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights); as a form of torture (practice of the European Court of Human Rights, based on the European Convention on Human Rights); as a war crime (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court); and as a form of gender discrimination (CEDAW

General Recommendation 19). In international Criminal Court for example (cited in Laura J. Shepherd, 2010), rape is defined as:

"*The invasion of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body by force, coercion, taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving genuine consent"*

It seems relatively easy to notice that recent developments in the legal broad definition of rape include mainly:

a. Gender neutrality, broadening earlier definitions of rape to include men;
b. Incidents[7] where penetration is from a foreign object;
c. An extension in the range of body parts;
d. The removal of the marital exception;
e. Threats, as well as overt force, are recognized as means of overpowering victims;
f. Lack of consent and taking advantage of an incapacitated victim. This includes mental illness, victims under the influence of drugs and alcohol…

The concept of gender neutrality within rape has been very influential; it expands the definition of rape to recognize male victims and female perpetrators. Despite what is just mentioned, most rape victims are female and most rapists are male. Too often, female victims suffer in silence, fearing retribution, lack of support, or that the criminal justice system will fail to bring the perpetrator to justice. Furthermore, if a minority of victims reports their experiences to the police, rape has always meant direct physical harm. Women show particular reluctance to label coercive sex as rape especially when it occurs within marriage (Frieze, 1983). In other words, popular definition of rape is often more restricted than the legal definition, in that victims are reluctant to use the term rape unless the circumstances are more extreme than the law

[7] There is a difference between the *incidence* of rape and the *prevalence* of rape. *Incidence* generally refers to the *number of cases* that occur in a given time period (usually a year). *Prevalence* generally refers to the *percentage of women* who have been raped in a specified time period (www.ojp.usdoj.gov).

requires (Walby and Myhill, 2001). This discrepancy between popular and legal definitions of rape has consequences for the treatment of victims of rape.

Given that estimates of the prevalence and incidence of rape vary widely from study to study, it is not possible in this chapter to provide comparable data on individuals' experiences as rape victims. Instead, we shall try to clearly distinguish between the common forms of rape research refers to (visit: *www.athealth.com)*:

a. *Date rape*: rape committed by someone that the victim is dating. Among college students, for instance.
b. *Acquaintance rape*: rape committed by someone that the victim knows, such as an acquaintance, friend, co-worker, date, or spouse.

c. *Stranger rape*: rape committed by someone that the victim does not know. Although most people believe that stranger rape is the prototypical rape, less than 20 percent of rapes are committed by strangers.

d. *Alcohol-involved rape*: rape in which the perpetrator, the victim, or both are under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident.

e. *Marital rape*: rape committed by the victim's spouse. Marital rape often is committed in association with verbal and physical abuse.

f. *Attempted rape*: an act that fits the definition of rape, in terms of the strategies used, but does not result in penetration.

g. *Gang rape*: rape involving at least two or more perpetrators.

Right now, pause again and think a moment. What would be the precautions one regularly takes, or think about taking, to avoid being a victim of rape? With this question comes a whole host of other curiosities about female victims of rape. Recalling the quotation that opened this section: *'women should wear purdah to ensure that innocent men… are not unconsciously forced into becoming rapists',* we argue that leading many women to restrict their independence and alter their attitudes and behaviours in the hope of avoiding being the

victim of male rape, ironically, is only to coerce them into accepting ideologies that reinforce patriarchy. If women are held to be somehow responsible for their own experience of rape, this may be suggestive of rape as a 'normalised' feature of gender relations within which masculinities predominate over femininities. Sexual freedom must be considered as a legal right and this 'normalisation' of men's violent behaviour that should be challenged and resisted. Everyone can freely, without fear, coercion or discrimination, make decisions about her or his own sexual life. Also essential is that Sates should have a clear picture of the problem then determine how laws can be strengthened to protect *victims'/survivors'*[8] rights.

2.7. Sexual Violence in the Mena Region

Women in the Mena Region, no matter which class they belong to or which country they live in, face problems in achieving stability and security. One of the most prominent challenges is sexual violence. They are experiencing it in the form of rape, forced prostitution, sexual harassment and there is more. Yet, most of them accept living in this world where they are treated like a piece of public property not because they don't know their rights, but because they don't understand who they are. They don't feel ownership of their lives and are not in charge of telling/ writing their narrative.

During the uprisings and the Arab revolutions, in Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria in particular, women felt threatened and insecure. Most of them lost their husbands during these revolutions when they were killed and arrested. This doubled their burden as it became their responsibility to provide financial support to their families. As a result, they were subjected to rape and they were the first victims of sexual harassment in the workplace. Palestinian women in Gaza, without exception of age or social status, are also facing violence because of the Israeli blockade.

[8] The terms *victim(s) and survivor(s)* refer to individuals or groups who have suffered sexual and gender based violence. While both terms can be used inter-changeably, the use of the more conventional term, *'victim'*, has been subject to the criticism that it denies agency to the raped woman and hence that the term *'survivor'* should be used instead to take account of her actions (Kelly, 1988). In certain legal contexts, the term victim may be appropriate but in non-legal settings, however, the word victim may imply powerlessness and stigmatization. (Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response, May, 2003).

Apart from these wars and conflicts, women do not feel secure anymore. For instance, women are being sexually assaulted publically, they feel that they live in an unsafe environment, and security is still a pressing issue for them. This in fact has negatively affected their participation in the public sphere. A recent study by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women revealed that 99.3 percent of Egyptian women have experienced some form of sexual harassment and more than 50 percent of women stated they experienced harassment on a daily basis, mostly while using public transportation and in the streets. Looking closely at these statistics, it appears clear that sexual harassment is the most urgent problem facing women and girls in Egypt. It becomes a barrier for them to play an active role in society and enjoy equal citizenship rights in their own country. Other countries in the Mena region face the same matter. Findings from the Conference on "Sexual Harassment as Social Violence, and its Effect on Women" Cairo (13-14 December 2009) shows that in Algeria, for example, 27% of female university students confirmed that they were subject to sexual misbehaviours by their professors. 44.6% of them complained about verbal utterances, whereas 13.8% said they were subject to physical harassment. In Qatar, 21.1% of young girls revealed their vulnerability to the same thing. It was also found that 30% of working-women were subjected to sexual harassment in their work places. In Yemen, 90% of women complained of harassment whether in public or work places.

Among the most prevalent sexual harassment myths in the MENA region in general and some countries in particular, is that women and girls are sexually attacked primarily because of the way they dress and behave. Thus, we find that during times of wars, conflicts, prosperity and development, women are the first to be to be affected and blamed. They are still told what to wear and how to behave in public space. It is through their narratives then they can become the organic center of the solution to their problems. So that they can deconstruct the culture surrounding them and rebuild an understanding that fits with their vision of the future, Arab women must know what type of life they want to live, their priorities and what it means for women in their own localities to be females.

2.8. Sexual Violence and the Penal Code in Algeria

Adaptable to different contexts and settings, the victim is insecure, threatened, afraid, unprotected and at risk of further violence. Many women do not report sexual violence to police

because they are ashamed, or fear being blamed, not believed or otherwise mistreated. In Algeria, for example, the available data are scanty, incomplete and limited (read below):

According to Amnesty International November[9], 2014:

"There are no comprehensive statistics available on how widespread sexual and gender-based violence is in Algeria. Yet, according to a major study on violence against women in Algeria published in 2005 and conducted by the National Institute for Public Health (Institut National de Santé Publique, INSP), and published in 2005 -5,4%- of the violence perpetrated against women was of a sexual nature. Due to the stigma attached to rape and other sexual assaults, victims of sexual violence often do not report abuses and this estimate is therefore thought to be much higher. Recent statistics by the judicial police reported by the Algerian media indicate that in the first nine months of 2013- 266 out of 7010- complaints related to sexual violence, including rape, sexual harassment and incest. The director of the judicial police responsible for the protection of women and children victims of violence reportedly said that the real figure was probably higher, given the taboo surrounding this issue. Sexual violence is often underreported, even more so in traditional and patriarchal societies which view women as the bearers of the family's honour and sexual assaults on women as shaming for the family's men. Balsam, a national network of listening centres supporting women experiencing violence, reported that in 2013 (4,116 out of 29,532) cases of violence against women reported to the network were for sexual violence - about 14%. Nada, a non-governmental organization focusing on children's rights, also reported an increase in sexual violence against children, including incest, of which both girls and boys are victims".

So what does all this mean? If a victim does not report the incident, it means that besides to the taboo nature of the topic, s/he does not know where to receive assistance and all the necessary information on the legal and criminal procedure; or s/he has no trust in the services. Lack of protection of victims and witnesses deters women from seeking criminal prosecutions in cases of rape and sexual harassment. This may be the case because instead of providing

[9] Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.

protection to the survivor and bringing the perpetrator to justice, Article ***326*** of the Penal Code serves to further penalize the victim by forcing her to marry the rapist. In effect, Article ***326*** may grant impunity to some rapists and have unpleasant results (Amnesty International, 2014). In Morocco for example, Amina Filali, a girl aged 16, committed suicide in 2012 after she was forced to marry the man she said had raped her.

Under Article ***336*** of the Algerian Penal Code, rape is made a crime punishable by 5 to 10 years' imprisonment but without providing a definition of the crime of rape. The same article provides for the sentence to be doubled – to between 10 and 20 years' imprisonment – in cases where the victim was under the age of 16 at the time of the rape. Article ***337*** further increases the penalty to life imprisonment if the perpetrators are ascendants of the victim, occupy a position of authority over the victim or are teachers, public officials or religious authorities or if they acted together with others in committing the rape. Article ***337*** states (in French):

"Si les coupables sont les ascendants de la personne sur laquelle a été commis l'attentat ou le viol, s'ils sont de la classe de ceux qui ont autorité sur elle, s'ils sont ses instituteurs ou ses serviteurs à gages, ou serviteurs à gages des personnes ci-dessus désignées, s'ils sont fonctionnaires ou ministres d'un culte, ou si le coupable, quel qu'il soit, a été aidé dans son crime par une ou plusieurs personnes, la peine est celle de la réclusion à temps, de dix (10) à vingt (20) ans, dans le cas prévu à l'alinéa premier de l'article 334, et de la réclusion perpétuelle, dans les cas prévus aux articles 335 et 336."

(Cited in Amnesty International, November, 2014)

Albeit according to the Family Code, as amended in 2005, women can divorce their husbands if they are violent towards them; and though more recent studies conducted by the Balsam network recorded in 2013 show that marital rape is a significant issue, comprising 14 per cent of instances of sexual violence, marital rape is not yet recognized as a crime under Algerian law. While this is an important point, the UN experts and bodies recommend, the punishment for marital rape should be the same as for rape. About street harassment, the Algerian authorities now intend to criminalize, in the Penal Code, acts, gestures or words that harm a woman's decency in a public place.

Indeed, thinking of the issues discussed above and those of other researchers in the field, it remains urgent, Amnesty International (2012) calls on the Algerian authorities, to implement the following measures:

a. Define the crime of rape in the Penal Code in accordance with international standards;
b. Criminalize marital rape as a specific crime within the Penal Code, providing the same penalty as for non-marital rape;
c. Ensure that survivors of sexual violence have access to effective remedies;
d. Repeal Article ***326*** of the Penal Code;
e. Ensure access to safe abortion for all women and girls who become pregnant due to rape or incest;
f. Create comprehensive programmes to provide psychological help, social, medical and legal support to victims and survivors of rape and other crimes of sexual violence.
g. Instruct the Ministries of Interior and Justice to compile and publish at least annually full statistics on rape and other crimes of sexual violence.

2.9. Intersectionality: A tool for research on violence against women

A key question may be so much why this sudden concern with 'intersectionality', but what continues to concern us most is the following kinds of questions: what the concept 'intersectionalty' means and how it should or could be used in various fields of inquiry? We have the following definitions:

a. Intersectionality has been heralded as '*the most important contribution that women's studies has made so far"* (McCall, 2005: 1771);
b. Intersectionality is a "*methodology of studying the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relationships and subject formations*" (Leslie McCall, 2005);

c. Intersectionality refers to *"the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power"*

(Kathy Davis, 2008: 68).

We may begin to suspect at this point that intersectionality seems to be exactly what is needed, but why should this be so? As the quotations state, intersectionality is specifically a feminist theory, originally coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), at the same time, an analytical tool for studying the ways in which gender intersects with other factors and how these intersections contribute to unique experiences of oppression and privilege. Crenshaw defines intersectionality as expressing a *'complex system of multiple, simultaneous structure of oppression',* suggesting that theorists need to take both gender and race on board to show how they interact to shape the multiple dimensions of black women's experiences (Kathy Davis, 2008). Consistent with these ideas, Bell Hooks's book (1981) entitled '*Ain't I a Woman? : Black women and feminism'* has been so crucial to understand the importance of intersections in today's academic works. Although this concept has not been first highlighted by her, Hook uses it indirectly. For her, the common discourse in feminist political theory of the 1980's which would constantly draw analogies between the situation of women and the situation of Blacks in America is absolutely reductionist. Such an argument implies that, in a sense, 'all women are white and all Blacks are men'. Gradually, the term 'intersectionality' gained prominence in the 1990's when the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins published her work '*Black Feminist Thought'.* Being almost the same to her predecessor Crenshaw, Collins (2000:42) argued that black women's unique histories and specific experiences with intersecting systems of oppression provide a window into these same processes for other individuals and social groups.

To make one, perhaps obvious, point: while women in some ways are subject to gender discrimination, other biological, social, and cultural categories including race, class, age, ethnicity, disability, language, sexual orientation, religion and status as being a refugee, migrant… do contribute to social inequality. This means that these factors do not act independently of each other, instead they interrelate, creating a system of oppression that reflects the 'intersection' of multiple forms of discrimination (Shubha Bhattacharya, 2012).

This is all very well. If it is born in mind that intersectional analysis starts from the premise that people live multiple, layered identities derived from social relations, history and the operation of structures of power, it needs to be acknowledged here that the people are

members of more than one community, and can simultaneously experience oppression and privilege (e.g. women are sometimes excluded from jobs deemed more appropriate for men because of their sex, and women may be excluded from jobs considered 'women's jobs' because of their race). What is appealing about this short example is that it explains how certain experiences that are unique to particular groups of women are rendered invisible and may not receive careful attention. It is of interest therefore to note that using intersectionality in our work requires that we think differently about identity, equality and power. The explanation is really quite simple; it is based on the idea that one must focus on points of intersection rather than isolated categories[10].

On the face of it, it seems an important but also a difficult point. The problem, with no doubt, lies precisely in the vagueness and open-endedness of 'intersectionality: how come that a theory which is so vague could come to be regarded by so many as the cutting edge of contemporary feminist theory? Even so this may be the very secret to its success. Today, it is unimaginable that women's studies would only focus on gender. Feminist scholars are likely to reject research that has not given sufficient attention to other variables, along with gender. Likewise, any scholar who neglects difference runs the risk of having her work viewed as theoretically misguided, politically irrelevant, or simply fantastical. Turning briefly to questions we posed above: what intersectionality is and how to use it? The seeming paradox between the recent success of intersectionality within feminist theory and the confusion that it generates is not all clear, Kathy Davis (2008:68) writes:

"…some suggest that intersectionality is a theory, others regard it as a concept or heuristic device, and still others see it as a reading strategy for doing feminist analysis. Controversies have emerged about whether intersectionality should be conceptualized as a crossroad (Crenshaw, 1991), as 'axes' of difference (Yuval-Davis, 2006) or as a dynamic process (Staunæs, 2003)…."

[10] The UK-based Equal Rights Trust (www.equalrightstrust.org) gives a very extensive list of **categories** saying that: "Discrimination must be prohibited where it is on grounds of race, colour, ethnicity, descent, sex, pregnancy, maternity, civil, family or career status, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, birth, national or social origin, nationality, economic status, association with a national minority, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, disability, health status, genetic or other predisposition toward illness or a combination of any of these grounds, or on the basis of characteristics associated with any of these grounds".

Conclusion

Violence has generated a large controversial literature, it has been studied from many different perspectives and each of them focuses on a specific part. Most scholars agree that what is regarded as violence shifts between place and time, this may be clearer via an example: consider the notion *"senseless violence".* One often hears this term in cases where there is no good or useful purpose behind committing violence. Violence following insignificant insults or altercation appears to be inexplicable and senseless. Probably, what people do not have most in mind is that there is no excuse for violence whatever the reasons, but it seems that violence is subject to cultural definitions. The same behaviour might be judged violent in some circumstances but not in others. Wrestling and boxing, by way of an example, are violent, but inasmuch as both participants enter the ring voluntarily and obey the rules might not be considered as *'violence'*. Violence might be also politically organized. States have organized violence both as a means of punishment (legitimate force) but also of entertainment and glorification of its power – as with the Ancient Roman 'games'. In short, we could not agree more that it is shocking how little we seem to know about violence but we feel strongly that we all have something to say about it.

To this end, we have shed important light on the relationship between violence and gender. In particular, this chapter reviews why gender -based violence should be distinguished from other forms of violence, including definitions, common forms, consequences, international prevalence and evidence regarding women's experiences of violence. Overall, it focuses narrowly on a particular type of violence in women's lives: sexual violence. To admit to the existence of this form everywhere is particularly painful. Explanations for its causes remain contested and complex; however note with great concern that we have learnt that sexual violence itself is most prevalent in environments where there is a general lack of respect for human rights. It is even more worrying that a wide range of sexually violent acts can take place in all classes, cultures, religions, races, genders and ages…. So, given this sense of urgency, it must be studied somewhat differently today. For an intersectional analysis to be useful for this issue, specific inquiries need to be made about the experiences of those living at the margins. We then, in the next chapter, extends this discussion by drawing attention to how such issues frame particular methodological choices made in this work.

Chapter Three: Research setting, sample and methodological approach

3.1. Introduction

Whatever question can be formed about this chapter, it must be essentially appropriate to ask how useful it is. This statement signifies the need for saying that all possible efforts have been made to enhance further the usefulness as well as the quality of this chapter. For now, suffice it to say that we tried to find ways to creatively combine qualitative and quantitative approaches, the mix of both approaches will provide the richest and most complete understanding of the subject under study. Then comes the question of selecting the methods by which the data are to be obtained.

Quite often what remained relatively obscure at this juncture is the relationship between the theoretical framework and the methods selected to address the research questions. The present chapter aims to bridge this gap, paying attention and adhering to the appropriate methodological and conceptual terms that have to be mentioned. You might remember from the beginning of this study that it is best to collect data from a variety of sources and in a variety of manners to compare responses and interpret results. Researchers call this *triangulation* of the data (The Wadsworth Guide to Research, 2009). Well, choosing the most appropriate means of research is certainly a matter of many factors; the subject of the research itself should ultimately determine the methods used. The subject of this work calls for an integration of three common data collection techniques: participant observation (of public spaces), semi structured interview (for the collection of teenage girls' life stories), and questionnaire (to both teenage female and male informants). Our overt and covert participation in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens; listening to what is said, asking questions, collecting whatever data are available, in fact shed light on the issues that are the focus of this project. In this case, it would be important to have a clear description of the methods used to conduct this research, including a description of the participants, how they were selected, how data were collected, what questions were asked and how they were analysed.

As mentioned above, the best pursuit of our research questions requires the use of multiple tools. Through critical discourse analysis of narratives produced in interview data, this thesis could not ignore the fashionable term "discourse" and the notions of "context, power and ideology". In few words, these concepts are written in a manner that does not assume much previous knowledge on the part of the reader as they are explained in a systematic way to make them as easy to learn as possible. To be provided with an opportunity of exploring these concepts in use, part of this chapter is designed to serve this.

3.2. Qualitative Approach

As is extensively discussed elsewhere, the qualitative research has become the favoured methodology for many scholars doing feminist and cultural studies. Its focus is to give voice to people at the margins of cultures; people who are not represented in reports of quantitative research (Scott W. Vanderstoep & Deirdre D. Johnston, 2009). More specifically, as qualitative researchers, we aim to describe the meaning of participants' experiences even if the experience is not typical of the majority. All this means that every case is accepted and worthy of study. Every case is representative of a specific person's life experiences and interpretations of those experiences represent truth and reality of the social systems within which that person interacts. The emphasis is on observations, interviews, and the analysis of some type of text. The term text is broadly defined in qualitative research but here it includes spoken word 'narratives'. Drawing on resources from CDA and feminist approaches, this thesis takes as its focus the conceptualisation of language/discourse as actively producing and constituting social phenomena: *"discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak"* (Foucault, 1969:49). The goal is to understand in depth the viewpoint of the participants, realizing that taking an inductive approach, without a preconceived idea of what we will find, will let the data speak for them.

3.2.1. Narratives

Central to this PhD project are different narratives of personal experiences. Specifically, oral narratives of the sexual harassment teenage girls face in public spaces. This, of course, brings us to the point with which we need to start: why narratives, in particular? Narrative, to put it simply, is *'the representation of an event or a series of events'* (Porter Abbott, 2002:13). Note, by the way, that though most scholars agree that a fundamental marker of narrative is 'action' which produces change (Murray, 1998); 'event' is the key word here. Without the word 'event or action', one will not have a narrative but a description, an exposition or something else. 'Teenage girls feel unsafe almost every day' is a description of these girls; it is not a narrative because nothing happens. 'Teenage girls are constantly harassed' is a narrative since it tells of an event. At this point, we understand it essential to answer this vexed question: What deserves the title of narrative?

There have been debates as to what constitutes a narrative without a concrete conclusion being reached. Some scholars have disputed the necessity of at least one event for there to be narrative while there are others who require at least two events, one after the other (Barthes, Rimmon- Kenan). This highlights the idea that a narrative is not merely a list or series of events but there must be an ordering. Second and importantly, scholars also dispute the term 'representation' (how the story is conveyed). The definition of narrative that appeared in the second edition of Gerald Prince's Dictionary of Narratology (2003) notes that: *'narrative is essentially a mode of verbal presentation and involves the linguistic recounting or telling of events'.* Here again, for some scholars, a narrative requires a narrator. But for many others, the presence of a narrator is a needless constraint. As they have argued, the narrator is one of a number of instruments (actors, cameras…) that can be used in the narrative process of representing events. These are some reasons why there has been such a debate about what deserves the title of narrative. Taking all these considerations into account, we would like, above all, to emphasise only those meanings of the concept 'narrative' in the sense we feel is appropriate in the given context. Sherline Pimenta and Ravi Poovaiah (2010) use a working definition: *'narrative meaning to tell a story'.* While we certainly would not claim that this is a restrictive definition, we see the focus on the question 'what else could a narrative possibly be?' as still immensely important.

Noël Carroll (2001) goes into some detail about this question. Carroll argues that narrative is comprised of more than one event (events) that are *connected,* are about a *unified subject,* and are represented as being *ordered in time*. To put it another way, if we read a 'non-narrative text type' like an essay that has a unified subject and possible order, for example, the only time involved in it is the time it takes to read. It does not have an internal time sequence. But when we read a narrative, the chronological aspect shows the reader how the events follow a particular timeline. The reader becomes aware of what happens in the story. What makes narrative unique among text-types is its *chronologic,* the subtle transition from beginning to end in terms of explanation and plot construction. In conclusion, we can say a 'story' is a sequence of events while a 'narrative' is the representation of a story (how a sequence of events are conveyed).

Following this, we move on to consider what we are primarily concerned with: oral narratives of personal experiences. In the words of Labov and Waletzky, narratives constitute a method of recapitulating past experience that matches *"a verbal sequence of clauses to the*

sequence of events that actually occurred" (1967: 20). In a similar way, Cortazzi (2001) asserts that when we tell stories, we make sense of past experiences by sharing them with others. Many studies refer to Labov's (1972) seminal work on narrative structure to identify the key components of an oral narrative:

a. *abstract* (a brief summary of the general propositions the story will make);

b. *orientation* (essential background information like time, place, and people involved);

c. *complicating action* (key events of the story);

d. *evaluation* (highlighting the point of the story);

e. *resolution* (how the crisis was resolved); and finally,

f. *coda* (concluding remarks).

It must be said that not all narratives contain all components, but the complicating action and resolution are essential (Thornborrow and Coates 2005). It must be also noticed that various definitions of narrative lead to various methods of analysis: Thematic analysis, structural analysis, interactional analysis, performative analysis…etc (see, Catherine Kohler Riessman, 2003).

Now then, we have reached a point of return to the beginning of this section "*why narratives, in particular*? Narratives are not only about a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Narrative, Porter Abbott (2002) mentions, is also something we all engage in. We make narratives many times a day; indeed we start doing so almost from the moment we begin putting words together. From this point of view, it has been pointed out that theorists would place it next to language itself as the distinctive human trait. As regard this universality of narrative, Roland Barthes' often-cited fullest statement is worth quoting here: "…*Caring nothing for the division between good and bad literature, narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself"* (1997:17). In terms of narrative functions, scholars suggest at least five functions. What follows is helpful for the purposes of our study (see, Hans J. Ladegaard, 2012:454):

a. Narrative creates coherence, it *'synthesizes personal experiences and sensations that may otherwise be disconnected',* re-experiencing past events and making sense of them (Medved and Brockmeier 2008: 61);

b. Narrative serves a distancing function. As Bruner (2002: 89) argues, *'we distance ourselves from the immediacy of events by converting what we've encountered into story form'*;

c. It serves a communicative function; narrative connects the teller to the listener so that the narrator's universe and experiences become shared;

d. Narrative serves an evaluative function. It provides a framework for evaluating past events; they gives the opportunity to re-evaluate and suggest alternative interpretations;

e. Narrative also serves an explorative function; it allows us to explore two sides of human experience: the real and the possible.

It appears, then, that these are important functions as they may be ways for teenage girls to escape isolation and loneliness by letting somebody else into their narratives.

3.2.1.1. Participants and The Interview Process

Consistent with the perspective stated above, we, as researchers, realize that teenage girls' narratives needed to be documented and shared with a wider audience. For this purpose, we interviewed about twenty teenage girls (The minimum age is 14 years and the maximum is 22 years) from various areas in the north west of Algeria, including Tiaret, Mascara, Oran, Relizane and Mostaganem. They were guaranteed anonymity for ethical reasons, that is to say, giving them fabricated names and omitting details that could reveal their true identities. In general, when we sat face to face with them, we quickly realized that most of them were more afraid of us, they were also curious, hesitant and sometimes indifferent towards us. Hence, before the interviews, we tried to explain the research topic and ask for their consent to use their narratives for research purposes. More importantly, it has been always advisable to take actions guided by respect for the wishes, the right and the dignity of the survivor. In these instances, we conduct our interviews in locations convenient for the participant and with same sex interviewer. We have been good patient listeners who have maintained non judgmental manner and asked relevant questions. The development of the interview schedule was informed by a range of literature on the issue (see chapters 1 and 2). The questions we asked were related to what they felt they could talk about concerning problems they had faced in public spaces;

including but not limited to streets, sidewalks, alleys, public buildings, such as hotels and restaurants, and common carriers such as buses and taxis; elaborating on how they had coped with. Of course, this was a question that we purposefully included to explore issues of agency and the construction of the self. In particular, the selection of participants was governed by a number of variables including:

1. *Gender:* It was suggested to have only female teenagers.
2. *Age:* To see whether or not experiences of the interviewees depended on their age.
3. *Locale:* can be identified based on urban or rural geographical areas.

3.2.1.2. Transcription

Notice that Fairclough (1995:191) recommends that "discourse analysis papers should reproduce and analyse textual samples in the original language, despite the added difficulty for readers". This means, since all of the interviewees are native speakers of Arabic and the study took place in North West of Algeria, this posed a problem: "sequence and grammar are very important when analyzing discourse; furthermore, certain idioms and linguistic expressions may not lend themselves to translation" (Rebecca Rogers, 2004). Mindful of these shortcomings, we decided to work with the Arabic originals and translate them to English once we analyse every original transcript. This would give readers a greater insight into the cultural meanings and the different voices in the narrative. Because for critical discourse analysts, narratives of personal experience provide powerful insights into the figured worlds[1], in the English versions we will try to remain faithful to the registers of the participants and their cultural and linguistic gist of the originals. It was also advised to observe body language, the use of pauses, emphasis, laughter and other features which we felt were important to the interaction and would help to contextualise the process of analysis. This provides a direct link to the observation of public spaces (social spaces that are generally open and accessible to people); a useful direct way to gather first-hand information by relying on senses and note-taking skill.

3.2.1.3. Analysing Narrative Discourse: A Plea for Diversity

[1] A figured world is a picture of a simplified world that captures what is taken to be typical or normal. of course, this varies by context and by people's sociocultural affiliations (Rebecca Rogers, 2004).

It is argued persuasively that any scholar cannot /should not be assigned to one single approach to (critical) discourse analysis; each one has drawn on different theories and methods. This is entirely justifiable by Rogers' words (An introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis, 2004):

"…it is not desirable to associate one person with one set of analytic tools as if this were "Gee's methods" or "Fairclough's methods" or "Kress's methods" for conducting discourse analysis…..these researchers would all embrace the concept of methodological hybridity; they freely admit that their methods are drawn from a wide range of scholarship, and that they adopt and adapt analytic methods according to the needs of a particular inquiry". (2004:10-11)

Exactly like the view has already mentioned, in their book of "Discourse Analysis as a Theory and Method", Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2004) state that *"it is possible to create one's own package by combining elements from different discourse analytical perspectives and, if appropriate, non-discourse analytical perspectives" (2002:4).* In spite of the different fruitful approaches within discourse analysis, there is no clear consensus among researchers to share a single way to analyze discourses. (Critical) Discourse analysis is not one approach, but an interdisciplinary field that is used in many types of studies. Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips continue stressing that it is very significant to create one's own multiperspectival work with a complete package. For them, to construct a coherent complete package is to be aware how to weigh up between the similarities and the differences of the theoretical backgrounds, methodological guidelines and the specific techniques that the analyst uses. Being in favour of this diversity, van Dijk also asserts that CDA does not have a unitary theoretical framework. He finds it incompatible with a critical attitude to be embarrassingly obsequious to any approach. Note, too, that this means that CDA should not be limited to cognitive and social analysis, but when possible, depending on what one wants to know about the real world problems. Needless to say, CDA should have also historical, cultural, socio-economical, philosophical, logical, and neurological approaches as well (Meyer & Wodak, 2001).

Keeping all this in view, the methodology which was adopted in the analysis of oral narratives can be summarized in Fairclough's dimensions for CDA. The reason why the present research is conducted within this framework is to analyze the narratives at three stages:

description, interpretation and explanation. According to Fairclough (1989:24), language is a kind of social practice: '*discourse refers to the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part*'. He insists that critical analysts should not only focus on the texts, the process of text production and interpretation of the texts, but also look into the interrelationship among texts, production processes, and their social context.

So, at the first two stages, the linguistic choices of the texts are examined. In the first stage 'description', narratives (texts) are seen as objects (discourse as a text), that is to say linguistic features such as choices in vocabulary (wording), grammar (transitivity, passivization) and text structure (thematic choice, turn-taking system) should be systematically analyzed. In the second stage 'interpretation' (discourse as discursive practice), which means apart from analyzing linguistic features and text structure, attention should be drawn to other factors such as intertextuality. These factors link the text to its context. We cannot fully describe this here but to understand it (see below p.131), Fairclough (1989:26) argues: *'explanation is concerned with the relationship between interaction and social context with the social determination of the process of production and interpretation, and their social effects'.* In other words, the analysis in explanative part is in reference to the historical, social, and cultural contexts. In the 'explanation' stage (discourse as social practice), we suggest then again to be in favour of plea for diversity. To illustrate, the linguistic choices will be explained in the light of Teun Van Dijk's approach of the concept of context in which the narratives are produced. Here briefly, we are going to draw on a variety of theoretical and methodological frameworks to answer questions about the way specific discourses construct identity (the constructionist approach), power relations and the way aspects of ideology underpin social interaction. For example, to explore the operation of power in the ways in which sexual harassment is variously constituted, we drew insights from Foucauldian discourse analysis. These three dimensions are presented separately here because they are considered as analytic procedures. But, the researcher ought to consider them so closely connected since one cannot conceive of description without interpretive and explanatory analysis (Maria Izabel S. Magalhaes, 1993:188).

Before moving on to describe the quantitative study, we will firstly discuss the notion of discourse as theorised within critical discourse approach more generally and Foucauldian discourse analysis in particular.

3.2.2. Multidisciplinary CDA: Claims and Aims

It is repeatedly put that, since the publication of Fairclough's *"Language and power 1989"*, the term "CDA" has been deployed as a method of multidisciplinary analysis throughout the humanities and social sciences (From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). On May 8, 2004, at the first international conference of CDA in Spain, Rebecca Rogers conducted an interview with Norman Fairclough, the professor of language in social life at Lancaster University in UK. One dialogue was devoted to the history of CDA. On reflection, always with reference to CDA history, Fairclough said: *"I guess that is two different questions. Do you mean the history of this particular network? Or the history of critical work on language and discourse? because I think they are two very different things."*

Arguably, it appears difficult to believe that CDA would be in the position it is today without the insights brought to it by its particular network. For the first question: "*Do you mean the history of this particular network?"*, it may seem that it is not about one scholar's personal history with "CDA", but really a history of a particular network of scholars; or if possible a history of a chance group meeting. Following a small symposium in Amsterdam in January 1991, unintentionally and through the support of the University of Amsterdam, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak met together in order to discuss theories and methods of "DA" and particularly "CDA". This European meeting announced the start of new various symposia, conferences and "CDA" networks in various places, but of course, the start of these networks is also associated with the launch of notable journals such as van Dijk's journal *Discourse and Society* (1990) as well as several books, like Norman Fairclough's *language and power* (1989) and *Language, Power and Ideology* by Ruth Wodak (1989)…etc. This indeed explains the first tentative steps taken by eminent CDA researchers.

Directly relevant to the second question, "*or do you mean the history of critical work on language and discourse"*, the inevitable is that one should not exclude the evaluation of past work where there is a reason that the emergence of "CDA" can be traced back to it. Some of the tenets of CDA can already be found in the Critical Theory connected with a group of the Frankfurt school and other neo-Marxist theorists before the Second World War. Most significantly, critical discourse theorists had been particularly influenced by Jürgen Habermas' view (1977: 259) that *"language is also a medium of domination and social force"*. A matter of opinion, much of what has been briefly noticed in most recent CDA research is that many theorists, Michel Foucault is a case in point, have become increasingly influential. One has to

admit that these were the starting points that serve to illustrate the main goals and principles of CDA:

"CDA as a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context." (Teun van Dijk 2008:85)

"CDA as discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society itself a factor securing power and hegemony"

(Norman Fairclough 1993: 132-133)

Basically, CDA has been also chosen to be described by some main common tenets outlined by Fairclough and Wodak (1997)[2]. Straight to this point, what follows is a summary of what has been routinely repeated in major articles:

a. CDA addresses social problems;
b. Power relations are discursive; they are exercised through discourse.
c. Discourse constitutes and is constituted by society and culture;
d. Discourse functions ideologically;
e. Discourse is historical; it can be understood with reference to its historical context.
f. The link between society and text is mediated;
g. CDA is interpretative and explanatory; it goes beyond textual analysis;
h. CDA has an ethical stance. Proper permission must be sought, and issues regarding the privacy of individuals or named institutions must be carefully considered.

[2] These common tenets will be further discussed elaborately, see below: "What is discourse in CDA? & What is the analysis in CDA?"

As regards the special principles, aims, theories and methods of CDA, although it is virtually impossible to briefly and adequately delimit them, a great debt is owed to van Dijk (1995:17) who asserts that (not really all) work in CDA can be characterized by the following major criteria which may establish its usefulness and perhaps would distinguish it fairly well from other work on discourse.

a. CDA is *problem- or issue oriented*, rather than paradigm- oriented. It effectively studies relevant social problems (such as sexism, racism, colonialism and other forms of inequality)

b. CDA does not characterize a school, a field or a sub-discipline of discourse analysis, but rather an explicitly critical *approach, position or stance* of studying text and talk.

c. In order to study social problems or issues adequately, CDA work is typically *inter- or multidisciplinary,* and specially focuses on the relations between discourse and society.

d. CDA studies (may) pay attention to *all levels and dimensions* of discourse, viz those of grammar (phonology, syntax, and semantics), style, rhetoric, schematic organization, speech acts, pragmatic strategies and those of interaction, among others.

e. Many studies in CDA are however not limited to these purely "verbal approaches to discourse, but also pay attention *to other semiotic dimension* (pictures, film, sound, music, gestures, etc) of communicative events.

f. Much work in CDA deals with the discursively enacted or legitimated structures and strategies of dominance and resistance in social relationships of *class, gender, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, language, religion, age, nationality or world-region.*

g. Much work in CDA too is about the underlying *ideologies* that play a role in the reproduction of a resistance against dominance or inequality. CDA specifically focuses on the strategies of *manipulation, legitimation* and other discursive ways to influence the *minds* (and indirectly the *actions*) of people in the interest of the powerful.

Fairclough (1996) lays stress on the open- endedness of the findings required in CDA. He always expounds his views on the issues of subjectivity and multiplicity that are almost

unavoidable in social sciences, indeed, what is most remarkable about his approach is its lucidity. For him, it would appear that CDA can never be objective: it always has particular interests, always comes from a particular perspective, and renders analyses that are partial and incomplete (Taalat Pasha, 2011). In fact, much of what has been briefly noticed is that CDA practitioners have spoken proudly about CDA theoretical eclecticism whereby they are capable of to bring instances of manipulation and ideology not immediately apparent to average readers; consequently they are empowering them with a new critical awareness (Christopher Hart, 2010). Similar effort to ensure the cogency and the strength of plurality of CDA, is made by Fairclough who has never claimed that his framework is not open or cannot be juxtaposed with any other methodology; meaning that CDA is by nature prone to multiple interpretations as well as procedures:

a. The inclusion of ethnographic methodologies, such as interviews and questionnaires;
b. Verification of the analysis results by asking for peer-reviews;
c. The use of quantitative analysis;
d. Relating the results of the textual analysis in logically-based procedures to the readings from any non-textual contexts.

In view of the importance of context, historicity and intertextuality, CDA practitioners have always stressed the historical background and context of the texts analyzed. Given that most critical discourse analysts tolerate varied approaches and as we have just suggested, contributions both to theory and practice come from an indefinite number of sources, it appears difficult at the present time to define the boundaries of CDA as a discipline. Therefore, any definition of CDA or its key elements *"critical, discourse and analysis"* should always specify which research or researcher one relates to.

3.2.2.1. What is *'Critical'* about CDA?

Central to this rapidly growing area of language study is the shared perspective "critical". All over again, it comes no surprise that this notion mainly stems from the Frankfurt school. The leading group Frankfurt scholars as Adorno, Marcuse and Horkheimer and

currently Jürgen Habermas are commonly associated with Critical Theory. While rejecting the Marxist view that economic factors determine all other aspects of human existence, their critical work had to engage with questions of oppression, injustice and inequality. In fact, it is Marc Poster (1989) who argues that *" Critical Theory springs from an assumption that we live amid a world of pain, that much can be done to alleviate that pain, and that theory has a crucial role to play in that process*." Broadly speaking, as stated by Rebecca Rogers et.al (2005), Critical Theory is not a unified set of perspectives, more exactly; it is concerned with issues of economy, race, gender, religion, sexual orientation and education. Once more, it may be felt that the contribution of Critical Theory to the understanding of CDA and the notion *"critical"* in particular is of great importance. Critical theories, including approaches to CDA, aim at producing and conveying critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination, produce enlightenment and no more be under delusion.

Even though understood differently, the word 'critical' can sometimes be misleading. In its popular use, it is often used for a negative evaluation as in 'The chair of the governors is really critical of the head teacher'; meaning that the chair thinks the head is not successfully running the school. In CDA, it is used more with the sense of *critique*, meaning that analysis may, on occasion, be directed towards a positive outcome, such as investigations of successful resistance texts (Meriel Bloor & Thomas Bloor , 2007).

Gavin Kendall in conversation with Ruth Wodak (2005) discussed the beginnings of her career, what propelled her into critical discourse analysis and the most developments in CDA. Get straight to the point, Kendall held a discussion with her about the gains and the risks are in the moment of being *"critical"*?. Wodak too believes that the term *critical* does not imply the common sense meaning of being negative but rather skeptical. It means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity and challenging dogmatism, any kind of dogmatism is opposed to being critical indeed. *"Critical"* could be also understood as embedding the data in the social context, making ideological positions manifested in the text transparent, and having a focus on self reflection as scholars doing research. In a similar way, for Fairclough (1989) used the term "critical" to show up connections which may be hidden from people – such as the connections between language, power and ideology. Lazar (1993), taken from Lia Litosseliti & Jane Sunderland (2002:19), considers this as a process of demystification. By way of explanation, this can be understood particularly as demystifying something which may have become naturalized. Critical self-reflection must accompany the research process continuously: from

the choice of the object under investigation to the choice of methods (categories) of analysis, the construction of a theoretical framework to the interpretation of the results and possible recommendations for practice following the study.

To the above-mentioned interviewer, Wodak narrated that from her experience in Vienna 2003[3], she knew that being *critical* involves risks too, taking a stance and writing in other non-academic genres (newspapers) can make a scholar more vulnerable. Put differently by van Leeuwen (2006):

"Naming oneself critical only implies superior ethical standards: an intention to make their position, research interests and values explicit and their criteria as transparent as possible, without feeling the need to apologize for the critical stance of their work".

3.2.2.2. What is *'discourse'* in CDA?

John E. Richardson (2007) truly makes a worth mentioning remark: when trying to unpack the meaning carried by this term, one often comes across authors using different and -sometimes radically different- accounts of what discourse is and the way it ought to be used. In commenting on this view, Morgan (2010:02) tends to have a reasonable opinion: "*definitions of discourse and discourse analysis can be diverse depending on the epistemological stance of the theorist".*

In useful shorthand, the widely used term "discourse" is frequently used to refer to "language structured according to different patterns that people's utterances follow when they take part in different domains of social life…" (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002). This entails that different types of discourses can take place in specific institutional contexts. In this sense, we can talk about the term *'discourse domain'***.** If we talk of educational discourse, 'education' is the domain then. Religion, psychology, law, media with all their structures to name but a few may all be seen as domains. In a form that is understandable to everyone, Meriel Bloor and Thomas Bloor (2007) write that CDA is probably concerned with discourse from a more

[3] The closure of her research centre in 2003 in the Austrian Academy of Sciences where she was harassed by some right-wing, anti-Semitic, and sexist members of the Academy who also opposed interdisciplinary critical research vehemently (What is critical discourse analysis, May 2007). See the *Times Higher Education Supplement* November 2003, for details on this "case".

specific domain. They, once more time, show that a great deal of discourse relies on more than one mode (way) of communication. *Multi-modal discourse* in magazine for example might make use of words, photographs, drawings…etc.

Last but not least, after examining some other claims and assumptions, it can be also seen that there is a disagreement about the meanings of *discourse and text***.** Three points here are especially worthy of notice. First, some linguists do agree with the assertion that the two terms seem to be almost interchangeably. Second, others do avoid using the term "discourse" completely, preferring the term "text" for all recorded instances of language in use and other and draw a clear distinction between them. Third, some others however draw a clear distinction between them (David Nunan, 1993). According this last view, whereas it may be argued, conversely, that discourse refers to the whole act of communication involving production and comprehension, not necessarily entirely verbal, text refers to actual written or spoken data, in Fairclough's terms; text is the product of discourse. It is commonly used to describe a linguistic record (a text) of a communicative event. It is perhaps an electronic recording or a written text, which may or may not incorporate visual materials (Bloor & Bloor, 2007). Albeit the distinction could go deeper[4], but in this sense it is just between product and process (this point is discussed further below).

Compared with the fact that Cook (1989) tends to use it as a stretch of language interpreted formally, without context, Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) among the authors who are concerned with the constitution of texts, proposed that a text as a meaningful speech event will meet seven standards of textuality: *cohesion* (the ways the words are connected in sequence); *coherence* (the outcome of cognitive relations, such as mutual knowledge between the participants in the discourse); *acceptability* (the form of the text in terms of appropriateness to the cultural setting and the way in which it is received by those taking part); *intentionality* (the text producers' discourse purpose, goals or plan); *informativity* (how far the degree of information transmitted is more or less suitable for the receivers in the circumstances); *situationality* or relevance (the factors which make a text relevant to the situation in which it occurs); and *intertextuality* (the way in which a text relies on previous texts for its form and references and the ways in which it may incorporate other texts).

[4] For further explanation, see: (Text, discourse, discours: the latest report from the Terminology Vice Squad, 1999: 911-918)

It is not questionable that James Paul Gee is widely known for the distinction between little "d" and big "D" discourse. His theory of discourse (1999) indeed has been particularly significant for education researchers in the United States. As the quotation (mentioned in Rebecca Rogers et.al 2005) suggests, little "d" discourse refers to the linguistic elements that are said and written. Discourse with a capital "D" refers to both the ways of representing; believing, valuing, and participating (cultural models) and all of the sign systems that people have at their disposal. From this it follows that it is incontrovertible that discourse is a fuzzy trendy term with many definitions. Mills, quoted from Lia Litosseliti & Jane Sunderland (2002), writes:

"The term 'discourse' has become common currency in a variety of disciplines: critical theory, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, social psychology and many other fields, so much so that it is frequently left undefined, as if its usage were simply common knowledge. ['Discourse'] ... is often employed to signal a certain theoretical sophistication in ways which are vague and sometimes obfuscatory "(Mills 1997:1).

If that is the case then we will apply definitions connected to the purposes of this study. Let us repeat if not emphasize that while being non-unified and multifaceted in terms of theoretical and methodological approaches, some common features of discourse can be identified. Embedded within this perspective, although long but never pointless, Fairclough and Wodak's definition of discourse (1997), according to Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer (2001), properly speaking, has become more and more popular:

"CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people". (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258)

What precisely do these quotes imply?. Being faced here with an explosion of concepts, exactly how to define them is debatable, it has to be accepted from the outset that language is part of society and not external to it. Following this accepted view, while being both constitutive and constituted (1), for critical discourse analysts, discourse is also ideological (2) and historical (3) (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) .

Discourse as a form of *social practice* both *constitutes / shapes* the social world and is *constituted /shaped* by it. Social practices are human behaviours which involve obeying certain socially shared (discoursal) conventions within which the actors have some degree of individual freedom and opportunities for unique behaviour. That is in Fairclough's more felicitous phrase (1989:28) "being socially constrained does not preclude being creative". It is not difficult to think of other examples: social practices would be classroom teaching, television news, birthday parties, medical consultations, religious services and so on. The knowledge required to engage in religious services for example may involve knowing how to pray (kneeling, sitting, etc) and what to say when praying (verbal conventions). These shared conventions may have been learned through home environment, education or experience (Meriel Bloor & Thomas Bloor's words, 2007). Being in line with Roland Barthes' slogan (1982): "people are both masters and slaves of language", Fairclough (1989) expounds that social agents (people) are not totally free to do whatever they want, but on the other hand their actions are not totally pre-determined. He particularly points to the family as a typical social institution where social conventions set limits to what is possible, what kinds of events can happen and what cannot. To repeat his saying word for word:

"…Even when people are most conscious of their own individuality and think themselves to be most cut off from social influences - ' in the bosom of the family, for example - they still use language in ways which are subject to social convention".

Language and Power (1989:23)

Every social practice is an articulation (connection) of diverse social elements which are associated with particular areas of social life including discourse. Although others are added, Norman Fairclough continues saying that actually performed social practices include the following elements:

a. Activities

b. Objects and instruments

c. (Un)specified Time and place

d. Social subjects, Social Relations with beliefs, knowledge, values, etc

e. Discourse (Fairclough emphasizes that discourse does not only include written and spoken language but also other forms of semiosis: (body language, visual images).

In Fairclough's own words, the relationship between these different elements is *dialectical*. So, for example, if a boy is raised by parents think and talk about gender in highly patriarchal terms, then he is more likely to enact gendered practices that are patriarchal. That is to say, being not fully separate, each element partly internalizes, contains or influences each other. As this example suggests, gendered practices can clearly influence the way people talk about gender. On the other hand, it can be also generally recognized that discourse influence the way they behave. In this case, CDA hence is the analysis of the dialectical relationships between discourse and other elements of social practices. Relevant to what is being talked about, the idea of social practice offers a way of seeing how we experience the world. The relationship between parents and their children is partly discursively constituted, Fairclough says. But, at the same time, discourse can be seen also constitutive, it is used, to return to Kress's definition, "to organize and give structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about". Basically, we can explain this by saying that it implies a mutually constitutive relationship between the word and the world at multiple levels: at the level of systems of knowledge and belief (discourses determine what can and cannot be said) ; at the level of social relationships and groupings (as gender, class) and at the level of effects such as social identities (who we are and how we are perceived by others), (Fairclough, 1992, cited in Matthew Clarke, 2008)

Important forms of social practices are *discursive practices.* These processes through which texts are *produced* (created) and *consumed* (received and interpreted) contribute to the constitution of the social world including social identities and social relations. In every discursive practice –all the factors that contribute to the production and consumption of text and talk – discourses, genres and styles are used in particular ways. The term genre has been

adapted by functional linguists to refer to different types of communicative events (Martin 1984; Swales 1990). In other words, different types of communicative events result in different of discourse i:e the words and grammatical structures themselves (David Nunan, 1993:49). Among several others, a marvelous example of what is meant would be the political discourse, it is constituted by diverse genres such as political speeches (both written and spoken), press conferences, government legislation…etc (John E. Richardson, 2007). Comparatively speaking, style is traditionally defined by Teun Van Dijk (2009), as specific variations of expressions such as the type of situation (formal vs. informal). The way in which these elements are networked together within discursive practices is what is called an order of discourse. Orders of discourse are also called "modes of talking" which point to the fact "that social institutions produce specific ways or modes of talking about certain areas of social life, which are related to the place and nature of that institution" (Kress 1985). If we understand them right, Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips (2002) argue that an *order of discourse* is the sum of all the genres and discourses which at such an extent describes the limits of what can be said within a specific social domain (as higher education, business sector…etc) . One major feature of this is dominance, others may be alternative. For instance, within a hospital's order of discourse, the discursive practices which take place include doctor–patient meetings. The dominant way perhaps still maintains social distance between doctors and patients, and the authority of the doctor over the way interaction continues; but there are others ways which are more democratic, in which doctors make their authority seems less important. Consequently, orders of discourse will become different when discourses and genres from other orders of discourse are given a use.

From the same quote, it is certainly not surprising that there is much to be said on discourse, ideology and history. Overall, as we will make these claims concrete, one must be acutely aware that discourses do ideological work as well as they can be understood with reference to their historical context (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Having taken notice of a succinct overview of the shared assumptions held by the principal scholars who have profoundly contributed to the development of CDA, we must return to consider the main lines on which their work is organized and developed.

3.2.2.3. What is the *'analysis'* in CDA?

Much as one could say there is this clear approach, that approach or that approach, in an interview with Rebecca Rogers (2004, May), in general rather in particular, the most fruitful approach with discourse is to maintain a degree of openness and flexibility in relation to its meaning since the value of the term is as a heuristic tool, similar again to culture, and that value is likely to be lost if we try to pin the meaning of the term down too precisely (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).

3.2.2.3.1. Norman Fairclough's Three Dimensional Model

It goes without saying that Fairclough not only has several theories to heavily draw on (as Foucault' concept of *orders of discourse* and Gramsci's concept of *hegemony),* but also his analysis is based on Halliday's Systemic-Functional Grammar (the notion of text). In his noticeable publication "Language and Power in 1989", using few words, he made an attempt to develop a synthetic theoretical approach to questions of language and power called "Critical Language study or CLS for short". For the moment, we do not want to go into great detail here, but the important point is that for Fairclough, the concept discourse is understood in three different ways. First, he suggested that discourse in the abstract sense refers to language use as social practice. Secondly, it is understood as the kind of language used within a specific field (we have above used the term in these two ways). Thirdly and finally, he has introduced discourse as a countable noun which refers to the way of signifying experiences from particular perspectives. Based on this last sense, the terms: a / the discourse and discourses can be used to turn one's focus on particular discourses, for example: (the) feminist discourse, the discourse of law, of teaching….etc.

One has to be careful to not dismiss that Fairclough describes discourse also as having three dimensions: as text that is spoken or written (text); an interaction between the people involved in the processes of production and interpretation of the text (discursive practice); and a part of a social world (social practice). With focus being put on discourse as a wider term than text, Fairclough (1989: 24) uses the term discourse to refer to "the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part". That is to say, the whole process involves the process of production in which text (is a product, and the process of interpretation in which a text is a resource. It is of no account if the analysis of processes gives no attention to the knowledge of language, values, beliefs, assumptions, etc or in Fairclough's terms "members' resources" (MR), on which people draw on to produce and interpret texts. Correspondingly, not only these

resources are socially determined, but also the conditions of their use. Put differently, Fairclough (1989) insists that critical analysts should not only focus on the texts, the process of text production and interpretation of the texts, but also look into the interrelationship among texts, production processes, and their social context. Discourse then involves the social conditions of production and interpretation (the social conditions of the immediate social environment, the social institutions and the society as a whole where the discourse occurs). Having said that, corresponding to the three levels of discourse, Fairclough subsequently gives three separate components on which the analysis of each discursive event (such as a newspaper article, a film, a video, an interview or a political speech…etc) is based on:

a. *Description* is the stage which is concerned with the formal properties of the text.

b. *Interpretation* is concerned with the relationship between text and interaction.

c. *Explanation* is concerned with the relationship between interaction and social context.



Figure.3.1. Dimensions of Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1989)

To start with the textual analysis itself, following Hallidays' Systemic Functional Linguistics, Fairclough views text from a multifunctional perspective. Having said so, moving from micro-textual analysis to the macro-textual analysis (see John E. Richardson, 2007: 47), texts simultaneously fulfill these functions: ideational function, interpersonal function and textual function (Rebecca Rogers et.al 2005). Since the text analysis alone is not sufficient for discourse analysis, it is at the stage of analyzing discursive practices, textual analysis becomes

discourse analysis, John E. Richardson (2007) assumes. Using several ways, it is concerned with how on how the texts are produced and how are interpreted by readers. For instance, by examining a newspaper article, the process of production may involve a set of institutional routines, such as news gathering, news selection, writing, and editing, etc. Fairclough also sees the point of using the concept "intertexuality" when showing its importance in his analysis. According to him, briefly: "*in its most obvious sense, intertextuality is the presence of actual elements of other texts within a text…"*, actual elements of other texts are present within a text. More often, consciously or subconsciously, these elements can be the repeated use of expressions, a reference to other texts or quotations. Necessarily one also should include the concept "interdiscursivity" which occurs: *"…when different discourses and genres are articulated together in a communicative event"* (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 73). Finally, in the third stage, questions of power and ideology are addressed. Such questions cannot be answered, but in Fairclough's terms, it is necessary to draw on other theories.

Having the possibility to move backwards and forwards between the three levels, conclusively there is no correct interpretation. This point is actually shared by Wodak as it will be shown below.

3.2.2.3.2. Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Model

Before we go on to discuss the features of this approach, related to the concluding point shared by both Fairclough and Wodak above, we need to briefly summarize that:

"CDA is not concerned with evaluating what is right or wrong. CDA, in Wodak's view, should try to make choices at each point in the research itself, and should make choices transparent. It should also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others"

Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer (2001:65)

During the time Van Dijk and Fairclough started publishing similar critical research, in 1989, Wodak published her work "Language, Power and Ideology". She has carried out research in various institutional settings such as courts, schools, and hospitals as well as a variety of social issues such as sexism, racism and anti-Semitism. The discourse of anti-Semitism in 1990 led to the development of an approach she and her colleagues in Vienna named the discourse- historical approach (DHA). It is noteworthy, to agree with Rebecca

Rogers et.al 2005, that unexpectedly, in spite of Wodak's contribution to development of CDA, there have been few references to her.

With very few details, Wodak's DHA is interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, and analyses changes in discursive practices over time and in various genres. Probably because she was trained as sociolinguist, her approach is abductive; that is a constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is necessary. Linked to her approach, it should be noted, are the unique positions that discourse and historical context occupy. While she fully endorses the views that the context, in which the language appears, is crucial to CDA, she places great emphasis on these criteria in the understanding of discourse:

"Discourse is a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as "texts" that belong to specific semiotic types; that is genres". (Reisegl and Wodak, 2001: 66)

DHA identifies the first criterion 'text' as a specific and unique realization of a discourse that is subsumed by genre. As Fairclough (1995) puts it, the second criterion 'genre' is identified "as a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity". In this context, genres subsume texts. 'Fields of action', the third criterion which stems from the work of Bourdieu, capture the broader structural context in which the discourse, text and genre are located (Jason Glynos et.al 2009). Emphatically, she stresses that discourse is always historical; it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other discursive events which are happening at the same time or which have happened before. In other words, as it has already been implied, intertextuality and interdiscursivity can be seen everywhere:

"A discourse about a specific topic can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through one another. Discourses and discourse topics spread to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other or are in some other way socio-functionally linked with each other"

(Meyer & Wodak, 2001:67).



Figure.3.2. Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships between discourses, discourse topics, genres and texts (Michael Meyer & Ruth Wodak, 2001: 69).

Unavoidably we have missed some notable concepts, but what cannot really be missed within DHA is the concept 'critique'. The three crucial elements of critique are as follows: discourse immanent critique, socio-diagnostic critique and prospective critique (Meyer & Wodak, 2001: 65). Immanent critique helps to discover contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text or discourse. Socio-diagnostic critique sees ideology to be a property of everyday beliefs. Finally, influenced especially by Habermas, prospective critique comes directly from the idea that the analyst should be concerned with critiquing and changing society, rather than just explaining it.

Precisely because it is not possible to provide a really extensive analysis of a case study, it becomes necessary therefore to repeat the general procedures which have been given a special importance by Meyer & Wodak (2001:93):

a. Collect information about the co- and context of the text (social, political, historical, etc).

b. Discover the genre and discourse to which the text belongs, and then locate texts on similar topics, texts with similar arguments, macro-topics, field of action, and genres.

c. Formulate precise research questions and explore neighboring fields for explanatory theories and other aspects that need to be considered.

d. Apply these categories sequentially to the text using theoretical approaches to interpret the findings that result from the research questions.

e. Make an extensive interpretation of the data, returning to the original research questions and the problem under investigation.

3.2.2.3.3.Teun Van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Model

For the similar reason, Teun van Dijk[5] must not be omitted from the list of CDA practitioners. He is also one of the most often referenced and quoted in critical research. Most of his works are concerned with media discourse, prejudice (1986) and, recently, issues of racism and ideology (1998) (Meyer & Wodak, 2001). Being in favour of diversity, van Dijk asserts that CDA does not have a unitary theoretical framework. He finds it incompatible with a critical attitude to be embarrassingly obsequious to any approach.

Unlike his many colleagues, van Dijk values the significant importance of the concept "cognition" in CDA, communication, and interaction. Again and again, for him, this however does not mean that CDA should be limited to cognitive and social analysis, but when possible, depending on what one wants to know about the real world problems, needless to say, CDA should have also historical, cultural, socio-economical, philosophical, logical, and neurological approaches as well (Meyer & Wodak, 2001). van Dijk's task is to probe the triangular relations between social structures, discourse structures and the lost segment of many critical linguistic studies "cognition". That is to say, the mediation of power relations necessitates a socio-cognitive approach. To elucidate at least superficially, despite his reluctance to labeling, it is indeed within van dijk's socio-cognitive discourse approach that the link between **discourse** and **society** is mediated by **cognition**.

[5] **Teun A. van Dijk** is a professor of discourse studies at the University of Amsterdam. He lectured widely in Europe and the Americas, and was a visiting professor at several universities in Latin America.



Figure. 3.3: Discourse-Cognition-Society Triangle (adapted)

There is no denying that different scholars have different definitions and complex uses of discourse (see p.28 for details). For Teun van Dijk (2002:67), who seems to agree with Fairclough and Wodak (1997), discourse, in its broad sense, is the representation of all kinds of meanings:

"Discourse is a multidimensional social phenomenon. It is at the same tune a linguistic (verbal, grammatical) object (meaningful sequences or words or sentences), an action (such as an assertion or a threat), a form of social interaction (like a conversation), a social practice (such as a lecture), a mental representation (a meaning, a mental model, an opinion, knowledge), an interactional or communicative event or activity (like a parliamentary debate, a conversation, a courtroom session of a trial, or a classroom lesson*), a cultural product or even an economic commodity that is being sold and bought (like a novel). In other words, a more or less complete `definition' of the notion of discourse would involve many dimensions and consists of many other fundamental notions that need definition, that is, theory, such as meaning, interaction and cognition".*

So far as we can tell, van Dijk holds that it is a widespread misconception that gender, age, race, or status as instances influence directly the way we speak (traditional sociolinguistics). If such a direct influence occurs, all people in the same social situation would probably speak in the same way, however they definitely do not. This, without any doubt, he continues, raises the question: "how then we relate society and discourse?. Van Dijk borrows the notion of mental model from cognitive psychology and has developed it into context model

to support his claim. The term "model" is clearly defined by the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2003) as a representation of something, either as a physical object which is usually smaller than the real object, or as a simple description of the object. Mental models are, by definition, cognitive representations of personal experiences as well as interpretation, including personal knowledge and opinions, of a given situation. Van Dijk (2009) goes on saying that when a person experiences an event, a unique model is constructed of the event or an older similar model is updated. This accounts for the production of different versions of the "same" event witnessed by different people such as journalists or witnesses in court. (van Dijk, 2009:06).

But then again, even so, models are not entirely personal; they are also social and intersubjective. The cognitive approach also needs to account for social cognition, that is, the beliefs or social representations they share with others of their group or community. More specifically, owing to interaction, communication and socialization, language users have acquired various kinds of shared knowledge and other beliefs. In sum, mental models are located in the episodic memory (part of long-term memory), which refers to information stored through personal experiences, they are personal, unique and subjective and they are based on socio-cultural knowledge and other socially shared beliefs, etc. Said in other words, this link between personal and social cognition in a model building is so crucial for the socio-cognitive approach. To illustrate, if the personal mental model of social events of an influential person is shared by others of a group or community, mental models may be generalized to form social representations such as knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, and conversely, socially shared knowledge, opinions and group beliefs may affect personal beliefs and thereby be expressed in discourse.

Society in this triangle includes both the local micro (face to face interactions) and the global political macro structures (groups, institutions, movements and organizations, political systems, etc). Usually, these two levels shape one complete whole. For instance, a sexist speech at school is a discourse at the micro-level of social interaction, but at the same time may enact or be a constituent part of the reproduction of sexism at the macro-level. Context too is of two types, micro and macro. On the one hand, macro context refers to historical, cultural, political, and social structure in which discourse takes place; but on the other hand, micro context shows the features of the immediate situation in which discourse occurs. Van Dijk (2008) considers micro context as a form of mental model known as the context model. In whatever ways context

is defined, it is generally agreed that to fully understand discourse we need to understand it in its context. According to van Dijk, contexts defined as mental models; they are (inter)subjective, unique and dynamic. As an example of the social variable "status", because of the social construction, the presence of a teacher prevents most pupils from using swearing words. At this juncture, contexts become unique experiences in the sense that every pupil brings with him/her an individual set of values and knowledge that can be adapted. Differences in these factors, from one pupil to another, explain the differences in language use.

Context models as mental representations that control many of the features of text production and comprehension such as genre, register, choice of topic, cohesion, intonation, syntax, lexicon,, imagery and etc. The opposite of what has been suggested is also true. To say that discourse influences the social situation, for instance the relations between the participants, then this is only true indirectly, that is, through the context models. Coming back to the above-triangle, it is interesting to ascertain that the relation between society and discourse is indirect, and in van Dijk's view: *"mediated by the socially based but subjective definitions of the communicative situation as they are construed and dynamically updated by the participants",* or again in socio-cognitive terms, to devoid context models stored in the episodic ("autobiographical") memory of the participants, it would be so difficult to digest how social structures influence discourse, and get influenced in turn.

It is readily apparent here that the socio-cognitive model can be workable to describe manipulative discourses that influence the audience (as politicians or the media manipulating voters or readers). For van Dijk (2008), cited in Liu Lihua (2012:250), there are at least three factors which work happening at the same time at controlling the audience: the topic selection which is the major factor in constructing "us" and "other", the discourse strategies used in encoding the topic and the mental status of the audience. Let's now consider the meaning of manipulation given by van Dijk (2008):

"For one thing, manipulation is social, which means that it needs to be defined in terms of social groups, institutions or organizations, and not at the individual level of personal interaction'', for another, manipulation is cognitive, which indicates that manipulating people involves manipulating their minds, that is, people's beliefs, such as their knowledge, opinions and ideologies which in turn control their actions".

Van Dijk (2008), cited in Liu Lihua (2012:251)

The triangle above is encased in a circle named "context" because this latter is constituted by all the three corners; and hence influenced by any change occurs to each. It is the social constructions of society that determine the nature of the context and its influence on discourse (the example of the presence of teacher). The way the discourse is being influenced by this context is by way of the participants' (inter)subjective interpretation of the event (in cognitive terms[6]: mental model). So, context here becomes a unique experience that produces a unique discourse which is used to persuade and manipulate both individuals and social groups.

To recapitulate, even though bearing several striking similarities, differences between major approaches to CDA necessarily have accentuated that the multidisciplinary and eclectic nature of CDA has taken root everywhere and perhaps, in other words, the necessity of one single theory or approach to it has not been taken seriously. Predominantly based on the research of the three leading theorists within the field (Norman Fairclough (1989), Ruth Wodak (2001) and Teun A. van Dijk (2009)), it can be deduced that CDA does not provide ready-made approaches for how to do the analysis, but it emphasizes that for each research, many sub-disciplines with their own theories and methods should be, in a balanced manner, selected. Because of this plea for diversity and the vastness of CDA field, it is not within the scope of this thesis to embrace the entire field. Consequently, we have made a number of choices in the name of relevance of what to include and what to leave out.

Due to the fact that CDA must be accessible, teachable and hence comprehensible, esoteric style and abstruse jargon are inconsistent with its aims. Readers must not come across a complex analysis that may not be neither understood nor learned from (Teun Vandijk, 2001: 97). In addition to the arcane formulations the critical discourse analysts have to avoid, many of them feature a typical vocabulary. Related to this view, the central core of this work is to focus on power and ideology. The necessity for these two technical terms is to be found in what follows. In general, CDA, briefly and tentatively, asks questions about the way specific discourse constructs power relations and the way aspects of ideology underpin social interaction.

3.2.3. Power and Agency: Foucauldian Perspective

[6] Other related terms as positive representation "Us" vs. negative representation "Them", and other polarizations will be further discussed. See p.52

Palpably, most people have intuitive sense of what power means. They would doubtless prefer to use as synonyms the terms influence, coercion, force or control for example. Robert A. Dahl (1957:201) has suggested that underlying most such terms is the basic shared notion of "A" having the ability to cause "B" to do something that "B" otherwise would not do. But as to delve deeply into the very diverse set of theories of power, we feel it probably of considerable interest to note that the conceptualization of this concept has always been a matter of disagreement.

Making no pretension to survey all the existing literature of the roots of power in history, we have seen the necessity to discuss a selection of contemporary prominent theorists, more basically in the social sciences, for whom this concept is central in their thinking. Exactly as it is mentioned by Andrea Mayr (2008: 11), Scott (2001) makes a useful distinction between what he describes as the "mainstream" and "second-stream" traditions of power research. The former goes back to the work of Max Weber (1914) who served as a point of departure for thought about power *as a factor of domination*. Weber asserted that power not only resides within the state, but also in other sovereign organizations such as businesses and the church. Adhering not very strictly to the Hobbesian view (1968), Weber defined power as "the probability that an actor within a social relationship would be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance to it". Besides to his interest in bureaucracy, what concerns Weber first and foremost is both the state as an institution which has a monopoly of force and the source of the formal authority that activates legitimate power. In this respect, power of institutions[7], in democratic systems, needs to be legitimized and justified by means of discourse to be accepted by people. Meanwhile, legitimation[8] makes it necessary that opposing groups will be delegitimated. If, for example, the invasion of any nation is justified by the government and the military through rhetoric (discourse) which argues that ridding the world of an evil dictator and therefore tacitly is necessary to liberate the downtrodden people of this nation, it would be accepted and therefore unchallenged. As a result, when the exercise of power is regarded by people as legitimate, it became authority (an adapted example, Language and Power 2008:03).

[7] Agar's definition suggests that institutions are not restricted to physical settings such as schools, hospitals, prisons…etc and can refer to any powerful group, such as the government, family, the educational system, churches, the media,…etc. This conception involves asymmetrical roles between institutional representatives and clients who must comply with institutional norms (Language and Power 2008:04).

[8] See p. 52 (Max Weber' three grounds of legitimation)

This classic mainstream tradition, according to Andrea Mayr again (2008), culminates in Lukes' (1974) treatment of the "faces of power". This debate begins with the critique of the so-called "the one dimensional view" developed by the pluralist tradition of American democratic theory, including especially Robert Dahl (1957). This could be entirely based on the view that power, as investigated in sovereign organizations, exists in so far as it can be observed in visible instances of conflicting interests and explicit conscious decision-making process (declared political preferences). The criticism of Bachratz and Morton Baratz (1962) then was completely justified. They introduced both the overt face of power – the way decisions are made – and the covert face of power, which is the ability to prevent decision making. Andrea Mayr (2008: 12) makes this clear by giving a case in point which shows how powerful groups in society use the media to secure their powerful positions (covert political preferences).

In 1974, Steven Lukes developed Bachrach and Baratz's approach further. The third dimension that he added to the discussion of power is the ability to implant in people's minds interests that are contrary to theirs. Power, according to Lukes (1974: 34): *'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interest'.* This leads to the conclusion that if institutions can form one's values, they consequently would be able to control the ways of doing things that are mainly against one's true interests. Given that this is not completely understandable, particularly by those who are subject to this influence, Andrea Mayr (2008:13) stresses that this happens usually through discourse and the capacity of power to act ideologically. In short, Althusser (1971) also was one of the pioneers to give special emphasis on power as a discursive phenomenon through which the roles of ideologies are considered.

Now, moving away from this section, as noted already power as domination, there is the second stream which is not closely connected to the first orthodox belief but to the standpoint of power as persuasion. One can here rightly believe that, referring to Andrea Mayr 2008, the focus is on the strategies and techniques of power in which discourse is given a special attention. To the point, let us immediately begin with Antonio Gramsci (1971), a key figure in the development of this second stream, whose concept of *hegemony* presents the ideological means through which powerful groups in society succeed in making less powerful people consent to and accept their own values as natural and beneficial, all most completely through discourse. For that reason power is not exercised by coercion but by routine instead, in other words, this involves fixing beliefs and behaviours confirming the practices and discourses of the ruling

group mainly through language and communication (enough examples can be taken from the media (Language and power, 2008).

Particularly important, as Gramsci (1971) points out, there is no escaping the fact that dominant groups indeed try to stay in their particular dominant positions. Two adequate hegemonic functions they have to maintain are: generating consent "legitimacy" among population and creating authority by building a capacity for coercion through institutions such as "the police, the legal system, prisons and so on". To quote Andrea Mayr (2008:14):

"*…the more legitimacy dominant groups have, the less coercion they need to apply… the more commonsensical ('naturalized' in the words of Marx) the discourses and practices appear, the greater is the capacity for dominant groups to rule by 'consent".*

(Language and power, 2008)

Michel Foucault[9], a philosopher, psychologist and a historian, is also a leading figure to provide us with a clear and deep understanding of the complicated relations between power, institutions and knowledge, not forgetting the critical discourse of power relations. It is almost impossible today to deal with the concept of power without relating to his views. Thanks to him, the discussion discourse and power has been considered in new fields as: medicine, psychiatry, human sexuality, the criticism of literature, art, semiotics and feminist analysis. Poring over many articles, studies and interviews, it is deducible that for Foucault discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak" (1969:. 49). Discourse is as a social practice, it takes shape and is framed by the different historical and cultural contexts in which it emerges. Power, and more specifically the social power of groups or institutions, is defined as power belonging to people who have privileged access to social resources, such as education, knowledge and wealth. Foucault's fundamental idea is that the privileged place to watch carefully power in action is the relation between the individual and institutions. For Norman Fairclough (1989:34), there are power relations between social groupings in institutions, as between women and men, parents and children, employees and employers, lovers, young and old, ethnic grouping to name but a few which are not specific to particular institution.

[9] Though many disagree with this, Foucault has a reputation for being difficult, dense or obscure. He is probably the most frequently misunderstood or misapplied theorist of our times (Jonathan Gaventa, August 2003).

Contrary to the previous views of the sovereign power whereby power is solely exercised through repression and ideology, in his first volume of Histoire de la sexualité (1978), Foucault rejects the belief that power can be something owned by those in power but rather something that manifests itself in a certain way. It is possessed neither by individuals nor by the state or other sovereign institutions (Language and power, 2008). He considers it wrong to recognize any particular institution or set of practices as a constant source of power. Power is rather seen as more diffused and dispersed, it is not wielded at all. Jonathan Gaventa (2003) describes Foucault's notion of power as ubiquitous, it appears in every moment of social relations:

"*Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. … Power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor a possession. It is the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society."* (History of Sexuality p.93)

As might be expected from this claim, M. Foucault focuses not on the questions "who has power and how they get it and use it?", but on "how does power function in society?" instead. For him (1980:98):

"*Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or as something which only functions in the form of a chain…Power is employed and exercised through a netlike organization…Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application"*.

Moreover, power is not in every case repressive or negative, it is also *positive and productive.* Repressive measures are not just repression but they are also productive, causing new behaviours, identities and knowledge to emerge, usually through discourse: *"We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production."*(Discipline & Punish p. 194) With few well chosen words, power in Mark G. E. Kelly's view (2009:37), as presented in *Surveiller et punir, Naissance de la prison,* involves the following features: "the impersonality and of power, meaning that it is not guided by the will of individuals; the relationality of power, meaning that it is always a case , can be found in any type, of power relations between people, the decentredness of power, meaning that it is not concentrated on a single individual or class; the multidirectionality of power, meaning that it does not flow only from the more to the less powerful, but rather "comes from below," it is productive, meaning it causes positive effects.

Strictly speaking, central to Foucault's thinking is that power is inextricably linked with knowledge. One cannot ignore that, as Andrea Mayr (2008) shows expressly in detail; knowledge can be used effectively through discourse practices in specific institutions to control the conduct of people. In the same line of thought: '*power and knowledge directly imply each other . . . there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations'* (Foucault, 1977: 27).

To think again of this, we stress the importance of the Panopticon[10] which is designed to maintain continuous efficient surveillance in prisons. In Foucault's words, unlike previous societies, modern society has seen a great emergence of new disciplinary systems that easily produce *"docile bodies".* To illustrate, since the prisoner, who is subjected to the visible tower[11], knows that he is seen without being able to see his watcher, he becomes to himself his own jailor. The shift here is that these disciplinary practices are not restricted only to prisons but also to schools, hospitals, factories, cities and universities. Indeed, Foucault extends Bentham's work and shows in details how disciplinary power works and how human bodies follow the norms because of the threat of the modern panoptic societies. For him, discipline is a set of strategies associated with certain contexts which pervades the individual's general thinking (mind) and behaviour. To be clear enough, as prisoners; individuals (such as a student within a classroom, a soldier at a drill) also turn their gaze upon themselves and discipline their bodies with the appropriate gestures and movements in various contexts according to the expected and stereotyped social cultural norms. Therefore, Foucault (1979: 138) introduced the term "docile subjected bodies" and put it as that: *"...the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it…"*

More precisely, those gestures and movements that are required from the individual have to be internalized as being "the self". The body is absolutely controlled not by external means but through the internal control of the person himself. That is the reason why Foucault

[10] The philosopher and the social reformer Jeremy Bentham (1787) developed an ideal architectural design for the prison. The Panopticon is structured in such a way that inmates in the cells do not interact with each other and are regularly visible from the central tower.

conceives human subjectivity in terms of passive docile bodies and claims that the effect of power on these bodies results in reducing social agency and autonomy as well. To state it differently, people are formed as *'subjects'*, that is, free but disciplined individuals. Imprisonment then can be seen as the marvellous example of the symbiotic relationship between knowledge and power. Their relation depends on each other equally, that is the disciplinary surveillance of the prison creates a new kind of 'knowledge' of the nature of criminals which in turn is essential to create a new kind of power, rehabilitation and discipline (Language and power, 2008).

This view has been severely criticised on the basis of discourse determinism and of failing to provide an adequate theorisation of agency as a precondition for resistance to power (e.g. McNay, 1991; 2000; Deveaux, 1994). It was accused of locating the individual as passive in the web of social discursive action. In response to such criticisms, Gavey (2005) argues that notions of resistance are inextricably interwoven in relations of power in Foucault's theorisations as reflected in his claim that *"where there is power, there is resistance"* (1980: 95). To sum it up, Gaventa (2003) asserts that discourse is also crucial to the operation of power as well as resistance. In conclusion, *"discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart"* (History of Sexuality p.100). The productive effect of discourses in the context of power relations and resistance was deemed particularly suited to examine gendered power relationships in the conceptualisation of sexual harassment in this thesis. In other words, agency as discursive resource rather than a state or essence is the focus.

3.2.4. Ideology: Self and Others

As mentioned before, CDA is concerned with revealing the often hidden ideologies[12], in everyday discourse, but then again like the concepts of discourse and power, no wonder if nobody has yet come across a single adequate definition of ideology in the social sciences, politics, or in the mass media as common examples. Indeed, to use van Dijk's words (1998), definitions cannot be expected to summarize all the insights and capture all the complexities of such notions. Despite all the existing books, articles and the heated discussions on this vaguest notion since it was introduced by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy in 1796, Andrea

[12] For the most part, we do not use ideology in a very positive sense (Teun A.van Dijk; 2003)

Mayr (2008: 10) keeps saying in the similar vein that ideology is probably the one that most defies precise definition. Terry Eagleton (1991:01) already said that this has been certainly true not because theorists of this field are remarkable for their low intelligence but this term itself does not lend itself to one unified and self-contained definition.

So as to not be brought back as routinely to the eighteenth century when Destutt de Tracy in France proposed a 'science of ideas' called *idéologie,* roughly speaking, definitions of this term most often stem from two very wide categories: (1) ideology with pejorative connotations, meaning ideology as working in the interests of a social class and (2) ideology with neutral connotations, representing systems of ideas, beliefs and practices and (Talaat Pasha, 2011). It follows from these views respectively; Teun A.van Dijk (2003) describes in his introductory book on discourse and ideology, that the critical/ pejorative approach which is a coinage of Marx and Engels bears a pejorative meaning. They spoke of ideologies as forms or some kind of 'false consciousness and hence this implies, in no more than van Dijk's words, *"popular but misguided beliefs inculcated by the ruling class to legitimate the status quo and hide the real conditions of the workers"*(Discourse and ideology; 2003). It is therefore reasonable that, in Gramsci's (1971) thinking, ideology plays a necessary role in sustaining the domination of the ruling class; probably to a greater extent, ideology is used as a soft alternative to absolute power. This may give a detailed knowledge of the concepts of hegemony (domination by consent). Gramsci's observations showed that consensus based on ideology is more effective than that which is based only on armed forces. Essentially this could be observed in the way institutions (the church, school, administration system, political parties, media…etc) exercise power over its followers.

The more general point illustrated here by van Dijk is that quite recently ideology, namely as a system of false misguided or misleading beliefs, has been existing very frequently in the social sciences and more specifically in political uses; and it was being used in strong disagreement with the concept true scientific knowledge. Because this seems unconvincing nowadays for a number of reasons (Ideology: an introduction; 1991), Fairclough and Wodak (1997) put it expressly that the definition of ideology as a tool for dominance does not rely on concepts of truth or falsity, they cautiously define ideologies as: *"particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation."* More precisely, linked to Gramsci's critical conception of ideology, Fairclough (1995:14) truly mentions that ideology is 'meaning in the service of

power'. That is for critical discourse analysts, ideologies are seen as the tools by which the social power of most dominant group members is justified, condoned and accepted as legitimate and common-sense (Language and power, 2008).

Van Dijk (1998: 69) is in agreement with Fairclough and Wodak (1997) on how ideology needs not to be a misguided belief or have a negative evaluation. He (1998: 07) provides a general definition of ideology: *"ideologies are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its members"* but rather takes a more neutral approach to the concept ideology itself when defining it cognitively[13] as: *"representations of who we are, what we stand for, what our values are, and what our relationships are with other groups, in particular our enemies or opponents, that is, those who oppose what we stand for, threaten our interests and prevent us from equal access to social resources and human rights (residence, citizenship, employment, housing, status and respect, and so on)"* (cited by Suzie Lauritzen og Malene Fisker, 2009)

Given what we have just quoted, according to van Dijk, the individual's, not the group's, beliefs are not considered ideology, nor are social or culture beliefs. Precisely, the key idea here is that the ideologies or beliefs of a whole culture are commonsense knowledge that is unquestionably perceived. Logically one might argue that any group with a certain ideology tries gradually to establish its beliefs as commonsense knowledge, taken for granted, by using many tools, the most noticeable of which is discourse[14]. Moreover, although it looks understandable, the word "group" needs a special attention. As it is not restricted to all people who are gathered in a certain place and time, the organization of a (social) group here requires individuals with common goals, including ordinary members having simply a membership cards, or with specific positions and special roles such as leaders, followers, teachers, ideologues as well as offices. The group would succeed to spread, inculcate and defend its ideologies only if it is well-structured. On reflection, van Dijk notes that ideology includes the social norms that exist within the culture the group belongs to, as well as it includes the voices of all social groupings in society whether dominant or dominated (Talaat Pasha, 2011).

Since it has been expressed directly that ideologies have something to do with systems of ideas - usually used in psychology as "beliefs"- particularly with the social, political or religious ideas shared by a social group or movements such as communism / anticommunism,

[13] More details on van Dijk's theoretical cognitive approach, See p.40.

[14] Discourse both constitutes and is constitutive of social practices (Fairclough,1999)

feminism / sexism, racism / antiracism, and other examples of widespread ideologies which, be they more/ less positive or negative, control interpretations of events and monitor social practices, Teun Van Dijk (1998:06) develops in more detail that it is this type of ideologies that may be perceived as negative because purely and simply they generate polarizations. Right now, let us confine our discussion to van Dijk's *ideological square* whereby he examines how discourses express, confirm and constitute ideologies. People begin producing discourses in terms of Us and Them/ Self and Others/ Ingroup description and negative Outgroup description: "WE have true knowledge, THEY have ideologies / WE are good and THEY are bad". Elaborating on these double strategies which are often manifested in discourse by lexical choices, the selection of topics and other linguistic features, each polarization consists of, to quote Kuo & Nakamura, 2005:410): *"emphasizing our good properties/actions; emphasizing their bad properties/actions, mitigating our bad properties/actions; and mitigating their good properties/actions"*. To say it again, the ideological square gets its label from the four dimensions that explain and justify the existence of inequality in the society:

a. Emphasizes positive things about us;
b. Emphasizes negative things about them;
c. De-emphasizes negative things about us;
d. De-emphasizes positive things about them.

The further point which can be made here is the distinction between the pejorative/critical and the neutral definitions of ideology. For Thompson (1990:56), who adopts the critical, ideology is "the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination". He provides a definition of ideology that is not limited only to conflicts between ruling classes but to any form of domination. To keep his explanation simple, ideology in this case takes various forms. The two forms which are mentioned by Talaat Pasha (2011:53-55) will serve as illustrations:

1. Legitimation*:* the process of representing an event as "legitimate and "worthy of support". Quoted in Thompson, Max Weber identifies these three grounds (may occur in combination or develop from one ground to the other gradually) on which legitimacy can be claimed:

a. Rational grounds: "appealing to the legality of enacted rules and using a chain of reasoning to persuade the audience of the validity of existing social relations;"

b. Traditional grounds: "appealing to the sanctity of immemorial traditions." So close to what Thompson refers to as *narrativization,* how the present has emanated from a glorious past and is attached to time-honored traditions. In many cases, ideology propagators may create traditions to color the present with legitimacy;

c. Charismatic grounds: "appealing to the exceptional character of an individual who exercises authority." This does not concern the charismatic attributes that are inherent in the person as "attractive" and "popular," but the person may be propagated as associated with words qualities that represent the charismatic flavor. To repeat Taalet Pasha's words (2011): the *Iron Lady* with Thatcher and *al-ra'ees al-mu'men "*the believer president" with Sadat.

2. Dissimulation: the process of concealing, denying, or mitigating relations of dominance in a given context. The techniques used to achieve dissimulation are:

a. Displacement: this means a process where a term used to refer to one object or individual is used to refer to another and, thus, either positive or negative attributes connoted by the term is transferred. This process is meant to associate a person, a system, or a regime with a glory past or popularity in present;

b. Euphemization: a process of beautifying a (negative or unacceptable) action or process: the US existence in Iraq is not called "invasion" but "liberation".

c. Trope: this includes figures of speech such as metonymy and metaphor.

d. Unification: a process of establishing "a form of unity which embraces individuals in a collective identity" regardless of racial, religious, social, gender, or political barriers which may separate them.

e. Fragmentation: concerns the process of fragmenting the opposing or the other individuals and groups whose unity stand as a challenge or a threat to the dominant individuals and groups.

It is also worth mentioning here that ideologies are seen as systems that legitimize opposition and resistance against domination and social inequality. Karl Mannheim named such positive or oppositional ideologies "utopias". In this sense, then, ideologies are not necessarily negative, dominant as well as they need not be forms of false consciousness. The inclusion of these ideas has nothing to do with the exclusion of others; there are also non-dominant negative ideologies. Therefore, the question of "what ideologies exactly are" does not exclude other critical meanings. Ideology with its fuzzy life certainly includes broad and more flexible definitions (Discourse and Ideology; 2003).

3.2.5. Stance in Discourse

Up to this point, we have been convinced that discourse, be it spoken or written, makes it possible or impossible to talk about things, phenomena, relations and positions in particular ways (Foucault 1972), noting that discourse also makes available positions for people to take up in relation to other people (Wendy Hollway,1984/2001). Often this means that speakers as well as writers can take stances which can be in general referred to their subjective attitudes toward something; relying on multiple linguistic resources and interactional practices (Pentti Haddington, 2005).

Having looked at different studies in various fields (linguistics, psychology, sociolinguistics…etc) involving different perspectives and synonymous labels like evaluation, hedging, appraisal, positioning, attitude, stancetaking and subjectivity actually accounts for the fact that "stance" remains an elusive and a complex concept. To refer to Robert Englebretson (2007), a very little is understood now about stance: what it is, how we do it, what role language and interaction play in the process, and what role the act of taking a stance fulfills in the broader play of social life. To put our discussion on a concrete footing, let us consider how the most influential investigators of stance have defined this term. Biber and Finegan (1988) told us that by stance they mean "the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message". Slightly different, Biber et al (1999) wrote stance means "personal feelings, attitudes, judgments, or assessments that a speaker or writer has about the information in a proposition". Some years ago, the corpus linguist Douglas Biber again (2004) suggested that "stance is the expression of one's personal viewpoint concerning proposed information". The more general points illustrated here are: while the first definition focuses on the lexical and grammatical expression of stance and the

third definition does not, both of them tacitly assumed that the mental side of stance needs to be expressed. In addition to that, all the definitions respectively concentrate on the expression of individual speakers or writers rather than on interactive relations.

Quite differently, Du Bois (2007) offers an analytic tool, the stance triangle, which explains that instead of having different types of stance as in a large number of studies, evaluation, positioning and alignment represent three acts in the same one act "stance". Additionally, among the available relevant literature on this social perspective of stance is the author Precht who cites Martin (2000) to suppose that since stance requires positioning one's self, it is more an interpersonal experience than a subjective one. In other words, the expression of one's viewpoint (Biber, 2004) is based on the interlocutors and their way of expressing themselves. Du Bois deals with this in more detail, the result "taking a stance" which is linked to dialogicality [15]means that the stancetaker (1) evaluates an object, (2) positions a subject (usually the self), and (3) aligns with other subjects:

" stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field" (Du Bois, 2007:163)



Fig. 1 Stance Triangle (adapted from Du Bois 2007: 163)

Figure. 3.4: Stance Triangle (Adapted from Du Bois 2007:163)

[15] Dialogicality is felt when a stancetaker derive words from, or further engage with, the words of those who have spoken before (Stancetaking in Discourse, Robert Englebretson (2007:140)

As reviewed by Minna Palander-Collin (2008), Robert Englebretson (2007:06) approaches stance as an everyday concept. He extends this definition by using five conceptual principles: (1) stancetaking occurs on three levels as physical action, personal attitude/belief/evaluation and social morality; (2) stance is public and perceivable, interpretable and available for inspection by others; (3) stance is interactional and it is collaboratively constructed among participants with respect to other stances; (4) stance is indexical, evoking aspects of the broader sociocultural frameworks or physical contexts; and (5) stance is consequential, leading to real consequences for the persons or institutions involved.

Just as the recent sociolinguistic and discourse analytic works allow us to look at the notion of stance, so too they do to look at the notion of frame. According to Lakoff (2004, 2008), frames are *'mental structures that shape the way we see the world'* and that *"...every word is defined relative to a conceptual framework"*. Frames are part of the unconscious mind and they operate automatically to help us make sense of the world. This claim lies in this specific example cited by Suzie Lauritzen (2009): framing is when one party in a debate speaks of a *'revolt'* as a good thing, though the term would normally refer to a population which feels unfairly treated and consequently wishes to gain new leadership of their country. Generalising at this point,*"revolt"*, like most cognitive models, is culture specific. Yet, frames, like values, vary from culture to culture, and they affect the way we view the world. Lakoff (2008: 22) emphasizes that frames thereby become narratives we live by and appear as complex narratives in people's life stories, fairy tales...etc. With this result, framing is important in CDA because the way we view the world carries cultural messages that become accepted as everyday common sense. The set of frames that is commonly shared by members of a group is known as the *archive.* The archive makes it easy to communicate within that group, but makes it more difficult to communicate across groups (Bloor & Bloor 2007).

As we can see the definitions vary, it is still remarkable that the stance is the primary goal of the participants in a conversation (Kiesling, 2009), stance is still an interesting area to focus on in a search for gender differences in language. It can be conscious or unconscious and explicit or hidden (Bloor & Bloor, 2007). One has to look at the different types of stance; the

two types[16] commonly dealt with are the epistemic stance and the affective stance. The former is related to the degree of certainty concerning the object of discussion whereas the latter is related to the emotional feelings (E. Ochs, 1996). Moreover, stances are not exclusively expressed by means of words, researchers provide good details about choices of certain words especially adverbs, verbs, and adjectives, lexico-grammatical features, hedges, certainty verbs, doubt verbs, modals, mood, change of word order, codeswitching, tone of voice, gestural features, face expressions and so on. Of course no matter their expressions are, language users' stances could be supportive, disapproving or neutral (Xiufeng Tian, 2014).

3.3. Quantitative Approach

Given that qualitative approach is typically less concerned with aggregate generalizations, it represents only the people studied, and some research questions require a large group of people to answer; we employed different approach for accomplishing this task. Generally speaking, it is agreed that quantitative research is based on the measurement of quantity or amount. It involves creating measures of behaviours, thoughts, or attitudes. One might ask: can questions of discourse of sexual harassment be inherently quantitative? We can create measures of sexual harassment through different ways of asking research questions. In this case, questionnaires are often the best option. They are the best way to collect a large amount of data from a large number of people in a short amount of time and in many life domains.

3.3.1. Participants and Data Collection

Questionnaire is a series of written questions that particular persons who have something in common would answer. Central to the exploration of sexual harassment in this thesis, the questionnaire consisted of a series of prompts which aimed to tap into issues concerned with definitions, causes, consequences and policy interventions. We recruited a diverse sample of participants to facilitate the possibility of eliciting manifold versions of the subject under study. A total of 200 participants are asked to complete the questionnaires. They were not asked to place their names on the instrument so that the data could not be matched to

[16] Although the distinction between epistemic and affective stance is common in the literature, the classification of stance is revisited (see some suggestions for the study of stance in communication, Massimo Chindamo et al. 2013)

them. Participants recruited varied in terms of gender, age, occupation, social background and other forms of direct experience with the research issue. Some participants had a specialised interest in sexual violence more generally (police officers and professionals supporting victims of sexual harassment in particular). The inclusion of participants who have no direct interest in the topic also helped much.

3.4. Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations were taken through all the research steps. We took into consideration the principles of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity. When we talked to the participants initially about their possible participation, we outlined what the project was about and what we broadly trying to achieve. In the case of the interview study, they were asked if they would like to take part and either a convenient time, day, location was agreed on for participation. We emphasised that they did not have to answer any questions that they did not wish; as they had the right to withdraw at this stage of research. We used a number of strategies to ensure that their contribution to the research project was anonymised. Besides, we provided them with my phone number and email. For the questionnaires, debriefing occurred at the end of the participants' contribution.

3.5. Conclusion

As we arrive at the end of this chapter, it is perhaps appropriate to take stock of what we have hitherto achieved with respect to the issues already raised. As recognized as an important and valuable part of this thesis, this chapter is designed to describe the methods used to collect and analyse the entire data set for this thesis. This description was embedded within broader theoretical, methodological and ethical concerns which were taken through all the research steps. This begins with a short account of narratives as a genre, focusing on the use of oral narratives, followed by a brief discussion of research site, sample and the analysis of narratives data, then finally the use of statistics to understand what constitutes sexual harassment. In short, taking readers step-by-step through each stage of this chapter, exploring particular theoretical and methodological implications are all examples of triangulation.

In trying to do our best to provide what is always in great demand, this chapter attempts to mention the common aims and claims of CDA; it gradually presents a range of approaches that are available to the analyst. Once again, it is found that questions about CDA, concentrated entirely on its approaches, were considered within the terms of valid plurality and multiplicity. They are of course researchers themselves who do much to comprise a number of methodological approaches. Thus, in spite of the fact that CDA is truly lambasted by critics, one does see that no attempt is made to impose a single approach. To make the chapter easier to follow, we devoted considerable attention to the most known approaches which are in particular: the three dimensional model (Fairclough 1989), the discourse-historical approach (Wodak, 2001), the socio-cognitive approach (van Dijk, 2002) and the Foucauldian discourse analysis in particular. After reviewing the various specific theoretical backgrounds each theorist applied, this chapter seeks to develop readers' awareness of some invaluable concepts such as power, ideology and stance taking in discourse.

However, no matter how much one analyses and describes a field, something of its essential nature remains unsaid. We hope therefore that those who read this chapter will be more able to question the role of narrative discourse particularly in shaping the ways in which norms work to regulate everyday existence. In the fourth chapter that follows, analyses of the aforementioned data will be outlined; this begins with a reading of the selected narratives collected in the interview.

4. Chapter Four: Findings and discussions

4.1. Introduction

"Look, I want to be free, to go where I want, when I want, wearing what I want, without fear of public sexual harassment, full stop!" Anonymous girl says.

We like how, as a girl, she learns to own her voice and takes much courage to speak her feelings and thoughts honestly. It is important to note, even briefly, that we believe the voice of this girl constitutes a great force that will eventually be listened to and taken seriously. She still has the opportunity to be part of a positive change and to recognize her dreams and aspirations. Her words are a good start. She may say things without knowing their significance, but the fact that she says them shows that we can gain insights into the way she feels about herself. She tells what she is, what she wishes to be and as she tells so she becomes, she is her story (Cortazzi, 2001). Through close analysis of what this girl says and how she says it, we can ask and perhaps even answer the question: why does she say it? It is our hope, then, to look at similar stories and see what conclusions they move to.

There is no escaping the fact that narratives of public sexual harassment must be told, generally the reason is that narratives are constitutive of reality and numbers alone would not lead us to the answers. As will be evident in this chapter, there are many things we wish to explain to the reader, all related to the ways teenage girls talk about public sexual harassment through their personal trauma narratives. Simply by being in a public space, they can be constantly cat-called, harassed, touched, threatened, followed, leered at and worse. Every day they are reminded that they live in a world where they are a commodity because every day they are treated like a piece of public property. What emerges then is a picture of extensive abuse that affects their lives, but is systematically under-reported to the authorities. Overall, accessible yet rich, this chapter presents how the study is conducted and how the analysis is made; detailing what is already alluded to in the above general introduction.

The ideas that are discussed in this chapter are the result of many hours of insightful discussion and argument with many people. In fact, these results have only been made possible by the participation of the respondents who gave their time to talk about their very personal and difficult experiences. It was the first time many of them had spoken to anyone about their experiences. For this, we would like to thank them and tell them that 'a problem shared is a problem halved'.

4.2. Data Analysis

4.2.1. Narratives of Personal Experiences

After several readings of the collected stories, thirteen excerpts were selected on the basis of the criteria identified by Labov and Waletzky's (1967) definition. They illuminate the overall picture afforded by the interviews and illustrate important aspects of identity construction for teenage girls as well. Here is a selection of their stories translated in English[1]

a. ***Int*** = *female interviewer*
b. […] = short pause, pause in seconds
c. *Italics* = trembling voice

Excerpt 1: *Asma, 17years old, from a rural town in Tiaret.*

Asma: *Er, you know […] I am the youngest girl in my family which is made up of my mother and three brothers. I was in primary school, eight or nine years old. I once went to buy some things from the supermarket downstairs, at the same building where I lived. As I was coming back, I had catcalls made at me for the first time "Psssssst"; a group of about four boys came behind me and started making comments about how they liked my hair, which was nice to hear as I took good care of my hair. Err […] really I didn't know what was going on at the time.*
Int: *did it end there?*
Asma: *No, one of the boys proceeded to reach for my [...] my [...] mm [...] boobs and [...] and groped them [...] yeah, he [...] he touched me. I was not too young to not realize that no one is supposed to touch me in [...] those parts. I was a child, how sick is that? It's too late now and I can't tell anyone about it. I wish my Mom had taught me sooner.*

4.2.1.1. A problem without name

Asma's words exemplify an instance in which the survivor/victim is unable to figure and understand; she is unable to name what happened. Her answer begins with a hesitation *'Er, you know […]'*, which in itself may signal many things: she may experience hundreds of public

[1] All Arabic originals can be found in the Appendix "A".

sexual harassment incidents and does not know which one to mention, or perhaps the nature of the subject makes her feel too nervous to speak. The lexical choices and the discourse markers Asma makes are noticeable. In line 6, she says: "… ***Really***, *I didn't know what was going on at the time*". The adverb "really" may suggest an intention to not think that she is responsible for what happened.

Street sexual harassment affects Asma regardless of her age. The informant said it happened in primary school and more than once. From being followed, cat-calling to groping, Asma's responses seem arguably surprising. She liked the comments she received from the group of those four boys "*which was nice to hear as I took good care of my hair…"*, but when she was groped, her words could express how such conduct is unwanted and how uncomfortable she was in public space. Asma feels too embarrassed talking to us about her private parts. This interpretation is supported by the reference to the pauses she takes in lines *7, 8* and *9*. She besides uses repetition repeatedly *"and…and, he…he"* and this probably indicates how it is difficult for her now to raise the issue and difficult to prove. Again, Asma portrays the identity of the entirely blameless child when she commented on her inability to react *(line 9);* she therefore shifted blame onto her mother who did not educate her and raise her awareness that touching (only physical public sexual harassment) is a problem.

Excerpt 2: *Aicha, 21 years old, from an urban village in Oran.*

Aicha: *When I was fifteen years old, I used to love hearing those words and compliments which mean something like "hey, gorgeous, kissing noises…etc" hissed and whispered at me by men on the street. I felt like the most beautiful girl in the world.*
Int: *Did this feeling last long?*
Aicha: *[…] just recently, as I was walking to my aunt's home at nap time, a man on a motorcycle passed by me. He turned around and followed me, telling me how pretty I am. I smiled and thanked him. But he started to circle me as I was walking and told me to hop on that he would take me somewhere fun. I told him 'no', but he was persistent, getting more visibly aggressive every time I said no. He got mad and hit the seat behind him hard enough. I was about to cry and I felt so alone and scared, I remember exactly how I felt. […] It was painful, emasculating, and sickening. I still have nightmares.*
Int: *What could you do?*

Aicha: *Ohhhh[…], a man came to my rescue and put himself between me and him. That man however didn't understand my feelings; he made me feel like it was my fault. […] He shouted angrily: 'Praise be to Allah you were not raped, you should not come alone to these places at nap time'.*

4.2.1.2. Compliment or Public sexual harassment?

We can understand that lines 1 and 2 in Aicha's narrative *"I used to love hearing those words … I felt like the most beautiful girl in the world"* do not only normalize the idea that public sexual harassment is ok, but also give the message that to be sexually harassed on the street is desirable. To Aicha, this is like a compliment and she wants to hear it; she feels good and comfortable when men catcall; that gives her an ego boost and a sense of empowerment. Aicha thereby encourages such conducts and allows men to say anything they want to her anytime and anywhere. In other words, normalizing or even encouraging compliments from street harassers broadcasts the belief that men are entitled to express verbally and physically their sexual desires for women who have not consented to being a part of them. Besides, females should smile and thank them. But 'hold on', we seriously doubt if this has anything to do with compliment.

That however did nothing but made things worse. As the story progresses, we meet a sexually harassed female who feels unsafe, scared, violated and unwelcome in public spaces. We could see this when Aicha loses control of her own narrative, her voice started to tremble and we thought she was going to cry (lines 9-10). In reality, Aicha used to think that it is simply a matter of yelling something deemed to be complimentary; but her harasser takes a step further. He follows her and demanded her attention. After that, he becomes violent upon rejection because his right to her body is more important than her right to say 'no'. Aicha's use of the expression of pain '*Ohhhh […]*'also deserves comment. The same message is repeatedly sent to women, public sexual harassment is their faults. Aicha's rescue tells her that such spaces are for men and women especially alone are not welcome in them. Now then, we shall not forget to reconsider the word 'rape': *"Praise be to Allah you were not raped…"* (line13). This illustrates that public sexual harassment is also a harmful and serious social problem because it falls along a spectrum of violence. It can start as verbal harassment and easily turns to rape and even murder. In all, it is worth considering the heavy price Aicha pays for this status quo.

In this excerpt, she claims for herself an identity of not only an easy target who does not learn how to take a compliment but also does not know what it truly means to be sexually harassed.

Excerpt 3: *Ahlem, 18 years old, from an urban area in Mostaganem*

Ahlem: *Like any girl, I was sexually harassed on the streets of my village. I just learned to block it out. I experienced it with wearing hijab, pair of trousers, skirts… but it didn't make one jot of difference.*

Int: *Does this concern you very deeply?*

Ahlem: *Not at all, it's a trivial matter. I think it is not a serious problem. It's a natural phenomenon, men are attracted to women. THEY used to look at girls in certain ways and WE also do attract them. How can they control their looks? Yesterday, for example, an older guy looks at me and says "Hey, beautiful" but in a manner that I mean er [...]. I simply smiled, and a word cannot hurt, right? But if it's a single /young man harassing me on the street I tend to get quite aggressive. Or it is about touching; you know, it depends on the situation.*

4.2.1.3. Normalizing public sexual harassment

Excerpt 2 provides a picture of a simplified world that captures what is taken to be typical or normal. What is taken to be typical or normal, of course, varies by context according to Ahlem. The pressing question here is why did Ahlem begin her narrative with the expression *"Like any girl, I was sexually harassed..."?* Comments such as these generalisations are usually offered spontaneously. But this line indeed recapitulates what the narrative will be about.

Ahlem's account however contains interesting contradictions. She did describe scenarios in which she perceived herself to be at risk from sexual street harassers albeit her discourse minimized male's sexual harassment. In other words, despite the fact of being often subjected to overt observation, verbal commentary by male strangers and expressing frustration of being silenced *"I just learned to block it out",* lines 4, 5 and 6 *(it's a trivial matter. I think it is not a serious problem. It's a natural phenomenon…)* reveal that Ahlem's self construction is closely intertwined with the predominant stereotypes in her social milieu. She does so by giving attention to the way things are supposed to be and calling on discourses of naturalizing a binary gender system "THEY vs. WE". It interests us more to bring to the foreground the issue of how

talking about sexual harassment implicates positioning oneself: Who is Ahlem in relation to sexual harassment? In fact, according to her narrative, she must be the target and not the perpetrator.

As can be concluded from what is reported by Ahlem, there is no clear conceptualization of what sexual harassment is. This is especially true if we consider her use of the tag question *'a word cannot hurt, right?'* Irrespective of how the definition of sexual harassment is made, age could be of great importance. In line 7, Ahlem says *'but if it's a **single /young** man harassing me on the street I tend to get quite aggressive'.* So, it could of course be debated whether only young men should be understood as harassers.

Excerpt 4: *Salima, 16 years old, from a rural area in Chlef.*

Salima: *In my family, a girl needs permission where she could go and what time she needs to come back. My mother always says: "don't be too loud, don't talk to boys even if they tease you, move appropriately and don't attract too much attention towards yourself", you know, just to keep me safe. But despite these precautionary measures, men never stop teasing.*
Int: *what does this mean?*
Salima: *Let me share with you what happened that day. "I was fifteen years old, er[…] in my final year of middle school. Because I live in a very rural area, I would get the bus to school every day, often on my own. Occasionally, it was very crowded, so I was standing holding on to a hanging handle. "Suddenly, I started to feel the back of my hair moving. At first I thought it was caused by a breeze, but it happened again, I clearly felt fingers playing with my hair. Then for a very short time, I felt someone fondling me in the back. I turned around and I was faced with a man, I guess he was in his thirties, forcing me to make the contact.*
Int: *mhm, did you react?*
Salima: *I remember I really didn't know how to react. I couldn't even speak, so I said nothing, like nothing happened […] I believe if I didn't ignore it, our neighbours who were in the bus, they would tell my father and it would be a big problem and I might stop attending school.*

4.2.1.4. Suffering in Silence

Salima's account of her family accepted norms is commonly heard among the informants. She is expected to be docile, shy, and not to be outspoken and opinionated. Her behaviours must be closely linked to notions of honour and shame purely and simply because she is under the close and continued scrutiny of society (Panoptic society). This means Salima is constantly under pressure to think about her family name in her daily life, ranging from the clothes she wears to the way she behaves in public. Thus she cannot stay overnight, she cannot be seen to roam around and she cannot be seen to be interacting with boys. Her experience of sexual harassment on a bus suggests that pressure exerting messages from her mother about the importance of being submissive seems pointless; it has no significant effects however. Salima, with a voice heavy with irony, puts it very aptly: *"But despite these precautionary measures, men never stop teasing"*.

Also, here is an unpleasant truth. Salima experiences particular difficulties with transport to get education. She is transported to and from school each day and because of the lack of carriages she would often end up standing in the aisles or cramped in doorway. Even worse is the idea that if they are packed like sardines, Salima's whole body would be millimeters from others then. She reports that a strange man in his thirties played with her hair and touched her in a sexual way. Yet she has been silenced through this time by the fears of what could happen to her and how she would be perceived by the public: neighbours and her family in particular. She could not speak back to her harasser because of the social pressure to not make a fuss; that was a private event and nobody heard it. In line 14, Salima explains how simply blame might be placed on her and not the harasser *"it would be a big problem and I might stop attending school"*. In other words, instead of speaking out against the seemingly overwhelming problem of harassment, Salima often takes steps to avoid it. Anyway, we are not sure if these are wrong or right ways to respond to harassment but we feel absolutely sure that when Salima speaks she is afraid her words will not be heard nor welcomed, and when she is silent she is still afraid. Regardless of what she does or does not do, nothing changes. But to not make matters worse she defines herself in relation to her family; that it is impossible for her to show any sign of agency (identity for the other).

Excerpt 5: *Kenza, 13 years old from an urban city, Tiaret*

Kenza: *On my way to school at midday, two unknown men came creeping up behind me and pulled my school bag. They asked me if I had known anything about my period, I was so shocked that they used the word "period" […] I had never heard it from men before. Following their question, they slapped me on my […]. They laughed and went away. They made my blood run cold. There was nothing I could do, I didn't know who they were, I was so embarrassed; I ran all the way home.*

Int: *Did you tell your parents?*

Kenza: *No, never, impossible. I told my mother that I have got a headache and I am feeling a bit feverish, I didn't go to school that afternoon.*

4.2.1.5. Controlling Talk

Kenza's narrative echoes with the previous account in terms of the way she responded to public sexual harassment; she kept silent. With respect to time of day, Kenza, the newly arrived teenager, faced harassment during broad daylight. She finds herself alone with two unacquainted men whose comments are not only derogatory but also have profound consequences (lines 5 and 6). Besides, it seems easy for us to judge whether their behaviours are intentional or not and therefore to question them. It does get us thinking: why did these guys think it was OK to just harass strangers? If we still sometimes use girls' sexuality as an excuse when a strange man is being inappropriate, the two men had made a slap and walked off, not waiting for any sexual advance or expecting Kenza to respond at all.

When Kenza was asked whether she told her parents, in line 7: *"no, never, impossible. I told my mother that I have got a headache and I am feeling a bit feverish",* she said. Her three negative answers 'no, never and impossible" show that something is not allowed. Her silence is so accepted that her mother does not even notice it. To the point, silencing Kenza does not mean to prevent her talk but rather shaping it, to restrict the things she may talk about and the way she expresses them. It all start with no communication, no room for claims of "it's demoralizing, I feel so embarrassed, humiliated and my blood run cold…" because of those unwanted behaviours. Kenza thus is learning how to become so skilled in brushing off lewd comments and feels ashamed if she draws any attention. Her silence however not only does fortify harassment but also promotes the system of exclusion from public spaces (line 8).

Excerpt 6: *Fatima, 19 years old, from an urban village, Mascara.*

Fatima: *Well, one day, I was just walking home, minding my own business, not wearing 'revealing clothes'. A man came behind me on his bicycle and pulled my hair saying words I cannot utter!. When I turned to face him I discovered that he was my cousin.*

Int: *Oh, really?*

Fatima: *Yeah, his face becomes red, he didn't know it was me, my hairstyle was different.*

Int: *What did you do when you found out, how did you feel?*

Fatima: *I was speechless, it was a big problem that day, and he almost killed me. I am in continuous and direct conflict with him, he always criticises my clothes and holds me responsible for getting harassed and that's what I strongly refuses. For him, this is due to poor upbringing of me.*

Int: *Did you tell your parents?*

Fatima: *I told my mother, but she took his side. She used to say: "eat to suit yourself, and dress to suit others". But I said: "you see how I am dressed", if I change my hairstyle each time or dress this way, it doesn't mean that I am bad…It's not by appearance. And I have already seen on TV, they said it is not a question of what we dress.*

4.2.1.6. Planning Behaviours

Excerpt 6 provides a different scenario. As Fatima claims, she was sexually harassed by her cousin on the street but definitely he did not recognize her; he was easily mistakable for her when she changed her hairstyle. In his mind, she is a complete stranger (line 4). He turned red after the incident perhaps because such bahaviour is both inexcusable and unexplainable; normally he is forced to defend his honour by protecting and controlling her and not to ruin her reputation.

Fatima's narrative reflects yet another image of victim blaming. Lines 6, 7 and 8 continue the sequence of the events. Shockingly common, rather than admitting his guilt; her cousin thinks he has the right to pass judgments on her. But worst of all is the greater tolerance for harassment. Fatima informs her mother of what happened to her but the latter considers it a natural unintentional incident. In an honest opinion, though she is the victim; she is unfairly burdened with the ways in which she has to plan her behaviours in public and above all must never think about fighting back against something that is so present in her community. Comments such as *"eat to suit yourself, and dress to suit others'* suggests that Fatima is obliged to ask herself daily: "have I missed anything? May be the dress is too tight. May be the Tshirt

is too short. May be the scarf is too coloured or may be the make-up is too conspicuous". She must always think in what reactions she will get; she must constructs herself through her relationships with others and through the eyes of others who imprint on her their own gaze and positioning. Lines 9 and 10 capture the inner speech of Fatima, an important point in the narrative since it reveals her rejection of the status quo idea that this situation is inevitable and unchangeable. It is possible that this reaction is only momentary but she considers the comment to be disrespectful and an insult. Notice that it is not so much her cousin's comments themselves that are hard to deal with; but it is rather the way in which Fatima has to shift and plan her behaviour in public that is most frustrating. She referred then to the media as a source of information through which the issue is discussed and public awareness is increased against it.

Excerpt 7: *Rania, 18 years old, from an urban city in Tiaret.*

Rania: *I am the only child in my family. My father died when I was five years old and my mother is a simple housewife. She works here and there to earn some money, you know; her income is not er: enough for our living.*

Int: *Yeah,*

Rania: *My mother always advises me to take a longer walking route to avoid uncomfortable stares or cat calls. If I'm even a half-hour late coming home, she panics. She always says: "I will raise you like I was raised and if you make a mistake, I will blame myself".*

Int: *Okay,*

Rania: *So, I was fifteen years old when it all started. I was in high school; I would walk home from school. One day, I changed my way because there is a short path through the centre of town. A man behind me asked me if I need help carrying my school bag. Not interested* in what he had said. *I did not tell my Mum. Another day, he stopped me when I was walking home and asked me if I had a boyfriend? Then he said: "I like you", he gave me money and tried to touch my private parts.*

Int: *then, what did you do?*

Rania: *I run crying all the way back home. I blamed myself; it was my fault. Every time I think about something like that I feel disgusted… If only I had not changed my way home.*

4.2.1.7. Self- Blame/ Guilt

Before Rania shares her experience with us, she introduced herself and told us about her family background. Rania did not grow up in the presence of her father. Her mother felt compelled to leave home to provide an income for her family. Rania's mother is particularly concerned about the future of her daughter and whatever sacrifice she makes, she makes for her only child (line 2 and 3). To look even further, she is the dominant figure in Rania's life. The responsibility for providing a safe and caring environment typically falls on her. Besides, it does not come as a surprise that the final decision regarding her daughter's honour is left to her. She knows very well that people will talk about her daughter whether she respected the prevailing rules or not. It is vital therefore why expressions such as *"I will raise my daughter like I was raised" and "If my daughter makes a mistake, I will blame myself*" were repeated by her, showing her fear that a girl may lose her honour and reemphasizing the role of guardianship that she plays rendering her responsible for eradicating any dishonour, represented by the body of her daughter.

Things are much worse than that, so it appears. They are worse in that it is not a matter of being limited to specific behaviours. As we can see in this narrative, Rania felt insecure when an old man signified a threat of rape. She moved away from the harasser rather than confronting him due to fear of escalation. We found that she does not respond verbally or physically to the man who harasses her but she feels so guilty. For a reason which is clear, Rania considered it her fault. If she avoids such route, she would not be harassed, she illustrates in line 12. Stated in this way unfortunately, Rania does not question her response of '*Not interested'* when that happened before (line 9). She does not question her own reactions so as to realize that her body is not for strangers to touch freely and harassers should keep their hands to themselves. In fact, she does not even doubt her freedom in public spaces.

Excerpt 8: *Samah, 15 years old from an urban city, Mascara*

***Samah**: I was 12 years old when I heard kissing noises. I know, it sounds awfully young, but I really looked pubescent girl when I was 12. Anyway, I was walking home alone when a group of boys who had to have been about 16/17 years old were sitting in the park just loitering. As I walked past them one of the guys yelled at me: "Hey, I want to talk to you". He yells again: "Come here bitch, don't ignore me; I'm talking to you." so I ran away from them as fast as I could. They followed me in the street telling me: "they know where I live and they are going to come to knock on my door and tell my father and my brother".*

Int: *So you had to run again?*

Samah: *The problem is that daddy saw them commenting on regularly. He was not with me. Once I pointed at the perpetrators, he shouted angrily "go home […]". Yes, yes; he swore at me in front of them. It was a cruel punishment; my father beat me to death: "He pulled a knife and wanted to stab me". Even my aunts were against me, they asked questions like: 'why are you still outdoors; you already have big breasts?" and things like that. They said they felt great shame on what I have done. They believe that brings shame on me and my father.*

4.2.1.8. Victim Blaming

Samah wants us to see that there is a misunderstanding of the difference between the victim and the harasser's conduct. Here in fact she uses no contesting strategies to challenge this view; her opening remark *"…but I really looked pubescent girl when I was 12…"*asserts that she expects to be a ready target for the same type of harassment that younger women might suffer more from, which is to say that she recognizes she is no longer young and perhaps more eye catching to be harassed. Probably at times Samah just gives credence to the idea that harassment is a matter of routine that she does not feel like she can take it seriously. In line 8, she says, *"the problem is that daddy saw them commenting on regularly"*. Once again, the problem is not that she is routinely subjected to street harassment which frightens her and reinforces fears of rape; her only problem is her family reaction. When her father witnessed what happened, though she pointed at the harassers, Samah could never be believed. Her father thinks she attracts too much attention towards herself. The repeated discourse markers '*yes, yes my father swore at me in front of them'* and her emphasis upon the expression *'punishment'* indicate that especially relatives do not have a lot of sympathy for the victims, Samah was beaten and shouted at. Her aunts claim that she is responsible for her sexual objectification (line 12). In other words, they simply blame the victim and detract from the harasser's behaviour. This is of course based on certain considerations such as societal pressure. Now then, just pause and think for a moment: if the perpetrators are certain that Samah keeps quiet when she is harassed and she does not complain because she does not want to be blamed, it seems that they would really take advantage. All in all, we have no hesitation therefore to say that victim blaming is absolutely a part of an unfair culture.

Excerpt 9: *Manel, 20 years old, from an urban city in Oran.*

Manel: *I was probably about 19 when it happened and I am now 20 years old. I cry every time I think about it; and I need to tell someone about it.*

Int: *Yeah, I am all ears,*

Manel: *I'm not very pretty; you see […] I have black skin; I wear glasses and I fix my hair in a fashionable way. I always wear jeans and a T-shirt. I have been sexually harassed twice, once in the street and once at a park in one day. First the street: some guys kept asking for my number left and right, some even went as far as asking bad things[…] I'm not that kind of girls […]*

Int: *okay,*

Manel: *At a park, I was standing beside a road waiting for my friend to catch up so we could cross it. Some other guys shout something at me. I was not paying attention so I have no idea what they said. Without warning, they came up to me and said "hey sexy, you would look better with no clothes on […] and worse"*

Int: *Was there anything you did?*

Manel: *There is nothing that can be done about sexual harassment. I started telling the persons involved stopping the behaviour but no one reacted; they think I must have done something wrong. That still haunts me. And to think how powerless I was, how silent I stayed, it fills me with rage.*

4.2.1.9. No common voice

In her interview, Manel expresses how important is this opportunity to talk about painful experiences in a non-threatening environment; in fact, it is a story that she waited years to fully tell and she is not any longer reluctant to disclose its particular details. Manel spoke of her physical appearance; her black skin, glasses, hairstyle and clothes. Though there is nothing unusual about it, she sees herself not very attractive (line 3). This self-denigration is just because she has the belief that only sexy girls are harassed. In light of the above however, girls are harassed for multiple reasons within a single harassment incident and her black skin is no exception. Also, in situations like these the goal of the harassers here is often to get attention, sex, whatever, not just to let girls know they find them charming.

Through the telling of a story of self- marginilisation, Manel narrates the sequence of the events she lived. She felt threatened twice (in the street and in the park); especially when the men suddenly came up to her and asked for sex. But it is apparent from her pauses at lines

(6 and 10) that she realised the possible effect of her words; she felt that taboos around sex. As we get to the end of the narrative and the participant is asked how she reacted, Manel firmly believes: *'there is nothing that can be done about sexual harassment'*. Not everyone is so sure how to stop public sexual harassment; they assume there is nothing they could really do about it. Manel tried to be an agent in her own story but there was no supportive feedback from the bystanders, they did not help her to relocate herself from a position of powerlessness to resistance. At times, those who observe these interactions actually are afraid or get quite confused because they do not know exactly what happens and how to effectively deal with it. Therefore, the most likely response will be to not get involved. Given this indifference in a society that largely operates on these premises, Manel reports a variety of negative emotions in response to it including fear and anger.

Excerpt 10: *Leila, 17 years old from an urban city, Tiaret.*

Leila: *Usually my friends and I just try to move away as fast as we can to get out of those creeps and their words: you are beautiful kitten, can I have your number, let's do something things tonight, and your eyes are beautiful […]*
Int: *what do you think?*
Leila: *I have been educated by my mother, father, my brothers and even school to be shy because I am a girl, not speak about these things. If a guy does something, look down and walk away. This is why I could say I could not defend myself. In the past I used to get afraid. But now I defend myself and to defend other girls in the street. I'm not doing something wrong, it's him who is doing something wrong and the law should punish him, but you know the law is not applied. The people who are watching don't say anything. They don't react; they don't try to protect you. On the contrary, they ask: "what's wrong with you?" Sometimes when you go to a police officer to complain about it, the issue seems microscopic compared to the other problems happening in our society. If you go you to the police officer he may told you why you travel alone at this time and why are not you accompanied by male if you know it is not safe, go home.*

4.2.1.10. Widespread Apathy

The worst part of Leila's's narrative again is that public sexual harassment is an everyday reality for women; they have to be conscious 24×7 in their cities. As discussed previously, they have to be conscious of where they are going; what they are wearing, what time they are going to be there. They leave at a certain time and they are back at a certain time as well. Even a closer look at Leila's narrative reveals that her family advised her on more non-confrontational ways of remaining safe; not being too loud nor attracting too much attention towards herself to simply get away from the harasser. We can only conjecture that their reaction is to be safe no matter what it takes; but though Leila understood their concerns, she is not willing to adopt everything they suggested and desired to use their own judgments in determining how a particular situation should be handled. Viewed in this light, she realized she has made no mistake; she is very explicit about what she thought was wrong with her society. To comment shortly, she believed that there is a general apathy toward women's concerns about public harassment, which was seen to extend from police to the general public. She felt that harassment was seen as a normal and regular affair and thus ignored *'the issue seems microscopic compared to the other problems happening in our society…*' Policemen were seen as extremely insensitive when blaming women for the harassment they faced (lines 11 and 12). According to Leila then, the whole problem is that women cannot report since police do not investigate and law is not applied.

Excerpt 11: *Sabrina, 19 years old from an urban city, Tiaret*

Sabrina: *er: just I want to say I am always veiled when go out in public. Few months ago, one man in his thirties boarded the bus. He came and stood near me. Whenever the bus was coming to a stop or taking some turn he seemed to lose balance […] I didn't find it a bit strange. I told myself he had probably done it by accident.*

Int: *Yeah?*

Sabrina: *It didn't end there. A few minutes later, his next move was to put his arm around me and gave me his phone number. Rationally, I knew it was something abnormal and I wanted to do something about it. I was uncomfortable with the several things he did, so, when he came near me again, I held the pin used in my head veil and I pricked his arm. "Next time, I would shout out loud and tell the whole bus", I said to him.*

Int: *How did he react?*

Sabrina: *He got off the bus at the next stop.*

4.2.1.11. **Public Shame**

In describing these events, it is interesting to note that women are generally harassed regardless of what they are wearing; though Sabrina is always veiled when going out, she has been touched inappropriately. Actually we may already know similar horrific stories, if a female travels by herself; mostly she will see a very different street than males. Sabrina was fondled on a bus, she thinks it a coincidence (line 4) but for a moment she was expecting the usual, partly because this is shaped by her previous experiences: *'Rationally, I knew it was something abnormal and I wanted to do something about it'*, she said. Sabrina is conscious of her body, she understood this is a sexual harassment and this is indeed a statement of power.

The clauses expressed in lines 6, 7, 8 and 9 are ways of letting us know that no one has the right to Sabrina' body, a right to discuss it, analyse it or appraise it whether they like or not. She tried to start self-defence; her tactic is to make a scene, making it harder for men to harass her both physically and orally. As it is evident in her story, when the perpetrator came near her again, she held the pin used in her head veil and pricked his arm. Not only this, Sabrina uses direct speech to revoice the displeasure of many victims: *'next time, I would shout out loud and tell the whole bus'*, her best weapon here is public shame. She wants to be just loud enough so that people know that she is not ok. We can tell she will execute this successfully if the crowd is looking at her encouragingly; we mean it is on her side. In line with this belief, it means she is not alone in standing up to sexual harassment. Consequently, the final line expresses the outcome of her strategies; the result of her actions, in particular the agency of Sabrina.

Excerpt 12: *Hanane, 19 years old, from an urban village, Chlef.*

Hanane: *I was about 18 when, one day on my way to home, a fifty year old man told me: "You got great eyes, baby!" In response, I scream, "My name is not a baby, you probably have a daughter older than me", and then I asked him: "how you would like it if your daughter or sister was walking and some random strangers called them inappropriate names".*

Int: *Did he apologize?*

Hanane: *Unconcerned by this thought he burst out laughing and said: "psst […]smile sweetie". Following this, I gave him an angry look then I said: "I am not a dog, don't whistle at me. I do not like this kind of treatment and I would report it to my father if you continue". He said: "Don't make me laugh!" He thought I would not do it.*

Int: *Did you call your father?*

Hanane: *Of course I did and he came but, unfortunately, the man ran away in fright. My father always tells me: 'if you feel overpowered then and there call me or call the police'.*

4.2.1.12. Perpetrator Blaming

Hanane' story will seem small in comparison with the abovementioned ones. What is dramatic perhaps is that a fifty year old man sexually harassed her. Look, we don't pretend that there is a lower or upper age limit for harassing women but we really feel disappointed that a man of her father's age on the street just looked at her like she is a whore. No matter who that man is, through looks, sexist words and gestures including phrases like *'hey baby'* and *'psst'* sounds; he asserts his right to define her as a sexual object; forcing her to interact with him and telling her to smile.

What is not being talked about so far, and should be, is the decision Hanane takes. More radically, lines 3 through 6 are all in direct speech and show the confrontation between Hanane and the harasser, each echoing two opposing figured worlds: the oppressed world of what ought to be for Hanane and the world of authority for the harasser. This is a clear episode of resistance indeed: Hanane explains her decision to speak out against sexual harassment; she did not wait a second to confront directly. Here she sounds confident; she does not care if she will be at risk; that is to say she has no fears that the situation might escalate further. One thing is certain: she just reinforced the fact that she is never at fault. This is absolutely due to certain reasons. Concurrent with this sense, we wonder: who is behind her self-emancipation?

What is specifically disturbing is that that man did not understand. His laughter and ironic reply suggest that he was not going to stop, he did not take her seriously; therefore her resistance appears futile. Given the seriousness of the issue, Hanane called her father whose feedback helps her to become an agent in her own experience. As she concludes, her father remained worried about her safety; he was advising her daughter on how to handle unpleasant situations and to take actions against harassers in particular. Note, by the way, that Hanane does not feel inhibited to talk to her father about the issue, and therein lies her power. Owing to his support, she describes the moment when the harasser finally understood.

Excerpt 13: *Djamila, 19 years old from an urban city, Relizane*

Djamila: *I, through experience, try to avoid certain areas, do not stay out late, limit my movements in public and wear loose clothing.*
Int: *Keep in mind that you do not dress provocatively, does it help?*
Djamila: *Sure not enough, I often took the bus to and from university. Well, one day, I wanted to take a taxi from the station. Without permission, a strange man took a picture of my entire body […] on his mobile phone. That time, I felt a surge of anger. I approached that man and said loudly and firmly: "Hey, I know what you're doing, you photographed me and this is sexual harassment, I'm calling the police."*
Int: *How does he react?*
Djamila: *He said: "I didn't do anything. You misunderstand my gesture". "I was busy on my phone so I did take no picture of you", he continues saying. He then showed me his mobile but I am sure he deleted it. After that, he said: "you really don't please me in anything, look at yourself in the mirror".*

4.2.1.13. Confronting the harasser

In line with our expectations, we found that Djamila too is always staying on guard; public sexual harassment by strange males is extremely influential in determining how she approached her life. In trying to delve further into examples of this, without her permission, Djamila was having her picture taken. But Djamila thinks more overtly about matters and abandons, if only for the time, the typical picture we had in some of the previous narratives. She felt a surge of anger and did not hesitate to approach that man and said directly, openly and publicly: "*Hey, I know what you're doing, you photographed me and this is sexual harassment, I'm calling the police"* (lines 6 and 7).

Definitely the focus must be on these lines, lines of agency. This discourse does not index an identity of deference and inferiority; it instead puts up a fight against this enforced identity. Djamila is not that easy target; she immediately views the gesture from that man in the station as a potential threat. She did not allow acts deemed unethical to become a daily experience. As she has gained more knowledge of herself and her position in her society, she acts as a subject rather than an object. By and large, there might be a significant relationship between awareness of sexual harassment and the tendency to respond to it. While this explanation is possible, as a further check, the choice to remain silent and ignore the harasser is also a difficult one for

Djamila, perhaps because she felt that really this is the limit or she might believe the protection is guaranteed. We are not here to surmise that this is the way to do it; we attempt to shed light on street harassment as it is perceived and understood by Djamila.

Later in the same narrative, the harasser did not admit to have made a mistake. Ironically and tragically, that man who extremely sounds authoritarian in his relationship with women attempted to control everything he did. As we have read and reread his words: *"you really don't please me in anything, look at yourself in the mirror",* Djamila, with her liberated behaviour and attitude, does not give him pleasure (the object pronoun *'me'*). That man shows no fear of confrontation; he rather feels he is in a position to use a violent discourse to punish Djamila who fails to meet his unspoken sexual and emotional needs. He tells her what is best for her, assuming that Djamila cannot have her own opinion and, in addition to that, he turns a question of his personal preference into a question of her physical inadequacy. It also leaves it open to interpretation whether he would admire her if she kept silent and did not call too much attention to herself; and therefore this discourse contributes to the construction of Djamila as a subject who is always associated with sex and not with other relationships.

4.2.2. Questionnaire Analysis

Because we were hesitant to draw any conclusions about the findings due to the small number of the interviews we conducted with the teenage girls; a questionnaire is opted as the most extensively used method to test several research hypothesises. After identifying the

prevalent themes in the interviews, we reread the narratives separately for each theme to identify the presence or absence of the theme within the questionnaire we prepared. It is therefore developed on the basis of the concerned research questions and it includes both planned (structured) closed-ended and open- ended deeper questions. The informants have the freedom of offering a range of answers; closed-ended questions as well require them to choose one or more choices as given by the questionnaire designer. In sum, the initial questionnaire was developed in Arabic and then translated to English, each of the respondents' questionnaires took approximately 8 minutes to complete. It consists of five sections; their main aim is to illustrate how public sexual harassment is discursively produced and enacted in everyday practices. Besides, it investigates how talk on it is used as a discursive resource to produce identities. The first section comprises descriptive data related to the characteristics of the respondents while the other four sections are dedicated to these topics, namely: perceptions, types, causes and impacts of public sexual harassment.

4.2.2.1. The respondents' characteristics

This section contains only one element 'gender' which is required to characterize the participants and give explanations to their answers. The distribution of the concerned sample is illustrated in the table (4.1) as follows:

Table (4.1): The distribution of the sample (N= Number / Percentage = %)

a. Female version: items were presented from a first-person perspective (I).
b. Male version: items were presented from a third-person perspective (she).

Gender	N (Table)	% (Diagram)
Female	120	60
Male	80	40
Total	200	100

Diagram (4.1) : The distribution of the sample (%)



The sample is not very evenly split between female and male teenagers. The data presented in the table (1.1) indicates that the majority of the respondents are female teenagers (60%), while male teenagers constitute only (40%). One thing is certain: it was difficult to find male teenagers to fill in the detailed questionnaires, besides; immediately after giving them the questionnaires, they appeared to show a very limited curiosity to know about the issue. More speculatively, this is mainly due to the hypothesis which states that public sexual harassment primarily targets girls, not boys in North West of Algeria. This statistical overview makes it clear then that gender is an imperative variable for understanding sexual harassment.

4.2.2.2. Perceptions of Public Sexual harassment

From personal experiences, we all know a tremendous amount about public sexual harassment, though often what we know is implicit, something we cannot fully articulate. Since this needs further exploration, two main questions therefore structured the core of this section. At this point, it only needs to be noted that both questions seem inseparable; one prompts the other. Notably, before going on to make some general remarks about the key concept itself and how the respondents might make best use of it, for the point of departure in particular, we find it more persuasive to mention a range of opinions on how the informants perceive public sexual harassment. In the context of this perspective, it was extremely important to present vivid assumptions which define what they take as a given and they cannot therefore be tested or proven wrong. In actual fact, these assumptions give rise to the second question: is public sexual harassment as a social issue a matter of concern? To improve overall response rates, this worth considering question had also possible answer choices.

4.2.2.2.1. ‘What do you understand by 'public sexual harassment?’

Table (4.2): Perceptions of public sexual harassment (N)

Gender	A natural phenomenon that girls have been accustomed to because of visiting men's places	Any simple acts used to get women's attention in public space	Any unwanted words or behaviours that make a woman uncomfortable	Exposure to any form of violence by men
Female 118	20	45	50	3
Male 77	52	20	5	0
Total 195	72	65	55	3

Diagram (4.2): Perceptions of public sexual harassment (%)



Looking at the data displayed in the diagram (2.1), it can be easily observed that a significant difference does exist between the respondents in their perception of public sexual harassment. Its meaning is not the same for the concerned population, even among the same group; the answers are at variance as to what they perceive as being public sexual harassment. Compared to the 2.5 % of the male informants, 25 in 59 % of females say that it is '*any unwanted words or behaviours that make them uncomfortable'*. The majority agreed that public sexual harassment is not behaviours that they like or want. Further, the results show that male respondents with 26 %, more than their female counterpart with 10 %, perceive sexual harassment as *'a natural phenomenon that girls have been accustomed to because of visiting men's places'*. This has attracted much attention; some females themselves depict the stereotypical picture: female victim/ male harasser. To put it another way, they expressed how

they should have less freedom than males to move around outside the house and participate within public domain. To a certain extent, sexual harassment becomes normalised, more tolerable and society is inclined to justify it.

The most astonishing finding is that, with a response rate of 10%, males define sexual harassment as *'any simple acts used to get women's attention in public space'* while the item which states that it can be *'an exposure to any form of violence by men' s*howed 1.5 % of female respondents agreeing as against none of the males. On a moment's reflection, this is terribly surprising. Males do consider various behavious to be sexual harassment; on the other hand, they strongly disagree to find the same behavious offensive and violent but pleasurable. Still this underestimates the reality of the problem; it seems that violence is usually confined to the use of physical force. In answering the open-ended question, the informants are most likely to describe harassment as more sexually violent attack, even rape, a foreign concept but not specified. Fewer of them say that they *'do not know'* how to define it. This could also mean that they may have not gained awareness about the subject, have no adequate knowledge of sexual harassment as well as no widely agreed upon definition, or even a formal term. So, even though there is no universal standpoint for males or females (controversies), we are not here to see the gender gap, not to do precisely that, but to rethink public sexual harassment, in short to discuss the questions in which their opposing opinions clash.

4.2.2.2.2. Do you think public sexual harassment is a matter of concern?

Table (4.3): The seriousness of public sexual harassment (N)

Gender	A trivial matter/ not a serious problem	it is disturbing
Female 120	16	104
Male 80	60	20
Total 200	76	124

Diagram (4.3): The seriousness of public sexual harassment (%)



Following the previous answers of the first question discussed above and others that remain implicit, predictably, 52% of the females, as opposed to 10% of the males, believe that sexual harassment makes them feel worried; it is disturbing. Readers could quickly realize that this has a direct link to what stated before. As an illustration, although in this diagram (2.2) men are also more likely than women, representing (10%) and (8%) of the entire sample respectively, to think that sexual harassment is humiliating and embarrassing in today's society, 30% of them report that it is trivial matter. Let us take the claims (A) at face value 'public sexual harassment is a natural phenomenon', let us also accept that it is trivial (B). From those truths, is (B) the result of (A)? Let us grant that this statement is correct *"because it has become normalized and expected as if it is just the ways things are and have to be, it is trivialized"*, what then effectively shape it? This question is very open and can be perceived as hard to answer. We cannot enforce a brief pause here but there must be any number of reasons for it in the following sections.

4.2.2.3. Types of public sexual harassment

This section, in which the questions are ordered in a manner that we think they may be of most direct use to readers, is intended to make a contribution on three levels. First, it aims at presenting the most common examples of public sexual harassment committed by males against female teenagers. Second, it indicates its prevalence. Finally, the third question was asked to explore where these acts take place. Together, these reflect a broader concern to refresh and reinvigorate the field of public sexual harassment research in Algeria, with a view to developing, extending and taking it in new directions.

4.2.2.3.1. Which of these behaviours can be labeled as Public Sexual Harassment?

Table (4.4): Types of public sexual harassment (N)

Gender	Staring/ Leering	Winking	Following up/Chasing	Whistling/Kissing sound/demanding phone number/ Facebook account	Sexual interactions about appearance/body	Touching
Female	20	40	40	80	80	80
Male	0	3	10	50	70	84

Diagram (4.4): Types of public sexual harassment (%)



This diagram represents perhaps the most common and frequent behaviours that are deemed to be public sexual harassment. A look at the entire results of responses to each item shows that females categories more behaviours than males, ranging from staring to touching. According to them, public sexual harassment includes: staring (4.3%) winking (20%), following up (20%), whistling /kissing sound/ demanding phone number/ facebook account (40%), sexual interactions about appearance/ body (40%) and touching (40%). But, a cursory look at the diagram makes it clear that males do not strongly agree to consider the whole acts constituting public sexual harassment, here are the percentages respectively: (0%, 1.5%, 5%, 25%, 35%, and 42%), the list is likely to be less extensive than females'. They indeed have

narrower definitions of public sexual harassment and therefore the various ways in which they do so may mask considerable differences in its seriousness. It can be stated that females and males have a difference of opinion about such acts; central to this is the claim that there is a range of behaviours, either verbal or nonverbal, which are not necessarily always of sexual nature, yet females still perceive them to be sexual harassment because they are unwanted and unwelcome. The longer we think about this, the more we appreciate how important are, above all things, the respondents' perceptions of the issue being studied.

4.2.2.3.2. Are incidents of ' Public Sexual Harassment' prevalent in your city?

Table (4.5.): Incidents of public sexual harassment (N)

Gender	The incidents are very rampant	there are a few incidents	the incidents are very rare	the city is safe
Female 120	36	70	12	2
Male 80	3	7	50	20
Total 200	39	77	62	22

Diagram (4.5): Incidents of sexual harassment (%)



From such a figure which tends to focus on public harassment where the perpetrator is male and the victim is female, it may only take a few seconds to notice that estimates of its prevalence and incidence are consistent with the previous results; they vary widely between

males and females. 36 to 70 females, who define public harassment more broadly and inclusive than men, said it is rampant and still a notable problem. Remarkably, only 3 males report that it is getting worse quickly. Interestingly enough, besides to very few females, between 20-50 males assert that their cities are quite safe and the incidents are very rare. These statistics in fact merit further investigation but further thought makes it easy to understand that the previous predicted hypothesis is confirmed: the reality of sexual harassment is underestimated by males in particular.

4.2.2.3.3. Where in your city are acts of public sexual harassment more prevalent?

Table (4.6): Places where public sexual harassment takes place (N)

Gender	In Public Transport	On a road or street	In crowded markets	In every public space	Not prevalent in my city
Female 118	15	45	6	50	2
Male 80	10	10	2	28	30
Total 198	43	60	8	55	32

Diagram (4.6): Places where public sexual harassment takes place (%)



This, then, is finally the point which said something else about some defining characteristics of public harassment. It is not hard to see that rates varied between 3% and 25% for females and rates varied between 5% and 15% for males show that the previous verbal and nonverbal behaviours occur in places to which public generally has access. 30% out of 80 males

however reported that these acts are not prevalent in their cities. If we are able to make predictions about this again, we can say that males insist that most of these acts are socially acceptable and are not aligned especially with sexual violence.

4.2.2.4. Causes of sexual harassment

If we can accept the facts already discussed as generally true, for most people, most of the time, then we can draw from them several questions of interest to readers in this field. As researchers, the question we have grown most used to hearing is not 'What?' or 'Where?' but 'Why?' we need to ponder: when a girl goes out to a public space, is she secure or not? If not why is so? And obviously too, we feel the emphasis on this point: at a broader level, why do such incidents of public sexual harassment occur in society? These questions would enable us to explore our issue from different perspectives taking into account that there is no single reason but rather a series of interrelated factors.

4.2.2.4.1. Are girls secure or not in public spaces?

Table (4.7): When a girl goes out to a public space, I think:

Gender	Never secure regardless of her clothes and time	secure irrespective of her clothes and time	secure as long as her clothes and time are appropriate
Female 120	70	10	40
Male 80	5	10	60
Total 200	55	35	110

Diagram (4.7): When a girl goes out to a public space, I think: (%)



The first item which states that 'when girls go out they are never secure regardless of their clothes and time' showed, by comparison, 70 of female respondents agreeing as against 5 of males representing (35%) and (2.5%) respectively. Females do only suppose that women are open persons in public places. The second item shows 10 females and 10 male respondents agreeing with the statement that there is nothing to worry about; 'girls are secure irrespective of their ways of dressing and choices of time when they go out'. As it is evident, for the third item which says 'girls can be secure as long as their clothes and time are appropriate', reports are quite similar, they are as follows: 20% of females and 30% males. They have the same opinion that if a girl is decent, does not wear eye-catching clothes, walk and move appropriately, she will not be open to public harassment.

4.2.2.4.2. Why do some men tease women?

Table (4.8): In your opinion, some men tease/harass women, because:

Gender	It is fun	It is 'masculinity'	They will not be opposed or punished	The cultural dominance of men over women	Women do enjoy it.
Female 120	10	10	55	20	25
Male 80	10	10	8	2	50
Total 200	20	20	63	22	75

Diagram (4.8): 'In your opinion, some men tease/harass women, because': (%)



Here again the gap between informants is still widening. The highest percentage of females says some men tease women because they know they will not be opposed or punished (27.5% as compared to 4% for the males). In a similar way, females do not ignore the ways in which public harassment can be shaped by culture (10%) as against (1%) males who perceive it in the same perspective. Interestingly, another 12.5 % of the females in our sample believe that women do enjoy it, but males are more likely to believe so (25%). Disturbingly, a significant minority of the respondents- both males and females- explains and justifies public harassment by having fun and a means by which males perform their masculinity.

4.2.2.4.3. Why do incidents of public harassment occur in society?

Table (4.9): At a broader level, why do incidents of public sexual Harassment occur in society?

Gender	Police are ineffective	No severe punishment	Public Apathy -	Male mentality	Girls dress improperly	Girls bring trouble for themselves	natural phenome_ non
Female 120	10	20	20	40	10	10	10
Male 80	2	2	4	2	20	30	20

Diagram (4.9): 'At a broader level, why do incidents of public sexual Harassment occur in society? (%):



The respondents give various reasons for public harassment. They believe it is because police are ineffective, there is no severe punishment, and reasons including general apathy, the idea that girls encouraged harassment as well as the mentality of males which views public harassment as a natural phenomenon. Other reasons include subjects related to religion and culture. Overall, of the male respondents, only 1 % reported that male mentality is wrong while 15% said that girls bring trouble for themselves. This reversed for females, with 20% reporting males' particular ways of thinking about females are not desirable while 5% said that girls are responsible for public harassment. The male respondents blame females by detailing faults in their behaviours. At other times, when stating that there is a widespread apathy which was seen to extend from police to the general public, females are less likely to blame themselves, they do put the blame on men's mentality. We can look at this from any number points of view, but this could be part of the way that gender stereotypes change.

4.2.2.5. Impacts of sexual harassment

We think the start is made so far. To continue the foregoing brief description; this is the last question that we need to examine: how can an incident of public sexual harassment make girls feel? What is particularly significant about this is to describe the effect public harassment has on the victims and, more importantly, their reactions. That is to say, its explicit purpose is to bring with it a focus on females' understanding of their social situation, identity, and what impact public harassment has had in their lives, besides to the males' views about them.

4.2.2.5.1. How can an incident of public harassment make girls feel?

Table (4.10): Impacts of public sexual harassment:

Gender	Enjoy it	it is a very common issue	learned to live with	not knowing what to do	They want to do something to face the issue.	They often confront such an incident.
Female 120	12	20	20	28	25	15
Male 80	34	24	12	2	2	6
Total 200	46	44	30	30	27	23

Diagram (4.10): Impacts of public sexual harassment %:



Statistics indicate that 14% females find themselves not knowing what to do to face public sexual harassment. However, few actually (12.5%) report their will to do anything, and fewer still (7.5%) claim that they often confront such incidents. What concerns us more here is their knowledge that sexual harassment against them is a violation of their rights, and their knowledge of its negative effect on their lives. But, these results are not in accordance to males'. Males stress that public harassment is a common issue (17%) and females do enjoy it (12%) and have learned to live it (6%). This is often explained as resulting from men's natural sex drive or that women provoke sexual harassment through their appearance or dress.

4.3. Concluding Discussion: Discourses of Public sexual Harassment

We began this chapter by staging a very short scenario in which we tried to explain to the reader what this study is about. It was argued that it is about many things and more importantly about stories of public sexual harassment, or to cite 'Kenneth Gergen': *"a story about stories – and most particularly, stories of the self"* (2001:247).

The overall questions that have mainly guided us here are *how* questions: *how* is public sexual harassment talked about; *how* are narratives about it organized; *how* is blaming manifested in these narratives and *how* is talk about it can be used as a means for identity construction? Talking about public sexual harassment is of great importance, it makes it possible to understand the norms, concepts, beliefs and ideologies that define what is perceived as reality on this subject. Often critical discourse analysis targets the way in which reality is constructed. Indeed, its process is largely based around critically interrogating one's own taken-for-granted expectations, Wetherell and Potter (1992) asserted. This goes hand in hand with the constructionist perspective that views the use of discourse as socially and discursively constitutive of people's relations and identities in daily life. Such a perspective links with Butler's (1990) concept of 'performativity' in which she argues that gender identities are unstable and always discursively performed (see chapter one p.14). In line with this, Ochs (1992: 341) suggested that *'linguistic features may index social meanings (stances, social acts, social activities), which in turn help to constitute gender meanings'.*

4.3.1. Non-labelling; Non Resistance of Sexual Harassment

In addition to the corpus of teenage girls' narratives of personal experiences, this doctoral research distributes questionnaires for analysis. Based on the analysis, essential themes have been identified to discuss; not forgetting that further discussion of public sexual harassment starts first from observation of reality. A prevalent theme in this study is how public sexual harassment perceived. Teenage girls from all the groups are discursively affected by public harassment; they talk, think about and use it differently from males. This can be explained by the fact that their opinions and positions are reflective of their own experiences. The majority concur that it is quite common and frequent in public spaces, they are aware of its cases in real life and they did consider themselves most affected, threatened and concerned by it. This is expressed by their frustration with the unwelcome conducts by males. Some of them however, not especially those who live in rural environments, cannot offer vivid definitions and do not seem informed about all the pervasive forms of harassment, mostly described as physical

in nature, including touching, rubbing and groping. Every day acts are still largely dismissed as simple acts of boys joking or as wanted by girls based on the way they dress, walk…etc in public sites. The concerned sample used a range of rhetorical devices to minimise the seriousness of unwanted comments, stares and gestures, in a strict sense, they define them as 'not violent' at all and they use the phrase 'but nothing actually happened' or 'nothing really happened'. It is noticeable the significant difference in male and female respondents' views about the existence of this phenomenon in North West of Algeria. The crux of their arguments is that it is a trivial and natural fact of life that is not closely connected with sexual violence and that women must simply tolerate. That is to say, sexual harassment has often been constructed as the product of men's natural drive for sex and as a 'natural' problem.

Additionally, with data generated by participant observation and interviews, it is worth noting that the participants are at times 'reluctant' to use the term 'sexual harassment' to describe their experiences, it appears that they do not want to identify themselves as its recipients. The absence of the label sexual harassment in teenage girls' accounts must not be allowed to go unchallenged. Curiously; we must ask the questions: but why? And what is needed to allow recipients to label their experiences in ways that are meaningful to them? One might quickly realize that such questions have no simple answer and are much too broad to be answered in a direct way. There is a clear sense here that sexual harassment is not yet part of the larger discourse of Algerian people and there is no clear definition or conceptualization of what it is, many expressions of unwanted conduct may not be labelled as sexual harassment because they do not resonate with everyday understandings of the term 'sexual'. Participants believe that the concept 'sexual harassment' is a harsh term that is sexual in orientation and should not be used lightly. It is overwhelmingly viewed as the physical violation of the body, and is conflated with rape. To put it simply, the issue of labelling their experiences as 'sexual harassment' is deeply related to connotations of honour and shame. So, their behaviours in some contexts would be interpreted as 'provocative' of men's actions which positions them as responsible for incidents of unwanted sexual attention (victim blaming).

This is quite interesting; males' and females' everyday understanding of public harassment is socially constructed. Discursively, naming something as public harassment implies interpreting a social action and categorizing it as either moral or immoral. In this interpretation, Connell (1987) suggests that the ones that have social power in the society are the ones that decide what behaviour belongs to the norm. On reflection, it is not so strange that

the justification of public harassment owes much to power relations, related stereotypes and ideologies. Cultures of honour norms for instance do more than simply differentiate violent from nonviolent, they make things seem invisible and therefore naturally true. Questions we pose about who are the perpetrators and victims of public harassment are also shaped through cultures which are not simply accepted but enforced by laws. In a related vein, the respondents take the attitude that a girl's sexual purity or fidelity determines not only her own honour but the honour of men in her family. More interestingly, even the failure to live up to ideals of feminine purity, modesty, and deference can damage male relatives' reputations. For this reason, man is forced to defend his honour by protecting her, controlling her, and jealously keeping her in a continuum of a patriarchal authority in the family. To put it bluntly, there is a misunderstanding of the difference between the victim and the harasser's conduct: while maintaining a space for the innocence of male harassers, there is no space of why else they are harassers. This indeed does not serve the purpose of showing public harassment as a violation of women's rights and a form of discrimination against them, there is doubt that harassment has profound impacts on women's consciousness, physical well-being, liberty, and fundamental rights.

We have reached a point of return to the beginning of this section: *how public harassment is perceived?* These questions are open to multiple interpretations: are the harassers males, are the targets females, are the harassers unacquainted with the targets, what kind of person do you imagine when you hear the term victim, what would 'a victim' look like, how is a 'victim' likely to behave, is the forum a public one, are the conducts physical, verbal or nonverbal, are they sexual, negative, unwanted, degrading, humiliating and frequently threatening, are they based on certain social variables, do we need an extension of vocabulary for describing unwanted conducts….and so on? In short, if we pause and think a moment, it is imperative to stress a necessary first step: obtaining an appropriate working definition of sexual harassment is the key to victim resistance against normalising constructions of unwanted behaviours as 'just sex' and as a 'trivial' part of everyday life. In a strict sense, it appears that non labeling experiences as sexual harassment distract attention away how this phenomenon is variously defined, understood and how it can be resisted within the current Algerian cultural context.

4.3.2. Victim's Identities: The Problem of Passivity

Through narratives of teenage girls, whose key intention is to illustrate the prevalence of public harassment committed by men against women, it is hard to escape the conclusion that women are always reminded of their vulnerability to sexual harassment. It causes them to choose to quit their jobs or drop a class, to stay home at night, avoid going out in public alone, stay on guard, opt to exercise indoors, take longer routes to their destination, and it is not a coincidence that it restricts their clothing choices. Besides, there is a general apathy toward women's concerns about public harassment; it extends from police to the general public. In picturing the scene this way, public harassment is an invasion of women's privacy without consent; it keeps them from having equal access to public spaces and resources.

Yet the story does not end here. It is argued that leading many women to restrict their independence and alter their attitude, behaviours and talk for the sake of avoiding being the victim of male harassment, ironically, is only to coerce them into accepting ideologies that reinforce patriarchy. More precisely, many gestures and movements that are required from women have to be internalized as being "the self". The body is absolutely controlled not by external means but through the internal control of the person himself. That is the reason why human subjectivity is conceived in terms of passive docile bodies and claims that the effect of power on these bodies results in reducing social agency and autonomy as well. Women; unlike men; must view their bodies as objects that need self- surveillance within panoptic patriarchal societies in particular. They follow these norms because of the way they looked at by others besides to the threat of being sanctioned by male patriarchy. We may suggest that they do not want to bear this burden; they refuse to be those victims who receive blame and the threat of annihilation. Indeed they don't want to chock because they realize that being a woman means being continually noticed and assessed. As a result, they naturalize and justify these disciplinary practices against themselves. Their self-control then is achieved through the lens of man's perception of the ideal female body. Indeed male gaze and judgment make them confine to some stereotyped gender roles and just feel as if they are behaving naturally. In other words; because of the unequal power relationship between the watcher 'male' and the watched 'female', women lose their sense of autonomy when trying to appear desirable to men. Thus, this representation helps to maintain a series of unequal power relations between those who usually have an unnoticed normal body and those who constantly have more docile objectified body.

If women are held to be somehow responsible for their own traumatic experience, this may be suggestive that public harassment is explained or justified by the argument which

perpetuates the myth of women's provocative style of dressing, walking... There is no kernel of truth in this, victim blaming is absolutely a part of an unfair culture of honour which reflects a system designed to control and trap women into a narrow range of behaviours. Such victim-blaming discourses may translate into teenage girl's understandings of their experiences of sexual harassment. As mentioned above, some of the recipients' descriptions of the reasons why they had not labelled their experiences as 'sexual harassment' draw on victim blaming discourses. Now for this, the respondents were also unwilling to identify themselves as victims because of the negative depictions of the label 'victim' which include being weak, vulnerable, frightened, emotionally needy and out of control. Similarly, other researchers have justifiably argued that some females refuse to identify themselves as the victim in sexual harassment scenarios because they wish to avoid particular connotations of powerlessness, passivity, vulnerability and subordination associated with victim status. Exactly like this shared view, Kitzinger and Thomas (1995) made it clear that those recipients who reject victim status by refusing to use the label 'sexual harassment' to describe their experiences, may inevitably lead them to cope with sexual harassment by making a joke of it, playing along or by ignoring it and thus normalising its acts. It may lead also to the adoption of particular coping strategies which fail to challenge sexually harassing behaviour. To fully elaborate this claim, Burt and Estep acknowledge that whilst the victim role can have negative connotations, they conclude with the view that victim status allows women recipients access to a range of benefits that are more difficult to obtain without it. These benefits, to quote them, may include *"the right to claim assistance, sympathy, temporary relief from other role responsibilities, legal recourse and other similar advantages"*. Consequently, the adoption of victim status allows women recipients to be recognised as unfairly and unjustly treated people.

This explanation still begs the question of whether the true nature is reflected. If there would be no need to give a recap on the presentation of victimhood as a tool for resisting sexual harassment, too much, of course, can be said about the accordance of victim status to women. Owing to its connotations with weakness, powerlessness and dependency, the label 'victim' is seen as a problem. As Elshtain (1986) points out, conceptualisations in which women recipients are treated as victims in need of protection from sexual harassment perpetuate the idea that women are helpless and incapable of fighting sexual harassment on their own. So far as we can tell, since women have been traditionally represented as weak and passive in relation to men, the adoption of victim status is seen to reinforce such depictions of femininity and this only serves to strengthen the image of women as weak and powerless. According to Gavey (2005),

the construction of women recipients of gendered violence as helpless victims may worsen the situation. It makes behaviours like rape, sexual coercion and sexual harassment possible. In other words, discourses of female victimization and passivity seem to perpetuate conditions for the (re)production of sexual harassment.

4.3.3. Resistance within Sexual Harassment Discourses

We can understand that the conceptualization of power moves beyond the idea of it being merely repressive to it also being productive, causing new behaviours, identities and knowledge to emerge, but usually through discourse. Discourse itself acts as a kind of surveillance, Foucault argues. He gives reasons that with power comes the possibility of resistance, of course according to the ways various discourses are used because *'[d]iscourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it'* (Foucault 1979: 101).

Having said so, what remained to be explained is about discourses of resistance: are those girls breaking gendered stereotypes and cultural norms? While some informants' language use indexes an identity of deference and inferiority, others put up a fight against this enforced identity, they provide examples of those who are trying to claim a different identity for themselves. Though they may be considered as violent hysterical and dishonourable females; they decide to be no longer victims and defend themselves. They pointed out that the girl is not the only symbol of the family's honour, boys commit many dishonourable acts but are not blamed. Multiple ways they resist, such as: expressing particular outrage, responding to verbal harassment, using public shame, blaming and confronting the harasser and so on (this is fully described in the previous section). In fact; it must be acknowledged from the very first that telling their narratives is an important way of resisting. It makes sense of themselves and their world. This argument may become easier to understand if we check out (#MeToo). #MeToo is a phrase that was created on the social work to provide women and men a platform to tell their harrowing stories of sexual harassment and assault**.** Millions of women come forward with their experiences, spreading the phrase as part of an awareness campaign to show ubiquity of the problem, tweeting: "If all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote 'Me too' as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem". So, they are aware that their gender is expected to be physically and emotionally

weak, fragile, obedient, less powerful and easily subjected to these kinds of violence. This reflects, on the one hand, what socialization process involves about the construction of femininity, and on the other hand, it proves that public spaces are certainly reinforcing gender roles. Since they resist the dominant discourses of honour norms and do not consider the girl's behaviour as being wrong, their conceptualizations of what counts as public sexual harassment are diverse and wide-ranging and do not always correspond to 'common-sense' definitions or understandings. As they participate in resistant discourses, they become part of a process of changing perceptions of experience, forming new perceptions and reconstructing their own and others' identities (Horsman 1990 and Weedon 1987).

So what does all this mean for the study of identity construction? Lin (2008) argues that there are at least two driving psychological motivations for identity: being-for-the-self and being-for-the-other. There is no doubt that the identity constructions identified in most of these oral narratives belong to the second category. Most teenage girls are discursively affected by the so-called honourable culture and gender norms. For them, public harassment is exclusive to males and no need to report these incidents to the police. Therein, the western concept 'possessive individualism' by which individuals own their identities fails to recognize that for many identities; there is also a position that is forced and has to be occupied, Ladegaard keeps saying. As having fixed occupied identities of sacrificial daughters and pretty sisters who are doing honourable and correct things, teenage girls define themselves in relation to their families and show no sign of resistance because the patriarchal culture of honour has strongly legitimizes males' sexual harassment against them. In conclusion, the analysis demonstrates that public sexual harassment is discursively gendered in its practice, depictions and blaming.

5. Suggested Recommendations for further research

This study shows that public sexual harassment in Algeria is a serious problem that requires an immediate attention and a further research in the future. Future work might examine for example:

a. How do people not adequately addressed in this survey such as black women, women with disabilities, trans people, refugees, students in a school and classroom environment…respond to sexual harassment? What are their unique experiences of sexual harassment?

b. How can these people become more sensitised and willing to tell narratives?

c. How can a person best support them? What response is helpful, truly successful and what response is not?
d. Why do accounts of stories such as these continue to perpetuate stereotypes and generalisations?
e. How do the social new media influence the coverage of their stories?

f. What space management /better planning public space architecture for a more secure life? What space strategies for the inclusion of women in public spaces?

g. Which laws to introduce for the prevention of public sexual harassment?

6. Difficulties with this area of study

Like most other studies, this one seems to have some limitations. The most important of which is that the respondents still do not have the culture of reporting the incidents of their experience of sexual harassment. They do not have the confidence that the material supplied by them to researchers will not be misused and as such they are often reluctant in supplying the needed information to researchers.

a. There is also the problem that our libraries are not able to get copies of old and new reports, journals, books and other government publications.

b. There may, at times, take place the problem of conceptualisation and also problems relating to the process of data collection and related issues.

General Conclusion

It is hard to remember just how difficult it was when writing an introduction to this dissertation, as it depends on whom we were writing for, how we wanted to catch the reader's eye, what research questions to be asked, which methodology to be used, and where we were in the research process. Rereading it, it is harder still to remember how tricky was to explain what this study is about. It is about a great many things, all related to a world in which women can safely walk into public spaces without fears of being sexually harassed. Implicit in these statements is that before such a world can ever be achieved, the problem of public sexual harassment must be tackled.

Significant work has already been done on sexual harassment by researchers, civil society organisations, media organisations and some public bodies, but we are conscious that much of the focus of this must be on the experiences of victims and survivors. We wanted to supplement this body of research by bringing a non tokenistic comprehensive approach where we felt there were gaps of understanding the issue in Algeria, particularly on perceptions and attitudes that underpin public sexual harassment. In line with this, we employed what we called 'discourses of sexual harassment', meaning that which makes it possible to investigate how talk on harassment is used as a discursive resource to produce identities.

This work employed mixed methods : participant observation, semi structured interview and questionnaire. Our participation in teenage girls' daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens; listening to what is said, asking questions, collecting whatever data are available, in fact shed light on the issues that are the focus of this project. Consistent with this, we realized that teenage girls' self stories needed to be documented and shared with a wider audience. For this purpose, we interviewed a sample of twenty teenage girls. The questions we asked were related to what they felt they could talk about concerning problems they had faced in public spaces. Since some research questions need further exploration, it was suggested to distribute a questionnaire. A total of 200 participants; who are asked to complete the questionnaires; varied in terms of gender, age, occupation, social background and other forms

of direct experience with the research issue. Some of them had a specialised interest in sexual violence more generally.

We are aware that this is a small project. Nevertheless, the findings help to build a picture and indicate where more research and policy attention could start because the issue has been comprehensively tackled; the findings also facilitate an understanding why Algerian public spaces are not safe and enjoyable for all women and girls through giving voice to the voiceless participants.

Most teenage girls consider sexual harassment as the most common form of violence against them. They often first experience unwanted behaviours of sexual harassment below the age of 18. We were particularly disturbed to hear that from them. We also heard about a wide range of behaviours including unwanted sexual comments in streets, sidewalks, alleys, public buildings, such as hotels and restaurants, and common carriers such as buses and taxis..

Sexual harassment in public spaces has significant and widespread impacts, both on respondents as well as on the Algerian society. It reduces women and girls' freedom to enjoy public life, and can negatively affect feelings of safety, bodily autonomy and mental health. Being sexually harassed can be a degrading, humiliating, and harmful experience in itself. It helps to keep girls unequal by perpetuating an unfair culture.

One of the effects of sexual harassment are that girls feel that they do not control their bodies in public spaces and that they are seen as sexual objects, whether or not the experience is explicit. More precisely, many gestures and movements that are required from them have to be internalized as being "the self" because they are under surveillance everywhere.

The story does not end here ! From the time we first began doing some research on women's self-defense and women's resistance to public sexual harassment more generally; we assumed that many participants would be very supportive of this project, however it was not the case. The point was that resistance to women's self defense is so strong. In brief, it is believed that women's resistance is impossible, too dangerous and it risks victim blaming.

The question remains then: ‘if we don’t talk about it, and we can’t ask about it, how are we ever going to understand its scope?’ To prevent sexual harassment, there needs to be an understanding of why it happens; girls and young women themselves say they are frustrated when people focus more on the victim’s conduct than on the behaviour of harassers and want more work to be done to prevent sexual harassment. Understanding the factors that contribute to sexual harassment is an important prerequisite for developing effective policy solutions to the problem.

In 2014, the Algerian authorities took long overdue steps to address sexual and gender-based violence. In June, they introduced draft laws which, if adopted, would make sexual harassment in public spaces criminal offences (Amnesty International; 2014). Although these are positive steps, public sexual harassment against teenage girls is still widespread in the country. The Algerian authorities approach to the issue has been tokenistic, that is they are doing this only to show that they are following the rules or doing what expected and seen to be fair. No comprehensive approach has been adopted, public spaces were not examined and factors such as emotional, psychosocial and spiritual aspects of the victims were not studied.

The laws alone can not prevent public sexual harassment, they cannot address the cultural acceptability of sexual harassment because most of which is underreported. Research tells us that the prevalence and impact of public sexual harassment in Algeria is not recognised, data is not routinely collected on its incidence.

This is not a new problem but it is a problem which we cannot continue to ignore ; it has to be addressed otherwise it becomes more difficult as time goes on. There is an urgent need then for the Algerin authorities to have a robust understanding of why public sexual harassment happens, who perpetrates it, and how men and women differ in their perceptions and experiences of the problem. They must understand the cultural attitudes and social norms that lead to or enable sexual harassment, and how to go about challenging and changing them. Without understanding these factors, it is not possible to design and implement effective policy solutions. However, it was very clear from our this work that the prevention is not the responsibility of the government alone, its prevention might start from the bystanders to public spaces architects. Some good work for architects forexample could be what space management for a more secure life ? What space strategies for the inclusion of women in public spaces?

In fact, while this particular task is based on interrogating one's own taken-for-granted assumptions and a large corpus of narratives by Algerian teenage girls, we feel that such study is quite justifiable in its own terms. By looking at the way discourse operating as the medium through which we come to understand or know the world– including public harassment, we gained insight into the way we feel, about ourselves, about women whoever they are, through close analysis of what we say and how we say until in the end we could ask and even answer the question: Why did we say it?

Reading *'Discourse of gender-based Violence'* as a thesis about narratives of sexually harassed teenage girls in North West of Algeria does not erase its usefulness for readers with no special expertise in either gender or language studies. Ideas, debates and theories are presented in this thesis with such diversity in mind. We have tried to provide clear definitions and explorations of each concept in a way that is easy to understand. In short, everything has been accounted for in order to build up our theoretical framework for analysis. In hope that we did this satisfactorily; we hope that those who are already familiar with such studies get a taste for more interesting questions - questions about further research.

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Appendices

Appendix (A): Consent Form

Consent Form

I am a PhD student attending Abdelhamid Ben Badis university of Mostaganem. I am undertaking a research project that is investigating public sexual harassment. To explore this topic I am conducting interviews. During the interview you will be asked about your thoughts and opinions about this issue. The interview will be tape-recorded. The tape recordings will be written down word for word and extracts from the interviews will be used in my research project. I will ensure that your identity will not be revealed in this work. Given that this might be a sensitive issue, there is no pressure whatsoever for you to agree to participate in this research. Do not participate unless you feel completely comfortable in doing so. If you agree to participate and at a later stage you do not want to be involved in the research, you have every right to withdraw from the study. If you have participated in the research and no longer wish for your contribution to be included in the final project, you can withdraw your contribution. Thank you in advance.

Appendix (B): Interview Questions

The participants would introduce themselves and tell us about their family background, before they were invited to share their experience(s) of public sexual harassment. The open ended questions we asked were related to what they felt they could talk about concerning problems they had faced in public spaces:

1. What does the phrase sexual harassment mean to you?
2. Are there are forms of sexual harassment that are more serious than others?
3. What leads someone to give unwanted sexual attention to someone else?
4. How can an incident of public sexual harassment make them feel?
5. What is the best way of dealing with it?

Appendix (C) : Arabic originals

مقتطـــــف 1 :أسمـــاء ,17سنـــــة ,منطقـــة ريفيـــة ,تيـــــارت

***أسماء* :**أا... علابالك أنا البنت الصغيرة في دارنا التي تتكون من ماما و ثلاث إخوة. كنت في المدرسة الابتدائية, ثمانية أو تسع سنين, رحت مرة نشري وحد الصوالح للدار من الحانوت تحت appartement لنسكنوا فيها. كي وليت راجعة, سمعت "تيسبيس" لأول مرة. جماعة فيها quatre garçons جاو خلفي و بداو يعلقو على شعري. أنا عجبتني. ااا [...]الصح [...] انا ما*كنتش عارفة شراهم يقصدوا فهذاك الوقت*.

***الباحث* :** كملت هنا القصة؟

***أسماء* :** لا, واحد من les garçons قرب لي و...و...مم [...] *مسك صدري*[...] *واه هو*[...] *هو توشاني*.علا بالي ما كنتش قاع صغيرة حتى ما نعرفش بلي لازم حتى واحد ما يلمسني [...] في هذا الأماكن. كنت صغيرة [...]يقلق هذاك الأمر. ذروك فاتت منقدر نخبر حتى واحد. تمنيت كون ماما وصاتني بكري شويا.

مقتطـــــف 2 :عائشـــــة, 21 سنـــة, منطقـــة حضريـــة, وهـــران

***عائشة* :**.كي كان عندي خمسة عشر كنت نبغي نسمع هذوك الكلمات تاع إعجاب لي يقولوهم لي الرجال في الطريق مثل "هاي. الشابة.سسسسست...". كنت نحس روحي أنا هي أجمل وحدة.

***الباحث* :** هذا الإحساس طول؟

***عائشة* :** [...] غير كيما صراتلي, كنت رايحة لدار خالتي في المقيل، وراجل على دراجة نارية فات عليا داربيا وتبعني، قال لي شحال شابة. ابتسمت وشكرته. بصح من بعد دار دورة وحدة أخرى وقال لي هيا ركبي معايا نديكوحد ا لبلاصة هايلة. قلت له "لا"، لكنه كان ي insister، في كل مرة قلت له لا بدا يولي agressive. جن جنونه وضرب الكرسي وراه وذنيا تطرطقوا من الضربة. قريب ما بكيت وحسيت روحي وحدي خفت بزاف . راني عاقلة مليح هذاك الإحساس. [...] إحساس مؤلم ويمرض.مازال لحد الآن كلكوشمار.

***الباحث* :** شدرت؟

***عائشة* :**يفففففف.[...] وحد الراجل شافني وقف بيني وبينه وسلكني منه , بصح مفهمنيش, خلاني نحس أنا الغالطة. [...] زعف علي وقالي :"الحمد لله ما اغتصبكوش, كيفاش جي وحدك لهاد بلايص و في هذا الوقت"

مقتطـــــف 3 :*أحـــلام*, 18سنـــة ,منطقـــة حضريـــة ,مستغانـــــــم

أحلام:.كيما أي بنت, تعرضت للتحرش في الطريق تاع فيلاجنا. تعلمت نسكت و خلاص. لبست حجاب, سروال, ...Jupe بصح تصرالك تصرالك.

الباحث: هذا الشيء يقلقك؟

أحلام: لا لا, حاجة ما تستاهلش. ما هيش problème. حاجة normal, رجال هاكا دايرين. **هما** متعودين يشوفو في لبنات هاكا. **وحنا** ثاني رانا نااتيروهم (attirer). كيفاش يديرو؟ البارح par exemple, راجل كبير شاف في و قال :"هاي, الشابة" بصح بطريقة كيما نقولوا [...]. أنا تبسمت وصاي. كلمة ما دات ماجابت, نيشان؟ بصح لو كان راجل صغير يدور بي فالطريق, نتقلق. ولا يلمسني ولا.....راكي عارفة, على حساب situation.

مقتطـــــف 4: سليمـــــة,16 سنـــة ,منطقــة حضريـــة ,شلـــف

سليمة :في عائلتي, البنت لازم تسقسي قبل ما تروح لأي مكان وعلى الوقت للازم ترجع فيه. ماما دايما تقولي :"ما ترفعيش صوتك كي تهدري برا, متهدريش مع الشاشرة حتى لو عاكسوك, تمشاي نيشان باش الناس ما تحطلكش البال", راكي عارفة باش مايقلقونيش, بصح قاع هكا,الرجالة مايحبسوش.

الباحث: شراكي تقصدي؟

سليمة : خليني نخبرك وحد القصة صراتلي وحد النهار. "كان عندي خمسة عشر عام, اااه...العام التالي في CEM. ومين نسكن في منطقة برا, دايما نركب وحدي في bus باش نروح نقرا. هذاك النهار كان bus معمر. كنت شادة في اليد في الوسط. فجأة, بديت نحس شعري يتحرك. في الأول ظنيت بسبب الريح بصح حدثت للمرة الثانية ,حسيت أصابع يلعبو بشعري. بعد لحظة, حسيت واحد يتوشي في من lors. كي درت لقيت وحد الراجل, يكون في الثلاثين, يجبد في ليه.

الباحث: هل واجهته؟

سليمة : نتذكر حقيقة ما عرفت من دير.ماقدرتش حتى نهدر, ما قلت والو وكلي ماصرا والو. أنا نظن لو كان مسكتش, الجيران الراكبين في bus يخبرو أبي و تصبح مشكلة كبيرة وحبسوني على القراية.

مقتطـــــف 5 : كنـــــــزة,13 سنـــــة ,منطقــة حضريـــــة ,تيـــــارت

كنزة : كنت رايحة l'école في نصف النهار, زوج شبان مانعرفهمش مشاو خلفي وجبدولي cartable تاعي. ومن بعد سقساوني على العادة الشهرية .تشوكيت كيفاش قالولي هذه الكلمة[...] Jamais سمعت راجل قالها لي من قبل. بعد ضربوني على [...] ,ضحكو علي وراحوا. دمي جمد . ما قدرت ندير والو, ما عرفتهمش, خفت ورجعت نجري للدار.

الباحث: خبرت اهلك؟

كنزة : لا,كيفاش ,مستحيل. قلت لماما راسي ضارني وعندي الحمى. ما رحتش نقرا هذيك الحشية.

مقتطـــــف 6 : فاطمـــــــة,19 سنـــة ,منطقــة حضريـــة, معسكـــــــر

فاطمة **:** صح, وحد النهار, كنت نمشي في حالي كنت رايحة لدار ما كنت لابسة حتى حاجة فاضحة. وحد الراجل راكب bicyclette جا مورايا و جبد لي شعري وقالي كلام منقدرش نقوله !. كي درت نواجهه صبته ولد عمي.

الباحث: أه, صح؟

فاطمة **:** ايه صح هو ما عرفنيش, كنت مبدلة style تاع شعري.

الباحث: شدرت كشفتيه, كيفاه حسيتي؟

فاطمة: قعدت ساكتة, مشكلة كبيرة ذاك النهار, قريب قتلني.راني دايما في خلاف معاه, دايما ينقد لبستي و يشوفني انا الغالطة, وان ماتعجبنيش هدرته. علا حسابه هو أنا قليلة تربية.

الباحث: خبرتي اهلك؟

فاطمة: خبرت ماما, بصح جات معاه. هي دايما كانت تقول :"كول ما يعجبك ولبس ما يعجب الناس". أنا قلتلها :"راكي تشوفي كيفاش نلبس" وإذا بدلت style شعري ماشي معنتها أنا سيئة..ماشي كلشي بالمظاهر و déjà راني شفتهم في La Télé قالو على التحرش الجنسي ماشي اللبسة هي السبة.

مقتطـــــف 7 : رانـــــــيا,18 سنـــة ,منطقــة حضريـــة, تيـــــــــارت

رانيا **:** أنا البنت الوحيدة في عائلتي. بابا توفى وفي سني خمس سنين, وأمي امرأة عادية قاعدة في الدار. تخدم باش تعاون روحها, علا بالك, الدخل ما يكفيناش.

الباحث: إيه؟

رانيا **:** أمي توصيني باش ندي الطريق الطويلة باش نجنب المعاكسات. لو نتأخر نصف ساعة تتقلق. هي دايما تقول "كون ديري غلطة لوم روحي".

الباحث: طيب؟

رانيا **:** كان عندي خمس عشر عام كي بدات أول مرة. كنت في lycée, نمشي دايما من الدار لل lycée. وحد النهار, بدلت طريقي حولت نفوت من طريق قصيرة في centre تاع البلاد. راجل جا مورايا وقالي نرفدلك كرتابك .ماهتميتش بشا قالي و ما خبرتش ماما. نهار آخر, حبسني كي كنت رايحة لدار وسقساني :"عندك صاحبك ؟" ومن بعد قالي :" راكي عاجبتني وأعطاني دراهم و بغى يلمس اماكن خاصة.

الباحث: شعملت؟

رانيا **:** رحت نبكي لدار.لمت روحي, كانت الغلطة تاعي.كل مرة نفكر فيها نحس بالاشمئزاز....ونقول ياريت مبدلتش الطريق.

مقتطـــــف 8 : سمـــــــاح,15 سنـــة ,منطقــة حضريـــة,معسكـــــر

سماح: كان عندي 12عام مين تبعوني. علا بالي لي يسمع يقول صغيرة, بصح أنا كنت نبان بالغة بزاف في سن 12. المهم كنت رايحة لدار وحدي مين وحد الشاشرة بين 17/16 عام كانوا يدوروا في park. كي جيت فايتة حداهم, واحد منهم عيط علي :"راني باغي نهدر معاك, رواحي هنا. يا العود راني نهدر معاك ". تم انا هربت منهم. بصح هما تبعوني في الطريق وقالولي :"علابالنا وين تسكني ورانا جاييين نطبطبوا عليكم ونخبروا باباك وخوك".

الباحث: همالا هربت عليهم تاني؟

سماح:المشكلة بابا شافني وهما يعاكسوا فيا. مجاش معايا. كي وريتله هدوك الشاشرة. قالي طلعي لدار وسبني. واه واه سبني قدامهم. عذبني ضربني قريب مقتلني :"جبد خدمي وبغا يضربني بيه"وحتى عماتي جاو معاه, وبداو يسقسوا 'انت علاه راكي تخرجي صدرك راه كبير ؟' قالولي : حشمتينا ,بهدلتي روحك,وفضحتي بابالك.

مقتطـــــف 9 : منـــــــال , 20سنـــة ,منطقــة حضريـــة,وهـــــــران

منال **:** كنت تقريبا في التاسع عشر كي صراتلي هذا القصة, ذروك راني في العشرين.كل مرة نبكي كي نفكر فيها وخاصني نحكيها لكاش واحد.

الباحث: إيه, راني نسمع لك؟

منال **:** شوفي أنا مانيش قاع شابة راكي تشوفي[...] عندي بشرة كحلة ,ندير lunettes ونحزم شعري بطريقة عادية جدا. دايما نلبس jeans و T-shirt.تحرشو بي مرتين, مرة في الطريق ومرة في park. أولا في الطريق, بعض الشباب تعرضولي و طلبو numero telephone تاعي ومن بعد طلبوا حاجات سيئة [...] انا مانيش من هذاك النوع[...]

الباحث: ok؟

منال: في park كنت نستنى في صحبتي حتى تجي ونقطعو الطريق. شبان آخرين قالولي حاجة. محطيتلهمش البال ماعندي حتى فكرة شقالو. بدون أي تحذير جاو عندي وقالولي :"علا بالك تولي بزاف شابة بلا حوايج [...]وحاجات اخرى سيئة"

الباحث: كانت اي حاجة درتيها؟

منال: ما كان حتى حاجة نديروها ضد التحرش . بديت نعيط للناس لشافوني, ولا واحد تحرك. في بالهم أنا كاشما درت.مازال لحد الآن نتقلق و كي نخمم شحال كنت محقورة وعلاه سكت تغيضني.

مقتطـــــف 10 : ليلـــــــى , 17سنـــــة ,منطقــة حضريـــــة,تيـــــــارت

ليلى: عادة صديقاتي وأنا نحاولوا الابتعاد بأسرع ما نستطيع عن هذوك الزعران وكلماتهم: أنت قطة شابة، عطيني رقم هاتفك، خلينا نفعل شيئا الليلة، وعينيك شابين ...

الباحث: أنت كيفاش شوفيهم؟

ليلى: ماما قراتني، بابا، خاوتي وحتى l'école باش نحشم لأنني فتاة، وحتى منهدرش على هذه الأمور :إذا كاش واحد يدير حاجة، نشوف في الارض ونمشي للقدام. هذا علاه ممكن نقول مطقش ندافع على روحي. من قبل كنت نخاف, بصح ذروك ندافع على نفسي وعلى الشيرات في الطريق. أنا ما درتش غلطة ، هما غلطوا والقانون لازم يعاقبهم، و كما تعرفوا القانون ميتطبقش. الناس اللي يشوفوا ما يقولوا والو. مايردوش و ما يحاولوش يحموك. بالعكس، يسقسوك: "شتكاين؟" وخطراتش كتروح la police باش تشتكي ، الموضوع يبانلهم حاجة صغيرة ما تستهلش مقارنة المشاكل اللي تحدث في مجتمعنا.وبلاكl'officier يقولك علاه تخرجي في هذا الوقت, وعلاه ماتخرجيش مع راجل ين علا بالك مكاش الامان , روحي لداركم الله يهديك .

مقتطـــــف 11 : صابرينـــــة , 19سنـــــة ,منطقــة حضريـــــة ,تيـــــارت

صابرينة : اه بغيت نقول انا دايما نخرج متحجبة. اشهر فاتو, وحد الراجل في الثلاثين ركب حدايا فـbus . كل ماكان bus يبغي يحبس ولا يدور...يبدا يتمايل....بانتلي normal كنا راكبين كيما السردين وماكانش بعيد علي بزاف, بلاك صدفة.

الباحث : إيه؟

صابرينة: ما كملتش هنا. بعد دقايق حط ذراعو علي وأعطاني numéro de téléphone. عرفت بلي هذا الشي anormal وكان لازم ندير حاجة. كنت inconfortable, كي قرب مني شديت épingle وثقبته في ذراعه. قلتله :"المرة الجاية نعيط لكامل الناس فـbus.

الباحث : كيفاه تصرف؟

صابرينة: نزل بسرعة عند arrêt.

مقتطـــــف 12 : حنـــــان , 19سنـــــة ,منطقــة حضريـــــة, شلـــــف

حنان : كن تقريبا في الثمانية عشر,واحد النهار كنت رايحة لدار. راجل يكون في الخمسينيات قالي :" حبة,عينيك شابين".رديت عليه :"ما يسمونيش حبة بلاك تكون عندك بنت كبيرة علي", و سقسيته :"كيفاه تحس لو كان بنتك ولا أختك وعاكسوهم جماعة هكا".

الباحث : طلب السماح؟

حنان : ما حارش قاع, طرطق بالضحك وقالي:بسسست ضحكي يا الحلوة. من بعد شفت فيه شوفة anormal وقلتله : "ما تبستليش ما نيش كلب ,منبغيش هذا الهدرة ذوك نخبر بابا".قالي ماضحكينيش. حسب بلي ماغاديش نعيطلوا.

الباحث :وعيطيله؟

حنان :واه وهو جا bien sur.بصح هذاك الرجل dommage هرب..بابا دايما يقولي كي يصرالك هاكا عيطيلي ولا عيطي la police

مقتطـــــف 13 : جمـــيلة , 19سنـــــة ,منطقــة حضريـــــة, غلـــــيزان

جميلة: بسباب واش رانا نعيشوا انا نحاول نتفادى بعض البلايص, منتاخرش برا , نحاول من bouger بزاف, ونلبس لبسة مليحة.

الباحث: أنت كيما تلبسيش لبسة فاضحة, مكاش إزعاج؟

جميلة: باينة ماشي قاع ذيك الدرجة. انا دايما نديbus كي نروح ونجي للجامعة.وحد النهارانا وصحبتي بغينا ندو taxi منla gare. حنا معلباناش, وحد الراجل صورني من الخلفي تليفونه. في هذيك الدقيقة تنارفيت.رحتلو directement, وقلتله شفتك شا كنت الدير,شفت flash ,شفتك كي صورتني و هذا تحرش جنسي وذوك تباصي.

الباحث:شرد عليك؟

جميلة: قالي مدرت والو راكي تتبلاي علي كنت لاهي في تليفوني وماصورت حتى فوتو. من بعد ورالي التليفون مكان والو بصح راني متاكدة محاها. فالتالي قالي: « كي دايرا أصلا انتيا ,شوفي روحك فالمرايا » .

Appendix (D) : Debriefing Letter

Debriefing Letter

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey. In it, you will be asked a range of questions on how you perceive public sexual harassment and also about your experience of its types if committed against you. The purpose of this questionnaire is to examine the several ways in which the understanding of public sexual harassment is both discursively gendered in the name of the so-called honourable cultures and the social gender norms. This information is important, so please answer all questions as honestly as you can. To ensure that your answers remain anonymous, please do not put your name or signature on this questionnaire. The answers you give will be kept confidential and no one will know what you have written. The only people who will see your answers are the researchers, who will not know which questionnaire belongs to which person.

Appendix (E) : Questionnaire

Questionnaire

"We are currently working on discourse of public sexual harassment, it would be grateful if you answer the following questions":

Section One: The Respondents' Characteristics

Gender: Female ☐ Male ☐

Section Two: Perceptions of Public Sexual Harassment

1. What do you understand by 'Public Sexual harassment'?

- ☐ A natural phenomenon girls have been accustomed to because of visiting men's places
- ☐ Any simple acts used to get women's attention in public space
- ☐ Any unwanted words or behaviours that make a woman uncomfortable
- ☐ Exposure to any form of violence by men

Other (please specify) _____

2. Do you think Public Sexual Harassment is a matter of concern?

- ○ Not at all, it is a trivial matter and not a serious problem
- ○ Yes, it is disturbing

Other (please specify) _____

Section Three: Types of Public Sexual Harassment

1. Which of these behaviours can be labeled as Public Sexual Harassment?

- ☐ Staring/ Leering
- ☐ Winking
- ☐ Following-up/ Chasing
- ☐ Whistling/Kissing sound/ demanding phone number/ Facebook account
- ☐ Sexual interactions about appearance / body
- ☐ Touching

Other (please specify) _____

2. Are incidents of 'Public Sexual Harassment' prevalent in your city?

- Yes, the incidents are very rampant
- Yes, there are a few incidents
- Not really, the incidents are very rare
- Not at all, my city is safe

Other (please specify)

3. Where in your city are acts of Public Sexual Harassment more prevalent?

- Generally, in Public Transport
- Generally, on a road or street
- Generally, in crowded markets
- Almost, in every public space
- Not prevalent in my city

Other (please specify)

Section Four: Causes of Public Sexual Harassment

1. When a girl goes out to a public space, I think

- She never feels secure regardless of her clothes and time.
- She feels secure irrespective of her clothes and time.
- She always feels secure/safe as long as her clothes and time are appropriate.

Other (please specify)

2. In your opinion, some men tease/harass women, because

- They think it is fun
- They believe it is 'masculinity'
- They know they will not be opposed or punished
- Because of the cultural dominance of men over women
- They think women do enjoy it.

Other (please specify)

3. At a broader level, why do incidents of Public Sexual Harassment occur in society?

- Police are ineffective in ensuring safe environment.
- No severe punishment to deter the perpetrators
- Public Apathy - The victim expects no help from the surrounding people.

- [ ] Male mentality is wrong for females
- [ ] Girls dress improperly
- [ ] Girls bring trouble for themselves by going to "wrong places" in "wrong times"
- [ ] It is a natural phenomenon - men are attracted to women

Other (please specify) _____

Section Five: Impacts of Public sexual harassment

1. How can an incident of Public Sexual Harassment make girls feel?

- ○ Enjoy it.
- ○ They do not feel anything; it is a very common issue.
- ○ They feel bad, but learned to live with
- ○ They feel bad, but they do not know what to do
- ○ They feel bad, and they want to do something to face the issue.
- ○ They feel bad, and they often confront such an incident

Other (please specify) _____

إستما رة بحث علمي

في إطار بحث علمي ميداني لإنجاز أطروحة دكتوراه، يتناول"**موضوع التحرش الجنسي في الفضاء العام"** ، نضع بين أيديكم هذه الاستمارة التي نرجو منكم الإجابة عنها بكل صدق و موضوعية مع العلم أن معلوماتها تبقى سرية و لن تستخدم إلا لأغراض علمية بحتة، و شكرا على تعاونكم معنا.

.تعليمة: لملأ الفراغات ضع علامة (x) في الخانة المناسبة.

المحور الأول : البيانات الشخصية

الجنس: **ذكر** ☐ **أنثى** ☐

المحور الثاني: تصورات عن التحرش الجنسي في الفضاء العام

1.ما الذي تفهمه عن "التحرش الجنسي في الشارع"؟

أ. ظاهرة طبيعية تعودت عليها الفتيات بسبب زيارة الأماكن الخاصة بالرجال ☐
ب. أي وسيلة تستخدم للحصول على اهتمام المرأة في الفضاء العام ☐
ت. أي صيغة من الكلمات أو سلوك غير مرغوب فيه يجعل المرأة غير مرتاحة ☐
ث. التعرض لأي شكل من أشكال العنف من طرف الرجال ☐
-غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد).....

2. هل تعتقد أن التحرش الجنسي أمر مقلق؟

أ. ليس على الإطلاق، بل هو مسألة تافهة وغير خطيرة ☐
ب. نعم، الأمر مقلق ☐

المحور الثالث: أنواع التحرش الجنسي في الشارع

1. أي من هذه السلوكيات ممكن يطلق عليها مصطلح التحرش الجنسي ؟

أ. تحديق ☐
ب. غمز ☐
ت. متابعة / مطاردة ☐
ث. صفير / أغنية / طلب رقم الهاتف/حساب الفايسبوك ☐
ج. معاكسات جنسية حول المظهر / الجسم ☐
ح. لمس ☐
-غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد).....

2. هل حوادث "التحرش الجنسي في الشارع" سائدة في مدينتك؟

أ. نعم، الحوادث متفشية جدا ☐
ب. نعم، هناك عدد قليل من الحوادث ☐
ت. الحوادث نادرة جدا ☐
ث. ليس على الإطلاق، مدينتي آمنة ☐
- غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد).....

3. أين في مدينتك هي أعمال التحرش الجنسي أكثر انتشارا؟

أ. عموما، في النقل العام ☐
ب. عموما، على الطريق أو الشارع ☐

ت. عموما، في الأسواق المزدحمة
ث. تقريبا، في كل الأماكن العامة
ج. ليس سائدا في مدينتي
-غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد).....

المحور الرابع: أسباب التحرش الجنسي في الشارع

1. عندما تخرج الفتاة إلى الفضاء العام، أعتقد :
أ. إنها **لا** تشعر بالأمان بغض النظر عن ملابسها والوقت
ب. تشعر بالأمان طالما أن ملابسها وأوقاتها مناسبة
ت. **دائما** تشعر بالأمان بغض النظر عن ملابسها ووقتها
- أسباب أخرى (يرجى التحديد).....

2. برأيك، بعض الرجال يضايق الفتيات، لأنهم

أ. يعتقدون أنها متعة
ب. يعتقدون أنها 'رجولة'
ت. يعرفون أنهم لن يعارضوا أو يعاقبوا
ث. بسبب الهيمنة الثقافية للرجال على النساء
ج. الفتيات يستمتعن بذلك
-غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد).....

3. على نطاق أوسع، لماذا تحدث حوادث التحرش الجنسي في المجتمع؟
أ. الشرطة غير فعالة في ضمان بيئة آمنة
ب. لا عقاب صارم لردع الجناة
ت. اللامبالاة العامة / لا يتوقع أي مساعدة من الناس المحيطة
ث. عقلية خاطئة للذكور عن الإناث
ج. لباس الفتيات غير لائق
ح. الفتيات تجلب المتاعب لأنفسهن من خلال الذهاب إلى "أماكن خاطئة" في "الأوقات الخاطئة"
خ. إنها ظاهرة طبيعية - ينجذب الرجال إلى النساء
-غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد).....

المحور الخامس: أثار التحرش الجنسي في الشارع

1. كيف يمكن لحادث من المضايقات الجنسية يجعل الفتيات تشعر؟
أ. الاستمتاع به
ب. لا يشعرن بأي شيء. إنها مسألة شائعة جدا
ت. الشعور بالسوء، ولكن تعلمن التعايش معه
ث. شعور سيئ، ولكن لا يعرفن كيف يتصرفن
ج. الشعور بالسوء، وبردن أن يفعلن شيئا لمواجهة هذه القضية
ح. الشعور بالسوء، وكثيرا ما يواجهن هذا الحادث
- أثار أخرى (يرجى التحديد).....

Abstract

This doctoral research analyses Algerian sexually harassed teenage girls' narratives of personal experiences focusing on how linguistic resources are used to index their identities. More precisely, this thesis aims at examining the several ways in which the understanding of public sexual harassment is both discursively gendered in the name of the so-called honourable cultures and the social gender norms deeply rooted in the cultural epistemology. Hence, we attempt to devote the first two chapters to the major concepts of the study, while the last two chapters are purposefully designed for the methodological framework and the discussion of the findings. On this basis, the researcher seeks to test the validity of what were hypothesized by including a variety of well- known methodological frameworks. Besides to observing the research site, interviewing the participants and distributing questionnaires, we had to draw on resources from critical discourse analysis and feminist approaches which take the constitutive nature of discourse as its focus. The research findings indicate that sexual harassment is discursively gendered in its practice, depictions and blaming.

Key words: CDA, Gender Identities, Violence and Narratives.

Résumé

La violence faite aux femmes est omniprésente aussi bien dans la sphère privée que publique. La violence qui occupe mon contribution est liée à l'harcèlement sexuel en Algérie. Les femmes victimes de cette violence sont condamnées au silence. Pour combattre cette réalité amère il faut que les femmes sortent de leur situation de victime et prennent la parole pour dénoncer le fait. Cette thèse analyse les récits d'expériences personnelles d'adolescentes algériennes harcelées sexuellement, en mettant l'accent sur la façon dont les ressources linguistiques sont utilisées pour indexer leurs identités. Par conséquent, nous essayons de consacrer les deux premiers chapitres aux concepts majeurs de l'étude, tandis que les derniers chapitres sont délibérément conçus pour le cadre méthodologique et la discussion des résultats. Sur cette base, le chercheur cherche à tester la validité de ce qui a été supposé en incluant une variété de cadres méthodologiques bien connus. En plus d'observer le site de recherche, d'interviewer les participants et de distribuer des questionnaires, nous avons dû rassembler les principes de l'analyse critique du discours avec les critères de l'approche féministe qui s'intéressent au caractère constitutif de discours. Les résultats de la recherche indiquent que l'harcèlement sexuel est sexuellement discuté dans sa pratique, ses représentations et ses reproches.

Mots clés : Analyse critique de discours, Identités de Genre, Violence et Récits.

ملخـــــص

هذه الأطروحة تهدف إلى دراسة التجارب الشخصية لمراهقات جزائريات تعرضن للتحرش الجنسي والتي تركز على كيفية استخدام الموارد اللغوية لترجمة هوياتهن. الغرض الرئيسي منها هو أنها أكثر بكثير من مجرد عمل أكاديمي على العنف الجنسي ضد المراهقات، ولكن أيضا لهم ومعهم. وبصورة أدق، فإن هذا البحث يهدف إلى دراسة الطرق العديدة التي يكون فيها فهم التحرش الجنسي مرتبطا بما يسمى بالثقافات والمعايير الاجتماعية المتأصلة بعمق في نظريات دراسة النوع. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، فيما يتعلق بالفتيات اللواتي لم يترددن في سرد تجاربهن، فقد اخذنا على عاتقنا التحقيق في كيفية إلقاء اللوم عليهن وإجبارهم على قبول الوضع وعدم إظهار أي علامة رفض وتحرر. ومن هنا، نحاول تكريس الفصلين الأولين للمفاهيم الرئيسية للدراسة، في حين أن الفصلين الأخيرين مصممين بشكل مقصود للإطار المنهجي ومناقشة النتائج. وعلى هذا الأساس، يسعى الباحث إلى اختبار صحة ما تم افتراضه من خلال تضمين مجموعة متنوعة من الأطر المنهجية المعروفة. إلى جانب مراقبة الموقع البحثي، وإجراء المقابلات مع المشاركين وتوزيع الاستبيانات، كان علينا أن نجمع معا مبادئ تحليل الخطاب النقدي والعمل الأساسي لدراسات المرأة.

الكلمات الدالة: تحليل الخطاب النقدي، **الهويـــــة، العنف والخطاب السردي.**